

AFGHANISTAN 2014 THE DECISION POINT

Edited by

Mark S. Smith

James H. Brown

Maxwell A. Meier

Afghanistan-2014: *The Decision Point*

Compiled and edited by

Dr Maria Sultan
Aamir Hashmi
Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi

Publication

by

South Asian Strategic Stability
Institute (SASSI) University
&
National Defence University (NDU).
Islamabad

September, 2013

© 2013 South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University, and
National Defense University (NDU), Islamabad.

ISBN: 978-969-9921

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the Pakistan Copyright Rules, 1967, without the prior permission of the publisher.

Produced by:
SASSI University and NDU

Phone (SASSI): +92 51 2290917
Fax (SASSI): +92 51 2103479
E-Mail: sassi.uk@gmail.com
Web: www.sassi.org

Phone (NDU): +92 51 8003125272
Fax (NDU): +92 51 9260663
E-Mail: ddnmhc@ndu.edu.pk
Web: www.ndu.edu.pk

Editors
Dr Maria Sultan
Aamir Hashmi
Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi

Layout: Faheemullah Khattak
Design: Asad M. Naeem
Graphics: Salman Mauvia

Coordinators: Beenesh Ansari, Shama Kazmi,
Annum Naveed & Mazhar Bashir

*Dedicated to:
Pakistan's unsung heroes
and the victims of terrorism*

Editors

Dr Maria Sultan is the Chairperson and the Director General of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is the founding co-director of the South Asian Strategic Stability Unit at the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (BDRC), (University of Bradford). She also served as Deputy Director South Asian Strategic Stability Unit at (BDRC). Dr Sultan is a specialist in South Asian nuclear arms control and disarmament issues, weapon systems development and strategic stability. She has published widely in academic journals, news dailies and books.

Earlier, Dr Sultan worked as an assistant editor in the influential English daily 'The Muslim'. She is a visiting faculty member at the National Defense University (NDU), Pakistan Foreign Service Academy, Pakistan Naval War College, the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and the Command and Staff College Quetta. She is an advisor to the Ministry of Defence on strategic and military affairs.

Colonel Aamir Hashmi is presently working as Director, Research and Publications, Deputy Director, Libraries, ISSRA, NDU. He is also the editor of the annual research journal, 'NDU Journal'. He has also served in ISPR as an Editor of the magazines, The Press Review and Military Bulletin from 2005 to 2007, and

he is also an author of two books in poetry i.e. 'Zara Si Roshni Chahe' in Urdu and 'Eclipse of the Heart' in English. He is a Masters in English, and has also earned a diploma in English language from Defence Language Institute, Texas, USA, as well as a basic course in Public Affairs from Defence Information School, Fort Meade, Washington. At present, Colonel Hashmi is registered for an M.Phil in international relations at the NDU.

Lieutenant Colonel Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi is, at present, serving as a **Deputy Director**, National and Military History Cell, NDU. He is also the editor of the NDU's bi-annual research publication, 'ISSRA Papers'. He has M.Phil in Government and Public Policy to his credit. He is currently enrolled in the Ph.D programme at the NDU. His areas of interest include comparative study of religions, study of radicalization and de-radicalization in societies, history, particularly, military history and public policy analysis.

Contents

The Editors	i
Foreword	viii
The Editors' Note	x
Preface	ivx
Pakistan - The Afghan Question and Priorities	1
<i>Maria Sultan, Asra Hassan, Aamir Hashmi, & Elishma Noel Khokhar</i>	
Challenges of Transition in Afghanistan: Quest for Peace and Stability	69
<i>Arif Kamal & Beenish Sultan</i>	
Political Stability of Afghanistan: A Pre-requisite for Stability of Pakistan	89
<i>Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi</i>	
Pakistan and the Afghan End-game	129
<i>Tahir Nazir & Shumaila Ishaque</i>	
Afghan National Security Force: A Catch-22	167
<i>Khurshid Khan & Afifa Kiran</i>	
Durand Line: A Historical Perspective	209
<i>Lutfur Rehman</i>	
Swat and FATA Operations	233
<i>Sara Azam, Muhammad Haroon & Beenesh Ansari</i>	
Pakistan's Role in Building Connectivity for Regional Integration: Turning Dreams into Reality	255
<i>Masroor Ahmad & Mahroona Hussain Syed</i>	

Combating Terrorism: The Battle Fought by Pakistan	277
<i>Ali Qaswar Khaleeq & Ayesha Zaryab</i>	
A Decade of Drones' Strikes	303
<i>Mateah Aqeel & Sajjad Haider</i>	
Improvised Explosive Devices: The Impending Threats	329
<i>Ameer Abdullah Khan & Ghulam Muhammad Qaisrani</i>	
Afterword	353
Summary	357
Contributors	363
List of Abbreviations	371
Annexure-I: Statistics about Fatalities	375-406
Annexure-II: Statistics about Drones	407-429
Maps	430-442

Foreword

Afghanistan's political instability and the security situation, ridden with continued violence and bloodshed for the last three and half decades, have impacted on all aspects of life in Pakistan, more than any other country in the world. The losses, in terms of men, material and in psychological dimensions of both the nations, are beyond estimation. Pakistan and Afghanistan share over 2500 kms long border, which binds them in a perennial and inalienable relationship on the one hand and poses a serious challenge of effective border management on the other. Any plans or structures formed for security of Afghanistan, how nobly intended they may be, would not work, unless its immediate neighbors, particularly Pakistan, are taken on board to evolve joint security and developmental mechanisms.

It is, therefore, the call of the time that intellectuals, academicians and journalists of both the countries should embark upon serious research effort, to deeply analyse the Afghan security quagmire, politico-strategic and socio-economic challenges faced by both the nations, with a view to finding out ways and means to put an end to violence, extremism and socio-economic deprivations of their people.

It gives me immense satisfaction that a joint team of scholars from National Defence University (NDU) and South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University have made an endeavour, in the shape of the book in hand 'Afghanistan-2014: The Decision Point', to set the pace for such a serious research on Afghan imbroglio. The need for collection of primary data on

war-ravaged Afghanistan, spreading over last three and half decades, can hardly be denied. While, I commend the efforts of Director General ISSRA, Major General Ziauddin Najam, and Dr Maria Sultan Chairperson and Director General South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University for undertaking this highly useful and timely endeavour, I urge upon them to continue with this journey in the days to come. I extend my deep appreciation and heart-felt felicitations to all the editors and writers, who contributed towards the publication of this book.

Lieutenant General Muhammad Javed Iqbal,
President NDU

Editors' Note

The situation in Afghanistan and its fallouts on the regional and global security have been the focus of intellectuals, think tanks, academicians and policy-makers all around the globe. The geo-strategic and socio-economic environment of Afghanistan remained characterized by a continued spade of violence and bloodshed, first; during Soviet-Afghan war, followed by a prolonged civil war and now for the last twelve years of an unending Global War on Terror (GWOT). Wars bring nothing to those nations and countries, upon which these are befallen, but sufferings and misery in all the fields of life. Afghan wars proved extremely devastating not only for the people of Afghanistan but also for their neighbours in Pakistan. GWOT, fought with the intent of winning peace for Afghanistan and the world at large, does not seem to have achieved its objective.

The stakes are too high for the regional and global players in the wake of NATO's planned drawdown in 2014. The question arises that once the NATO countries, with enormous resources and military might, fell short of their objectives to win peace in Afghanistan, how the nascent state of Afghanistan, which takes a new birth after each successive war, can be expected to meet the daunting challenges that it is confronted with. Similarly, how far the neighbouring state of Pakistan, which did not suffer in any way less than Afghanistan, could be pushed to win peace through military means, while the terrorists continue to receive an unabating flow of aid and arsenal from different corners of the world.

NATO's drawdown in 2014 is, therefore, seen by most of the analysts with mixed feelings. To some, it appears as a culmination of a long and horrific war, which may pave the way for Afghan people to architect their own destiny, whereas, to the others, it is likely to turn into another civil war. The people of Pakistan, being the direct victims of Afghan wars, are naturally worried about uncertain geo-political and socio-economic condition of Afghanistan, as it heavily impacts on their own lives. They want nothing but peace and stability in South Asian region, so that they may also taste the fruits of development and, in result thereof, betterment in their lives. This is the message that the book in hand is launched with.

The book 'Afghanistan-2014: The Decision Point' is a joint endeavour by the scholars of National Defence University (NDU) and a renowned Islamabad-based think tank South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. The culture of joint research ventures and projects is not very common in Pakistan. It needs not only commonality of objectives and shared visions but also a sense of earnestness to translate them into actions. The book in hand reflects the commitment of both the institutions in the pursuit of excellence.

The papers contributed to this book have gone through a rigorous process of data collection, cross-examination of facts and editing. Some of the writers are highly experienced and reputed individuals, whereas, a few are being ushered in this domain for the first time.

While the joint editorial board has put in a deliberate effort to ensure the quality of the papers and print, however, there is no claim of perfection in any way. All our endeavours are always subject to improvement and betterment. Nevertheless, the editors hope that this book will open up new avenues of thinking and research on Afghanistan situation and its effects on the neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan.

Preface

After almost three decades of the war in Afghanistan, first under the banner of the 'Afghan Jihad' and then as the war against terrorism, vast majority of Pakistanis have accepted the reality that stability of Afghanistan is a prerequisite for stability in Pakistan.

This is particularly true; as Pakistan suffered approximately 51,000 casualties, over 1,500 terrorism related events per year since 2001, 1,876 fatalities due to the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), 1.5 million refugees' influx from Afghanistan and approximately three million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), as the war in Afghanistan picked up pace and the transnational character of the threat made, terrorism a living reality for Pakistan. The economic losses over \$ 90 billion in the war has made the idea of economic recovery almost impossible for any popularly elected government in Pakistan.

Similarly, beyond the dilution recognition in the institutional capacity has further engraved the effects of the Afghan war and terrorism in Pakistan to a point, where the very rationale for Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy and commitment to the international alliance is questioned (by various stakeholders).

The counter terrorism policy in Pakistan is faced with enormous challenges. At this time, neither the rationale and objectives of global war on terror nor its socio-economic emphasis is making the policy on counter terrorism acceptable to all stakeholders.

This book is written at a time, when the US troops' withdrawal from Afghanistan is a year and half away.

It leaves us with multiple questions, which need to be analyzed, in order to suggest, a set of policy guidelines for a sustainable peace process in the region, which is acceptable to the Afghans, Pakistan and the United States.

It is said, “a lion must not be kept, if it cannot be fed.” That is the reality of Afghanistan post 2014 and the economic costs of a more than a decade long war.

The effects of this war have brought into its fold and all those who have dared to enter the Afghan reality, including NATO, US, and Pakistan, with a stark reality squarely staring in their eyes that there are no winners in this war. Strategically, Afghanistan can never outlive its utility despite the fact that it is land locked, militarily unsustainable and politically ungovernable. It has and is likely to remain an arena of great power politics.

The war in Afghanistan is a case in point for military historians and strategists, as there are no winners at the end of this decade long war. The current Afghan war is not the first of its kind, battles have been fought on the Afghan soil, which have brought all interested to the region, to stake their claims; and like in the past all have but achieved only the relative success.

Unfortunately, the short-term gains have always replaced the long-term engagement with Afghanistan. This time however, the international community, along side the United States’ aims to correct this; as they have declared their respective strategic priorities in line with the long-term goals of engagement. The strategic partnership document signed between United States and Afghanistan reflects this commitment. If the United States is expected to win ‘the battle of hearts and minds’

as per their stated declarations vis-a-vis Afghanistan, and is committed to the long term economic assistance to Afghanistan, political stability post-2014 will be of critical importance

The absence of a victor or a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan todate has made it the most violent war theatres in the world. This complicates the policy choices for an exist strategy in Afghanistan and the way forward, including policy alternatives for the United States and its allies, as they plan for post-2014 drawdown.

The mosaic of choices and policy alternatives are likely to be shaped by the security situation in Afghanistan and the nature of change. This is likely to be further affected by the nature of the disengagement process, the vacuum created in the power corridors in Afghanistan and the over all battle picture emerging amongst the warring factions. The outcome will define both the role of the regional competitors, Afghan groupings and networks, international partners and the invisible players of the Afghan chessboard. The pace and the nature of the situation post 2014 will be determined by factors such as drug production, size of the Afghan economy, illicit trafficking of small arms, trans-border terrorist effects, IEDs, and the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take over from the outgoing NATO and US forces.

The combined ability of the Afghan government to survive and the ANSF to maintain peace in post 2014, will be the litmus test for a long-term engagement of the international community. Similarly, it will be equally essential that the Afghan economy transforms itself from a war economy; based on arms trade and drug trafficking,

to a market economy, based on legitimate trade. This must be supported by the transit trade and the energy corridor potential from south to Central Asia.

The absence of security, conflicting interests inside and outside Afghanistan and the growing lack of clarity of the Afghan peace process have but exacerbated the problem of terrorism in the region.

There exists a great deal of deliberate ambiguity and lack of clarity, which shouts for a peace process. It is also not clear that how long the US will be able to keep Pakistan on board with the peace process. Likewise Pakistan and US will be able to keep the Afghans onboard, moreover, this counter terror endeavor also ties in neatly with the efforts to explain an increasingly skeptical American public and Congress towards the goals, aims and objectives of continuing the war in Afghanistan.

The US presence in the region is both a source of stability and instability, not only for Afghanistan but also for the region. 2014 will see the exit of the US combat forces from Afghanistan. This will be '*The Decision Point*' for the region, the Afghans and the international community. For their choices will determine, whether Afghanistan rises from the ashes of war like the legendary Pheonix or it relapses into never ending chaos.

This volume takes the next vital step in providing a Pakistani perspective with regard to the multiple challenges and opportunities offered by the peculiar set of circumstances in the region.

The hopes and the expectations for the peace in the region have to be balanced with the lessons learnt.

The mistrust among all stakeholders is the stumbling block, which needs to be removed, if the region is to stand a chance for success. This is particularly true, if the evolving security situation in Afghanistan has to transform to reconciliation and supplement the on going peace-building efforts.

A book of this kind could have been written at any institute in Pakistan, but there is still no better place than SASSI and NDU to pursue research on such a strategically important subject. Despite the changes that have taken place in global politics and regionally over the past decade; SASSI has been contributing by virtue of diverse technical skills of its researcher team and policy experts to the national debate. We have greatly benefitted from SASSI's unique resource and intellect in writing this book. Every member of SASSI, to include the researchers, administrative staff, the composers, the editorial experts deserves a big round of applause for their efforts in writing this book in a profound and organized manner. Several individuals took time to read parts of or all of the manuscript, offering valuable comments, which helped in improving the content considerably. Most of all, I would like to thank my co-editors for their untiring support and diligence throughout the course of producing this book.

The editors and contributors have tried to summarize the essential aspects in short articles, with a purpose to give a textured picture of Pakistan's contribution to the decade long war in Afghanistan and how it has impacted on Pakistan.

The editors would like to thank all contributors for their relentless work and for completing the book

in a very short time frame. Particular thanks to the silent workers of SASSI, namely: Annum Naveed, Faheemullah Khattak, Beenesh Ansari, Mazhar Bashir, Shama Kazmi, Shahzad Aftab, Asad M. Naeem, Salman Mauvia, and Khurram Shazad and Mohsin Raza of the NDU.

Special thanks to Professor Awais Rauf, General Ziauddin Najam and Brig Amir Yaqub and their team at the NDU for their support and diligent work in coordinating, editing and achieving the goals of producing the final version. We would also like to thank Sheikh Waqas Akram for providing insight and input on counter terrorism strategy.

The editors would also like to thank the National Defense University (NDU) and the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University for their support to the project and making valuable resource available. The NDU President and SASSI Chairperson office deserve special thanks for their instant and positive response to the idea, for encouragement, direction and finally provision of the necessary funds.

Above all, we all thank Almighty Allah, the Omniscient and the most Knowledgeable, for giving us the courage, virility and strength to accomplish this arduous task.

Dr Maria Sultan
Chairperson
South Asian Strategic Stability
Institute (SASSI) University

Pakistan - The Afghan Question and Priorities*

*Maria Sultan, Asra Hassan, Amir Hashmi,
& Elishma Noel Khokhar¹*

Abstract

Burnt Pakistan has emerged from the thirteen years long war against terrorism as a more resilient state determined to achieve its objectives. The survival of the State of Pakistan is linked to eliminating the threats, emerging from the Afghan imbroglio. It is therefore, important that Afghanistan is stable and peaceful, as it is a pre-requisite for peace and stability in Pakistan.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Dr Maria Sultan is the Chairperson and Director General of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University.

Asra Hassan is a Research Fellow at the South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University, her area of interest is combating terrorism and core mission, objectives in Afghanistan.

Colonel Amir Hashmi is working as a Director, Research and Publications, Deputy Director Libraries, ISSRA, (NDU).

Elishma Khokhar is a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University, her area of interest is 'terrorism and counter terrorism'.

Introduction

The 9/11 attacks and United States' decision to launch a war against terrorism, changed the landscape of stability in this region. The UNSC Resolution 1267 described the terms and conditions under which the war was to be fought against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. However, very rapidly the counter terrorism mandate expanded to counter insurgency, as the Bush administration decided to attack the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

The change in war objectives compounded the threat and problem in Afghanistan that ultimately brought the region at crossroads with the US, particularly the State of Pakistan, for which the choices laid were simple and straight "either you are with us or with them." Hence, what ensued was the complexity, confusion and arduous journey of the longest war in the contemporary times.

The region saw the worst spate of terrorism, international conflict and human loss. With a decade-long war, numerous military losses, civilian casualties, economic destruction and overwhelming use of force became the overriding paradigm of thinking in Afghanistan. This led to the reality of the day that Afghanistan has no winner.

The war in Afghanistan has always cast deep shadows on Pakistan. The geo-political and the geo-strategic importance of Pakistan is a double edged sword, on the one hand it ushers Pakistan to the center stage of the international political security architecture, and at the behest of great power politics; and on the other, it has

placed Pakistan at the crossroads of regional aspirations, proxy wars and unrealized potential of the great State of Pakistan. The symbiotic relationship of Pakistan with Afghanistan adds to this complexity. Afghanistan being landlocked, and strategically dependent on Pakistan for its mere survival, has shaped Pakistan's policy choices in an ever-changing political security landscape.

The security scenarios post 9/11 not only changed the South Asian priorities but also globally re-defined the nature of war.

Conventional forces were used against unconventional asymmetric threats in Afghanistan. The threats according to the US goals in Afghanistan, broadly were: prevent terror attacks against mainland US from Afghanistan; contain and prevent potential possible nuclear chemical and biological use of weapons by terrorists; prevent interstate rivalry and wars (India-Pakistan) to dominate the mission objectives in Afghanistan, contain and neutralize hostile elements within Afghanistan and Pakistan; neutralize threats with military use inside Pakistani territory (FATA included) and Afghanistan.

The mission objectives were primarily directed to contain and eliminate Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The war in Afghanistan started with a broad mission objective for the US, its allies NATO forces and ISAF. The decision to make Afghanistan the focus of the internationally directed efforts against terrorism created an imbalance with regard to the war objectives, force disparity and the end objectives of the military operations.

Immediately after the fall of the Taliban regime, the erstwhile *Mujahiddin* and the *Northern Alliance* became the new centre of power. The Afghan government was created with the support of US, Russia and anti Taliban factions. However, the emphasis on military strategy to counter terrorism resulted into enforcing the goal disparities and quickly became counter insurgency. The Afghan government was technically accepted by the Afghan people, but with limitations to their mass approval by the warring factions and the excluded ethnicities in the new power disposition in Afghanistan.

The limitations were not only at the public level but also were perceived at political, economic and security level. The past human rights record and corruption could not be set aside either by the Afghan, international partners or the local population.

Afghanistan became the centerpiece of the global war against terrorism. For Pakistan the focus on Afghanistan, as an international war effort, created multiple paradoxes. The decision to support the international coalition's war against terrorism created the first paradox, as it demanded a complete policy reversal by Pakistan vis-a-vis the Taliban.

At the public level, this policy reversal was not understood, as the region did not see the counter terrorism and counterinsurgency objectives as interchangeable or expandable. Resultantly, the policy change was seen as betrayal by the Taliban and its affiliates in Pakistan; and therein, began the first blow back of Afghan war; loss

of empathy in the masses for governments' policy to support the international coalition and to the emergence of global terrorism in Pakistan.

The military strategy in Afghanistan was accompanied with the shift in US policy. The policy change defined the existing inter-linkages of the development threat preception domestically and internationally, the available response options. This meant the emergence of Af-Pak policy, a new shift in US foreign policy for the re-configuration of the South Asian paradigm as Af-Pak.

The response options immediately after 20-day war was defined by these policy parameters and based on the emergence of the Af-Pak policy of the US. This also meant the re-orientation of the US policy choices and US policy framework for the region.

Pakistan quickly supported the US operations in the early phase of war, both by carrying out joint intelligence operations in Pakistan, urban areas against Al-Qaeda operatives, and against their affiliates in the (FATA) of Pakistan. The operations were seen as the hallmark of joint US-Pakistan collaboration against terrorism. However, at the local level the Damadola killings in FATA, which resulted in the deaths of more than forty innocent children. These operations were done in close support of the US special operations force and with the Pakistani military support. The operation Enduring Freedom, which was carried out on the Pakistani side in the early phase of the war and bogged up operations such as those carried out in Angoor Adda set the region

on fire. At the strategic level these two decisions set Pakistan-US relations on collision course; initially, these were appreciated, but they tied Pakistan to military goals and success in Afghanistan and the determination of Pakistan's relevance through the Af-Pak policy prism.

The shift in the US policy towards Af-Pak had serious repercussions for Pakistan's security calculus. The Af-Pak policy framework became a challenge. Before 9/11, Pakistan saw the regional security threat as essentially South Asian (India-Pakistan) and Central Asia/Afghanistan threat was perceived as limited.

On the India-Pakistan front, the first year of Pakistan's engagement saw the year long Indian military build-up on the eastern front from 2001-2002. This build-up, nonetheless, did not see any tangible support for Pakistan either from the US or NATO. Pakistan failed to draw strategic mileage from its commitment to the war against terrorism, rather faced a two front threat, emerging for the first time.

The threat for Pakistan rapidly expanded from a state centric Indian conventional threat at the eastern borders to a trans-border asymmetric threat from the western front. This altered the dynamics of internal and external security for Pakistan.

The enhanced international security focus on Afghanistan had resulted into a push internationally to reduce Pakistan's security concerns within the 'Af-Pak' framework in contrast to the regional realities of the India-Pakistan confrontation and adverse relationship.

This relationship unfortunately meant two things for Pakistan; firstly, primacy of the Afghan conflict and its impact on Pakistan's security, secondly, push for re-adjusting Pakistan's security concerns vis-à-vis India in favour of the Afghan war.

The global consensus towards fighting terrorism and centrality of the Af-Pak policy had yet another immediate fallout. Afghanistan became the direct focus of international security efforts against terror and Pakistan became the victim of benign neglect.

This focus and quick transition from an intensive military assault campaign; with widespread aerial bombing, spiced with a quick hand over to the Afghan government for political stability, upheld by warlords ushered an era of an unholy alliance of the United States with the Afghan government. The 1990's adversaries were now the future of Afghan political stability; this made peace in Afghanistan a distant dream. It created further confusion in the war objectives of the US, the international alliance and the objectives of the Afghan government.

The UNSC Resolution 1267 had outlined the actors for use of force in Afghanistan as ISAF (supported by NATO and US forces), but the fact remained obvious, the war in Afghanistan was to be led by the United States.

This combined the war objectives as both counter terrorism and counter insurgency, though each was seen as natural corollary to the other. This focus provided

more strategic importance to the Afghan theatre, the war against terrorism with lesser clarity of force goals on ground. The NATO and ISAF partners could not develop a strategic synergy with regard to the nature, scope and outcome of the various military operations in Afghanistan; different partners, with different take on mission objectives and political outcomes with no clue of the future in hand.

For Pakistan, the mix was disastrous, as it increased global and regional security responsibilities for the State of Pakistan, at the expense of the existing regional order and priorities for Islamabad. The imbalance among the declared war objectives of counter terrorism were not equally commensurating with the goals of state building, which was to be led by the Afghan government. In fact, it meant a guarantee for failure and absence of structural success for Afghanistan.

The only clarity of action remained in the centrality of the use of force in Afghanistan, which was led by the US and NATO forces, almost all battles were won and militarily success was achieved, to a certain extent, but it failed to bring about a smooth transition towards peace.

The emphasis on military strategy to counter terrorism resulted into force goal disparities and final outcome. Afghanistan government was accepted with limitations, such as political, economic and security; while the dominance of military strategy and absence of consensus on thrust of action created two kinds of problems. First, the military force lacked legitimacy

in Afghanistan as the Afghanistan government failed to gain legitimacy. The result was that despite the fact that US and NATO won most, if not all, military battles on ground, the effect could not translate into consolidation of victories or into a strategic success. Second, the infighting on ground and the lack of clarity in the mission goals amongst the NATO and ISAF member countries meant that after the fall of Kabul, Kandahaar did not become the target of next military assault, but stopped short at Mazar Shariff. This delayed action facilitated the consolidation of the Taliban led insurgency in Afghanistan.

The strategic inertia amongst the international military operators and strategic reassertion and rejuvenation of the Taliban and the warring factions made Afghanistan once again a global war theatre. General law and order situation worsened, as Afghanistan relapsed into the abyss of an international conflict, inefficient corrupt government with the impossible standards of maintaining security.

Counter terrorism objectives were blurred by counter insurgency strategy and goals. The absence of a stable domestic economic structure led to the re-emergence of drugs as the major economic backbone of Afghan economy.

This in real effect accounted for the international political blindness vis-à-vis the role of the Afghan government and its legitimacy among the Afghans or towards the hopes and aspirations of an Afghan led, Afghan owned settlement.

On the military front, it led to disillusionment, loss of mission objectives, fatigue and lack of direction for strategic management of forces, as the employment concept meant to go for when and where against an invisible enemy, irrespective of the cost. Diverting the aims from state-building to counter insurgency, counter terrorism only deepened the lines of mistrust between the Allies and the other stakeholders. Time only added to haze of war and lack of the clarity to develop a sound exit strategy.

The standards set to determine the success or failure in the war were unclear and so were the war objectives and strategy. There was also lack of understanding, effective coordination and cohesion among the Allies and the functionaries of the government of Afghanistan with regards to the pursuance of war objectives and implementation of war strategy. Hence, the Af-Pak policy in actual effect was ridden with confusion and lack of precision.

The idea of the proponents of Af-Pak policy was that central policy and re-drafting of Afghanistan policy 'as Af-Pak will affect Pakistan's security options and link it closely to the war against terrorism'. This assumption though accurate in its formulation suffered from a strategic blindness, as it failed to appreciate the blowbacks of the Afghan war and the impact of the policy on Pakistan.

The war in Afghanistan had started under the assumptions that:-

-
- The region had to make a choice, either it was with the United States or with the terrorists and those who supported Al-Qaeda would be treated as combatants and terrorists.
 - Pakistan's support in counter terrorism was important to the peace and stability in Afghanistan.
 - Engagement with Pakistan was necessary, but Pakistan's role in Afghanistan was seen in the context of 'being yet another half of the Afghan problem'.
 - The "Taliban were Pushtuns and they were and would remain hostile" to the US efforts in Afghanistan. Although, a nuanced approach was created that 'all Pushtuns are not Taliban', but it argued in tandem that 'all Taliban were Pushtuns.'
 - Pushtuns presence in the government of Afghanistan was seen equal to Pakistan's dominance in Afghan affairs.
 - Therefore, an enhanced Pushtuns' share in the Afghan government and internal affairs would cause unease amongst other ethnic groups and may destabilize the precarious balance of power amongst Karzai's government and the United States and its core objectives.

The combined effect of these assumptions and policies that were based on these alongside the dominance of military strategy entrenched the conflict

in Afghanistan both on ethnic faultlines and tribal priorities.

The years which followed the first spade of military operations in Afghanistan saw five kinds of problems for the military planners:-

- How to stabilize the surrounding areas post operations?
- How to stop the resurgence of the Taliban?
- How to contain the transformation of the Afghan conflict from terrorism to insurgency or localized wars?
- How to increase legitimacy of the Afghan government?
- How to translate military victory in battle into political success? (a task which remained unachievable).

While, these assumptions remained valid throughout the Afghan war, the only and the most significant change that became a part of the Afghan and US narrative was that the continued instability in Afghanistan was due to the Afghan and Pakistan based terrorist groups; which operated from safe “sanctuaries” allegedly inside Pakistan. This was reinforced with every military casualty in Afghanistan. According to the US and Afghan intelligence estimates Afghan insurgency was supported overtly or covertly by Pakistani security operatives.

The Afghan war had quickly translated into local wars as the tribal society reclaimed its share of influence,

the war effort got bogged down into several widespread small battles across Afghanistan with no tangible strategic victory for the allied forces. This also meant that while the Taliban regained influence and reclaimed territory in Pushtuns dominated areas initially and later in other parts of Afghanistan, they could also not claim complete victory over the entire State of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has and will remain a tribal society, this also means that the tribal understandings of the warring factions will always be dominated by the tribal influence of various ethnic groups on their respective territories.

This means the Afghan war was never won by one side and can never have a sole victor, no matter how long and deep is the assistance or the list of military victories. Local wars will always dominate military engagement of outsiders and the strategic outcome of war in Afghanistan.

In addition, a central government in Afghanistan could only survive, if it is broad based and has sufficient bargaining space for the leaders to offer, as a constant incentive for peace.

Pakistan understood this readily from its vast experience in Afghanistan and, therefore, tried to communicate this to US, as a major non-NATO ally. This advice was not entertained, as it was outside the strategic understanding developed by the US military planners and NATO commanders in the Afghanistan. The conflicting interests and perceptions of the two sides vis-à-vis counter terrorism only increased the blame game and the trust deficit.

The challenge was that on the one hand, the United States and the international alliance saw Pakistan and Pakistan's military support as quite essential for taking out important Al-Qaeda members and fortifying the Afghan border, but on the other, they saw Pakistan as a destabilizer and supporter of growing insurgency in Afghanistan.

The insurgency in the Pushtuns dominated areas of Afghanistan rapidly spread to Pakistan and gained impetus after 2003. In 2003, US decided to attack Iraq, this resulted in strategic disequilibrium, yielding space to the non-state actors and terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US re-engagement in Iraq left Pakistan to deal with brunt of the counter terrorism and counter insurgency in war against terrorism. Consequently, Pakistan's military establishment and Pakistani areas replaced the US for the terrorists. Allegations were leveled by the terrorists and the religious groups, which saw the war against terrorism as a US war and not as Pakistan's own war. The operations conducted by Pakistan in support of the US were also seen as equal to capitulation of the Pakistani sovereignty to the US and the dictum became that 'if you are with the United States, then, you are of them'.

The Pakistan Experience

Pakistan's international partners and US failed to register the imperatives of the re-alignment of Pakistan's security map towards Afghanistan and terrorism.

The immediate consequence of this for Pakistan

was that Pakistan suffered as a state, grappling with the national consensus on the fight against terrorism, as to what for it stood and what would be the cost of engaging in it? In confusion with a loss of narrative and mission control vis-à-vis the asymmetric challenge that Pakistan faced in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Pakistan entered the global alliance at a great cost to itself. This cost was to be paid for decades to come.

Pakistan's engagement in the Afghan theatre as a frontline ally saw the four phases of conflict in Pakistan.

- First Stage 2001-2004

Pakistan's mission objectives were tied closely to counter terrorism.

- Second Stage 2004-2008

When war against terror expanded the insurgency and saw area losses such as Swat and FATA to terrorists; lack of public support to government's counter terrorism and counter insurgency efforts and sporadic military action.

- Third Stage 2008-2011

The third phase of war saw the worst phase in Pak-US relation and unprecedented level of mistrust between the two sides and increased violence, terrorists' attacks and IEDs explosion in Pakistan .

- Fourth Stage 2011-2013

This phase saw an increase in violence in Pakistan

and let to consolidation of military operations. The challenge was how to re-engage and reconstruct conflict hit regions. Pakistan sought re-engagement in Afghanistan and with the United States. Shared interests, with graduated expectations, and rebalancing of the relations dominated the strategic priorities for this period.

First Stage 2001-2004

In the first stage of the war, Pakistan's mission objectives remained closely tied to the US counter terrorism operations and most of the anti-terrorist operations against Al-Qaeda operatives were carried out jointly with the United States and Pakistan, both in Pakistan's urban areas and in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). However, this cooperation was short lived, as after the initial success, the nature of conflict began to transform itself into entrenched conflict.

The reasons ranged from lack of public ownership to the war against terrorism, lack of capacity in terrorist hit regions, particularly the FATA region and lastly, the consequences of the joint military action by Pakistan and US inside Pakistani areas.

This policy decision had resulted in two limited joint military actions across Pakistani territory, particularly in FATA. The decision was, however, perceived negatively at all levels except in the power corridors, as the majority of the people believed that the 'war against terrorism was US war and not a Pakistani war'.

It also increased the perception that Islamabad's strategic objectives vis-a-vis terrorism were the extension of the US objectives. The conflict was limited in this stage and the most of the terrorists who had come into Pakistani territory were on the run, but with the US re-engagement in Iraq and resurgence of Taliban, they started to penetrate and get entrenched. And by 2003, when the US relocated majority of its war effort to Iraq, Pakistan started to face the blow back of the initial operations to other parts of Pakistan, especially in the Swat region.

Second Stage 2004-2008

This was the start of the worst phase of Pakistan's fight against terrorism. It saw ill planned operations, such as Lal Masjid¹⁵, increased drone strikes in Pakistan. On 30 October 2006, an attack in Chenegai killed approximately 70-80 people.¹⁶ The Dargai Suicide Attack¹⁷ was done in retribution, which killed almost 40 people while the civilian casualties were unacceptable, as the battle was defined between those who believed that the government was not pursuing an independent counter terrorism policy and was merely killing innocent Pakistanis for the US elections and those who believed that the threat was real and needed to be eliminated (though the choice of alternatives was debatable). The politico-military disconnect in operations against various terror networks only strengthened the divide and public ownership. The biggest challenge was the ownership to the war effort.

This led to the multiple deaths on both sides i.e. the

the security personnel and terrorists non-state actors. The main features of this period were:

- Loss of narrative and support for government efforts of counter terrorism, both the government and military were blamed for the menace of Lal Masjid 2007.¹
- It saw a blow back of the operation and the rise of the Swat insurgency which was catalyzed by the angry students, affectees of the Lal Masjid operation, renewed surge in Afghanistan against Taliban factions combined with a strategy of hit and kill operations set the tone of war in Pakistan too.

The 2004-2008 also saw the start of the drone attacks in Pakistan, which at times also targeted the peace councils.

The message was clear that Pakistan's counter terrorism strategy could not be pursued independently by Pakistan and if it were done, it would come at the cost to Pakistan's counter terrorism objectives.

This period saw an increase in the US anti-Pakistan rhetoric and an increasing gulf of mistrust within the US- Pakistan power corridors.

Third Stage 2008-2011

The year 2008 marked the end of the first 8 years of Pakistan in war against terrorism. The result was the successive military operations and piecemeal and selective engagement or the issue spiced by ill-fated

bonged up operations in Bajour Agency, joint special operations by Pakistan US in the Pakistan territory, Lal Masjid and Swat, which could be traced back internally and externally, to the security situation in Afghanistan.

It clearly left Pakistan with widespread militancy and Pakistan as the worst hit countries after Afghanistan by terrorism. During these years of collaboration with US in the absence of a local narrative about war against terrorism, isolated the public from the battle against terrorism. Terrorism gained ground in Pakistan. The US pressure on Pakistan increased, as the US rhetoric against Pakistan gained credence.

The international media reported that the ‘Taliban were 60 kilometers away from Islamabad.’ And there was talk that Pakistan was ill equipped to fight terrorism and lacked the political will to do so.

President Musharraf resigned in 2008,² the military tried to regain its credibility and took initiative by launching a major operation in Swat. This time, Pakistan was more successful, as various events in Swat turned in Pakistan’s favor.

The 2008-2009 Swat operation became a defining point for Pakistan and it determined its own counter terrorism strategy and distanced itself from the US goals in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This strengthened the distrust between the two sides (Washington and Islamabad).

In Afghanistan, by this time, the war objectives had been replaced by counter insurgency but this only

increased the level of violence. The idea was that first a military surge would help to break the back of the insurgency, then, it would be followed by a drawdown. The surge would ensure a position of strength on the military battlefield and would pave the way for peace negotiations from a position of strength. At this time, the war had expanded to Pakistan's FATA region and Swat.

The US operations in Afghanistan were supplemented by hit and kill operations, night raid operations carried out and supported by US Special Forces and CIA contractors. This policy was counter-productive, as it met with increased sophistication of attacks by the insurgents in Afghanistan, combined with the use of IEDs. This also led to more dedicated insurgents and quick replacement of the Taliban leaders with younger and more deadly leadership; the foot soldiers increased and so did the pace and scope of war in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Violence in Afghanistan increased and the blame shifted to Pakistan, thus seiling the mistrust between the two sides, as the two armies of the respective countries grappled with the full thrust of militarized terrorism.

The high points of these eight years were the deaths of Al-Qaeda leaders in urban areas based on successful joint intelligence counter terrorism operations. These operations were carried out with close support of Pakistan military and intelligence agencies of Pakistan and the US. However, the presence of multiple actors in

the Pakistan's internal battlefield.

At times conflicting objectives, battle plans and execution skills meant that the absence for trust between Pakistan and US started to entrench. What followed was the next step towards strategic partnership between Pakistan and US based on divergent understanding, objectives and desired outcomes.

On the political front US tried to extend its cooperation with Pakistan with the US aid bill. The Kerry-Lugar Bill, also known as Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009 (S. 1707), was apparently a non-military assistance bill, but its conditions applied equally on both military and non-military aspects of cooperation between the two sides.

The assistance given through this Act was on a year-on-year basis and the US President in the light of certifications provided by the Secretary of State and Special Representative for Pakistan-Afghanistan.

The bill provides a legal framework of cooperation between the two sides. The cooperation was tied with the security conditionalities and certifications by US Secretary of State, and Defense that Pakistan is fighting effectively against Taliban and Al-Qaeda and, then, the waivers will be issued accordingly.

The bill in Islamabad was perceived as having direct consequences to Pakistan's national interest. It also limited the degree to which Pakistan could cooperate.

The point of difference was in the assumptions laid

out vis-a vis Pakistan in the KLB:-

- Pakistan was an allegedly a “sanctuary” for terrorists, who were conducting operations in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan’s counter terrorism operations, though successful, were limited with regard to the threat present in Pakistan.
- Government of Pakistan was unable or lacked capacity to deal with the threat effectively.
- US would expand its intelligence network operatives in Pakistan and will carry out unilateral actions, if its national security so demanded.
- US would engage directly with individuals, non-governmental organizations, tribal leaders, government officials and other relative personnel to gain and support anti-terrorism combating operations in Pakistan.
- US will use cooperative threat reduction program as a framework for limiting the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in Pakistan.
- The Federally Administrated Tribal Agency (FATA) of Pakistan represented a terrorist sanctuary alongside Quetta, Mureedke, where the writ of the state was either non-existence, but totally challenged.
- They will strongly support Pakistan security establishment for Al Qaeda and pro-Taliban elements. Therefore Pakistan could not be trusted completely for counter terrorism objectives, goals either in Pakistan or in Afghanistan.

- US would act unilaterally or with regional support to achieve any of the stated aims.
- Title-I of the bill outlined the socio-economic projects in Pakistan, however, in the monitoring mechanism; all projects covered under this section had certain provisions, such as that the name of the individuals who worked and assisted these programs in Pakistan could be placed in a classified annexure, if required. This was perceived by Pakistan as deliberate effort to circumvent transparency vis-à-vis the actions carried out in Pakistan would remain doubtful.

In order to achieve all the said objectives outlined in the KLB, the bill enabled all other aiding legislations within this framework for different US agencies; to work in Pakistan. The KLB essentially drew the line of mistrust, cooperative action and shared objectives between the two sides. For Pakistan, the above assumptions and the consequent developments increased the gulf of mistrust. The KLB enabled the US to fund and support most extensive intelligence gathering operations, using both military and civilian agencies of the United States. This was followed by the ill-fated operation against Osama Bin Ladin (OBL) in Pakistan.

The manner and the method in which the operation was conducted; where Pakistan government or the security partners were not taken on board; was seen in Islamabad as Pakistan's 9/11.

The sense of shock and betrayal in Pakistan eventually

etched the limits of Pakistan US cooperation. The Raymond Davis killing, in which a US CIA operative/contractor killed two innocent Pakistanis, preceded the OBL incident earlier.

The US state machinery, as high as the office of US Secretary of State, came in action; first to cover his identity as a US official diplomat to Pakistan and, then, to negotiate a deal for his exit.

The OBL incident incidentally was also followed by an operation conducted by US Special Forces on a border security military check post at Silala. This incident caused the death of 26 soldiers including officers in charge. The inquiry that followed by the US declared the incident as a technical oversight and as an accident. Pakistan perceived this act as unacceptable, as the timeline of the incident in enquiry on the Pakistani side showed that the act on the post was deliberate, consistent desire, to carry out military and CIA operations in Pakistan.

The trust broke down completely between the two sides and Pakistan stopped the NATO supply routes indefinitely; till the US side apologized for the transgression and terms of engagement with the US were rewritten.

The quick succession of these three events led to the domestic re-alignment in Pakistan's policymaking circles that Pakistan strategy inside Pakistan and Afghanistan was on a coalition course with US.

Pakistan closed the Ground Logistics Communica-

tion Assistance and US side responded with increased rhetoric against Pakistan security military and government agencies as the prime destabilizer for Afghan security situation.

Pakistan-US Relationship on Ground Zero

The war in Afghanistan had started under the assumption that the region had to make a choice either it was with the United States or with the terrorists and those who supported Al-Qaeda would be treated as combatants and as terrorists.

The second assumption was that Pakistan was important to the peace and stability in Afghanistan therefore there was a need to remain engaged with Pakistan. However, Pakistan was to be de-hyphenated from the India-Pakistan equation and seen as the other half of the Afghan problem.

The third assumption was that the Taliban were based in the Pushtun population and the Pushtun population would remain hostile to the US efforts in Afghanistan. Although a nuanced approach was created that all Pushtuns are not Taliban but all Taliban are Pushtuns.

Pushtun presence in Afghanistan's political set-up was equal to Pakistan's dominance in Afghan affairs

Therefore, an enhanced Pushtun share in Afghan government and internal affairs would cause unease amongst other ethnic groups and may destabilize the precarious balance of power amongst Karzai government and the United States.

The years that followed the first spade of military operations in Afghanistan, saw five kinds of problems for the military planners:

- How to stabilize the surrounding areas post operations?
- How to stop the resurgence of the Taliban?
- How to contain the transformation of the Afghan conflict from terrorism to insurgency or localized wars?
- How to increase legitimacy of the Afghan government?
- How to translate military victory in battle into political success (a task which remained unachievable)

While these assumptions remained valid throughout the Afghan war, the only and the most significant change, which became a part of the Afghan and US narrative with every military casualty in Afghanistan, was that the continued instability in Afghanistan was due to the Afghan and Pakistan based terrorist groups, which operated from safe “sanctuaries” allegedly inside Pakistan.

These, according to the US and Afghan intelligence estimates, were supported covertly and at times allegedly through overt support by Pakistani security operatives.

The predominance of these assumptions in the US and Afghan governments narrative in the years following 2004 to 2102 vis-à-vis Afghanistan stability increased mistrust between Pakistan and United States.

The relationship and Pakistan's presence in Afghanistan was seen as zero sum option with increased emphasis that the thrust of the military attacks on the US and NATO forces were conducted by the Haqqani network. This network was being supported by Pakistan and Pakistan's counter terrorism policy choices and strategies were affecting the military battlefield in Afghanistan. US leveled more pressure on Pakistan from 2009 onwards to carry out military operations against the Haqqani network. Pakistan maintained that the majority of the group strength was located in Afghanistan and a joint military action was necessary on both sides to eliminate the threat.

Table-1 Military Operations Conducted by Pakistan (2001-2013)

Name	Time	Place	Purpose/Targets
Operation Enduring Freedom	2001–2002	North & South Waziristan	To Capture Al-Qaeda members To Stopping infiltration from Afghanistan
Operation Al-Mizan	2002–2006	North Waziristan	To target Taliban commanders Nek Mohammad Wazir, Baitullah Mehsud and foreign fighters

Operation Rah-e-Haq	2007	Sawat	Maulvi Fazlullah
Operation Zalzala	2008	North & South Waziristan	Taliban commanders Nek Mohammad Wazir, Baitullah Mehsud and foreign fighters
Operation Sher Dil	2008	Bajour	Qari Zia Rahman
Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem	2008	Khyber Agency	Mangal Bagh, Tehreek-e-Taliban Lashkar-e-Islam
Rah-e-Rast	2009	Sawat	Maulvi Fazlullah
Operation Rah-e-Nijat	2009-2010	North Waziristan	TTP (Hakimullah Mehsud, Qari Hussain and Wali Muhammad)
Operation Koh-e-Sufaid	2011	Khurrum Agency	To stop sectarian killings, kidnapping and extortion

(Source: SASSI Factsheet No 10, August 2013)

Military Operations Conducted by Pakistan in FATA (2009-2010)

Summary of Operations

- Large Size Operations (Corps level) - 2
- Major Operations (Brigade & above) - 242


- Minor Operations - 648
- Cordon & Search Operations - 6420

Peace Agreements

- The Shakai Peace Agreement in March 2004
- The Sararogha Agreement in February 2005
- Peace agreement with Maulvi Fazlullah in May 2008

Islamabad carried out more than six thousand plus operations in FATA between 2009 to 2012 to clear the area from militants and terrorists. The results were phenomenal.


WHERE WE WERE – APRIL 09



Source: Based on military sources

Pakistan started to clear the area although, the situation in Swat had stabilized but the threat in FATA was reaching new heights. To re-address the threat, Pakistan quietly made a military surge in the area and by 2012 cleared around eighty percent area from terrorists' control. Pakistan has almost deployed more than 1,51,000 military troops in this area to control the problem from expanding into Pakistan. This strategy was also necessary, as Pakistan stabilized and cleared the areas, but the situation in Afghanistan took a worst turn for violence.


WHERE WE ARE – JANUARY 12



Source: Based on military sources

The decision to enhance operations in the FATA region was made, keeping in view the Pakistan's perspective and priorities to bring about peace and stability. A stable and peaceful border of Afghanistan-Pakistan was a priority to avoid illicit trade, drug and human trafficking. Though the aims were to obtain

maximum gains out of this war against terror, however, Pakistan had to face extreme repercussions regarding war against terror.



Source: Based on military sources

Impact of the War

According to an estimate, Pakistan suffered a loss of over \$ 90 billion in thirteen years of combat and war. Pakistan faced 51,000 civilian casualties, according to military estimates, as a result of this ongoing war against terrorism. Nearly 1,500 suicide attacks took place in almost all over the country and more than 1500 IED attacks that badly hampered the peace and stability in the whole country. The contribution in war against terror has also brought an internal threat to Pakistan: a threat of rebellion within the masses against the government.

According to the data compiled by South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) Pakistan has recorded a total of at least 6,211 terrorism-related fatalities including deaths of 3,007 civilians, 2,472 militants and 732 Security Forces (SF) personnel in 2012. 2013 have already


witnessed 2,696 fatalities, including 1461 civilians, 283 SF personnel and 962 militants. These statistics show the amount of human loss that Pakistan had to bear for its contribution against war on terror.

The growing estrangement between Pakistan and US over the period resulted in weakened cooperation in counter terrorism operations. The year 2009 was the bloodiest year for Pakistan, Pakistan lost approximately 11,000 civilian and military personnel and for Afghanistan this year became the start of the most violent year of the conflict.

Table-2: Civilian and Military Casualties in Pakistan (2003-2012)

Year	Civilians	Security Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	2178	496	1344	4018
Total*	17333	5318	26504	49155

Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP)



**Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in
Pakistan 2003-2013**

** Data updated till August 4, 2013*

Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013

Pakistan's government joined the US as an ally in 'war against terrorism', but the costs in real time almost crippled the State of Pakistan. This decision was supplemented with the US financial commitment to pick up Pakistan's share of economic burden of the costs of operations and to provide aid, facilities to combat terrorism.

Pakistan received \$ 24.4 billion according to United States. Pakistan officially invoiced \$ 13.8 billion out of which mere \$ 8.7 billion were transferred by 2012.

Pledges to Pakistan's economy in this entire period did not materialize; beyond the minimum, leaving Pakistan to its own resources to rise from the abyss.

Afghanistan 2009-2013

2009 was an important year for Afghanistan. Two strategies became the centerpiece of the counter

insurgency operations COIN and counter terrorism operations in Afghanistan, alongside select combat US and NATO military operations. These were: 1) increased use of hit and kill operations, night raids and drone strikes; and 2) combined military operations against Taliban hotbeds in the south of Afghanistan.

The assumption was that select kinetic operations, with increased lethality, would allow for negotiations to be conducted from a position of strength for the United States. This would also allow in breaking the chain of command for the Taliban; however, it failed to calculate the pace with which command positions in the Taliban ranks were to be replaced with more battle-hardened and unidentified commanders.


For Pakistan, this meant the expansion of the Afghan war to Pakistan as the US drones strike gained momentum.

The pre-dominance of the military use of force in the Afghan–Pakistan equation increased the problem of terrorism in the two countries, since the US force was not matched evenly with the speed of the political engagement, re-building or re-constructions in the conflict-hit areas.

In 2011 and 2012, Afghanistan situation deteriorated into further violence. This time, however, the violence saw increase in attacks by the insurgents and terrorists.

- Green on Blue attacks.
- Use of Sophisticated IEDs.
- Desertions of the Afghan National Security

RISK ASSESSMENT – 2012



Source: Based on military sources

The US decision to withdraw its combat troops from Afghanistan has only compounded the problems on ground, as each side tried to maximize its gains on ground inside Afghanistan.


The withdrawal announcement was perceived by the region as an abdication in the favour of US domestic compulsions over the war objectives in Afghanistan, because they oscillated from counter terrorism to counter insurgency, state building and, then, to counter terrorism and training.

From 2011-2013, Afghanistan's stability has become hostage to internal power struggle. Lack of good governance and absence of state building structures and mechanism have increased the sense of socio-economic deprivation among various groups.

This is affected by the absence of law and order situation and lack of critical political will in Afghanistan, to address the challenge of widespread public disillusionment.

Despite claims of absolute victory by the Afghan government and the US, significant areas of Afghanistan remain hotbeds of violence and under Taliban influence.

The year 2012 was considered the bloodiest year in Afghanistan, as the Taliban attacks intensified, furthermore, the green on blue attacks and inside attacks accelerated from 2011 and since then only gained momentum.



Source: SASSI factsheet

The third challenge was the ability of the ANSF to take over the responsibility of the security of the Afghan State. The annual rate of attrition and desertion

of the ANSF is approximately 46,500 per year. And transferring security responsibilities to the ANSF by 2014 appears as a grave mistake, as there has been almost 14 percent increase in the green on blue attacks per year since 2012.

Afghanistan National Army (ANA)

From 2009-2011, an increase in violence was seen as the US surge followed by US withdrawal. Conflict was intensified and the blame game was at the highest, as Afghanistan and US blamed Pakistan and vice versa.

Policy-makers in NATO and the US believe that the gigantic task of achieving sustainable peace in post 2014 depends upon two very important factors, one being political settlement there and Afghan National Army the other. Since past a few years, American strategy has been to strengthen Afghan forces to place them in the front line of fire. So far, this strategy has proved a mixture of failure and successes.

Under the Afghan Ministry of Defense, the ANA is responsible for all land-based operations for state defense in Afghanistan. The former Soviet Union trained and equipped the ANA in 1990's. Later, by 1996 under the Taliban regime which aimed to rule the country by Islamic Shariah law, the ANA fragmented into regional militias. After the expatriation of the Taliban in 2001, tribal loyalties in the ANA gained influence and nationalism dwindled. In 2002 however, the ANA was resurrected with CF's support.

Currently the ANA is divided into six regional Corps, with the 201st in Kabul, 203rd in Gardez, 205th in Kandahar, 207th in Herat, 209th in Mazar-i-Sharif and the 215th in Lashkar Gah.³

The hierarchical structure consists of the Defense Minister General Abdul Rahim Wardak at the top with subordinates COG's Gen Sher Muhammad Karimi and VCOG's Lt Gen Mohammad Eshaq Noori. Further divisions include Comd AAF Maj Gen Abdul Wahab, Comd Gr Forces Lt Gen Murad Ali, Chief of Log GS Lt Gen Azizuddin, Chief of Int GS (DGMI) Maj Gen Abdul Khaliq Faryad, Chief of Comm GS Maj. Gen Abdul Mehrab Ali and Chief of Ops GS (DGMO) Lt Gen Shir Mohammad Karimi.

The Problem

The ANA has become more organized in recent years, but the success is not significant; structural problems remain there as a challenge. ANA's efficiency has increased to a certain degree and at some instances, it has neutralized Taliban's attacks in Kabul but it falls short of a success story. The problem with its command structure has been that most of the fighting and the violence is in Pushtuns dominated areas but the military command is with non-Pushtun commanders. The ethnic and tribal mindset plays to this, and as the draw down dates come close each military commanders wants to consolidate power in his respective region, troops indicate their preference to serve under various commanders due to their ethnic faultiness rather than allegiance to the force.

Secondly, for a national armed force, it is necessary that it should have national purpose which is owned at all levels of command. A national purpose for an army raised under the shadow of an insurgency can never be counter terrorism, especially, if the goals of counter terrorism post 2014 remain opaque.

Third factor leading to these desertions and increase in green on blue attacks is also an indicator of the effort of the soldiers of the ANA to secure their places with the respective warlords, drug barons and Taliban commanders, who are likely to remain powerful in their zones of influence and tribal territories.

Last but not the least, it is ethnic composition of the ANA which is non-Pushtuns; hence, will always face problems of command in violence hit areas. These areas are Pushtuns dominated and have faced majority of the increase in violence, therefore, bringing security to these areas will be necessary, if ANA is to emerge as a force of peace and stability post 2014.

The inherent problem of composition of ANA from all the factions of Afghan society is a major hurdle in structuring of a professional army under unified command, particularly in a tribal society.

This major problem of ethnic balance not only bars formation of a strong, uniform military but also results into a low level of motivation to go and fight against the adversary. Skewed ethnic composition has negative ramifications in the tribal society. Claimed overall representation of Pushtuns in ANA is approximately

42 percent, while they form 50-55 percent of Afghan society according to estimates. However, vast majority comes from North-eastern provinces, with more than one-third of total contributed by Nangarhar Province alone. Pushtuns in Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktika and Ghazni are 17 percent of Afghanistan's total population, but contribution in ANSF is only 1.5 percent since 2009. Kandahar and Helmand have contributed 1200 soldiers, which is less than 0.7 percent of 1,73,000 recruitment since 2009. Uruzgan with 300,000 residents, had only 14 recruits in ANSF last year. By comparison, Kunduz, with 900,000 residents, enlisted more than 16,500 recruits.

Moreover, more than 60 percent of ANA's southern Pushtuns came from Nimroz and Farah, but since March 2011, recruitment in both areas has sharply fallen (more than 50 percent in Nimroz). On the other hand, Tajiks, which are only 18-20 percent of population, enjoy a share of estimated 44 percent in ANA. Lack of ethnic balance within ANA especially among officers cadre, makes it difficult for ANA to hold areas cleared in Coalition Operations.

High rate of attrition is another major problem with organization of ANA. Current attrition rates projected were at 24 percent, in 2011.

These translated to a loss of 46,500 soldiers annually. The attrition resulted also in a financial deficit due to forced recruitment, training expenditure of inducting additional troops to make up the strength depletion.

Desertion not only resulted into the loss of trained soldiers but also in lowering down the morale of the forces. Afghan tribal culture makes it difficult for young men to observe strict discipline demanded by Army. In addition, sentiments against NATO forces and Taliban's planned infiltration into ANA are another reason for this astonishingly high rate of desertion.

In addition, Taliban's motivation, based on Afghan history of driving out the British and the Soviet forces from their fatherland has its impact many times stronger on Afghans than what is given by the US.

Other matter of grave concern in the establishment of a strong Afghan National Army is the issue of quality versus quantity.

NATO forces are unable to seize control of complete Afghan territory even after more than a decade of war. ISAF forces of 130,000 troops are unable to capture hostile Afghan territory. To overcome this weakness, the focus has been on increasing the number of forces with compromise on their efficiency, discipline and unity.

The model adopted for structuring ANA further affects this issue. So far, the focus has been on training ANA on the pattern of western militaries. It clearly shows a lack of understanding about the Afghan culture on the part of the NATO and US policy-makers. Furthermore, this training in parts will be conducted by the CIA contractors, which operate under a different code of conduct than regular national armies.

Afghanistan, a war ruined country with literacy rate lowest in the world cannot sustain such an army. Thus, the strategic and tactical orientation of ANA doesn't match Afghan culture, and ground realities. These can kill the objectives and mission responsibilities linked to the ANA.

The question, thus, remains whether the ANSF is strong enough to withstand the Taliban sans foreign help, especially since its competence is affected by tribal loyalties and the obvious dearth of experienced senior military personnel. The findings of the latest Pentagon Report speak; as it reveals that only 13 ANA units were evaluated as fit to function independently, while the rest can only operate under ISAF supervision.

The situation appears less optimistic when one witnesses the situation post 2014 for ANA keeping in view the funding problems. According to estimates, ANSF funding especially post 2014 requires \$ 6-9 billions yearly. So far, the US seems committed to take its allies on the same page in this regard. However, once NATO withdraws, their parent governments' commitments can be shaken by economic troubles at home.

Foreign assistance has been a large factor in sustaining relative peace in Afghanistan. NATO led ISAF conceptualized under the Bonn Conference has been deployed in Afghanistan under UNSC regulations since December 2001⁴. Since 2006, 50 troop contributing nations (TCN's) have joined ISAF. The current strength of US forces amounts to 90,000 troops and allied forces


consist of 40,313 troops. As of 2011, ISAF has four regional command areas with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's) deployed in each region.

Regional command of the capital Kabul is shared amongst Turkey, Italy and France. Since 2009, Turkey has been the leading nation in the capital. Regional command of North and West are led by Germany and Italy respectively, whilst South, East and South-West are under multinational deployment with a total of 50 nations currently in operation. Air bases are located in the Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Shindand and Bigram, which is home to the largest US airbases in the country.⁵

ISAF's mission was to *“create conditions whereby the Government of Afghanistan is able to exercise its authority throughout the country, including the development of professional and capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)”*.⁶


This includes effort required to help the ANSF to transition from a security assisted force to a unitary national security force. ISAF hopes to withdraw its troops by 2014. The drawdown plan is already underway.

ISAF DEPLOYMENT



Source: Based on military source

DRAWDOWN PLAN



Source: Based on military source

In post 2014 Afghanistan, the biggest possible challenge can lead towards the disintegration of ANSF. The ANSF will have to replace the security presence of the ISAF forces with its indigenous corps. According to various estimates, the ANSF is ill equipped to rise to the challenge and will not be in a position to carry out stand alone operations under an Afghan command.

The adequate US force level presence in Afghanistan post 2014 is yet another complicating factor, as it is not settled and the legal framework for the US presence in post 2014 is not clear. It is still debatable that whether the strategic shift from purely kinetic operations to fight, talk and build can achieve success, as it has failed to create conditions for success or resorting peace.

There is no clarity amongst the donor states how the security responsibilities be met after the 2014. Approximately \$ 4 billion have been set aside for the ANA training and staffing but it is not clear how will this materialize in the a sense of a legal framework for the US forces to remain in Afghanistan post 2014 and how will it maintain these forces levels after 2018. It is argued that force level would come down beyond 2018 as the security situation would stabilize in Afghanistan, but for that to happen Afghan economy would have to transform to a sustainable economy and political stability achieved.

In these thirteen years, \$ 62.8 billion were pledged in economic assistance to the Afghan government. However, the total amount of aid disbursed in these years is equal to mere \$ 26.7 billion. The factors for

mistrust amongst international donors range from corruption, lack of transparency, security challenges etc in Afghanistan, but mostly it is the challenge of capacity.

Pakistan has tried to contribute towards the economic development of Afghanistan. It granted around \$ 235 million and supported the completion of around 37 projects, such as Torkham Jalalabad road, Nishtar kidney centre, Allama Iqbal Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Science Nagarhar and Jinnah Hospital Kabul.

In addition, Pakistan has tried to expand the educational assistance to Afghanistan by training approximately 3000 Afghans in Pakistan with around 600 students in higher education per year. Efforts are in hand as well to promote the bilateral trade to \$ 5 billion per year by 2015.

IEDs and the Afghan Challenge

In Afghanistan, IEDs have become the biggest threat for the lives of Afghan people including children, women or men. In 2013, in Afghanistan 33 attacks were carried out, which resulted in multiple civilian and military casualties. In 2012, IEDs attacks were increased by three percent, as compared to 2011. These attacks were carried out by anti-government elements indiscriminately and unlawfully against the civilians.

In 2012, 782 IED incidents occurred i.e. more than two IEDs per day causing civilian casualties in 2012, which resulted in 2,531 civilian casualties (868 civilian deaths and 1,663 injuries), constituting 34 percent

of all civilian casualties, and 38 percent of all civilian casualties attributed to anti-government elements. Despite increase in attacks, casualties of security forces are lower than 2011, indicating better force protection measures.

The number of Afghan civilian casualties in the past five years had been steadily decreasing. A ratio of 2,171 killed and 2,928 wounded was recorded in 2009, 2,933:4,254 in 2011 and progressive dips of 3,007 and 1,451 killed in 2012 and 2013 respectively (none wounded). According to ISAF, there has also been an 18 percent decrease in insurgent attacks.

On the contrary, the US military withdrawal has led to a 24 percent rise in ANSF personnel attacks with 28 incidents in 2012 and nine incidents reported in August 2013 alone.

The Taliban, however, have rejected UN statistics as being an “attempt of propaganda against the Mujahideen” and have further denied that all those being killed are, in fact, civilians.⁷

The validity of the statement is questionable, especially since April 2012, there has been a notable increase in the use of asymmetric tactics by Taliban in the hope of gaining a better bargaining position and an eventual power sharing relationship with the Afghan Government, once ISAF exits. The strategy includes launching surprise attacks across the country, such as the September 2012 Camp Bastion raid which killed 2 US marine officers⁸ as well as high profile assassination

attempts.⁹

Overriding Factor: The Drug Connection in Pakistan-Afghanistan

Opium and heroine trade has emerged as the biggest sector of the Afghan economy in the last thirteen years of war.

According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) based in Vienna, the increase in area of cultivation of opium has increased to 18 percent, as compared to 2011 i.e. more than 154,000 hectares.¹⁰ The consumption of drugs has increased to 30 percent in 2013 as of 2003.

About \$ 83 billion revenues are generated from the illicit trafficking of drugs which are, then used in terrorism and organized crime. Hence the trafficking of drugs is the main interface between these crimes and cross border peace.

According to various estimates forty percent of the \$ 83 billion worth of drugs pass through Afghan- Pakistan route annually, in which approximately 25 percent of consumption is within Pakistan's Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK) province.

The Bush administration had specifically emphasized to counter the illicit trafficking of drugs. Money was also allocated under the Drug Enforcement Administration's West Asias initiative known as "Operation Containment".¹¹ Nonetheless, since the beginning of the war, opium trade and drug economy

of Afghanistan had not been targeted by ISAF or NATO command as a priority. The result has been that it has become a major factor of increased violence and finances for the war in Afghanistan.

The US State Department states:

“Opium is a source of literally billions of dollars to extremist and criminal groups ... Cutting down the opium supply is central to establishing a secure and stable democracy as well as winning the global war on terrorism.” (Statement of Assistant Secretary of State Robert Charles, Congressional Hearing, 1 April 2004)¹²

Obama’s “comprehensive” strategy to counter terrorism and Al-Qaeda also addresses the control of illicit trafficking of drugs, but the lack of emphasis on the centrality of this issue to stop the war in Afghanistan has not been addressed .

The difference in priorities between Pakistan and NATO, US and Afghan government is a major irritant. For Pakistan eliminating drug trade route is a short and long term interest while for the other parties, perhaps, security of Afghanistan irrespective of the drug challenge is priority. Bridging the divide would be essential, if post 2014 Afghanistan is to be seen through the prism of shared interests and objectives

Cold Start Doctrine (CSD)

The period 2008-2013 also resulted in parallel trends in the region, but mostly for Pakistan. It linked

the security matrix to the terrorism challenges on the one side and, on the other it increased the conventional threats to Pakistan's security interests.

The security developments that affected Pakistan threat calculus were:-

- Afghanistan's stability was directly related to Pakistan's role in Afghanistan and Pakistan's ability or inability to remain the front line state against terrorism.
- Increased internal challenges to Pakistan and hybrid militarized terrorism.
- Increased presence of extra regional and regional security agencies in Pakistan.
- Increased US led global push to enhance India's regional and global security role was to be at the Pakistan's cost.
- Desire to freeze and de-link India-Pakistan security relationship from the emerging security balance in the region.
- Operationalisation of offensive military doctrines such as proactive strategy and CSD in South Asia.
- Rapid increase in Indian military build-up.
- Operationalisation of the Indian nuclear doctrine and development of a nuclear triad.
- Development of Indian Ballistic Missile defenses.
- Enhanced efforts by Pakistan to increase the

counter security measures.

- Development of tactical nuclear capabilities.
- Expansion of the Indian nuclear program in the absence of internationally binding non-proliferation commitment.
- Increased US and UK led support to include Indian in the nuclear suppliers' group, as a technology supplier.
- Increased prospects of a proxy war as a result of India–Pakistan engagement in Afghanistan.
- Increased possibilities of a two front security challenge for Pakistan.
- Increased levels of instability at the regional level.

These new dimensions to the South Asian security have not managed to replace the existing balance of power between India and Pakistan, but managed to further complicate the already existing fragile terms of relative peace between the traditional rivals and stability of the Afghan End-game.

Furthermore, the external players are creating new dimensions and pushing the South Asian region into unparalleled destruction. At this critical juncture, Pakistan is facing multi-faceted internal as well external challenges. On one hand, Pakistan's political and military leadership has to deal with the deteriorating internal security situation, besides responding to evolving complex Afghan End-Game; and on the other, it has to keep an eye on its Eastern border as well.

Furthermore, the US and other international players are destabilizing the nuclear deterrence in South Asia by committing to supply India with nuclear technology, BMD systems and other state of the art weapons technology.

The nuclearization of South Asia, nuclear deterrence had been under test by the complex realities of the region. Traditionally, since 1980s India and Pakistan have faced various military crises and standoffs, but due to prevalence of nuclear deterrence no escalation took place between the two nuclear armed neighbors. This is today under the challenge, due to the shift towards pre-emption in the military doctrines.

The Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine (under the nuclear overhang) aims to undermine Pakistan's stated policy of minimum credible nuclear deterrence and has compelled Pakistan to enhance its other nuclear options to restore deterrence stability.

The doctrine was introduced by the Indian military in 2004, in order to modify its approach to war, and to increase Indian ability to 'fight short duration conflicts under the nuclear shadow'.

The threat of deterrence failure would increase, if India operationalizes its Indian Military's Cold Start Doctrine (an offensive doctrine) against Pakistan, thus ,de-stabilizing the region. The doctrine is based on the concept of pre-emptive strike and calls for rapid deployment of "Integrated Battle Groups" on India-Pakistan border.

India's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD), combined with force asymmetry, has the capability to increase the level of an arms race, raising the level of minimum deterrence stability in the region.

According to the proactive strategy of India, the strategic offensive is launched by India to ensure a policy of Compellence vis-à-vis Pakistan's security options and to achieve a decisive edge in the narrative that India will respond to any alleged 'terrorist attack' inside Indian territory with a major conventional attack inside Pakistani territory. This, when read with the Indian nuclear doctrine, according to Indian defense planners, would rob Pakistan off the nuclear options and call into question 'Pakistan's nuclear bluff'.


This will be done in the words of the Indian nuclear strategist Gurmeet Kanwal's with a declaratory policy that a nuclear strike against Indian soldiers, even if they are deep inside Pakistani territory, will constitute the use of nuclear weapons against India and will invite massive counter value and counter force punitive retaliation against Pakistan'.¹³

This scenario is based on the Indian nuclear doctrine, which states, *'India shall build and pursue a doctrine of credible minimum nuclear deterrence... any nuclear attack on India and its forces shall result in punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage unacceptable to the aggressor. In the threat of a major attack against India or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.'*

The Indian nuclear doctrine combined with Indian military strategy will take the region to a nuclear black mail, where the exercise of nuclear deterrence by India aims to pave the way for a punitive strike against Pakistan. The introduction of the CSD would be followed by the Pakistani counter measures for strategic equivalence with India.

The promotion of Indian military doctrine will shift the regional balance of terror from deterrence to a strategy of Compellence and invariably an escalation in the war theatres from sub-conventional to conventional and ultimately to nuclear exchange between the two states. This is the unfolding truth of the military engagement in a nuclear armed theatre.

The rationale for this strategic understanding by India is based on the following assumptions:-



- Nuclear blackmail will provide Indian forces sufficient time to launch an attack inside Pakistani territory, (76-92 hours).
- Delegation of authority to initiate the war to the pivot corps. Commanders would create the event of surprise, which was lost by India since the nuclear deterrence prevailed in the military theatre of the two sides.
- It will act as a restraint on Pakistan's nuclear option and response.

India's doctrinal transformation and anti-missile development underscore that it is inclined to maximize its relative power against Pakistan. Indian 'No First Use' is in itself judgment to build a large nuclear arsenal, and one which can undoubtedly be seen in the draft nuclear doctrine where India, on the one hand, vows to maintain minimum credible deterrence and on the other, it aspires to build a nuclear triad and further weapon development, without taking into account regional stability.


The threat to Pakistan on the eastern border has increased incrementally over time and is supported by the De-hyphenation policy on the western front two other significant military challenges have emerged. These are cross border attacks into Pakistan and drone strikes.

Cross Border Attacks

Border wars are always a source of internal and regional instability, no matter how significant or insignificant is the military challenge. Pakistan and Afghanistan border is more than 2,500 kilometers with mountaineous peaks as high as 24,700 feet and as low as 2,030 feet above sea level.


Pakistan-Afghanistan border has seen the increase of this challenge. With every passing year Pak-Afghan border has been attacked by groups of a hundred or two hundreds militants from the Afghan provinces. This is in addition to air violations and ground attacks / violations from the Afghan side.

CROSS BORDER ATTACKS INTO PAKISTAN




An analysis of data collected in the past four years reveals that cross border air strikes were at its peak in 2010 with a total of 179 violations recorded. The year 2011 saw a massive 471 fire violations, and 13 ground violations were recorded in 2012, which has been lower than the previous two years. So far, six attacks have been carried out against Pakistan in 2013 alone. These claimed 45 casualties and 15 injuries, as indicated by the following graphs

Border violations by Afghanistan



Source: SASSI Factsheet

Afghan Border Violations 2013



Source: SASSI Factsheet

The most recent reported attacks on Pakistani military posts had occurred from the Goshta district of the eastern Nagarhar province in May 2013, which were properly encountered, but they led to the deaths of 30 Pakistani soldiers, 30 Pakistani militants, 1 Afghan policeman and has left over 20 injured.¹⁴

Such attacks and border violations have worsened and increased the trust deficit between Pakistan and the Afghan government. And the already strained diplomatic relations between the two neighbors, a situation, which is not in the interest of either country.

Drone Attacks


Another major problem for Pakistan at the western border is of drone strikes carried out by US in the tribal regions of Pakistan. The US drone strikes started in 2004 in Pakistan. These led to 3,127 deaths in the 370 attacks to date. The losses include major damages of infrastructure, soldiers, civilians be it men, women and children.

Most importantly, it has created deep effects on the entire population of FATA and to Pakistan's counter terrorism challenge. Drone strikes could not help eliminate the foot soldiers rather, they have isolated the population from the government efforts.


Years	No of strikes	Total Killed	Children deaths	Civilian deaths	Militants Killed	HVTs Killed
2004	1	7	2	0	5	1
2005	3	15	5	3	7	2
2006	3	108	75	24	9	0
2007	5	47	1	28	18	0
2008	38	332	31	86	215	12
2009	55	643	39	116	488	8
2010	128	985	16	146	823	7
2011	75	573	4	108	461	10
2012	48	336	1	23	312	6
2013	14	81	1	1	79	5
Total	370	3127	175	535	2417	51

*** Data update till June 2013*


Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013



High Value Targets Killed in Drone Attacks: 2004 – 2013



Drone Attacks Success Rate



The illegality of drones and the mass public opinion against their use in Pakistan has added another level of complexity. The number of people who have died (for further detail see Annex-I) over time have only added to the national trauma.

Issues have arisen on account of target selections, transparency after action and most importantly the role of the CIA in managing the process in Pakistan has been a dividing factor between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan sees these attacks as illegal and will not accept therein a future pillar of Pakistan-US counter terrorism cooperation. For the United States drone strikes will remain a key tool for counter terrorism strategy in the region. A common understanding is required to bridge the gap between the two states and move forward on a cooperative framework.

The Way Forward

Pakistan believes in Afghan stability and aims to promote it, however, the centrality of this belief is based on the following assumptions:

- The current Afghan system of governance is seen primarily as an alien system by the majority of Afghans. A decade of inefficient and corrupt practices of the current Afghan government has made the system unacceptable to the larger populace of Afghanistan.
- The current system would not survive the transition despite Karzai's bid to prolong his tenure. The system of governance, though democratic in nature could only be sustainable, if it is broad based, representative of the tribal faultiness.
- And provincially autonomous in nature, perhaps under a federal system.

- Negotiations with Taliban are essential, as it is important to have all relevant stakeholders and the members of the warring factions.
- Withdrawal needs to be calibrated with the ground realities and the pace of developments in the negotiations.
- Regional ownership is necessary for Afghan stability beyond 2014.
- Better border management needs to be ensured on Pak- Afghan border.

For Pakistan, the priorities in the Afghan End-game are:

- Stop ‘mission creep to Pakistan’, particularly, in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- State building in conflict areas adjacent to Pakistani border areas, including the Taliban controlled areas.
- Sustainable economic structures, based on local ownership, perhaps, through the engagement of developed human resource of Afghanistan, especially from Pakistan.
- Relocation of the Afghan refugees in Afghanistan, they can be potential force of change, if human resource development and training can be imparted to them in Pakistan. This will help to create local ownership in the most violence hit areas of Afghanistan, as most of refugees in Pakistan are from the poorest strata of the Afghan society and are Pushtun and most of the war has also been fought in these areas). Reconstruction

would pick up pace, if state building is prioritized in these areas in post 2014.

- The issue would require both regional and international efforts, alongside the US and Afghan efforts, if the post 2014 some kind of cessation in hostilities or decrease in violence is sought.
- Militant solvency is a pre-requisite for any transition to succeed.
- Strategic COIN on both sides of the border would require coordination, if not joint action. This is questionable, as in post 2014 the power differential between Pakistan and ANFS will increase.
- Contain violence in FATA
- Focus on a community driven approach towards reconstruction.
- Use of economic development as a motivation to de-radicalize.
- Better border management between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Accelerate peace talks amongst the warring factions, and the US; however, the process would require Afghan ownership. These talks would have to be all-inclusive and broad based; capable of sustaining the transition phase.
- Recognition of the fact that Pakistan's interest in Afghan peace is based on ground realities and represents long and short term objectives of

Pakistan in Afghanistan.

- Containing the threat of terrorism in Pakistan will require Pakistan's engagement in the reconciliation process.
- Pacifying restive Pushtun populations will be a pre-condition for success.
- Cessation of Drone strikes in Pakistan; as they are providing counter-productive and a challenge to counter terrorism strategy.
- Stabilize India-Pakistan relations.
- Bringing the war into the border region of Pakistan is counter productive.

Conclusion

Shifting the blame to Pakistan did not change the situation on ground, but what it did achieve was that the initial structures of success that is ISAF, NATO, Pakistan, US forces and the Afghan government failed to draw support from each other.

The Afghan government's corruption and total lack of responsiveness by the United States towards the growing drug trade in Afghanistan and international partners has created a parallel war economy in Afghanistan. This has brought the region closer, including Pakistan, Russia, China, Central Asia and Iran, but at cross purpose to Karzai-led Afghan government and the United States in crafting common strategies. This needs to be broadened to include the two other important stakeholders of Afghan security.

Afghanistan is blend of various ethnicities, which are divided across international borders. Therefore, reconciliation would have to be broad-based and include in it populations and groups from both sides of the border, if stable structure of peace are to be enacted and maintained.

Reconciliation process is in jeopardy due to conflicting interests, lack of Afghan ownership but most importantly, the right platform to lead the negotiating process amongst the warring factions. This is despite the fact that the high peace council and Taliban-US–Pakistan negotiating process has gained greater acceptance amongst the Karzai government.

Challenges are that the set of Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan are by no means exhaustive, however, if any of the these objectives are to be achieved, it will require first and for mostly convergence of interest among Pakistan, United States and Afghanistan. It will also be important that it is understood that pre-conditions for the talks are not considered as end conditions, and last but not the least there is a need to move away from a zero sum assessment of each other's actions.

Key Findings

- Pakistan's has legitimate interests in Afghanistan; and the pursuit of these interests define Pakistan's priorities in the Afghan End-game.
- The war in Afghanistan is likely to expand into Pakistan post-2014, if negotiated settlement is

not achieved before 2014.

- The ANSF will remain the single most challenge to regional stability. Pakistan-US and Afghan cooperation is a prerequisite for achieving success and in reaching a peaceful settlement, the violence in Afghanistan will remain on the increase and will not decline in post 2014 Afghanistan.

Endnotes

- 1 “75 people killed during operation in Lal Masjid: DG ISPR.” Pak Tribune, on the web 12 July 2007, <<http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=183849>> (8 September 2013)
- 2 Previous Presidents, Official website the President of Pakistan, <<http://www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk/index.php?lang=en&opc=2&sel=4>> (8 September 2013)
- 3 “Afghan National Army.” Afghaniatan online, 25 Aug. 2013. Web. 25 Aug. 2013. <<http://www.Afghan-web.com/military/officers.html>>.
- 4 “History.” *Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force*. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Aug. 2013.
- 5 “List of ISAF Installations in Afghanistan.” *Wikipedia*. Wikimedia Foundation, 31 July 2013. Web. 25 Aug. 2013. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ISAF_installations_in_Afghanistan>.
- 6 *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures*. Rep. N.p.: ISAF/NATO, n.d. Print
- 7 Seiff, Kevin. “U.N. Report: Afghan Civilian Casualties Are up.” *Washington Post*. N.p., 31 July 2013. Web. 24 Aug. 2013. <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-31/world/40912599_1_georgette-gagnon-Afghan-army-taliban-s>.
- 8 “Inside Camp Bastion.” *BBC News*. BBC, 24 Sept. 2012. Web. 24 Aug. 2013. <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-19635544>>.
- 9 “Fearful Asymmetry.” *The Economist*. The Economist, 1 May 2008. Web. 25 Aug. 2013. <<http://www.economist.com/node/11293810>>.
- 10 “*Afghanistan Opium Survey Summary Findings*” UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

- 11 Chossudovsky, Michel. “*The Spoils of War: Afghanistan’s Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade*” Global Research, June 24, 2013. <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-spoils-of-war-Afghanistan-s-multibillion-dollar-heroin-trade/91>> accessed on August 23, 2013.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Gurmeet Kanwal, “Cold Start and Battle Groups for Offensive”, *Strategic Trends*, Vol. IV, Issue. 05, June 2006,
- 14 Mujiburrahman. “Afghan-Pak Border Guards Clash Leaves Casualties.” *Wakht News Agency*. Wakht News Agency, 06 May 2013. Web. 24 Aug. 2013. <http://wakht.af/en/index.php/politics-and-parliament/3817-Afghan-pak-border-guards-clash-leaves-casualties.html>.
- 15 Source: “75 people killed during operation in Lal Masjid: DG ISPR.” Pak Tribune, on the web 12 July 2007, <http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=183849> (8 September 2013).
- 16 *SASSI Factsheet* “Detailed Statistics Of Drone Attacks 2004-2013,” September 2013.
- 17 Dargai Suicide Attack on Cadets resulted in 42 deaths and 20 casualties. The attack was carried out on November 8, 2006. See for further details: Bill Roggio. “Suicide Strike Kills 42 Pakistani Soldiers in Dargai,” *Long War Journal* 8 November 2006 access through the web, 8 September 2013 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2006/11/suicide_strike_kills.php.

‘Challenges of Transition in Afghanistan: Quest for Peace and Stability’*

Amb Arif Kamal & Ms Beenish Sultan¹

Abstract

This paper aims to underline probable multiple scenarios that could emerge after the prospective US drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014. The withdrawal process promises an end to the ‘longest war’ in contemporary history, while leaving Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan in a longer struggle to overcome its negative impact on their social fabric and economies. In this regard, numerous challenges are foreseen by various stakeholders, mainly the United States, Pakistan and the current Afghan government. This is so, because, the diminishing American presence will also cause a reduction of influx in cash flows that have served as an engine of broad based activities in Afghanistan. Notwithstanding the skeptical views of the stakeholders, Afghanistan’s domestic environment, even to the rational analysts is fragile. The highly complex social status portrays that there is no win-win situation for any party involved. Hence, only relative power of negotiating parties will define the future Afghan set-up. Concurrently, the key regional players also have immense vested interests in the withdrawal scenario. Nevertheless, various scenarios will unfold in post 2014 Afghanistan,

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Ambassador Arif Kamal is currently Director Global Studies at ISSRA-NDU, Islamabad.

Ms. Beenish Sultan is Research Associate at ISSRA- NDU, Islamabad.

mainly reflecting on the extent of power-sharing amongst the local contenders as well as a 'fractional' transition of control of security apparatus from the Americans to the Afghan government. Furthermore, the chances of fighting in Afghanistan will not diminish and the potential of the Afghan National Army to fight against the resistance will define the domestic security scenario post 2014. Hence, the scenario is fraught with unpredictabilities and Islamabad should look towards employing a strategy so as to minimize the negatives and instill damage control.

Introduction

The end of heavy US military engagement in Afghanistan by 2014 brings an end to the ‘longest war’ in contemporary history. However, the country and neighboring Pakistan would need a longer struggle to overcome the destabilization impact on their economies and social fabric. Afghanistan is at the threshold of a transition that aims at bringing the US exit strategy to fruition. In this, the prime US objective is geared to the newer Obama policy to wind-down heavy military engagement abroad, while securing economic and political compulsions back home.¹ It is re-ordering the priorities and does not necessarily imply an eclipse from the scene.

The US plans of leaving behind 10,000 to 15,000 counter-terrorism groups,² primarily at Bagram Airfield, restricts the idea of a total withdrawal from Afghanistan. It also continues to raise the specter of fallout from the prolonged conflict on to the neighborhood. This is very much similar to Iraq, where about 140,000 American troops once resided persistently.³ The ‘road back’ from Iraq’s ‘war of choice’ was not as complicated as the one from Afghanistan. The latter hinges upon a full fledged strategy of reconciliation with the stakeholders, training the Afghan forces and building up the institutions of the country. Consequently, the challenge in Iraq was essentially one of rebuilding, whereas in Afghanistan, it is one of building from scratch.⁴ The upcoming take-over of Afghan forces, now being trained, comes in tandem with unpredictable domestic environs.

Context

The transition in Afghanistan is now acquiring an irreversible trend and carries with it the potential of unfolding multiple challenges for the various stakeholders namely: US, Pakistan, Government in Kabul and its Resistance. In this regard, the US desires to avoid ending up in a messy situation and, therefore, seeks a 'modicum' of stability in the wake of the process. In addition, every stakeholder is confronted by challenges which are more pronounced in the domains of: military, political, social and economic. Meanwhile, the US is in a state of denial as to whether or not the prime objectives in Afghanistan, disrupting and dismantling Al-Qaeda, have been achieved or not. In a nutshell, the process of transition primarily has inevitable linkages with the dynamics of the internal rapprochement and, therefore, remains blurred. Needless to say that the consequences for internal make-up and external fallout are, indeed, interwoven.

The Issues in Afghan Transition

The transition is fraught with uncertainties in multiple ways: the foreign troops' cut will bring in a reduction in the cash flows both for military and civil assistance, that has been the engine of broad based activities in the Afghan realm. This will now interface with country's fractious politics and insecurity, besides a wide range of additional factors that threaten to disturb the transition.⁵ This situation remains beset by insecurity, corruption, drug trafficking and political instability⁶ and therefore, poses costs and risks for the

'Challenges of Transition in Afghanistan: Quest for Peace and Stability'

major stakeholders; including both from the perspective of Kabul and neighboring Pakistan. Moreover, the prime US objectives also remain blurred.⁷

While the stakeholders are skeptical of the evolving scenarios as the transition approaches, the domestic environment of Afghanistan also appears to be bleak primarily in four domains.

- **Security.** The absorption of diverse local militias into the Afghan National Army (ANA) that stays short of making a cohesive arm of the state, has increased the tendency of ‘green on blue attacks’. Furthermore, there is a perceived imbalance between the projected rise in the army’s strength and budgetary resources⁸ that may inject another kind of militarization, either in the form of take-over by the army or fueling of internal disturbances and even cause an outburst on the neighborhood.
- **Economic.** The foreign presence on Afghan soil is itself generating immense economic activity primarily by way of funds. However, the fact remains that the aid⁹ driven economy is likely to crumble after the transition; when there are no long term commitments of foreign aid. In addition, the crisis situation over the decades has not given to a sustainable nucleus for economic development. This situation does not carry sufficient non-military basis for economic activity and dividends.

- ***Social.*** The conflict ridden country has a complex social system. This complexity in fact poses challenges in the post transitional phase. The cross-border demographic overlap of Afghanistan with Pakistan can carry a kind of negative mobilization if the negativities are not substituted by positives, due to the historical linkages between both the states. There can be fallout on Pakistan in the form of refugees and social migration¹⁰.
- ***Political.*** The ethno-politico distributions of the Afghan society exist as a chief reality. However, the political infrastructure of the country does not adequately reflect this fact, particularly the share of dominant Pushtoon community, which is one half of the population. Thus, the much promised conciliation process is not running in tandem with the transitional phase. This is bound to create a political vacuum soon after the transition.

Keeping in view the underlined issues, operationalizing the goal of a 'peaceful Afghanistan' will be a remote possibility if a steady dialogue is not promoted in the Afghan milieu amongst various stakeholders. The 'longest war' has produced a stalemate and cannot be expected to produce a 'victor's peace'. What can be achieved is a 'negotiated peace', based on mutual accommodation and concessions.¹¹ In addition, Pakistan, as a major stakeholder, is not free from the negative fallout of the war and the unpredictability of the outcome that is in store. Therefore, it has joint stakes with others in the management of this process.

US - the Player

The US needs a reliable support mechanism in the wake of Afghan transition. It has to share some responsibility with the regional powers, preceded by a transfer of responsibility and power to the Afghan government in a gradual and graduated fashion. For this purpose, the US also needs to bring on board international and regional stakeholders for stability in Afghanistan.¹²

The US has devised a multi-pronged strategy to deal with the transition in 2014. The state and 'nation building' is, thus, the new Afghan Project. The US is now concentrating on building up Afghan security forces, promising long-term and sustained support for Kabul, and training of the Afghan forces. The US has also realized that it will have to ultimately strike a negotiated settlement with the Taliban, because the US and NATO have completely failed to defeat the Taliban, or what many call, the Resistance forces. Interestingly, this realization is bi-directional, as the Taliban also know that they cannot have a run over on Kabul as well.¹³

In the wake of the looming stalemate, there is no win-win situation for any party to the conflict, though relative power of the negotiating parties would matter in a give and take manner, when the US proceeds further in an engagement with the Taliban in its attempt for reconciliation. In that scenario, the US role will be largely 'residual', yet significant, seeing the current situation. The US is building strategic partnership with the Afghan government in terms of maintaining its bases, air support, drones and intelligence.

The dilemma that the US faces today is whether to save face or to save Afghanistan. Both of these are conflicting impulses. There is no doubt that the Afghan war is the most unpopular and ill-timed war especially, economically, owing to the world-wide economic recession being witnessed for the past a few years. By all means, the Americans want the forces back home, cut losses and withdraw.¹⁴ The US is financing the Afghan security at the cost of \$ 3 billion in the form of USAID, supporting the reconstruction with a cost of \$ 3-4 billions.¹⁵ According to the current estimates, the US is incurring a cost of \$ 120 billion on military operations annually.¹⁶ Thus, the changing mission of US seems to be; to train, advise and assist the Afghans, which practically means adoption of a 'residual security role' over the horizon.

Imperative of Reconciliation Process in the Wake of Transition

The key element of transition entails a steady reconciliation process amongst the major stakeholders. It is seen as a prerequisite for safe drawdown and also to reduce possible fallout on neighboring Pakistan. The degree of progress in the reconciliation process also assures 'safe drawdown' and prevents immediate collapse in the order. Hence, any measure of success towards a 'political settlement' is ideal.¹⁷ However, to date the steps towards such process are viewed as half steps and Pakistan, despite being the major stakeholder, is not entirely in the picture.

The US engagement with the Taliban which was once varyingly described as 'scooping', 'contacts' and, perhaps,

'talks' can now be deemed on the onset of preliminary negotiations.¹⁸ The re-opening of the Taliban office in Doha, Qatar, this January, now provides a window between the two to engage the Afghan resistance, while the US gears up the drawdown.

The credentials of the interlocutors, the body of resistance they represent and the scope of discussion no longer remain in the gray area. The process of steering negotiations with the Taliban should now at least start talks to unfold an agreement on the space for Taliban in the power configuration in Kabul; this may unfold with the release of five Afghan prisoners from Guantanamo Bay and the return of the captured US soldier in Taliban custody. This comes in line with the attempts at setting a direction, if not pace, vouched by the US-facilitated preparatory steps; the UN Security Council's adoption of measures to separate the lists of Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the context of sanctions regime.¹⁹

Notwithstanding the nature of the contact, it would remain uncertain as to the measure of success or failure of the process. The core question would now relate to direction and scope of reconciliation, multiple level dialogue between the Taliban and non-Pushtoon groups, agreement on the constitutional framework, gradual cessation of kinetic operations.

The track of a successful dialogue with the US would promise Taliban the benefits such as a share of political power in Kabul, together with space to advance their religious practices, control over territory, economic. Ostensibly, the previous US posture lays down conditionalities that Taliban leaders must disarm,

cut ties with Al-Qaeda and recognize the government of Kabul and its constitution. It is uncertain as to how these conditionalities would sustain as the US talks with the Taliban have now acquired greater visibility. The Americans have now accepted both the Taliban and Haqqani network as a legitimate power in Afghanistan, are talking to them directly, and accommodating their main demands, even if they lead to abandoning their lead assets like Karzai.

The Role of Regional and International Stakeholders

The contemporary outlook of transition is indeed interwoven with the role of regional and international stakeholders. Besides the US, the regional players namely India, China, Iran and also Russia will have stakes in the process. Indians are already taking up a multi-faceted role in Afghanistan, mainly in terms of security, intelligence and economic reconstruction. This is precisely the reason behind deliberate portrayal of India's soft image in Afghanistan through media and diplomacy. There is, thus, complete Indian alignment with the American interests and strategy. India is therefore, planning to invest around \$6 billion²⁰ and opening up a steel mill in Afghanistan, which shows that the Indians are planning to enter into competition over Afghan mineral resources and together with the US, they will do their utmost to defend the post-Taliban order in Afghanistan.²¹

In this regard, China and India are indeed pursuing their pragmatic interests in Afghan setting. China is eyeing the trillion-dollar mineral wealth in Afghanistan and defeating extremism and separatism.²² Beijing

seems to share American view of stability amidst transition, besides reconstruction and providing soft security assistance in this connection. In case of Iran too, somehow the US and Iranian interests coincide, when it comes to defeating the Taliban. Iran has no serious issue with the American war and, therefore, would be comfortable in any effort to contain Taliban insurgence.²³ Iranians would like to improve state to state relations with all the regional players, including the US. It is already pursuing close partnership with India on communication links, though it is not in favor of American bases in the region.

Furthermore, although Russia considers the presence of extra regional forces in its neighborhood as a point of concern, it also does not want the transition to be hasty and, hence, leaving a political vacuum.²⁴ It critically views the political approach adopted by the US in the Afghan endgame scenario and publically emphasizes on a considerable reconciliation process.

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan: A Perspective

Pakistan is sharing the longest border with Afghanistan, therefore, it remains the principal party amongst neighbors in the wake of the transition. However, at present, the apparent US moves to directly access the Taliban resistance, while bypassing Pakistan, is a manifestation of near stalemate that continues to exist between the two stakeholders. No doubt, in the ultimate analysis, Pakistan's participation is vital for the success of the transition in Afghanistan, and the secure drawdown as the wheel of implementations moves ahead.

Pakistan shares regional and global interests in achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan. It has commonality of interest with other stakeholders in the destruction of Al-Qaeda and containing Taliban. Nevertheless, Pakistan no more pursues the concept of a 'strategic depth' viz-a-viz Afghanistan. In this context, it also needs to balance out its long term interests in a partnership with US. A logical corollary of this arrangement should be to confine the Indian activities in Afghanistan to rehabilitation and re-construction and certainly not to be playing as a new hegemon, while assuring that Afghan soil will not be used against the neighborhood. Concurrently, another challenge in the way is the eviction of the trans-border militant groups and delinking national security from private armed groups.

Pakistan's strategic disposition viz-a-viz Afghanistan brings in challenges as well as opportunities. The mutual border is the longest for either of the countries and carries ethnic overlaps of considerable size. Pakistan's role as the 'frontline' state has been a catalyst in the Soviet departure from the scene and remain pronounced in the international community's WOT. Afghan wars have proved to be too costly for Pakistan. It can save Afghan order, and also save itself from Afghan troubles.

A misperception seems to have been created that Pakistan is playing 'double-game'. By offering to bring Taliban to the negotiation table and having facilitated some talks between the US and Mulla Mohammad Omar's Taliban and also the Haqqani network, Islamabad has strengthened this impression.²⁵ Nevertheless, these

notions are misplaced, when viewed in the backdrop of ethnic overlaps between the two countries and necessity to engage the main ethnic group Pushtoons into the process.

On the other hand, Taliban have proved to be unpredictable and not very consistent in their attitude. They refused to expel wanted Pakistani militants and did not listen to Islamabad on the question of Osama bin Laden and for not destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas. It is going to be a struggle to ensure that Pakistan is not left all alone in a corner because of various unsubstantiated allegations, while the whole world lay in the opposite camp. This would be negative fallout of the exit of NATO forces.

There is an opinion that as Taliban would emerge stronger than their existing status after the exit of NATO forces, Pakistan would gain more leverage in Afghanistan compared to its present position. Pakistan would continue to be burdened by millions of Afghan refugees and more could migrate if a civil war breaks out in Afghanistan and Taliban try to recapture power once the NATO withdrawal is completed.

The issue of Durand Line/Pakhtunistan would continue to be unresolved and remain an irritant in Pak-Afghan relations whosoever is in power in Afghanistan.²⁶ However, Taliban in power would be a lesser problem for Pakistan compared to the other Afghan groups. Other present-day challenges for Pakistan including Baloch separatists finding sanctuaries in Afghanistan could end, if Taliban are back in position of power in provinces bordering Pakistan, once NATO forces are gone.

Pakistani Taliban using Afghan soil to launch attacks in Pakistan is a tricky issue, but it is more likely that Afghan Taliban following NATO exit would hold them back instead of letting them damage their ties with Islamabad. It is feared that TTP would be emboldened, if Afghan Taliban gain an upper hand following withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. The NATO exit may not mean the end of troubles for Pakistan, because Afghanistan without a political settlement would remain destabilized. As the US would have some military presence in Afghanistan and the region, its enemies too would continue efforts to remain in this theatre of war. Taliban for sure would continue the fight and even the depleted al-Qaeda would strive to remain relevant to the situation in the region.

The future turbulence in Afghanistan can have a serious impact on Pakistan. Thus, it would like to see a process of stabilization, which would help other things as drivers, so that we do not have a negative impact from the transitional phase. Pakistan has been facing the brunt of perpetual turbulence at its western border since quite a while now. However, an imperative question arises that can the tables be turned while the US has started off with the withdrawal or should it be ready for landing in a new type of crisis.²⁷

For Pakistan, the stability in Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal scenario and avoiding any negative tendencies is the central theme of its endeavors. For this, two things are of utmost importance: First, it should not be seen as instigating and designing a political architecture for the Afghans. Second, it needs to promote a national reconciliation process in Afghanistan. This is the first

step towards stability and protecting the core national interest of Pakistan.

Presently, Pakistan needs to adopt a more concrete strategy with an eye on longer term objectives, not just be reactive to situations as these unfold. In the absence of peace, Pakistan has been losing time in actualizing proposals for gas pipeline connectivity with central Asia, and cheaper electricity projects through Afghan territory. No other country is so directly linked with the Afghanistan situation as Pakistan, for this, a grand rapprochement over Afghanistan needs to be carried out. Therefore, a regional framework for peace that binds the countries of the region to Afghanistan's neutrality and to non-interference, offers the best hope for peace. It is here that Pakistan can jump in and play a decisive role.

Outlook beyond 2014

The situation beyond 2014 may unfold various scenarios in Afghanistan, they may be considered with a four-fold focus: Firstly, the transition may be considered only 'fractional' as the full control of security apparatus will not be transferred to Afghan security forces. Secondly, the fighting may not diminish in intensity as the drawdown approaches. Thirdly, the rate of attrition, now 20 per cent that will rise dramatically as the coalition forces withdraw. Fourthly, there are two ground realities that are likely to impact on the scenario: The resistance and Afghan National Army that also serves as an umbrella for warlords.

Beyond this, lack of clarity on the ultimate US objectives adds to complexity of the situation, and thus calls for treatment in a regional framework. Despite

claimed readiness of achieving a political solution to the Afghan issue by all sides, there are still no serious efforts to pursue a viable reconciliation process. Thus, the way out of a messy and an unwinnable war in Afghanistan appears to be more difficult than the hasty decision to attack the country nearly ten years back.

The US drawdown does not imply a total eclipse from a scene. With a continuous economic clout the US would still be taking decisions on issues related to security and strategy. Therefore, the administration in Kabul will remain dependent on external sources, especially for the tall order to maintain Afghan security forces.

The Resistance has suffered considerable losses, but it is still sustaining and constantly improving its capabilities, especially as evident in Panjsher, Ghazni and three other Southern provinces. Nevertheless, another scenario could emerge that before coalition forces withdrawal, the Resistance and the Afghan National Army will strike an agreement or compromise for which no major constitutional amendments are needed at all. Afghanistan will remain an amalgam of autonomous entities and, in theory, follow a pluralistic system and will interact politically with the rest of the world.

In a nutshell, Afghanistan beyond transition can remain a regional and global irritant, even if, there is a de-escalation. It has been the centre of gravity for conflict and competition since quite a while now. However, on the other hand, its geo-political disposition also carries great deal of potential to act as a bridge for trans-regional trade and regional energy corridor. In this regard, the geographical connectivity of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an indispensable reality.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The post 2014 scenario remains fraught with unpredictabilities. In this backdrop, policy agreed in Islamabad can only hope to strategize the country's interface with the scenario so as to minimize the negativities and exercise damage control of some sorts. The bottom line of Pakistani interests relate to the emergence of a free, united and 'friendly to all' Afghanistan.

The balance of domestic order lies in facilitating a power sharing mechanism amongst the Afghans, without the intrusion of the US. Consequently, after the power shift, the resistance and political parties in Afghanistan should reach a consensus. The ultimate formula may entail exclusion of Al-Qaeda, recognition of a pluralistic system and also commitment that the Afghanistan soil will not be used against any country.

Pakistan needs to play a three-pronged approach. Firstly, pursue the process of reconciliation within Afghanistan, directly or indirectly, so as to serve its core interest of stabilizing Afghanistan internally and to thwart the TTP phenomenon. Secondly, facilitate a political reconfiguration in power that has sufficient space for pushtoons who have a strong ethnic and linguistic overlap with Pakistani population. Thirdly, engage Kabul in very intense economic collaboration, whether bilateral or multilateral, that would deepen Afghan stakes in relationship with Pakistan and also correspond to the need of carving out a common habitat.

Key Findings

1. The withdrawal process promises an end to the 'longest war' in contemporary history while leaving Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan in a longer struggle to overcome its negative impact on their social fabric and economies.
2. Various scenarios will evolve in post 2014 Afghanistan, mainly focusing on the extent of power-sharing amongst the local contenders as well as a 'fractional' transition of control of security apparatus from the Americans to the Afghan government.
3. The withdrawal scenario is fraught with unpredictabilities and Islamabad should look towards employing a strategy so as to minimize the negatives and instill damage control.

Endnotes

- 1 Steve Coll, Roundtable proceedings at ISSRA-NDU, 26th April 2012.
- 2 David E Sanger, 'Confront and Conceal- Obama's secret wars and surprising use of American Power' (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012), 10.
- 3 Ibid, xviii.
- 4 Nathan Freier et. all, 'Iraq Vs. Afghanistan: A Surge is not a surge, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, 23rd Oct' 2009.
- 5 Anthony H Cordesman, 'The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition', Burke Chair in strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft' April 1' 2013.
- 6 Alexander Evans, 'The United States and South Asia After Afghanistan', Executive Summary, Asia Society- Advisory group on U.S. Policy toward South Asia, December 2012.
- 7 Khuram Iqbal, 'Cross-Border Implications of the Afghan Drawdown', Asian Conflicts Reports, Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research, Issue 18, July- August, 2011.

'Challenges of Transition in Afghanistan: Quest for Peace and Stability'

- 8 The projected strength of Afghan National Army is: 194,466 troops (Includes AAF) as of 31 Mar 2012.
- 9 Afghanistan is promised an aid of \$16billion with a \$2billion per year till the year 2017.
- 10 Estimates of 300 million Afghan refugees reside in Pakistan.
- 11 Berlin roundtable: Maleeha urges NATO nations to examine their Afghan policy, *Express tribune*, 4th Feb' 2013.
- 12 Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars; the Secret History of CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004)
- 13 Rasul Baksh Rais, Seminar titled: 'Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability', ISSRA-NDU, Dated: 27th June' 2012.
- 14 Astri Suhrke, *When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) 22.
- 15 Anthony H. Cordesman, 'The US cost of the Afghan War: FY2000- FY 2013- Expenditures and Aid and prospects for transition, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Burke Chair in strategy, May 14, 2012.
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Amb Arif Kamal, 'The Projected US withdrawal from Afghanistan: Reviewing the Broad Contours and Implications for Pakistan', NDU monograph, Vol: II, Issue II, 2011.
- 18 Tariq Osman Hyder, "Afghan Maze: Obama Maps Out Irreversible Drawdown of US Forces", *Gulf News*, 25 April, 2011
- 19 Rustam Shah, "Separating Al-Qaeda from Taliban", *Express Tribune*, June 24, 2011, Available on <http://www.columnspk.com/separating-al-qaeda-from-taliban-by-rustam-shah-mohmand/>, Retrieved on 02 July, 2011
- 20 http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/karzai-seeks-more-indian-investment-in-afghanistan-113052100842_1.html
- 21 ibid
- 22 ibid
- 23 Janne Bjerre Christensen, 'Strained Alliances- Iran's troubled relations to Afghanistan and Pakistan', Vesterkopi AS, Danish Institute for International Studies report 2011:03.
- 24 MK Bahadurakumar, "Russia stops US on road to Afghanistan", *Asia Times*, January 27, 2009
- 25 David E Sanger, 'Confront and Conceal- Obama's secret wars and surprising use of American Power' (New York: Crown Publishers, 2012) 118.
- 26 Bijan Omrani and Frank Ledwidge, "Rethinking the Durand Line: The Legality of the Afghan-Pakistani Frontier," *RUSI Journal* 154, no. 5 (October 2009): 48-56.
- 27 Liam Collins, 'United States Diplomacy with Pakistan Following 9/11: A Case Study in Coercive Diplomacy', (New Jersey: Princeton, 2008), 2.

Political Stability of Afghanistan: A Pre-requisite for Stability of Pakistan*

Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi¹

Abstract

Political stability of Afghanistan is a prerequisite for peace in South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular. Afghanistan's political situation directly impinges on the security of Pakistan. The continued conflicts and civil wars in Afghanistan for the last three and half decades have badly damaged the political institutions of Afghanistan and caused unimaginable losses, both in men and material, not only to the people of Afghanistan but also to the people of Pakistan, particularly in the areas located in the proximity of Afghanistan. In the wake of planned drawdown of NATO in 2014, an atmosphere of uncertainty looms large on the political horizon of Afghanistan, with the apprehensions expressed that this country may plunge once again in the abyss of lawlessness and civil war. The study in hand aims at distillation of Afghanistan's existing political and security systems and chances of their survivability after NATO's drawdown, besides analyzing the current frictions between Pakistan and Afghanistan on various issues. The underlying assumption of this study is that the political and security situation of Afghanistan has a direct linkage with security and political stability of Pakistan. The key findings of this study are that political and security systems of Afghanistan

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Lieutenant Colonel Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi is Deputy Director, Officer-in-Charge, National and Military History Cell, and Editor ISSRA Papers at NDU, Islamabad.

have too fragile structures and institutions, which are heavily dependent on foreign assistance. Afghanistan could not develop trustworthy relations with neighboring states, particularly Pakistan, by removing various irritants. The government of Afghanistan needs to recognize Durandline and work out, in collaboration with Pakistan, an effective border management and surveillance mechanism, to wipe out the infrastructure of drug- traffickers, saboteurs and terrorists from both sides of Durandline. The international community needs to work towards peace and stability of South Asia, as the people of this region deserve much needed respite and let-up from violence and bloodshed.

Introduction

Political stability is a prerequisite for the development and prosperity of any nation; a dream which yet remains unrealized in the case of Afghanistan. It is the most unfortunate tragedy of contemporary history that the state of Afghanistan and its people have been seething under perpetual political unrest, violence and human sufferings for the last more than three and half decades. Afghanistan is virtually a war-ravaged and fragmented country. Generations after generations of Afghan people have been witnessing nothing but violence, bloodshed and chaos in their society, both when they were fighting against former USSR and now when they are involved in GWOT. No let-up from this violence seems to be in the sight for Afghanistan and its neighbors, at least in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan's political situation directly impinges upon the security of Pakistan. Both these states share a long border, which stretches over 2590.4 km. This border is porous in nature, without any effective surveillance system, which becomes a major cause of cross-border movement of terrorists and criminals.

Since the NATO's planned drawdown is fast approaching, fears and apprehensions loom large on our national horizon about likely fallouts of Afghanistan's instability and frictions. It is assumed that the political and security situation of Afghanistan has a direct linkage with the security and political stability of not only Pakistan but also the entire South Asia. This paper aims at distillation of Afghanistan's existing political

and security system and chances of their survivability after NATO's drawdown, besides analyzing the current frictions between Pakistan and Afghanistan on various issues. The paper also proffers certain policy recommendations for various stakeholders.

Political Stability of Afghanistan – Defining the Criteria

The subject of political stability is one of the most intractable concepts in modern academic debate¹. Hurwitz defines political stability as “the absence of violence, governmental longevity, the absence of structural change, legitimacy and effective decision-making”.² The key indicators of political stability, according to Hurwitz, therefore, are:

- Absence of violence
- Governmental longevity
- Absence of structural change
- Legitimacy
- Effective decision- making

A number of empirical studies were conducted subsequently to further distil the themes related to political stability. The most common theme, related to degree of violence and strife and their intensity, was undertaken by Russet and Bunselmayer, in which they used a very rudimentary way of counting the number of deaths directly as a result of inter-group violence per 1,000,000 units of population.³ This technique was,

however, considered as an insufficient indicator to assess political stability, because there could be many political actions that may not result in the loss of life but which can be detrimental to the stability of any country.⁴

Claude Ake elucidated this concept further by observing that members of any society strengthen or undermine political system to the extent that they obey or disobey the laws produced by that system. "Obedience to the law constitutes political behavior just as much as contesting elections does," he opined. He further states, "if the incidence of violations of law continues to increase, political authority eventually atrophies; that is axiomatic."⁵

Another study was conducted by Ivo K. Feierabend and Rosalind Feierabend, who introduced a scale of 0 (extremely stable) to 6 (extremely unstable) ratings of eighty four nations over a time span of seven years (1955-1961).⁶ They defined the concepts of stability and instability as:

"The degree or the amount of aggression directed by individuals or groups within the political system against other groups or against the complex of officeholders and individuals and groups associated with them. Or, conversely, it is the amount of aggression directed by these officeholders against other individuals, groups or other officeholders within the policy."⁷

Both the writers opine that aggressive behavior of individuals is caused by 'system frustration', which in turn, causes instability. System frustration stems from

a system's inability to satisfy social demands as against 'social wants'. The system, in our case the political system, should have the ability to meet the demands and the needs of the society, apart from its ability to adapt to the changing circumstances.⁸

An important inference drawn by Feirabends is that aggressive behaviors might be inhibited by coercive mechanisms, such as punishments; however, a polity where coercive methods are the primary means of resolving the crises is not a stable polity. A stable society would be capable of relieving system despondency (frustration) through constructive methods. A number of political, administrative, entrepreneurial and other instruments would be available in a stable society to induce non-aggressive and non-violent behaviors.⁹

If the situation of political stability in Afghanistan is analyzed in the light of first indicator, suggested by Hurwitz, there can hardly be any denial that Afghanistan is one of the most unstable countries in the world. Afghanistan's internal politics have been characterized by coercive and violent means of problem solving in most part of contemporary history.¹⁰ The impact of this violence on the people of Afghanistan and, thereby, on Pakistan is an important subject of this paper.

The second element of political stability, as per defined by Hurwitz, is the longevity of the governments. There is a great deal of academic debate about this criterion to judge the stability of any political system.¹¹ The dictatorial regimes, for instance in Middle East, have very long periods of rule, whereas, the democratic

governments frequently change. Therefore, Hurwitz suggests that distinction should be made between legal and illegal successions of the heads of the government or states i.e. chief executives. Application of this criterion to assess political stability in Afghanistan may sound too simplistic, as only 17 heads of the states changed in Afghanistan since 1919. But how these governments were changed is a more relevant question with reference to the study of political stability of Afghanistan than the question 'how often'. Edmund Burke, thus, justifiably argues that "a state without the means of some change is without the means of conservation."¹²

As regards the legitimacy of a political system, as a criterion of its stability, some writers believed that it was an important element for sustainability of any political structure. The stability of a system is related not only to its legitimacy but also to its effectiveness, as opined by many writers.¹³ Ernest Duff and John McCamant state, "in a stable political system, the members of the system consider it to be both legitimate and effective."¹⁴ In the words of another writer, Martin Lipset, "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system to engender and maintain belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate one for the society."¹⁵ But linking legitimacy with political stability has been criticized by a number of writers as well.¹⁶

The application of legitimacy criterion to Afghanistan reveals that there was hardly any period in history of Afghanistan when all powerful leaders and common citizens could have accepted the legitimacy of the

political system. Afghanistan remained in most part of history the hub of foreign interventions and internal strifes. In recent times, the governments were frequently changed on gun point and the rulers were assassinated. Each successive ruler challenged the legitimacy of the previous one.

Yet another criterion to the study the concept of political stability is the 'basic structural arrangements in a society and their durability'. Hurwitz accepts the relevance of this criterion, but also highlights imprecision in its application. He also questions as to what is meant by basic structures and to what extent the changes should occur, which might determine that the structures had been changed.¹⁷ The concept of structural arrangements crystallizes through the study of Dessauer's analysis of 'foundations of a society': "stability has to depend on the actual changes being few, slow and not fundamental".¹⁸

It can be inferred from this discussion that the frequent changes in the fundamental structures or the foundations of the society indicate its instability and few, slow and infrequent changes indicate the inverse trends. Once tested on the anvil of this criterion, Afghanistan emerges conspicuously as a country, which has witnessed frequent changes in its political structures. Prior to 1919, Afghanistan was under the British suzerainty, followed by Amanullah's Government, which was reformist in nature. Thereafter, a succession of bloody changes, including PDPA's communist regime, Islamic State of Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal, Taliban's extremist government and now the Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan, all indicate towards frequent fundamental changes in the structures of Afghan politics.

Finally, there is a need to make a mention of another approach to study the stability of any political system and that is the relationship between the political structures (rulers) and the members of the society (ruled). Eckstein finds a number of overlapping factors, which contribute, towards stability of any system. "They include: continuity of the political system including its ability to adapt to changing circumstances, legitimacy of the system, effective decision-making, which demonstrates the political system's ability not only to make consensus-based policies but also implement them competently, and finally the genuineness rather than superficiality of the participatory institutions and processes of the political system."¹⁹

There are different other sets of criteria suggested by a number of writers, but for the purpose of this paper, the criteria set by Hurwitz are being used primarily to undertake study on the political stability of Afghanistan and its impact on Pakistan.

The Existing Political System of Afghanistan and its Fragility

Political stability in Afghanistan has been the dream of Afghans as well as their neighbors in most part of modern history. "The country's history is replete with long but intermittent periods of instability that alternated and diluted the achievement of each period of relative calms in which the inhabitants of this region tried hard to rebuild their lives."²⁰ The people of Afghanistan have

been living under the shadows of wars and violence, particularly for the last three and half decades. From 1979 to 1991, Afghanistan was manifestly under Soviet occupation, followed by factional feuds and civil war and a relative interlude of peace during Taliban's regime.

The present political set-up, introduced under US and NATO tutelage, seems to be as weak and fragile as a spider's web. Stability in Afghanistan has eluded not only the Afghans but also concerned foreigners and neighbors like Pakistan, since the establishment of modern Afghan state in the first quarter of nineteenth century.²¹ Applying the criteria enunciated above, an extremely dismal picture of the state of Afghanistan emerges, as discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

The Constitutional Framework of the State of Afghanistan

The present political system of Afghanistan got its legitimacy through Emergency Loya Jirga and Bonn Conference. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was framed by a Special Constitutional Body formed for the purpose i.e. Constitutional Loya Jirga on 14 December 2003, which managed to present the Constitution in January 2004 and, consequently, it was signed on 28 January 2004.²² The Constitution consists of twelve chapters, spreading over one hundred sixty one articles. The broader contours of the Constitution are as under:-

- Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary and indivisible state.²³

- The President is the head of the State and Chief Executive of the country, who is elected for five years, through direct vote. He has two Vice Presidents, who are nominated by the President.²⁴
- The National Assembly of Afghanistan consists of two houses: Wolesi Jirga (the House of People) and Meshrano Jirga (the House of Elders).
- Wolesi Jirga is elected for a term of five years. The total number of seats of Wolesi Jirga will vary from 220-250, distributed among various regions as per the proportion of the population. At least two female candidates shall be elected from each province.²⁵
- The Members of Meshrano Jirga are elected as under:-
 - Each Province Council elects one person to serve as the member of Meshrano Jirga for the period of four years.
 - Each District Council elects one person for a period of three years to serve as the member of the Meshrano Jirga.
 - Remaining 1/3 members of the Meshrano Jirga are appointed by the President from amongst experts, experienced persons, including two disabled persons and two representative of Kochis for a period of five years.²⁶

- Loya Jirga manifests the people's will in Afghanistan. It consists of Members of the National Assembly, Chairpersons of the Provincial and District Councils. The Ministers, the Chief Ministers and Members of the Supreme Court can participate in its sessions but cannot vote. This constitutional body is to be convened in the following situations²⁷:-
 - To take decision related to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the supreme interest of the country.
 - To amend the provisions of the constitution.
 - To impeach the President.
- Provincial Councils are elected for a period of four years through direct and secret ballot.
- District Councils are elected for a period of three years.
- All Federal Ministers are the nominees of the President. All Governors of the Provinces are again nominated by the President.

Structures of Afghan Government – The Weak Areas

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was, by all means, an interim arrangement. It is far from being the final document. There are a number of areas which need definite improvement. Some of the structural shortcomings of Afghan political system are being highlighted in this paper.

- **Ethnic Divide**

The diversity of cultural make-up of nations, on the bases of ethnicity, language and religious, is considered as a normal phenomenon in most parts of the world, provided other factors such as common culture and politico-economic interests homogenize the populace. At the dawn of modern times, the territory of what is now Afghanistan was inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups, which apart from Muslim faith, had little in common.²⁸ Ethnic factor is so strong in the affairs of Afghanistan that it plays central role in the making of political parties, elections, formations of Governments and recruitment and commissioning of public servants.

The ethnic groups in Afghanistan are solid cultural units, which remained divided by boundaries and have been engaged in conflict for years.²⁹ Historically, however, ethnicity had never been played up, as it is done today. Most of the top level leadership positions, including kings were held by Pashtuns, who had always been in majority as compared to other groups. The war in Afghanistan has vastly changed the traditional balance and power equation. Non-Pashtun minorities are more dominating today, particularly in post-Taliban Afghanistan than they were two decades ago.³⁰ Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais says, “the United States, in its war against Taliban after the 9/11 tragedy, tried the time-tested strategy of courting the enemies of the enemy. Northern Front came forward, as the natural ally of the super

power, by offering every possible help, as the interests of both the US and Northern Alliance were common in crushing the Taliban, which increased the apprehensions among Pashtuns about their representation in the post-Taliban power arrangements.”³¹

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan recognizes more than fourteen ethnic groups in Afghanistan.³² In the absence an accurate population census, the demographic composition of Afghanistan always remained controversial and unreliable. However, most of the analysts cite the following figures:-

Table-1: Ethnic Configuration of the State of Afghanistan³³

Ethnic Group	Percentage
Pashtuns	42 – 48 %
Tajiks	19 – 25 %
Hazaras	9%
Uzbeks	9%
Aimak	3 – 4 %
Turkmen	3 – 4 %
Balochi Tribes	2 %
Others	4 %

Despite being in majority, the Pashtuns feel marginalized in the existing political dispensation. In the light of Bonn Agreement, the Central Executive was formed as per following representation of ethnic groups:-


Political Stability of Afghanistan: A Pre-requisite for Stability of Pakistan

Table-2: Ethnic Composition of the Government of Afghanistan³⁴

Ethnic Group	Representation	Percentage
Pashtuns	11 Ministers	36%
Tajiks	8 Ministers	26%
Hazaras	5 Ministers	16%
Uzbeks	3 Ministers	10%
Others	3 Ministers	10%
Total	30	

Though a Pashtun origin President, Hamid Karzai, took over as the President, but todate the Northern Alliance’s domination of Afghan government is conspicuous, as it holds 64% of the overall Cabinet slots. Apart from above the representation of Panjshir group in the ASNF (Afghan National Security Forces) and civil services is disproportionately high, particularly in the officers’ cadre; as indicated in the following graph:

Figure-1: Ethnic Composition of the ANSF³⁵



It is rightly argued, therefore, that neither Bonn Agreement nor the government it chose was very representative of the demographic and traditional power centers of Afghanistan.³⁶ The subsequent developments in the central governmental structure could not correct this imbalance, due to strong influence of Northern Alliance and their ties with NATO and ISAF commanders. Ethnicity is more than ever a prominent factor in Afghan politics.³⁷

- **Highly Centralized System of Government**

Extensive powers seem to be concentrated in the office of President. The concentration of power is stunning, in fact. There is no oversight of the President's actions, which are unconstrained by any check and balances.³⁸ One can understand the rationale of powerful executive during the times of crises, but for a country like Afghanistan which has dispersed centers of power, based on regional, linguistic, sectarian and ethnic tendencies, the devolution of authority at local levels could be a more prudent approach. Similarly, a set of supporting institutions like Executive Office of US President would be required to assist such a strong Presidential Office, which Afghan economy can hardly afford.

- **Electoral Process**

Afghanistan's electoral process is highly controversial. Both the presidential elections of 2005 and 2009 as well as the parliamentary elections were criticized for lack of transparency, massive irregularities and manipulations. A major issue of elections was the

participation of over three and half million refugees, residing in Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan's democratic structure lacks institutionalization.³⁹ Some of the structural shortcomings are:-

- Weak Election Commission, consisting of hand-picked loyalists or protégés of powerful elite.
- Political factions and interest groups, dominated by warlords and drug barons, functioning as political parties. Political parties serve as nurseries for training and education of citizens in political skills, but such parties with strong democratic credentials do not exist in Afghanistan.
- Lack of democratic culture, political skills and empowerment of the citizens to actively participate and monitor the political process.
- Ethnic, sectarian and linguistic influences.
- Cumbersome procedure of elections that puts huge financial burden on Government exchanger, which a fragile economy of Afghanistan is in no position to sustain.

Smith has aptly drawn these conclusions about the election system of Afghanistan, when he says, "looking back at the significant transformations in Afghanistan over the past eight years-transformations that have yielded both positive and negative changes; one is stuck by two conclusions: the utter lack of progress made in building democratic institutions despite hundreds of millions of dollars spent on democratic processes, and

holding of now four elections (including the second parliamentary elections in 2010), and fact that the enduring disconnect between the citizens of Afghanistan and their Government – precisely what democratic democratization efforts were supposed to mend – is one of the biggest factors behind the growth of insurgency. Many discrete tasks have been done well, and the key electoral events have been held, but they did not seem to add up to democratization.”⁴⁰

Another report compiled by the experts at BOOKINGS Foreign Policy desk contains the following conclusions by Afghan think tanks themselves: “In the eyes of most Afghans, elections are being used to legitimize or rubber stamp the control of powerful and elections are compounding the distrust of institution.”⁴¹

- **Judicial System of Afghanistan**

Chapter-7 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan deals with the Judiciary. There are three tiers of Afghan Judiciary: The Supreme Court (in the centre), Courts of Appeal (in the provinces) and Primary Courts at District levels. These courts in most parts of the country are still in formative stage, for lack of qualified judges and supporting staff. Then, there is a considerable controversy about applications of various sets of laws. Islamic Sharia Laws, Anglo-Saxon Criminal and Statutory laws are applied in the courts. The qualified judges in Islamic Sharia, who can give balanced interpretations of Islamic laws, are hard to come by.

The Afghan Judicial system could not develop confidence in the people. Consequently, the disputes are still referred to and adjudicated by local Jirgas and tribal heads. This arrangement allows tribal chieftains to maintain their clout and weld their strong power bases.

- **Donors -Dependent Economic Structure**

One of the major concerns expressed by the experts about post 2014 Afghanistan is the sustainability of its economic structure, which is totally dependent on donations. How this huge political, security and administrative structure would be maintained, once the international donors pull out, is a big question mark. The wide spread corruption from top to bottom further compounds the problem. Although a number of donor countries pledged to continue their financial aids, at least through the years 2015 and 2017, yet there is no likelihood that Afghan economy would stand on its own feet in the foreseeable future. It does not auger well for a sovereign nation.

It is, perhaps, the reason that the successive governments in Kabul are ready to become willing stooges even to the states like India, which have hardly anything common with the people of Afghanistan, except the vested interests of power elites. "Afghanistan's transition from armed conflict to a stable, secure and developing society depends on its capacity to overcome a fundamental conundrum: economic development cannot take place in the absence of a secure environment, at the same time, a secure environment cannot long be sustained without progress in economic development."⁴²

- **Administrative Arrangements**

State of Afghanistan has 34 provinces (Walayat, plural Walayaat) and over four hundred Districts (Ulaswali). The elections to District Councils could not be held so far, due to serious controversies about district-boundaries. It entails, in turn, the non-completion of Mashrano Jirga (Upper House) of the National Assembly, where district Councils are required to send their representatives. Similarly, the Chairpersons are ex-office members of Loya Jirga, which also remains incomplete in the absence of elections of the district councils. There is also a disconnect between elected provincial councils and the nominated Governors. Provinces and districts are primary units, which need to take care of public welfare, maintenance of law and order and as well as developmental work. But existing government structure of Afghanistan seems to converge on the precincts of Kabul. Whereas, there is hardly any influence of the central government on far flung areas, which still remain under the influence of tribal warlords and clergy.

Afghanistan's Existing Security Apparatus and the Issue of its Survivability

Afghanistan has unfortunately been functioning as a security state for last four decades. The level of violence that Afghan society has gone through cannot be conceived about any other part of the world. When a house is at fire in a neighborhood, the other neighbor cannot be expected to remain unaffected. Hence, the

people of Pakistan are equal sufferers of Afghan tragedy. It is time that now all regional and global players must look at Afghanistan and Pakistan situation as a human tragedy. The chess board of power politics must not be laid on the corpses of innocent people, who are slaughtered day in and day out in proxies.

Since Afghanistan has yet to find political and security stability, being a war torn country, there is hardly any credible data available about Afghanistan and adjoining areas of Pakistan, in terms of losses to men and material, and the psychological impacts thereof on the general public. Even the data presented about post 9/11 period is highly unreliable, as it has been compiled by various organizations and institutions, with specific objectives. It will take time, when truth will unfold itself and we will come across ghastly stories. But whatever data is available, it is enough to tell us that security situation is far from being satisfactory.

Our concern in this paper is to analyze the existing security structure of the state of Afghanistan, the level of violence in Afghanistan and the strength and capacity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to withstand the challenges of national security after NATO's drawdown in 2014. The issue is being elucidated with the help of a few statistics, tabulated as under:-

Table-3: Major Security Related Indicators⁴³

Force	Current Level
Total Foreign Forces in Afghanistan	About 95,000 US: 63000 Other Allies: 32000
Total Number of US Security Contractors	109,564 Employed by U.S. companies, but not necessarily Americans. These figures only count those employed by the U.S. Department of Defense. ⁴⁴
Afghan National Army (ANA)	About 190,000 , close to the target of 195,000 planned by ISAF/NATO and about 5,300 Commands trained by US Special Forces
Afghan National Police (ANP)	About 150,000 close to the target of 157,000. 21,000 are Border Police, 3,800 Counter-Narcotics Police and 14400 Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
ANFS Salaries	About \$ 1.6 billion per year, paid by donor countries.
Number of Al-Qaeda Fighters	“Less than 100” or so, according to General Petraeus in April 2011.
Number of Taliban Fighter	Upto 25,000
Reintegration	About 7,000 re-integrated since 2010

It can be inferred from the existing state of security structure in Afghanistan that it would be extremely difficult for ANSF to face the daunting task of peace and stability in Afghanistan, once such a huge strength of foreign forces pulls out of this country in 2014.

Level of Violence in Afghanistan: Death Toll for the Last Five Years (2007-2012)⁴⁶

It needs to be re-emphasized that reliability of all figures pertaining to war casualties in Afghanistan is highly questionable, as UN started reporting casualties as late as in 2007. The period from 2001 to 2007, when heavy death toll took place due to massive onslaught of NATO/ISAF on Taliban militants, is conspicuously missing from most of the statistics compiled by US and the Western institutions as well as researchers about casualties in GWOT. But whatever figures are available from 2007 onwards are enough to indicate the level of violence in Afghan society, as depicted in the following tables:-

**Table-4 : US and NATO Casualties
(7 October 2007 to 15 July 2013)⁴⁵**

	All Fatalities	Hostile	Non-Hostile
US	2,244	1,795	449
Others	1,095	919	176
Total	3,339	2,714	624

Table-5: Afghan Casualties 47

Group	Period	Number of Casualties	
		Killed	Injured
Civilians	Upto 2007 to the end of 2011	11,864	-
	2007	1,523	-
	2008	2,118	-
	2009	2,412	3566
	2010	2,777	4,343
	2011	3,021	4,507
	2012	1,145	1,954
Afghan National Army	2007	278	750
	2008	259	875
	2009	292	859
	2010	821	775
	2011	511	256
	2012	173	327
Afghan National Police	2007	688	1,036
	2008	724	1,209
	2009	639	1,145
	2010	1,292	743
	2011	569	552
	2012	349	418

Surge in Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan in 2013

An alarming rise in the civilian casualties has been reported in Afghanistan in the first half of 2013. The UN report depicts a bleak picture, “Despite Afghan forces leading almost all military operations countrywide, a permanent structure does not exist in relevant ANSF

bodies to systematically investigate allegations of civilian casualties, initiate remedial measures and take follow-up action.”⁴⁸

Table-6: Afghan Civilian Casualties in 2013

Year	Killed	Injured
2013	1,319 Women: 106 Children: 231	2,533 Women: 241 Children: 529

Majority of analysts, researchers and scholars do not find much hope in the existing security system of Afghanistan. The composition and make-up of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is based more on ethnic influences than on professional selection or competence. The literacy rate of ANSF is very low; therefore, their capacity to achieve the level of modern fighting machine is limited. There are also apprehensions that ANSF may dissipate and fall back to regional militias and warlords. General Shaukat expresses his apprehensions about post NATO drawdown in these words, “Afghan Institutions are still too fragile; security structures are still ineffective and too unwieldy. Loosely controlled community police looks disasters..... It is perceived by most of the power players and stakeholders that Afghanistan is likely to once again experience civil war of nineties after departure of US forces in 2014”.⁴⁹

The Major Irritants in Afghanistan and Pakistan Relations

Once Afghanistan is recognized as one of the sources

of insecurity, not only for the peace of South Asia but also the entire world, it may not be a prudent policy for the US and NATO to abandon this volatile region once again, without showing any seriousness or commitment for durable peace in the long run. It needs to be appreciated and understood by all regional and global players that stability and peace in South Asia would remain a far cry, if real irritants among South Asian nations, particularly Pakistan and Afghanistan and Pakistan and India, are not removed. The following are the major issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan which cannot be settled without active role of US, NATO and UN:-

- Unrealistic Approach of Successive Afghan Governments about Durandline Agreement.
- Cross Border Movement of Drug-traffickers, Terrorists, Saboteurs and Criminals.
- Indian Factor in Afghan.
- Narcotics.
- Refugees.
- **Durandline Controversy**

The Durand line Agreement was reached between the Government of Afghanistan and Great Britain in 1893 and was signed by the then Amir of Afghanistan Abdul Rehman Khan and the British representative Sir Henry Mortimer Durand.⁵⁰ Pakistan inherited this Agreement on its independence in 1947, which stands recognized by UN and all regional and global countries, including US, UK, NATO and ISAF countries as well as successive Afghan governments, barring a few. It was,

in fact, a part of series of agreements reached among the Great Britain, the Tsars of Russia and Amir of Afghanistan, which resulted in the creation of modern state of Afghanistan.

Today's Afghanistan owes its identity to those agreements.⁵¹ The attitude of Afghan rulers has been described well by Ahmad Shayeq Qassem: "The processes which determined the Afghan borders are all open to controversy, yet the Afghan Government has only challenged its border with South Asia. The selective way in which the Afghan government treats borders is related more to considerations of domestic politics and transit trade with an impact on the country's political stability rather than the validity of its case".⁵² Durand line treaty was ratified by successive Afghan Governments in 1905, 1919 and 1930. US, ISAF and NATO Forces recognize this border as an international one, but could not convince the Government of Afghanistan to give it a 'dejure border' status.⁵³

The Government of Afghanistan needs to realize that it is better to play on '*positives*' rather than on '*negatives*' to negotiate the issues of transit-trade and make a serious effort to help itself and Pakistan secure their borders. It also needs to understand that 'securing border' does not imply 'closing of borders'. "The modern world requires secure borders, but does not require closed borders. In the 21st century, international investment, and the cross border movement of ideas, people, goods and services are necessary components of both economic and political development in any country. In landlocked Afghanistan, relations with neighboring countries define in many

aspects the interactions with the outside world as a whole".⁵⁴

The cost of this unnecessary controversy is not being paid only by Pakistan and Afghanistan but the whole world. The so called 'safe havens' for terrorists are located in the areas, which fall on either side of Durand line. Afghanistan needs to share the responsibility of these safe havens, if it is not ready to make Pakistan-Afghanistan border secure, by fencing and developing effective joint surveillance system, clearly demarcating the mutually agreed exit and entry points. The earlier it is done, the better it would be for the peace of the world in general and South Asia in particular.

- **Cross-Border Movement of Drug-traffickers, Terrorists, Saboteurs and Criminals**

A natural corollary to the border controversy is the cross-border movement of drug-traffickers, terrorists, saboteurs and criminals. Hundreds of kilometers of border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, passing through extremely rugged terrain / mountains, are free for all. Making this border secure is really a herculean task, but nevertheless, it has to be done, if both the countries and the world at large want an enduring peace. The hideouts and terrorist network of all known Al-Qaeda and TTP elements have been reported to be located on either side of Durand line. It is beyond comprehension, why the international community did not impress upon Afghanistan to help Pakistan secure this border and, thereby, secure the borders of both the countries. How much Pakistan has suffered due to this cross border terrorism, one can gauge from the following tables:-

Political Stability of Afghanistan: A Pre-requisite for Stability of Pakistan

Table-7: Casualties in Pakistan in Terrorist Activities (2003-2013)⁵⁵

Year	Civilians	Security Forces Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	1985	427	1263	3675
Total	17140	5249	26423	48812

Table-8: Suicide Attacks in Pakistan from 2002-2013⁵⁶

Year	Attacks	Fatalities
2002	2	27
2003	2	65
2004	8	82
2005	4	83
2006	9	161
2007	57	842
2008	61	940
2009	90	1090
2010	58	1153
2011	44	625
2012	32	243
2013	9	511
Total	376	5,822

- **Indian Factor in Afghanistan**

The presence of a wide spread network of Indian intelligence agencies, in the garb of trainers and contractors / builders, is a matter of serious concerns for Pakistan. No country can understand the Indian hegemonic designs better than Pakistan. Indian policy-makers could not and would not rise above their jingoism, to evolve the policies, which may be directed to integrate this entire South Asian regime into a peaceful and prosperous place in the world to live in, as the Europeans leaders did. Instead, India is still playing up with the militarist and coercive ploitics, which the European leaders of 1890s were passing through. Indians just want to surround and strangulate Pakistan. Their presence in Afghanistan bespeaks of nothing, but this fact and the Government of Afghanistan needs to understand it.

- **Narcotics**

Afghanistan is the world's largest producer of opium, which is around 80% of the total global production. The criminal gangs, drug-traffickers and terrorists thrive on black-marketing and sale of opium. It has been reported that 1, 54,000 hectares of land were filled by opium-poppy crops by the farmers in the year 2012, more than 131,000 hectors in 2011. It is amazing that the Taliban regime had been remarkably successful in eradicating the drugs from the society, whereas, the NATO and ISAF Forces kept a blind eye to this menace, for obvious short term military gains. Their belated actions now are yielding no positive results. 177 attacks have been

reported so far on the Afghan Security Forces, who tried to destroy poppy crops, killing 102 soldiers.⁵⁷ Narcotics are easily being infiltrated to various parts of the world. Pakistan is the worst victim of this menace, as a large number of Pakistani youth are fast turning into addicts. The effective border management and monitoring are a few of the means to eradicate or at least control this menace, which is extremely dangerous for the humanity as a whole.

- **Refugees**

One of the irritants between Pakistan and Afghanistan, but not the least important one, is the presence of around three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These refugees, who entered Pakistan after Soviet invasion of 1979, did not return to Afghanistan despite the lapse of more than three and half decades. Majority of them still lives in refugees' camps. They are a big source of cross- border movement of criminals, narcotics, arms and ammunition. Their continued presence has badly impacted the societal set-up of KPK and FATA in Pakistan. It is time that the government of Afghanistan should make effective arrangements for their repatriation.

Recommendations

The author of this paper, after dispassionately studying various aspects of political stability in Afghanistan, proffers the following policy recommendations for all stakeholders:-

1. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of

Afghanistan needs re-visiting, in order to devolve powers to the provinces and lower levels. Seeing the demographic and geographical configuration, it would be appropriate to work out more consensus-based central model of governance than an all powerful presidential model.

2. The governors in the provinces should also be elected, instead of being presidential nominees. It would add to their influence and effectiveness in the governance.
3. The factional politics in Afghanistan need to be gradually replaced by genuine representative political parties, based on clear policy-agendas and ideological foundations. Ethnic-based politics can only be changed into developmental and issues based politics through strong political parties.
4. Electoral system of Afghanistan needs complete re-vamping and institutionalization, in order to ensure transparent and credible elections in future.
5. Judicial system of Afghanistan has also to cover a lot of ground, to provide justice to the people even in the remote areas. Pakistan may extend assistance to the Government of Afghanistan for the training of judicial officers.
6. Afghanistan and Pakistan both should work out together joint programmes for economic development of the most affected regions. The

issue of Afghan transit-trade may also be settled amicably, so that an atmosphere of trust and confidence is promoted in both the countries.

7. The Government of Afghanistan should take bold steps to recognize Durandline, so that the borders of both the countries can be secured, both from the movements of terrorists, saboteurs/ criminals as well as the flow of narcotics to Pakistan and the rest of the world.
8. The Government of Afghanistan should take immediate steps for repatriation and rehabilitation of more than three million refugees, residing inside Pakistan. It is now over more than three and half decade that Pakistan is shouldering this burden.
9. The Government of Afghanistan should take concrete steps to provide exact information about Indian activities inside Afghanistan and address the concerns of Pakistan in this regard seriously, particularly at this point in time, once the Indians are again escalating activities on LOC and working boundary.
10. Pakistan and Afghanistan should work together to find out regional solutions to all the problems, with an extensive consultation with other neighboring countries i.e. Iran, China, CARS and Russia. Turkey, being the mutual friend of all these countries, can play a lead role.
11. Since the political stability of Afghanistan directly affects the neighboring state of Pakistan,

it would be unrealistic to work out any models of Afghan security in post- 2014, without effective and meaningful consultation and involvement of Pakistan.

12. The US, NATO, ISAF and UN should renew their focus on the peace and stability of South Asia and help resolve all issues, which endanger the peace and stability of this region. The political stability of Afghanistan cannot be ensured without making all its neighbors at peace. The people of Afghanistan and Pakistan deserve much needed respite from violence, bloodshed and lawlessness. All regional and global players need to work in this direction.

Conclusion

Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparable neighbors, which cannot be dissected by any machinations. The political stability of each of these neighbors is contingent upon each other. No other country in the world has suffered more than Pakistan, in terms of losses to men and material, and psychological impacts thereof to its populace, due to continued scourge of violence in Afghanistan for the last three and half decades. The proliferation of narcotics, arms and ammunition to each nook and corner of Pakistan is the gift of successive Afghan wars and civil wars since 1979. Now, when the final drawdown of NATO and ISAF is fast approaching, Pakistan's worries about the political stability of Afghanistan are but natural.

The central argument of this study is that peace in

South Asia in general and Pakistan in particular hinges on political stability of Afghanistan. Similarly, the peace and political stability of Afghanistan cannot be realized without effective collaboration of its neighbors. It is, therefore, logical that Afghanistan and all its neighbors should sit together, to honestly address the irritants and work out pragmatic recovery, re-construction, economic development and security plans, in which all of them find 'a win-win situation', and in turn, the people of this region live in much needed peace and tranquility. Afghanistan cannot be stabilized by quick fixes.⁵⁸ A long term commitment of UN, NATO and particularly neighboring countries would be required for an enduring political stability of Afghanistan.

Key Findings

- The political stability in Afghanistan is in the interest of not only Pakistan, but also the entire South Asian region as well as the world at large.
- The continued conflicts and civil wars in Afghanistan for the last three and half decades have badly damaged the political institutions of Afghanistan and caused unimaginable losses, both in men and material, not only to the people of Afghanistan but also to the people of Pakistan, particularly in the areas located in the proximity of Afghanistan.
- The existing Afghan political and security structures are too fragile, which do not seem capable of withstanding the challenges that they are likely to confront after NATO's drawdown

in 2014.

- Political stability in Afghanistan cannot be brought about without meaningful consultation, cooperation and involvement of its neighbors, particularly Pakistan.
- The people Pakistan and Afghanistan deserve much awaited as well as direly needed peace and let-up from the scourge of violence, therefore, the Governments of both the countries should promote friendly and harmonious relations, by honestly removing all the irritants in their mutual relations.
- The government of Afghanistan needs to recognize Durandline and work out, in collaboration with Pakistan, an effective border management and surveillance mechanism, to wipe out the infrastructure of drug-traffickers, saboteurs and terrorists from both sides of Durandline.

Endnotes

- 1 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'. MG Books Group, UK, 2009, p.4.
- 2 Leon Hurwitz, 'Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability'. Comparative Politics, Vol-5, April 1973, p.463.
- 3 Bruce M. Russett and Robert Bunselmayer, 'World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators'. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1964. pp.97-100.
- 4 . Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit. p.4.
- 5 Claude Ake, 'A Definition of Political Stability.' Comparative Politics, Vol-7 (January 1975),pp271-283. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor/discover>, on 4 August 2013.
- 6 Ivo K. Feirabend and Rosalind L. Feieabend, 'Aggressive Behaviors within Politics'. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol-10, September 1966 .pp.249-

Political Stability of Afghanistan: A Pre-requisite for Stability of Pakistan

271. Quoted by Ahmed Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem in his book 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit.p.5.
- 7 Ibid, p.5.
- 8 Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, 'Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America'.The American Political Science Review, Vol- 62, December 1968. p.1125.
- 9 Ivo K. Feirabend and Rosalind L. Feieabend, 'Aggressive Behaviors within Polities'. Journal of Conflict Resolution op.cit., p.5.
- 10 Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem, 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit.p.6.
- 11 See for example the arguments of Bruce M. Russet and Robert Bunselmayer in their book, 'World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators', (New Haven' Yale University Press 1964), pp. 104-105.
12. Edmund Burke, 'Reflections on Revolution in France' (London, 1790) p. 29. Quoted by Ahmed Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem in his book 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit.p.7.
13. Leon Hurwitz, 'Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability', Comparative Politics, Vol-5, April 1973, p.453.
- 14 Ernest A. Duff and John F. McCamant, 'Measuring Social and Political Requirements for System Stability in Latin America, The American Political Science Review, Vol- 62, December 1968, p.1125.
- 15 Seymour Martin Lipset, 'Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (London, 1960), p.77.
- 16 For study of differing views, one may go through introductory chapter of Afghanistan's Political Stability, written by Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem in his book 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit.p.7.
- 17 Leon Hurwitz, 'Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability', op.cit. p. 457.
- 18 Frederick Dessauer, 'Stability' (New York, Macmillan 1949), pp., 125-126.
- 19 Harry Eckstein, 'Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A study of Norway', (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966) pp. 11-32. Quoted by Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem in his book 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'.op.cit.p.12
- 20 Ahmad ShayeQ Qassem, 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized'. op.cit.p.1.
- 21 Ibid, p.1.
- 22 Kennath Katzman, 'Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security and US Policy, Congressional Research Service, 11 January 2007. pp.1-5.
- 23 Article-1, Chapter-1 of Official Afghanistan Constitution, p.2.
- 24 Ibid, Articles 60-63, p.16.
- 25 Ibid, Article-83, p.24.
- 26 26 Ibid, Article-84, p.25.

- 27 Ibid, Articles 110-115, p.33.
- 28 Amin Saikal, 'Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival'. Fifth Avenue, New York.pp.17-18. Quoted by Muhammad Saleem Mazhar et al in their paper 'Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan'. Journal of Political Studies, Vol-19, Issue-2, 2012. P.99.
- 29 Nazif M. Shahrani, 'State Building and Social Fragmentation in Afghanistan: A Historical Perspective (1986)'. Quoted by Muhammad Saleem Mazhar et al in their paper 'Ethnic Factor in Afghanistan'. Journal of Political Studies, Vol-19, Issue-2, 2012.p.99.
- 30 Ibid, p.9.
- 31 Dr Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 'Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan'. Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2008.pp.17, 32-35.
- 32 Article-4, Chapter-1 of Official Constitution of Afghanistan.p.3.
- 33 Muhammad Saleem Mazhar et al. op. cit.p.2.
- 34 Sven Gunner Simonsen, 'Ethnicising Afghanistan?:inclusion and exclusion in the post-Bonn institution Building'. Third World Quarterly, Vol-25, No.4.p.729.
- 35 Gretchen et al, 'Toward a Political Strategy for Afghanistan'. BROOKINGS Policy Paper No. 27, 27 May 2011. p.2.
- 36 Scott Seward Smith, 'Afghanistan's Troubled Transition'. Viva Books, Delhi, 2012. pp. 263-276.
- 37 Ibid, p-276.
- 38 Gretchen Birkle et al, 'Towards a Political Strategy for Afghanistan.' BROOKINGS Policy Paper number 27, May 27 2011.p.1.
- 39 Gregory Gleason and Timothy A. Krambs, 'Afghanistan's Neighbours and Post Conflict Stabilization'. Security Insight, George C. Marshall Europeans Centre for Security No.5 March 2012.p.1.
- 40 Ibid, p-276.
- 41 Gretchen Birkle et al, 'Towards a Political Strategy for Afghanistan.' BROOKINGS Policy Paper number 27, May 27 2011.p.1.
- 42 Gregory Gleason and Timothy A. Krambs, 'Afghanistan's Neighbours and Post Conflict Stabilization'. Security Insight, George C. Marshall Europeans Centre for Security No.5 March 2012.p.1.
- 43 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service, 25 June 2013.
- 44 BROOKINGS' Afghanistan Index, 15 July 2013.p.8.
- 45 Ibid.p.911.
- 46 Susan S. Chesser, 'Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians'. Congressional Research Service December, 6, 2013.p. Retrieved from www.fas.org/spg/crs/natsec/R41084.pdf.
- 47 Susan G.Chesser, "Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces nad Civilians'. Congressional research Service, December 6, 2012.pp.3-4. Retrieved from

- www.fas.org/spg/crs/natsec/R41084.pdf.
- 48 Emma Graham-Harrison.theguardian.com, Wednesday 31 July, 2013. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/afghan-civilian-casualties-rise-quarter-2013>, on 24 August 2013.
- 49 Major General Shaukat Iqbal, 'Security of South Asia, Impact of Conflicting Interests of Power Players and Way Forward for Pakistan. Manuscript, p. 101.
- 50 Kenneth Katzman, 'Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy'. Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 25 June 2013. p.47.
- 51 B.D. Hopkins, 'The Making of Modern Afghanistan.' Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. pp.11-33.
- 52 Ahmad Shayeq Qassem, 'Afghanistan's Political Stability: A Dream Unrealized', (UK, MG Books Group, 2009). p.44.
- 53 Raza Muhammad Khan, Lt Gen [®], 'Peace and War: Their Precepts and Principles'. Ferozsons Publishers, Rawalpindi, 2013.p.204.
- 54 Gregory Gleason and Timothy A. Krams, 'Security Insights'. George C. Marshal European Centre for Security Studies, Serial – 5, March 2012. p.1.
- 55 South-Asian Terrorism Portal, Datasheet, "*Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan*", Weekly Assessments and Briefings.<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>, Accessed on 22 August, 2013.
- 56 South-Asian Terrorism Portal, Datasheet, "*Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan*", Weekly Assessments and Briefings.<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>, Accessed on 22 August, 2013.
- 57 Major General Shaukat Iqbal, 'Security Politics of South Asia, Impact of Conflicting Interests of Power Players and the Way Forward for Pakistan. Manuscript.p.102.
- 58 William Maley, 'Stabilizing Pakistan: Threats and Challenges.' Foreign Policy Brief for the Next President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2008). p.1.

Pakistan and the Afghan End-game*

Tahir Nazir, Shumaila Ishaque¹

Abstract

The rapidly evolving security milieu in Afghanistan and overall in the region has created a set of challenges and opportunities for regional and extra-regional countries, to re-adjust their strategic priorities, according to the changing security architecture. Pakistan, being one of the key players in the Afghanistan conflict, is concerned regarding the evolving security and political landscape and trying to secure its short and long term interests in Afghanistan. At this critical juncture, Pakistan is facing multi-faceted internal as well external challenges. On the one hand, it has to deal with the internal worsening law and order situation and on the other; it has to respond to the evolving complex Afghan end-game. Furthermore, Pakistan has to re-position its security, political and economic priorities in the regional and international context, to optimize its benefits and reduce challenges of the Afghan end-game. It is against this dark backdrop, Pakistan's political and military leadership needs to cautiously evaluate the changing notions of security in the region and craft a policy, which could serve Pakistan's national interests as well as respond to the aspirations of Afghan people and international community.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

2 Tahir Nazir is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Currently he is focusing on Global War on Terror and its implications for regional stability.

1 Shumaila Ishaque is working as a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of research is 'Afghanistan and Peace Process Post-2014'.

Introduction

The drawdown of the US and NATO forces is likely to complete by the end of 2014.¹ It has sparked discussions about the impact of this drawdown on the security situation in Afghanistan and overall in the region. In the coming years Afghanistan is likely to go under a painless transition process in all spheres i.e. political, security, economic and social. According to the schedule set by US and NATO, the country is expected to take full responsibility from the foreign forces by the end of December, 2014.²

US and NATO forces will switch over their role from combat to “train, advice and assist.”³ It will shift the onus on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to take the leading role in maintaining the law and order of the country and to undertake, effective counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency operations and stand-alone against the Taliban and other insurgent groups. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is said to be a key player in the country’s transition after 2014.⁴ The foreign forces drawdown has shifted the international attention towards reconciliation, negotiations and finding a viable political solution of Afghan stalemate.⁵

The strategic milieu of Afghanistan is intricate, and it has many dimensions. The future of Afghanistan will be determined by the equation of four key players: the Afghan government, Taliban and other insurgent groups, US and Pakistan. It does not necessarily mean that the other regional and extra-regional actors are less important or they do not have stakes in the Afghan end-game.⁶

In this paper, the Afghan end-game will be studied with reference to Pakistan, as to why Pakistan is important for the stability of Afghanistan and for the overall region. The internal and external factors, which affected Pakistan's ability to play a constructive role in the Afghan impasse, will be analyzed. Pakistan's short and long term interests in Afghanistan, challenges and opportunities for Pakistan in the Afghan end game will also be discussed.

Why Pakistan is Important for Afghanistan?

Pakistan and Afghanistan are together home to approximately 43 million ethnic Pashtuns and being the immediate neighbor, Pakistan has seriously been affected by the developments in Afghanistan.⁷ It is not, the first time, that Pakistan has been affected by the Afghanistan's volatile security situation. Pakistan has faced the consequences of the Afghan-Soviet War, which started in 1979 and ended in 1990. Since 1979, Pakistan has paid the price of being the immediate neighbor of Afghanistan. This cost is not limited to security sacrifices of Pakistani people and security personnel; rather it also encompasses the political, economic and social costs with worst psychological impacts.

After 9/11 attacks, Pakistan became a frontline state in the war against terrorism and paid a huge price for that role. According to a recent report, Pakistan has lost 51000 lives,⁸ since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, including 4000 military casualties.⁹ And on economic front, Pakistan has suffered \$90 billion losses.¹⁰ The cost of Pakistan's participation in 'War on Terror', both human as well as

in material terms, has been heavier than any member of the foreign coalition fighting inside Afghanistan.¹¹ In return, Pakistan has only received \$15 billion from United States, which included only the provision and maintenance of essential military equipment and initially a meager amount as compensation.¹²

Additionally, Pakistan has faced the huge burden of 'Afghan Refugees' since the Afghan-Soviet War. According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Pakistan hosts over 1.6 million registered Afghans, the largest refugee population in the world, staying for the most protracted period in a single country.¹³ In addition to this, approximately one million un-documented Afghans are also living in Pakistan. The continuous stay of the Afghan refugees, combined with the growing security challenge posed by the illegal immigrants in Pakistan, has affected the strategic and socio-economic equilibrium of Pakistani society. It has injected an element of extremism and militancy in otherwise pluralistic society of Pakistan.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 by the US, has created a tsunami of violence across the region, consequently, Pakistan is facing the aftershocks of eruption of the worst kind of terrorism and barbarism in the modern history. It is generally believed that Pakistan's strategy of "cooperation" with the United States is one of the primary causes of contemporary terrorism directed at Islamabad.¹⁴ The terrorists and insurgents group killed innocent civilians and security personnel by exploding bombs, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and use of suicide bombings.

After the establishment of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), in 2007, the terrorists used sophisticated techniques against the law enforcement agencies to demoralize and inflict unacceptable damage to them. They have attacked the Mehran Base, key strategic installation at Kamra Airbase, and the powerful military General Headquarters (GHQ).¹⁵

The TTP and other militant groups justify their terrorist activities, by using the excuse of US and NATO forces' presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan's collaboration with US in the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT).

In short, Pakistan being the neighbor of Afghanistan and located at an important geo-strategic position has legitimate security, political and economic interests in Afghanistan's end-game. As it is evident from history, Pakistan can and will play a key role in Afghanistan.¹⁶ Thus, Pakistan has been working closely with the international community and Afghanistan at all levels to support Afghan reconciliation process. Pakistan strongly looks forward for the restoration of peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Pakistan has come to the conclusion that peace in Afghanistan is not only in its own interest but also in the interest of peace and stability of the region. There is emerging consensus among the political parties that war through proxies in Afghanistan has hurt Pakistan badly.¹⁷ Moreover, peace and stability of Pakistan lies in the peace and stability of Afghanistan and vice versa.

The role of regional countries, importantly Pakistan is critical in reaching a durable peaceful settlement of Afghanistan conflict. Recently, the newly elected Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif said, “Pakistan would support Afghan led, Afghan owned”, reconciliation process initiated by the Afghan High Peace Council, established in 2011.¹⁸ In recent months, Pakistan has played an essential role in bringing the reluctant Taliban leadership to negotiation table. According to Pakistan’s Foreign Office spokesperson, Mr. Aizaz Ahmed, “we (Pakistan) are convinced that an intra-Afghan dialogue and Afghan-owned peace process is the way forward to achieve peace in Afghanistan.”¹⁹

The opening up of Taliban’s political office at Qatar was the biggest political achievement of the decade long Afghan conflict, as it brought the warring factions to the negotiating table. In this endeavor, Pakistan has played its due role in convincing and using her political leverage on the Taliban’s leadership. The Taliban political office at Qatar was marked by the controversy and serious differences between Kabul and Washington. This controversy has generated a heated debate across the world regarding the future of the Afghan political reconciliation process. Now, the snow is melting at both sides i.e. Kabul and Washington. President Karzai hinted toward the resumption of peace process and negotiation on bilateral security agreement with United States.

In his 20th visit to Pakistan on 26th August 2013, President Karzai formally requested Pakistan to “facilitate ... the peace process in Afghanistan, and in

providing opportunities, or a platform, for talks between the Afghan High Peace Council and the Taliban movement.”²⁰

The Pakistan’s Prime Minister reiterated, that “Pakistan will continue to extend all possible facilitation and the international community’s efforts for the ... realization of this noble goal and Pakistan would also help reinforce regional efforts in support of stabilization of Afghanistan.”²¹

The recent meeting once again highlighted three things: firstly; the power sharing formula should be based upon the “inclusive” representation of the Afghan society, secondly; no solution can be imposed on Afghanistan from outside and thirdly; Pakistan has a critical role to play in Afghanistan’s peace and political settlement.

Internal and External Challenges Curtailed Pakistan’s Ability

There are a number of internal and external factors that influenced and impeded the ability of Pakistan as a state to play a constructive role in shaping the Afghanistan end-game for the regional stability.

Internal Challenges

Pakistan is faced with a host of internal challenges in the shape of violent extremism, growing sectarianism, militant separatism, foreign fighters, extra-state actors, failing economy and natural disasters. Furthermore, the country is facing the worst kind of onslaught of terrorism and violence in the contemporary history.

It has created a rift in the society, resultantly; it has been divided into two blocs: the right wing or the conservatives and the liberals or moderates. The two different and opposing views created confusion among the Pakistani society and generated an unending debate regarding the future course of action of Pakistani state vis-à-vis tackling the growing terrorism in the country. The conservatives are of the view that it is 'US led war' and we should get out from this as soon as possible. Also, they support the idea of reconciliation and talking with the Taliban.

On the other hand, the liberals are of the view that, although, this was not our war, but now we have been suffering the onslaught of terrorism since 2001, the terrorists are killing the innocent civilians and the security personnel, therefore, the government has no need to talk to them, rather they need to be crushed with a full military force.

The grave internal security challenges remain unaddressed, as being portrayed by the prevailing security situation of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan mainly and the rest of the country as a whole. Poor coordination among the security agencies and lesser attention to the capacity building measures of law enforcement agencies are adding to the problems. Pakistan, as a state, is facing tremendous and diverse challenges and the country has yet to formulate a comprehensive and wide-ranging counter-terrorism and national security policy.

The assault of TTP against Pakistan's law enforce-

ment agencies and civilians has increased at a dangerous level. Currently, TTP is based at Kunar, Afghanistan. Maulana Fazlullah, the leader of TTP is residing inside Afghanistan along with approximately 700 militants. On many occasions, Pakistan has raised this issue with the Afghan officials to crackdown on TTP and its affiliates, but Karzai government has shown no interest in this regard. Moreover, Pakistan demanded the custody of the Taliban leader, as he has blood of many innocent Pakistanis on his hands,²² However, Afghan government refused to hand over senior TTP leader Maulvi Faqir Mohammad to Pakistan.²³

In short, the ongoing 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan has grave geo-strategic consequences for Pakistan. Pakistan has paid huge cost in the form of militant insurgency in FATA, uprising in Swat, religious extremism, rampant rise of domestic terrorism, the backlash of US drone strikes and deep rift in the society regarding the 'War on Terror' and its aims and objectives.

External Challenges

In the wake of US and ISAF drawdown from Afghanistan, the uncertainty among the Pakistan's political and military leadership is increasing due to evolving Afghan complex end-game, intense rivalry between the regional players and competing strategic interests in the region. Pakistan has to re-position its security, political and economic priorities in the regional context. Pakistan, being the neighbor of Afghanistan, has certain legitimate security interests and stakes in

the 'deep game', which has been played on its western borders.

Pakistan and US faced the lowest point in their relations in 2011, as Washington and Islamabad's principles and strategies differed. Since 2001, there had been several issues i.e. killing of Osama bin Laden (OBL), Salala attack, Raymond Davis issue, replacement of Military Liaison Officers, use of NGOs for malicious reconnaissance, the American insistence to carry out operation against Haqqani Network and Pakistan's limitation, in this regard highlighted, the differences between both the countries.

As a result, Pakistan's relations with US have gone mired in deep mistrust that left Pakistan on the margins, even after making massive sacrifices in the 'War on Terror'.²⁴ In the following discussion, we will study the most important incidents that changed the course of this region and made peace a distant dream. President Karzai's uneasy ties with Pakistan and above all the Indian presence in Afghanistan will also be discussed.

OBL Operation

The killing of OBL on 2nd May, 2011, in Abbottabad by the United State's Special Operation Forces have raised several important questions about the future of Pakistan-US relations, and the US led 'War on Terror' in Afghanistan. The US' declaration that Pakistan was not informed about the raid on Osama bin Laden's home in Abbottabad illustrated the fragile and turbulent relationship between the two countries, and the fact

that US takes the solo flight, once, it comes to her own interests.

Pakistan also took corrective measures and responded to US in the same coin i.e. restricting its cooperation in the 'War on Terror'. Pakistan communicated to United States that it does not need military trainers and asked them to leave the country. Pakistan also conveyed to CIA's Chief that Pakistan would no longer tolerate CIA operators or contractors, inside Pakistan's territory who were not cleared by Pakistan.

NATO's Aggression

The Salala incident again aggravated the already tense situation between the two countries. The US led NATO forces attacked Pakistani border check-posts, stationed near the Pak-Afghan border on November, 2011.²⁵ This complicated the Pak-US future relations on the one hand and helped to identify the differences on the other hand, as the limitations of cooperation became visible. The blatant attack caused the death of 24 soldiers.²⁶ In response to this tragic incident, Pakistan decided to block NATO supply line for a longer time. The ground lines of communication were closed indefinitely, till US issued a formal apology.

The deadlock risked the counter-terrorism collaboration between both the countries and also intricate the US/NATO drawdown from Afghanistan. In this backdrop, US explored the alternate route from Central Asia for NATO's supply line, but abandoned it due to high cost. United States would have to pay

\$1 billion extra shipping fee as a result of the use of an alternative route through Central Asia.²⁷ However, after formal apology from US Secretary, Ms. Clinton, by stating, “we are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military”, subsequently, Pakistan government opened the ground lines of communications (GLOCs) for US and NATO countries and the relationship resumed to some extent towards normalcy.²⁸

Pakistan-Afghan Troubled Ties

Despite Pakistan’s numerous sacrifices, it has failed to win the support and sympathy of the Afghan political elite. Islamabad and Kabul never had good relations at the top level. Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai and his affiliates always blame Pakistan for creating trouble inside Afghanistan and throw all responsibility on Pakistan. They see Pakistan as a part of problem rather than a part of solution.

The pro-India stance of Karzai’s government has also created frictions between the two interlocutors. Moreover, India-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement highlighted that Karzai government is Indian-centric, whereas, Pakistan is still trying to negotiate a similar agreement with Afghanistan. The undue resistance from Afghan government has created hurdles for Pakistan’s leadership to play its due role in the stability of Afghanistan.

In addition to this, there are other issues, which are major irritants and serve as a bone of contention between the two neighboring state, such as:-

- Unresolved issue of Durand line.
- Influx of Afghan refugees and their continued presence in Pakistan for last three and half decades.
- Border management issues.
- Drug trafficking.
- Cross border movement of the terrorists and saboteurs.

The issue of Durand line has been a source of conflict between the two neighbors since 1947. Afghanistan is of the view that the treaty of Durand line was signed in 1893 between the British India and Afghanistan, and it is no more valid after the termination of British rule.²⁹ Afghanistan also claimed with little validity that the border treaty was inked by a state that no longer existed. On the other, Pakistan considers the Durand line, as an established international boundary and a settled issue.³⁰

All the other issues, such as influx of refugees, drug trafficking and cross border infiltration are the byproducts of the unresolved border issue, as it does not allow better border management. The difference between the two sides has deepened due to ongoing wave of instability in Afghanistan, weak state structure and continued mistrust between the two parties. However, at the same time both the neighboring countries have great prospects to co-operate not only in the fields of security, trade and economy but also in the field of health and education.

Indian Broader Footprints in Afghanistan: A Cause of Worry for Pakistan

The growing Indian influence in Afghanistan is supported by US and Afghan governments. It is evident from the Indian pledged amount of \$2 billion in Afghanistan against Pakistan's contribution of less than \$350 million.³¹ Moreover, India has become Afghanistan's leading regional development partner and its fifth largest bilateral donor. This has added to Pakistan's mistrust for the Indian policy objectives in Afghanistan.

The primary objective of India's Afghan policy is to counter Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan, to weaken Pakistan's influence over Taliban groups, uninterrupted access to Central Asian Republics' natural resources and lastly to encircle Pakistan.³²

Pakistan's uneasy relationship with Afghanistan and US created space for India to expand its footprints inside Afghan territory and to have a greater say in the evolving end-game. An un-abating US and Afghanistan blame game, that Pakistan is responsible for deteriorating security situation inside Afghanistan, forces Pakistan to re-visit its policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan, US and India.

This has led to a more cautious approach by Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan. On the other hand, India is busy in expanding its range of diplomatic activities i.e. opening up of two consulates in Jalalabad and Kandahar; and two more consulates in Herat and Mazar-e-sharief. Furthermore, India is investing in

large scale development projects such as Zaranj-Dileram Highway, Hydro-Electric Dam in Herat and huge investment in developing 1.8 Hjigak Iron ore mines in Bamiyan Province.³³ Additionally, Indian Agency for Partnership in Development (IAPD) will take the lead from Ministry of External Affairs and will expand development activities to Pashtun areas, bordering Pakistan.

The expansion of Indian footprints along the Pakistani border is a serious cause of worry for Pakistan. It has serious consequences for the domestic peace and stability in the country. Islamabad is of the view that there is a clandestine link between the increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan and the rampant rise of TTP terrorism activities inside Pakistan. India is also aiding and fueling insurgency in Balochistan by giving financial and logistic support to Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) militants.

Strategic Misperception: Downturn in Pak-US Ties

The State of Pakistan has fundamentally viewed Afghanistan, since September 2001, in terms of US presence on its border.³⁴ On the one hand, US has seen Pakistan through Afghan lens. Pakistan would, subsequently, be extremely apprehensive of the United States' agenda in Afghanistan and on the other; US would be equally doubtful of Pakistan's intentions, yet, the two countries continued to be coalition partners in the 'War on Terror'.³⁵ Consequently, this strategic misperception has given rise to many obstacles, which could be avoided.

Pakistan's Afghan policy has, therefore, been affected by internal as well external developments and interplay of four factors i.e. Pakistan–US relationship, Pakistan—Afghanistan ties, Indian factor in Afghanistan and the rise of domestic terrorism, led by TTP, since 2007 in Pakistan. In addition to this, the international community regarded Pakistan as a part of problem instead a part of solution. These developments pushed Pakistan into the margins and impeded its ability to play a constructive role in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's Short and Long Term Objectives in Afghanistan

The fate of Pakistan and Afghanistan is intertwined, due to geographic proximity, strong religious bonds, shared culture and historic connections. In the post 2014 Afghanistan, Pakistan has a significant role to play for peace process and the political settlement. Pakistan has opted to play a part of facilitator for negotiations between Taliban, US and Afghanistan, in order to move towards durable peace in the region.

The key question here is what are Pakistan's short and long term interests in Afghanistan? To put it straight, Islamabad's short term interests are the following:-

- Peaceful and smooth drawdown of American and NATO forces from Afghanistan.
- Sustainable peace in Afghanistan.
- Effective border management.
- Politically stable government in Kabul .

- Free and fair Presidential elections in Afghanistan in 2014.
- Smooth transition of power from Karzai to the next President.
- Destruction and dismantlement of remaining Al-Qaida members from Afghanistan.
- Ensuring that TTP, BLA and other insurgent groups do not use Afghan territory, as a launching pad of terrorism and anti-state activities against Pakistan.

The long term interests of Pakistan are the following:-

- Peace and stability in Afghanistan.
- Friendly government in Kabul.
- Immediate departure of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan.
- Bolstering security, economic and trade relations with Afghanistan and Central Asia.
- Making sure that India does not use its presence in Afghanistan, to pursue an anti-Pakistan policy.

In recent months, there is a significant realization in Islamabad that Pakistan's domestic peace and stability is vital for the national security. Therefore, it is in Pakistan's interests to eliminate terrorist networks and carry out operations against them. This realization had a major impact on Pakistan's Afghan policy. Fundamentally, four drivers have shaped Pakistani decision-makers' strategic vision of Afghanistan:-

- The rampant rise of violence, terrorism and worsening security situation in the country.
- Increasing Indian presence inside Afghan territory and Pakistan being pushed to margins.
- Emerging political consensus in Islamabad that war through proxies has hurt Pakistan badly.
- Public pressure on the policy-makers to disassociate from GWOT.

The recent calculated shift in Pakistan's policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan, manifests that Pakistan neither wants chaos, civil war in Afghanistan nor the complete Taliban's rule, both of which, it believes, would create domestic instability and militancy, in FATA and other parts of the country, having negative impacts on the state of Pakistan.³⁶ Therefore, stable, united and progressive Afghanistan is in the best interest of Pakistan.

Afghanistan Conundrum: Opportunity for Pakistan

In the backdrop of US and NATO forces drawdown from Afghanistan, key regional players are competing to secure their interests in Afghanistan. Countries such as Pakistan, India and Iran are attempting to align supporters to enhance their bargaining positions inside Afghanistan, allowing them to gain political and economic advantages after US and ISAF drawdown, in post 2014, Afghanistan.

The Afghan end-game is offering a golden opportunity to Pakistani decision makers to rethink and kick start a fresh beginning with Afghanistan by

forgetting the hard memories of the past. The fresh start should be based upon the notion of mutual respect, non-interference and mutual prosperity.

Pakistan must facilitate US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan. The steady reduction of foreign troops will undermine the narrative that fuels the insurgency in Afghanistan. Consequently, it will end the perpetual agony of the Afghan people, after thirty year of continuous warfare. This is the best thing which Pakistan could do for Afghanistan and it should seize this historic opportunity, which is knocking at its doorstep.

It is also an appropriate time for Pakistan to mend its ties with the Northern Alliance and other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. This will give an extra edge to Pakistan in the post 2014 scenario.

In this backdrop, Pakistan political and military leadership need to cautiously evaluate the changing notions of security in the region and craft a policy which could serve Pakistan's national interests as well as respond to the aspirations of the Afghan people and international community.

It should be crystal clear in the minds of the Pakistan's key decision makers that the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan lies in the peaceful settlement of Afghan conflict and political settlement is a pre-requisite for the better Pak-Afghan future.

Chaos, instability or civil war in Afghanistan would have serious consequences upon the domestic stability

of Pakistan. The spillover effect will be disastrous for neighboring and regional countries, as it has the potential to travel and affect the international peace and stability.

Wars always end with reconciliation and dialogue between the warring parties. Therefore, the initiative taken by the Afghan High Peace Council and reconciliation process led by the Afghan government, not the Americans, can find a lasting solution to the country's violence, lawlessness and corruption. Pakistan must support this initiative and play its due role in this regard.

Afghanistan Post 2014 and Pakistan

Following the departure of US troops from Afghanistan, Pakistan is likely to re-visit its policies towards Afghanistan to deal with the challenges posed by US drawdown. There is no doubt that the troops drawdown from Afghanistan would cause serious consequences and threats for Islamabad, as Pakistan is already facing grave issues regarding Afghanistan's situation after NATO forces pull out.

If the Afghan conflict is resolved through proper negotiations, this could be in the favor of long term interest of Pakistan, as it strongly believes that stability and peace in Afghanistan is guarantee to Pakistan's peace and stability. Being an immediate neighbor Pakistan cannot have peace, until Afghanistan has stable and powerful government.

The policy makers in Pakistan strongly believe that increased ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan can lead to deal with the menace of terrorism more

effectively. Pakistan's efforts to facilitate peace process would help to represent itself a responsible state in the eyes of international community, and also it would help to re-construct its repute regarding the peaceful settlement of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan's Post 2014 Security Dilemma

After US withdrawal from Afghanistan, there are mixed reactions of Afghan government and Afghan people about the security vacuum created by the withdrawal of NATO. There are legitimate questions: that what will be the nature of security vacuum? Who will fill this gap? And what will be the terms of engagements in Afghanistan? Afghan people have concerns that the Taliban would come back and would take over and lead Afghanistan. Haji Rokai, a tribal elder said, "as soon as these forces leave this province not only Wardak, but even some parts of Kabul, will be occupied by Taliban and Kabul security will be in danger."³⁷

There are concerns that the US troops' drawdown would strengthen the insurgents after the arrival of spring, which traditionally considers the start of Afghanistan's fighting season. Post 2014 scenario is likely to see increase in violence and insurgents' attacks, launched by various groups such as Taliban, the Al-Qaida linked Haqqani Network and Hizb-i-Islami etc.

Some people are doubtful that US Special Forces are expected to play a vital role after NATO combat troops drawdown by the end of 2014 and Karzai's decision could intricate negotiations between the United States

and Afghanistan over the scope of US operations after the pull-out.³⁸ According to local communities and media sources, militants have already started ambushes, shooting attacks and suicide bombings on American and Afghan forces there in Wardak.³⁹

The doubts are also expressed about the training and capacity of Afghan National Army (ANA) both by the Afghan people and regional countries, as they are already at a deplorable condition, because they lack training and equipment and could become less effective, when the Americans will leave.

Afghan National Security Force - Ready to Take the Lead?

The government of Afghanistan has appreciated the decision of US troops' withdrawal and stated that the Afghan forces are ready to take responsibility for the country's security.⁴⁰ On the other hand, Afghan government negotiated a legal framework with the US for next 10 years regarding limited presence of US troops, and its nine military bases, post 2014.⁴¹ According to this agreement US would cooperate and facilitate socio-economic development and would support to reconstruct its security and institutions.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai also appreciated this decision, because he wanted for a quick removal of foreign combat troops from Afghanistan and agreed with President Obama last month to hand-over of security responsibilities to his country's trained security forces in coming months. According to Afghan President,

“Afghanistan has welcomed the announcement by President Obama. This is something Afghanistan has wanted for so long now. The withdrawal in spring of foreign forces from Afghan villages will definitely help in ensuring peace and full security in Afghanistan. We are ready to fill the vacuum and we are ready to take full responsibility for security in 2013.”⁴²

Afghan people are not happy on the decision of US troops’ drawdown and have concerns that this would destabilize the country, which is suffering from war for the last 35 years. They also fear that the nearly 3, 52,000 Afghan army and police forces are not ready to take the lead for security.⁴³

Peaceful Settlement of Afghanistan’s Conflict: Possible Endgame

As United States and NATO forces plan for limited withdrawal after 11 years of war, the security situation in Afghanistan is still a major concern for regional and international actors.⁴⁴ Up till now, many efforts have been made to maintain peace and stability in Afghanistan, but all have been failed due to lack of proper planning, changing policies and reliance on military power. If US and other players have emphasized upon negotiations the circumstances would much different, as compared to the current situation. Various rounds of talks by US and Afghanistan as well as Pakistan have conducted with Taliban, but none of these efforts could result into concrete outcomes.

The issue of how to initiate a long-lasting peace process is a troublesome for Washington, Islamabad and Kabul, and for other regional and international actors, especially, for Afghan people, for whom the process should be clear in direction and transparent.

Pakistan's Role for the Peace Process in Afghanistan

Pakistan has very significant role to play for the peace process and political settlement in Afghanistan, as Pakistan is an immediate neighbor of Afghanistan and wants a friendly, peaceful and sovereign government, because, if there is any kind of instability after withdrawal, this would have serious consequences for Pakistan. For this purpose, Pakistan is playing a part of facilitator for negotiations between US and Afghanistan.

Breakthrough in the Peace Process

To start peace process in Afghanistan, Pakistan released 14 Afghan Taliban prisoners,⁴⁵ when Afghan High Peace Council led by Salahuddin Rabbani, visited Islamabad.⁴⁶ The Afghan officials appreciated this step and said that this would lead to reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Not only Afghans, but western diplomats in Kabul also appreciated the release of Taliban prisoners and saw it as a vital shift in Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan and believed that this would lead towards a political settlement for the decade-long conflict in the country.⁴⁷ Pakistan is very much concerned about the endgame and has shown great interest in peace process in Afghanistan.

On the eve of President Karzai's recent visit to Pakistan, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated that "Pakistan (has) strong and sincere support for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. We fully agreed that this process has to be inclusive, Afghan-owned and Afghan-led."⁴⁸

In addition, to facilitate and consolidate the peace process in Afghanistan, Pakistan is going to take another substantial step by the release of a few Taliban prisoners,⁴⁹ including Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar.⁵⁰ It proves that Pakistan is willing to facilitate the peace process between Taliban and High Peace Council, which are the main players for the reconciliation process in Afghanistan. Beside these, Pakistan has also supported to establish the office of Taliban in Doha.⁵¹

Role of US in Peace Process

Since 2009, President Barack Obama presented the view that the Afghan Taliban was likely to provide a stabilizing outcome of Afghan conflict.⁵² The very first initiative taken, by NATO military commanders and US was to re-integrate and re-settle low ranked Taliban foot soldiers, by providing them jobs and money, because they were young, jobless and fighting for money, more than for any religious cause. But this effort cannot bring about the desired results, because according to Taliban the step of re-integration of foot soldiers was most likely a counter-insurgency tactic to under-power Taliban instead of part of real peace process.⁵³

In 2011 Mullah Omar was indirectly approached to start negotiations, because Mullah Omar was inclined

towards peace talks.⁵⁴ During 2010–11 US shifted its policy from re-integration of foot soldiers to negotiations regarding settlement with Taliban leadership. But the direct interaction between US and Taliban began in November 2010, when the US officials met Tayyab Agha, a representative of Mullah Omar in Munich.⁵⁵

In 2011, other two rounds of meetings were held in Doha and Germany⁵⁶ before the establishment of Taliban's political office in Doha in January 2012.⁵⁷ The primary talks were about release and exchange of prisoners; five Guantanamo detainees in exchange for one American soldier, Bowe Bergdahl.⁵⁸ Since the US declined to hold negotiations, therefore, the talks broke down in March 2012. Although, US was very keen to re-start the negotiations with Doha office of Taliban, but at the same time they, were continuously offering an amount of 10 million dollars as a head money to capture Mullah Omer.⁵⁹

President Obama is likely to have more space towards peace talks after failing the strategy of use of force in Afghanistan. President in his State of Union Address mentioned, "We are negotiating an agreement with the Afghan government that focuses on two missions: training and equipping Afghan forces so that the country does not again slip into chaos, and counter-terrorism efforts that allow us to pursue the remnants of AL-Qaida and their affiliates."⁶⁰ It shows that Obama has changed the policy from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, because the air strikes and drone attacks were creating more anger among Taliban leaders towards US commanders.

Obstacles in Peace Process

There are many obvious and underlying reasons that can lead towards failure of negotiations between US and Taliban. First, to become part of a political settlement in Afghanistan, the Taliban insist on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces. Second, the main issue on which both parties disagree is, that what would be the shape of the future Afghan government and who will take control? Third, the most important obstacle is rising from civil groups and women's rights activists, who fears that, if the Taliban will be involved in the Afghan government, this results in limitations on their freedoms and activities.⁶¹

One of the main reasons behind the failure of the talks is that Taliban do not trust Karzai government at all and consider it as a puppet in the hands of America. Due to this bitterness and distrust, it is very difficult to bring Taliban on negotiation table. One of the options is to gather all concerned parties on the table with the help of United Nations (UN) and international community, to end the Afghan conflict.

There is a dire need to formulate a clear and transparent strategy for the political settlement in Afghanistan by US, Pakistan and the government of Afghanistan. A collective and unanimous strategy could be a base for successful peace process, by all three players on the political settlement of Afghanistan. If US wants a safe exit from Afghanistan and Pakistan wants stable conditions on its western borders, then, the importance of

peaceful settlement should be kept in mind, and it needs to be realized that peace and stability in Afghanistan is in the interest of all concerned actors. Negotiating parties must struggle for such kind of peace process that could be in the best interest of Afghan people. The regional and international actors should facilitate the peace process, whose outcomes reflect the desires of the Afghans.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that Pakistan is facing grave internal and external challenges to its national security. Consequently, these factors such as domestic instability caused by TTP, downturn in Pak-US ties and uneasy relations with President Karzai's government curtailed Pakistan's ability to play a constructive role in Afghanistan's peace process and Afghan end-game

However, Pakistan has certain legitimate geo-strategic interests in Afghanistan and in the region. Pakistan's willingness to endorse "Afghan led—Afghan owned" reconciliation process approved by Afghan High Peace Council, is a strong indication that Pakistan wants peaceful, stable and united Afghanistan.

Pakistan aims to broaden its sphere of activities to entire Afghanistan and desires to create goodwill among the common people rather than focusing only on Pashtun territories. Pakistan should work with the regional stakeholders, including China, to increase its range of activities from development to education, health and social welfare for the Afghan people.

Pakistan needs to come up with a comprehensive socio-economic development plan for Afghanistan. This could be in the shape of small scale development projects for Afghan rural areas and building strong connections with the Afghan companies through Public Private Partnership initiatives. These projects may be based on the local partnership and local ownership to form the basis of mutual cooperation. This would, resultantly, reduce the space for its strategic rivals in Afghanistan.

The international community should keep in mind that US and NATO troops' drawdown from Afghanistan must be gradual and responsible in nature. The peace process must be in the best interest of Afghans. The regional and international actors should facilitate the peace process and the outcome should reflect the aspirations of the Afghan people. It should be arranged in such a way that they may not destabilize the regional peace and stability.

I would like to end with this moving poem⁶² by Khadim Hussain which portrays the thoughts and feelings of a young man in a war ravaged country. It rightly depicts the afflictions and sufferings of the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

*My death dies every day.
My land is no more the land of flowers
Of doves and pigeons.
My land has heads scattered in every farmland.
Blood is no more costly
It's running like water in every street*

.....

Death is a norm in my land

It's no more the land of flowers, doves and pigeons

It's now the land of flames, bombs and armoured cars

*Khadim Hussain**

Recommendations

- It is imperative that in post 2014 scenario, ANSF, which include ANA and ALP, to take the leading role and fill the security vacuum, which is likely to be created after the drawdown of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
- It would be prudent for regional countries not to try to fill the security vacuum created by the drawdown of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Let's not make any mistake in this regard, because it would be disastrous for peace and stability of Afghanistan and the region, as it may give an excuse to regional strategic rivals to compete and preserve their national interests at the expense of Afghan people.
- It is extremely significant for the regional countries to stop looking at Afghanistan's stability in the context of their regional geo-political interests rather they should look at Afghanistan's stability through Afghan prism.
- It would be highly important for US and regional countries to come up with a joint memorandum of understanding regarding the peace building, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts in

Afghanistan after 2014, which reduce, the chance of a proxy war between the regional and extra regional countries.

- It is expected that in post 2014 scenario, there would be instability in Afghanistan for a shorter period of time, coupled with the huge unemployment, inflation and severe economic crunch, as the current Afghan economy is based upon the massive foreign financial support. Moreover, there is a huge gap existing between the country's import and export. Ultimately, this would compel Afghan people to migrate. Thus, Islamabad would need to pre-empt any eventuality to avoid the negative spillover effect on its domestic stability.

Key Findings

- The continuous stay of the Afghan refugees, combined with the growing security challenge posed by the illegal immigrants in Pakistan, has affected the strategic and socio-economic equilibrium of Pakistani society. It has injected an element of extremism and militancy in otherwise pluralistic society of Pakistan.
- Pakistan's strategy of "cooperation" with the United States is perceived to be one of the primary causes of contemporary terrorism directed at Islamabad.
- Pakistan being the neighbor of Afghanistan and located at an important geo-strategic position

has legitimate security, political and economic interests in Afghanistan's end-game.

- The role of regional countries, importantly Pakistan is critical to arrive at a durable peaceful settlement of Afghanistan conflict.
- The expansion of Indian footprints along the Pakistani border is a serious cause of worry for Pakistan.
- The stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan lies in the peaceful settlement of Afghan conflict and political settlement is a pre-requisite for the better Pak-Afghan future.

Endnotes

- 1 *Fact Sheet: Chicago Summit - NATO's Enduring Presence after 2014*, 21 May 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/21/fact-sheet-chicago-summit-nato-s-enduring-presence-after-2014>. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
- 2 Ibid
- 3 *NATO and Afghanistan*, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
- 4 Jason Wood, "The Importance of Cohesion in the Afghan National Army to Post-Transition Afghanistan," *The RUSI Journal*, 157, no.4 (2012): 42-47.
- 5 Paul D. Miller, "The US and Afghanistan After 2014," *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 55, no. 1 (2013): 87-102.
- 6 Moeed Yusuf, Huma Yusuf, Salman Zaidi, "Perceptions of Pakistan's Foreign Policy Elite" *Council on Foreign Relations*, 25 July, 2011, <http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/us-institute-peace-pakistan-united-states-end-game-afghanistan-perceptions-pakistans-foreign-policy-elite/p25733>. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
- 7 The exact size of the total Pashtun population is unclear as recent census data is unavailable in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The estimate provided is based on population figures and ethnic breakdown estimates given in the

- CIA World Factbook. US Central Intelligence Agency's World Factbook, online version, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook>. Accessed on 15 April 2013.
- 8 Muhammad Anis, "People voted to defeat misguided minority: Kayani," *The News*, 21 May 2013, <http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-22992-People-voted-to-defeat-misguided-minority-Kayani>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
 - 9 Khaleeq Kian, "Repositioning ahead of Afghan endgame," *Dawn*, 4 February, 2013, <http://dawn.com/2013/02/04/repositioning-ahead-of-afghan-endgame/>. Accessed on 15 April 2013.
 - 10 Ibid
 - 11 Rasul Baksh Rais, "Pakistan's Perspective on the Afghan Transition," *Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014*, ed. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012) pp.145-160.
 - 12 Kian, "Repositioning ahead of Afghan endgame," *Dawn*, 4 February, 2013.
 - 13 2013 UNHCR country operations profile – Pakistan, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e487016.html>. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
 - 14 Hy Rothstein, John Arquilla, "Understanding the Afghan Challenge" *Afghan Endgames: Strategy and Policy Choices for America's Longest War*, ed. Hy Rothstein and John Arquilla, (New Dehli: Cambridge University Press, 2013) PP.3-16
 - 15 Raza Rumi, "Those who attacked Kamra were not American, they are from among us," *The Express Tribune*, 19 August 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/424184/those-who-attacked-kamra-were-not-american-they-are-from-among-us/>. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
 - 16 Rais, 'Pakistan's Perspective on the Afghan Transition,' pp.145-160
 - 17 Ibid
 - 18 Pakistan to Promote 'Afghan-Led' Peace Process, *Newsweek*, July 1 2013, <http://newsweekpakistan.com/pakistan-to-promote-afghan-led-peace-process/>. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
 - 19 Islamabad wants positive engagement with Kabul: FO, *Daily Times*, July 26 2013, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2013%5C07%5C26%5Cstory_26-7-2013_pg7_2. Accessed on 2 August 2013.
 - 20 Afghan president Hamid Karzai urges Pakistan to help broker Taliban peace talks, 26 August 2013, *ABC News*, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-27/afghan-president-wants-support-for-taliban-talks/4914476>. Accessed on 26 August 2013.
 - 21 Ibid

- 22 Tahir Khan, "Afghanistan refuses to hand over Maulvi Faqir," *The Express Tribune*, 22 Feb 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/510971/afghanistan-refuses-to-hand-over-maulvi-faqir/>. Accessed on 16 April 2013.
- 23 Ibid
- 24 Rais, 'Pakistan's Perspective on the Afghan Transition,' pp.145-160
- 25 ISPR Press release "Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Concluded by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US led ISAF / NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano And Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency", 23 January 2012, <http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf>. Accessed on 20 April 2013.
- 26 Iftikhar Firdous, "24 soldiers killed in NATO attack on Pakistan check post November," *The Express Tribune*, November 26 2011, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/297979/nato-jets-attack-checkpost-on-pak-afghan-border/>. Accessed on 21 April 2013.
- 27 Clinton's 'Sorry' to Pakistan Ends Barrier to NATO, *The New York Times*, July 3 2012 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/04/world/asia/pakistan-opens-afghan-routes-to-nato-after-us-apology.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed on 3 August 2013.
- 28 Ibid
- 29 Kenneth Katzman, 'Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy'. *Congressional Research Service*, Report for Congress, 25 June 2013. p.47
- 30 Splintering relations? Durand Line is a 'settled issue', says FO, *The Express Tribune*, October 25 2012, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/456881/splintering-relations-durand-line-is-a-settled-issue-says-fo/>. Accessed on 22 August 2013.
- 31 Indrani Bagchi, "Trilateral helps India air opinion about Afghanistan's future," *The Times of India*, 4 March 2013, http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-03-04/india/37436096_1_second-trilateral-dialogue-afghan-taliban-taliban-office. Accessed on 22 April 2013.
- 32 Larry Hanauer, Peter Chalk "India's and Pakistan's strategies in Afghanistan: implications for the United States and the region" RAND Occasional Paper Series, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP387.pdf. Accessed on 22 April 2013.
- 33 Daniel Norfolk, "India's Engagement with Afghanistan: Developing a Durable Policy Architecture," *Afghanistan in Transition: Beyond 2014*, ed. Shanthie Mariet D'Souza (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2012) pp.161-183.
- 34 Moeed Yusuf, "Decoding 'Pakistan's strategic' shift in Afghanistan," *Stockholm International Research (SIPRI) Institute*, May 2013, <http://books>.

- sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI13wcaMY.pdf. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 35 Ibid
- 36 Ibid
- 37 “Afghan security vacuum feared along” ‘gateway to Kabul”, *Jnews Portal*, March 11, 2013, http://jnews.cs.um.edu.mt/news/Angry_Afghan_Villagers_Want_US_Special_Forces_Out.html. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 38 “Q & A: Foreign forces in Afghanistan”, *BBC News Asia*, June 18, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11371138>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 39 Harooni Mirwais and Georgy Michael, “Afghan security vacuum feared along” ‘gateway to Kabul” Analysis, *Reuters*, Mar 13, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/13/us-afghanistan-wardak-idUSBRE92C1AI20130313>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 40 Gen. Mohammad Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry, said the Afghan National Army “has this capability and quantity to fill the gap of those places where the foreign troops withdraw and leave Afghanistan.” “We are ready,” General Azimi said. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23prexy.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>. Accessed on 25 April 2013.
- 41 “Fact Sheet the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement”, The White House, May 01, 2012, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/fact-sheet-us-afghanistan-strategic-partnership-agreement>. Accessed on 27 August 2013.
- 42 “Karzai says Afghan forces ready for security role”, *Arab News*, 13 February, 2013, <http://www.arabnews.com/karzai-says-afghan-forces-ready-security-role>. Accessed on 25 April 2013.
- 43 “I heard on the news this morning about the withdrawal and became very sad. This is bad news for me,” said Mohammad Naim, a 45-year-old Kabul restaurant owner. “The presence of the US soldiers increased the morale of the Afghan people, the country was stable. I don’t believe Afghan forces can keep security. For example, you can see that there is still fighting in the provinces.” He recalled the civil war that followed in the years after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, and said he was worried history would be repeated. <http://www.arabnews.com/karzai-says-afghan-forces-ready-security-role>. Accessed on 25 April 2013.
- 44 “Obama Will Speed Pullout from War in Afghanistan”, *The New York Times*, June 22, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/world/asia/23prexy.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>. Accessed on 5 August 2013.

- 45 “Pakistan to Free Taliban Prisoners to Start Afghan Peace Process”, *The Guardian*, November 14, 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/nov/14/pakistan-free-taliban-prisoners>. Accessed on 5 August 2013.
- 46 Salahuddin Rabani Chairman High Peace Council, *Afghan Biographies*, http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&cid=1419&task=view&total=2323&start=1657&Itemid=2. Accessed on 5 August 2013.
- 47 Ali Arshad, “Endgame in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s New Approach”, December 19, 2012, *Rajaratnam School Of International Studies (RSIS)*, <http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS2302012.pdf>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 48 “Karzai stresses need for Pakistani help in Taliban peace process”, *Reuters*, August 26, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/26/us-pakistan-afghanistan-idUSBRE97P02X20130826>. Accessed on 26 August 2013.
- 49 “Baradar could be released to help facilitate Taliban talks”, *Business Recorder*, August 28, 2013, <http://www.brecorder.com/top-stories/0/1225646/>. Accessed on 28 August 2013.
- 50 “Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar is one of the four men who founded the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in 1994”, Profile: Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20582286>. Accessed on 27 August 2013.
- 51 “Pakistan played key role in US-Taliban breakthrough”, *The Dawn*, June 19, 2013, <http://x.dawn.com/2013/06/20/pakistan-played-key-role-in-us-taliban-breakthrough/>. Accessed on 27 August 2013.
- 52 “US open to Afghan Taliban talks”, *Aljazeera*, Mar 8, 2009, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2009/03/20093885411963197.html>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 53 Rashid Ahmed, “Afghanistan: Talking to the Taliban”, *Afghan Scene Online Edition*, June 2013, <http://www.afghahscene.com/june-issue-june-issue/10158-pakistan-on-the-brinko>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 54 “Head of the Supreme Council in Afghanistan”, <http://www.in.com/mullah-omar/biography-1900045.html>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 55 “Former personal secretary and spokesman of Mullah Omar and Government Official during Taliban Regime in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Afghanistan”, *Afghan Biographies*, http://www.afghan-bios.info/index.php?option=com_afghanbios&cid=2198&task=view&start=59&Itemid=2. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 56 “U.S. speeds up direct talks with Taliban”, *The Washington Post*, May 17, 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-speeds-up-direct->

- talks-with-taliban/2011/05/16/AFh1AE5G_story.html. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 57 “Taliban Opening Qatar Office, and Maybe Door to Talks”, *The New York Times*, January 3, 2012, <http://www.thenation.com/blog/160709/us-taliban-talks-qatar-germany#>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 58 “Taliban will free US soldier if 5 ‘operatives’ released from Gitmo”, *Russia Today RT*, June 20, 2013, <http://rt.com/news/taliban-us-soldier-gitmo-988/>. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 59 “Counter Terrorism Calendar 2013, Mullah Omer”, *National Counterterrorism Center*, http://www.nctc.gov/site/profiles/mullah_omar.html. Accessed on 15 August 2013.
- 60 “Obama’s 2013 State of the Union Address”, *The New York Times*, Feb 12, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/13/us/politics/obamas-2013-state-of-the-union-address.html?pagewanted=all>. Accessed on 26 August 2013.
- 61 “Afghan Taliban Open Doha office”, *BBC News Asia*, June 20, 2013, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22957827>. Accessed on 20 August 2013.
- 62 Quoted by Unaiza Niaz in her book “WARS, Insurgencies, and Terrorist Attacks”. (Oxford University Press, UK) year 2011, pp xxi

Afghan National Security Force: A Catch-22*

Khurshid Khan & Afifa Kiran¹

Abstract

Despite enormous resources and military might, the US was unable to achieve its long-term national objectives militarily in Afghanistan. Regardless of its well laid out plan and the heavy investment, the US might not succeed in giving an effective security structure to Afghanistan, unless it involves all stakeholders in the reconciliation process. If the international community fails to achieve consensus, it might lead to insecurity, a factor that will have the worst impact on Afghan political and economic structure, which is central to achieve long-term peace and stability of Afghanistan. Thus, permanent solution to the Afghan problems lies 'within' Afghans and cannot be imposed by external forces. It is strongly felt that whatever ISAF/NATO might have achieved in Afghanistan over the past ten years, is likely to go waste following the drawdown of their forces, if they are unable to evolve a workable strategy. The solution to Afghan imbroglio lies in 'proportionate representation' of all ethnic groups in all institutions of the state on equitable basis, which might help end 30 years of war in Afghanistan and finally; while

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Brigadier Muhammad Khurshid Khan recently retired from the post of Director Internal Security at ISSRA, NDU, Islamabad and now he is at the faculty of NUST.

2 Ms Afifa Kiran is working as Research Associate at ISSRA, NDU, Islamabad.

Pakistan would continue to remain a key player in the outcome of Afghanistan issue, nevertheless, it would also require close cooperation from other regional players like Iran and China, in order to bring about enduring peace in the region.

Introduction

Except for a brief period during late 1990s, when Taliban were in the driving seat, Afghanistan continued to remain under intense battlefield environment since the 1979. While the peace and comfort level of Afghan people were yet to be restored, the unlucky Afghans entered into second phase of horrific war in the backdrop of 9/11 incident, which goes on unabated. The US tried to win the war militarily by neglecting the history of this region, which bears witness that no invader had ever succeeded in defeating the people of Afghanistan. The present generation of Afghanistan has grown up under the shadow of war and does not even know what the word peace means.

Under the present security atmosphere, the current Afghan security structure erected, trained by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is entrusted with the task to undertake national responsibility of providing security and bringing peace in Afghanistan after 2014.¹ To realize this objective, the ISAF under the US Leadership has been building the ANSF to a combined strength of 3,52,000, including police. The recurring cost to maintain such a huge force is expected to be around \$4.1 billion per year.²

The US is preparing to depart. A smooth transition from the US-led regime to Afghan led forces and the resultant durable peace is a pre-requisite for other factors to come into play like economic activities and effectively functional judiciary.³ Additionally, achieving long-term sustainable peace in Afghanistan hinges upon

a number of other indicators, including the ability of Afghanistan to improve upon its economic health and long term uninterrupted economic / financial support by the international community.⁴ None of these factors can work in isolation. In the absence of security, investment would not come. In the absence of the investment, the economic prosperity is uncertain and similarly, in the absence of a consensus government in Kabul, the role of Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) would be undermined. This is a vicious cycle in Afghanistan and, thus, there is no sure way to predict that people of Afghanistan would live in peace in foreseeable future.

International Security Allied Force (ISAF) led by the US has already set up the timeline for its withdrawal. After 2014, the ISAF is expected to take back-seat, while allowing the Afghan forces to take the lead role. In order to prepare the ANSF to take over its primary responsibility, the ISAF countries are fully involved in its restructuring process. The ANSF primarily consist of two main segments i.e. Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), in addition to other security organs, including Air Force.⁵

For a prosperous and stable Afghanistan, besides political reforms, the role of ANA is crucial. For the last six to seven years, ANA is being trained by the US led ISAF, however, there is a less optimism with regard to its effectiveness and displayed performance, because of multiple factors, including an ethnic imbalance.⁶ It is apprehended that in case the US fails to bring about a consensus regime in Kabul, unrest may come within

the Afghan forces following the withdrawal of the ISAF. It might lead towards a fresh tension among Pushtun supported Taliban vis-a-vis other forces and create a risk of the stalling of ongoing efforts to take the process of state-building and 'reconciliation' forward in Afghanistan.⁷

Notwithstanding the above, the Western leaders seem optimistic about the peace process in Afghanistan. During his recent visit to Helmand, the Defence Secretary of UK, Philip Hammond, said, "The Afghans are developing capabilities faster than we expected and we have every reason to believe that they will be able to maintain security, as the ISAF forces draw down".⁸ Similar views had also been expressed by General John Allen, the former NATO forces commander. He said, "Afghan forces are defending Afghan people and enabling the government of this country to serve its citizens".⁹

Following the 'Strategic Partnership' agreement, it is expected that to realize its long term objectives, the US would place about six to twenty thousand troops inside Afghanistan. It will maintain its strongholds at the selected locations and provide an indirect support to the ANSF, especially when they are involved in conducting targeted operations.¹⁰

Regardless of the tall claims made by the political and military leaders, the preparation level of ANA as well as ANP is well short of the desired level. Neither the institutions nor the individuals are capable enough to deal with the various levels of crimes. Moreover, in

the absence of justice and security, common Afghans are facing an existential threat. The state of poor law and order is frequently referred to as main reason for people's frustration and disappointment with the central government. The Taliban intelligently exploit this weakness and increase their sympathizers willingly.¹¹

In this backdrop, this study aims at carrying out an in-depth study about the efficacy of the ANSF after NATO/ISAF's drawdown and the chances of their survivability beyond 2014. The main focus of this study would be to analyse the existing structure of ANSF, the evolution thereof and its ability to withstand the challenges of security in Afghanistan after NATO's drawdown in 2014, besides suggesting a way forward.

In this study, a descriptive approach has been adopted with some reference from the past history, applying primarily a qualitative method. The study would primarily encompass the efficacy of the ANSF in providing security to Afghan nation after 2014. However, since its effectiveness rests on the emerging political structure and the sustained long term economic support, therefore, these factors have also been touched upon to draw relevant lessons. Secondly, although, the ANSF consist of a number of security related organs, but this study revolves mainly around ANA and ANP, the two main pillars of the Afghan security structure. Lastly, the study utilizes the US policy documents as well as the scholarly articles published in international journals, and the newspaper articles and editorials.

ANSF: An Overview

The ANSF consists of Army, Air Force and Police. It is believed that while army and police are well on the desired track, Afghan air force could not get the due attention.¹² Afghan army is divided in five corps, one each located at Kabul, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.¹³ Similarly, the department of police is further divided in various branches, including Afghan Uniformed Police, Afghan Border Police and Afghan National Civil Order Police.¹⁴

Afghan National Army (ANA)

- **The State of ANA Prior to 9/11 Incident**

Modern Afghan army was established during early eighteenth century by Hotaki dynasty, followed by Ahmad Shah Durrani (1774).¹⁵ Since the creation of modern Afghanistan, the nation has seen three Anglo-Afghan wars and Soviet invasion. Prior to 1933, the army structure remained very weak because of tribal influence. However, during 1933, King Nadir Shah established a modern army of over 70,000 troops. By 1945, he raised the strength of Afghan army to 110,000 troops, including 20,000 the ruler's security forces.¹⁶ By 1960, King Zahir Shah was in command of 90,000 army troops in addition to air force, consisting of 8000 troops, fully backed by Soviet Union.¹⁷


Traditionally, Afghanistan had been producing warlords, who had been competing among themselves to exercise control over the state's central security mechanism. This practice has shaped the army's relations

with outside players like Russia, Pakistan and the US. It resulted in the proliferation of rival military factions. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion, Afghan army had seen downfall and with Taliban taking over Kabul, the formal army collapsed, and by 1992 fragmented into regional militias under various local warlords.¹⁸

- **Post 9/11 ANA**


With the fall of Taliban, the ANA was re-organized by NATO in late 2001. Today, the ANA remains the main pillar of the Afghan security architecture. The army remains under the Ministry of Defence in Kabul. The President of Afghanistan is the Commander-in-Chief of the ANSF. A diagrammatical layout of the Ministry of Defence is at Figure-I.

Figure I: Afghan Ministry of Defence¹⁹



The ANA is divided into six regional Corps with about 180,000 active troops as of December 2011. A diagrammatical layout of the training institutions and Corps along with their locations is at Figure-II.

Figure II: Afghan Training Institutions and Layout of Corps Headquarters²⁰



During a conference held at Bonn in December 2001, all stakeholders got together with a view to forming an interim government in Kabul. During the conference, an agreement was reached that recognized the “significance of an Afghan army and the establishment of Afghan interim government”. A year later, on December 2, 2002, at a conference held in Germany, “a decision was taken to raise an army of 70,000 soldiers divided among air corps and infantry units under the Ministry of Defense”. Accordingly, “the UNSC assumed the responsibility for tasking, organizing and authorizing an International Security Force for Afghanistan”.²¹

Although, with the emerging security situation in Afghanistan, the mandate and role of the newly organized Afghan army continued to shift from limited one to a broader one, however, as of today, in the wake

of the ISAF drawdown plan, the ANA is expected to take over the primary responsibility of protecting Afghan national interests. The objectives of ANSF include, “safeguarding territorial integrity, ensuring independence and sovereignty of the country, defeating insurgency and terrorism, contributing to the stable and secure environment, reforming various defense sectors and contributing to regional and international security and stability”.²²

During the December 2002 Conference at Petersberg, the strategy for security sector reform was further refined. It was “divided into five ‘pillars’, each with a lead nation in charge: the US, was responsible for the ANA, Germany for the ANP, the UK for counter-narcotics, Italy for the justice sector and Japan for disarmament”.²³ Sequel to the decision at Petersberg, the participating countries have coordinated their efforts to fulfill their commitments of providing the relevant material support to ANA and ANP.²⁴

Since Afghan military was well versed with the Russian origin weaponry therefore, nearly 80 percent of the weapons procured for Afghan forces were received from former Warsaw Pact countries. Currently, “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) is transitioning the ANA from the AK-47 to the M16 or the Canadian C7”.²⁵ According to a report published in the Long War Journal, “after 5 years of capacity building, the ANA has begun to show substantive, measurable results”.²⁶

Until 2009, ANSF could get only essential training and their professional standards were very low. However, ground realities changed for better when Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus, as well as General William Caldwell and David Rodriguez, were made in-charge of their training. Currently, “some 90 percent of all Afghan army units are working in field, which helps them improving their training. About 75 percent of all such ISAF sister units are co-located with their Afghan partners”.²⁷

In April 2006, “The Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan (OSC-A)”, responsible to implement police training and equipment program, became the CSTC-A. The CSTC-A has the primary responsibility for training and mentoring of the ANA. However, “formal training courses are administered at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC), National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMAA), or Command and General Staff College (CGSC)”.²⁸ Currently, the US has evolved an approach for fielding the ANA into three phases: “one; ANA development, two; transition to Afghan primacy, and three; the transition to strategic partnership”. In phase I, “the US, with coalition assistance, mans, equips, and trains a self-sustaining 122,000 troops”.²⁹

In order to hand over the lead role of providing security to Afghans, “NATO Heads of States and government decided at Strasbourg-Kehl Summit (April 2009), to expand and train ANSF”. To meet this goal, “NATO established the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) on 21 November 2009, since then, the ANSF has made significant progress”.³⁰

During January 2010, “The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, the formal decision-making body for Afghan and international coordination, endorsed increasing the growth target for the ANA to 134,000 by October 2010 and 171,600 by October 2011.” It has been successful to meet the objectives for the year 2010 and managed to induct 138,200 troops by September 2010. In Regional Command-Capital, “since 28 August 2008, the ANSF have gradually taken over the lead role for security in Kabul province”.³¹

As regards the training procedure, “after recruits are selected, they are then assigned to respective battalion (Kandak) consisting of approximately 750-800 soldiers”. After getting into respective groups, the training process starts and the soldiers undergo various phases of training, administered by Coalition forces. In order to attain the best possible professional standards, “during the training process, Embedded Training Teams (ETT) and Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLT) work closely with recruits to maintain the standards as established by CSTC-A, so as to provide the ANA personnel the experience of working with combat enablers, such as close air support/fires, medical evacuation and quick reaction forces”.³²

ISAF is extensively involved in improving the structural deficiencies of ANSF.³³ Under the program, “UK was required to create an ANA Officer Academy, to be opened in 2013”. Similarly, “Australia would contribute trainers to the new NATO-led training mission with a focus on the Afghan Artillery School and Officer

Training Academy”.³⁴ NATO says, “Both the police and army are ‘well on track’ to reach the goal of 352,000 by the end of 2012 ahead of schedule”.³⁵ Contrary to this statement, according to Afghan monthly progress report, except for the ANA soldiers, ANSF growth for remaining organizations like Air Force, ANP and the command structure of the ANA could not meet the objective as set out for May 2012.³⁶

The US General John Allen, the former top commander in Afghanistan, said during an interview in April 2012, “Afghan army and police force were proving increasingly capable in action. About 90 percent of coalition operations now are partnered with Afghan forces, and Afghan forces are in the lead more than 40 percent of the time”.³⁷ His argument is strengthened because on February 24, 2013, the ANSF have assumed an independent command of four districts of the western province of Ghor.³⁸

However, it is opined that the ANSF is likely to do well as long as the American forces are inside Afghanistan. The moment ISAF takes off and the US forces operate on reduced scale in Afghanistan; the ANSF would be handicapped because of the limited support available from the US in terms of aviation, artillery, communication and logistic.

Afghan National Police (ANP)

The ANP force is the primary national force for domestic security. It was first created with the establishment of the Afghan nation in the early 18th

century. Like the ANA, the modern ANP also remained part of the Hotaki and Durrani empires. The country witnessed anarchy during early 1990s, when police also collapsed. The current ANP was organized after the defeat of Taliban in late 2001. The force works under the Afghanistan's Ministry of Interior.³⁹

Primary ANP organizations consist of (as of March 12, 2012): Afghan Uniform Police: 84, 000, Afghan Border Police (ABP): 22,200, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP): 5363, and others: (Intel, MOI, HQ, Anti-Crime/CID, Counter Narcotics, Fire, and Medical): 18,200.⁴⁰ According to the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, "both the ANA and ANP have met their growth objectives for 2010".⁴¹

General Ekramuddin leads the ANP, which is further grouped into "five regional commands (North, South, East, West and Central) as well as the ANCOP". Local traffic police (which remained frozen) as well as the fire department also falls under the command of the ANP. Following the Bonn Agreement, Germany was given a lead role to train ANP with complete back up support extended by the US, being the largest donor.⁴² Consequently by 2003/2004, approximately 35, 000 officers were trained in basic recruits' schools. As pointed out earlier, initially, Germany took the lead role but later on, the US as well as UK provided most of the training.⁴³

In Spring 2005, the US Departments of Defense and State, decided to shift the implementation of the police training and equipment program to OSC-A (later on re-named as CSTC-A), under the authority of the

Commanding General, Combined Forces Command (CFC-A)".⁴⁴ Since then, there was a steady increase in strength of ANP, which reached to 95,000 in November 2009 and to 120,500 in September 2010.⁴⁵ Over the next two years, it made further progress and as in April 2012, the total strength of ANP was 1,49,642, which is expected to reach 160,000 by 2014.⁴⁶ This force is responsible for general police duties, while specialized police forces, deal with public order, counter narcotics, terrorism, and border control.⁴⁷

As expressed by the head of EU Police Mission (EUPOL) at Kabul, "ABP have a huge role to play in deterring insurgency and preventing smuggling, human trafficking, weapons, and drugs. They are also the first line of defence against counter-insurgency along the border".⁴⁸ EUPOL is deputed to train ABP which is led by Lieutenant General Mohammad Younous Noorzai. Joerg Dewenter, Acting Chief Border Police Unit, "recognizes a positive trend and notes that the force has grown from zero to almost full capacity...".⁴⁹

On January 12, 2012, Dewenter opined, "during the current summer, the ABP should be at 100 per cent strength, containing about 23,000-plus members". In addition, the US is also involved in arranging training, involving field exercises. One of the ABP badges of officers got two-week practical course on winter patrolling at the Tajik Border Troops Training Centre in Gissar.⁵⁰

The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) consists of 4148 people, who are trained on special duty as investigators. They are deployed all across the country,

while the majority is stationed at Kabul. Their primary responsibility is, “investigation, crime scene forensic procedures, documentation of crime, and assisting other agencies”.⁵¹ In the aftermath of deadly riots in Kabul on May 29, 2006, it was realized to raise constabulary force, which should be able to control the outbreak of urban violence in future. Consequently, the US military and Afghan authorities created an elite gendarmerie (constabulary), the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP).⁵²

Initially, the ANCOP was organized ‘as a riot control force, but later on, “it was assigned to the Focused District Development Program to replace district-level ANP who were away for training”. Although, to begin with, the force had to struggle but by 2011, it firmly established itself as an elite rapid reaction and counter insurgency force with a positive reputation among coalition troops and Afghan citizens”.⁵³

Realizing the significance of the Afghan police, the US has taken practical steps to improve its administration as well as training standards. It was reported in 2010 that the US was building nearly 200 modern police stations at the cost of \$600 million. The German police mission has organized training facility in Kabul, which is currently led by the US. In addition, “Regional ANP training facilities have also been established at Wardak, Gardez, Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Khost, led by the US and Germany”.⁵⁴ Moreover, in early 2012, the Ministry of Interior provided 300 armored vehicles to the first border police brigade stationed around the

porous Durand Line, in Nangarhar province. While appreciating the overall professional standard of ABP, the Third Border Police Brigade Commander, Col Mohammad Ayub Hussainkhel, said, “The border police are now capable of maintaining better security for the Durand Line”.⁵⁵

There is yet another establishment, which is called ‘Afghan Local Police (ALP)’. This force is being trained by the US. According to Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow at Brookings, “ALP currently numbers around 13,000 members and is set to increase to at least 30,000 by the end of 2014”.⁵⁶ Vanda explained that the main objective of the ALP is to provide security to the people, where ANSF are unlikely to be deployed for long period. She views, “in contrast to the rosy US military’s portrait of the ALP, many Afghans... have negative views of such militia efforts”.⁵⁷ Above all, this would remain a temporary force which can be disbanded any time, if required.

Afghan Security Beyond 2014: A Critical Analysis

As emphasized earlier on, the vision of having a stable Afghanistan would depend on: one; the likely political structure beyond 2014, two; implementation of the reform program and efforts to deal with the menace of corruption, three; the ethnic composition of the ANSF and its professional competency, four; the US long term objectives and its commitment to provide backup support to the ANSF, five; sustainable economic support for ANSF, and other organs of the Afghan government and finally; the participation and possible role of regional countries like Iran and Pakistan.

Bringing a consensus government in Kabul seems an uphill task. The political development of the past three months and President Karzai's back and forth policy, indicates that peace process is heading nowhere. The tripartite summit held during February 2013, between the leaders of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Britain could hardly break any ice. The goalpost set in the 'communiqué' to achieve a peace settlement over the next six months, seems over ambitious and completely unrealistic. The deadline set for the withdrawal of ISAF is closing up but practically there is no sign of political reconciliation visible.⁵⁸

It appears that President Karzai is ill prepared to reconcile with reality. For the last a few months, he remained uncomfortable with the US policies. A frustrated Karzai, while chairing the meeting of National Security Committee on February 24, 2013, ordered the US Special Forces to vacate the Wardak province within a period of two weeks. Moreover, President Karzai is accusing the US of collaborating with Taliban. Thus, Afghan government and its Western allies seem working on different frequencies regarding ISAF's '2014 exit strategy'. Although, Karzai finds himself in troubled water, but the US too does not have many options. Even if Karzai is taken out of the loop, it would not be so easy for the US to strike a balance between Taliban and Northern Alliance and other factions.⁵⁹

The reconciliation process notwithstanding, Afghanistan stability is linked with the possible outcome of the upcoming elections. The US Ambassador for

Kabul James B. Cunningham, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said, “*Key to Afghanistan’s future stability will be a credible and inclusive presidential election in 2014, followed by a constitutional transfer of power*”.⁶⁰ But keeping in view of Karzai’s track record, there are speculations that he would not act as neutral player to hold free and fair elections.⁶¹

Concerning the future of Afghanistan, the ISAF and the US may have different perceptions, but majority of the scholarly world seems pessimistic. Al-Jazeera cites a recent analysis of Gilles Dorronsoro, an Afghan expert with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who writes in recent analysis that “after 2014, the level of US support for the Afghan regime will be limited and, after a new phase in the civil war, a Taliban victory will likely follow”.⁶² “There is a real risk that the regime in Kabul could collapse upon NATO’s withdrawal,” said Candace Rondeaux, the ICG’s senior Afghanistan analyst.⁶³ Gabriel Reyes opines, “The ongoing process of withdrawal of international troops and the transfer of security to the ANSF have resurrected the ghosts of the 1989 Soviet pullout and aggravated the fear of growing instability or even a new civil war after 2014”.⁶⁴

The US House Armed Committee in its testimony opined, “There is a possibility that there will be a renewed outbreak of civil war after 2014, when the NATO presence is much reduced”. The Committee viewed, “ANSF will continue to be challenged well beyond 2014, in some critical domains including command, control, and intelligence, and air support etc”.⁶⁵ The overall

efficiency of ANA also revolves around the factors like “manpower, infrastructure, training, operational proficiency, discipline, and most importantly, public perceptions of the army”.⁶⁶

The emerging political scenarios are paradoxical in nature, with the Western predictions that Afghan forces will be able to defend the country after 2014.⁶⁷ Imam Hussain reinforces these arguments. He opined, “the new withdrawal date does not seem to be realistic either, since it is based on the flawed perception of success in Afghanistan”.⁶⁸ A senior ISAF official, when asked by the diplomats to pin point the areas where Taliban’s momentum has been reversed, his standard response was, “the success (against the Taliban) is like a stock market, it continues to go up and down during the day, but what matters at the end of the day is the stock index.” To the Afghans and diplomats the ‘stock index’ of US success is in fact at an all-time low.⁶⁹

Even some analysts predict a collapse of the Western-backed government and a civil war worse than that in the 1990s. According to Candace Rondeaux, “What will come to dominate in Kabul in 2014, 2015 will be chaos and violence. And the fracturing that we saw in the 1990s will only be compounded by the fact that there are more weapons in the country and greater incentives now for a lot more brutality than we have seen before”.⁷⁰

Christian Dennys, the researcher at UK Defence Academy and Cranfield University, wrote, “The Afghan security sector today is possibly more fragmented than at any time during the last nine years or even the last

250 years since the Afghan state emerged.⁷¹ These arguments are strengthened as we see the performance of the ANSF, when employed independently. The public has no confidence in government capability.⁷² Probably, because of this reason, the newly appointed NATO head in Afghanistan, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, explained, “the pull-out of combat forces by 2014 was going as per plan, but these should not be seen as a rush for the exit”.⁷³


According to the official sources, “only one of the ANA’s 161 units is capable of operating independently”. Similarly, “no units of the police is capable of performing without direct coalition assistance, and no sections of the ministries of Interior/Defence, which are likely to be charged with managing the security situation in near future, are competent to take self-governing responsibly.” All are involved in rampant corruption.⁷⁴ Furthermore, Afghan security forces have other serious problems as well. Besides corruption, the high attrition to the elite ANP force has gone up by 39 percent as reported last year.⁷⁵

The success of the US exist plan rests on two pillars; “training of Afghan security force that can stand on its own feet, and fostering regional co-operation on a conflict that defies borders”. “Forging a political settlement with the Taliban is considered by most to be the indispensable third pillar of this strategy; regrettably, an assessment of progress in all three areas gives cause for serious concern”.⁷⁶

There is yet another challenge to the ANSF that comes in the form of ethnic and sectarian composition.

Afghanistan has four dominant ethnic groups including over 50 percent Pashtun, 30 percent Tajik, 20 percent Hazara and 10 percent Uzbek. Except for a small segment of Hindu and Sikh, majority is Muslim, out of them 80 percent are Sunni and 20 percent are Shia Muslims.⁷⁷ It has been a challenge for the US to organize ethnically a balanced force. According to Col Mackenzie, while carrying out recruiting, “it has been attempted to maintain an ‘Afghanistan-first’ mentality, setting aside historical grievances”.⁷⁸ However, it has been officially confessed that there is a surplus of Tajiks in the ANA officer and NCO corps.⁷⁹ A diagrammatic layout is at Figure III.

Figure-III: Ethnic Mix of ANA Personnel Compared with Ethnic Mix of Population⁸⁰



Ethnic minorities are of the view that Afghanistan might go back to civil war and there may be a split within Afghanistan.⁸¹ Nonetheless, ISAF has done a great job in reducing the number of Tajik officers

from the ANA. In 2008, approximately 70 percent of Afghan Kandak (battalion) commanders were Tajiks. As of summer 2012, that number has been reduced to 40 percent.⁸² Despite an improvement, disproportionate numbers of Tajik are still in key leadership position and there is a shortage of southern Pashtuns. Rasul Baksh Rais, an eminent Pakistani scholar portrays the Afghan civil war as symbolizing “the two opposite struggles in Afghanistan, one by the Pashtuns to re-establish their dominance, and the second by the Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek minorities to seek adequate representation in political power at the centre and autonomy of their respective areas”.⁸³

The ISAF was able to meet the target, as far as raising a force to certain strength is concerned, but they failed to carry out quality recruitment. The soldiers have come from diverse culture and it takes time to adapt to an intense cultural change. However, a recent decision to increase the soldiers’ pay to \$110 per month may help with recruiting, reduce absenteeism rates, and encourage re-enlistment. Similarly, electronic transfer of funds has begun to ensure that the money goes to the soldiers”.⁸⁴ Despite these incentives, according to ICG report, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume responsibility beyond 2014. Afghan army and police are overwhelmed and ill prepared for transition.⁸⁵ Andreas Ulrich during his visit to police training center in Mazar-e-Sharif observed, “Afghan police remain poorly prepared to tackle the mighty challenges they will face as Western forces withdraw”.⁸⁶

Andrew Legon, a research analyst, points out a number of problems that police force is ridden with. It includes illiteracy, poor training, abuse of power and corruption. Additionally, their poor performance is undeniably compounded by drug use. “60 percent of the ANP deployed in Helmand use drugs”, the British officials confessed.⁸⁷ Ben Anderson’s latest visit to Helmand re-confirmed the stance taken by Legon.⁸⁸ Rondeaux opined that besides poor training, Afghan police is without dedicated air resources, with zero logistical supply capability and zero real cohesion, which is unlikely to deliver beyond 2014.⁸⁹

Apart from this, as indicated earlier, the “widespread corruption at all levels of the ANP has long been a major problem. Taliban fighters of both high and low ranks were able to immediately get themselves released from police custody, with bribes ranging from \$100–\$10,000”.⁹⁰ Taliban are at very comfortable position. During 2012, “they stormed onto one of the largest NATO bases in the country, destroying six fighter aircrafts in the biggest single loss of air assets for the US since the Vietnam War”.⁹¹ Afghan Interior Ministry pointed out that the causality rate of Afghan police officials was quite high in the Taliban-led attacks across the country.⁹²

Beside other weaknesses, ANSF also lacks discipline. Colonel Noori from ANA expressed his views during an interview, “today we have no discipline. If a soldier doesn’t want to go somewhere, he doesn’t”. He says, “one in seven soldiers and police desert each month and for every 10 soldiers trained another 13 trainees drop out”.

He further says, “we should not have been looking for quantity. We should have been looking at the quality of our soldiers”.⁹³ Above all, people do not trust police.⁹⁴

The US/ISAF intensions and efforts notwithstanding, the ANSF seem ill prepared to take self-governing responsibilities in the absence of ISAF. The possible economic constraints, as discussed in succeeding paragraphs, will multiply the problems. However, we fully endorse Dr Lodhi’s views, who opined, “the drawdown plan is out of step with movement on the political front and that the two processes must begin to converge, if the 2014 transition is to be peaceful and orderly. The closer this deadline gets, the harder it will be to negotiate”.⁹⁵

Political and security reforms, even if they are well on track, cannot be maintained, unless there is a sustained economic support from the international community. Evaluating Afghanistan, by using criteria of the World Bank’s Human Development Index, and income, in 2010, Afghanistan ranked 155 out of 169 countries.⁹⁶ It needs economic recovery after three decades of war, civil unrest and instability. The 2007-2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment found, “7.4 million people, third of the population, are unable to have enough food to have active life”.⁹⁷ There is a need for a heavy assistance from the donors to maintain a huge force of over 350,000 troops.⁹⁸ Mark Schneider, senior vice president of the ICG remarked, “it is going to be a difficult process to enable Afghans to be the hand-off partner for the departing Western forces”.⁹⁹

In the past, there has not been any serious debate on economic side of the issue linked with ISAF drawdown. While the donors did make pledges to finance the Afghan government, but no serious work has been done to chalk out the actual costs of sustaining ANSF. The crucial issue has been left out, which will be discussed later. Therefore, there are no clear plans as to how the donor countries would respond in future. It is opined that Afghanistan may face tremendous economic challenges beyond 2014. It might be stuck with a bill that it cannot pay. While the number may be dropped by 120, 000 troops by 2017, even then it would be difficult to support 230,000 troops for unlimited period. It is doubtful that in the absence of a favorable security environment and other factors like corruption, Afghanistan would be able to have self-sustained economy in near future, a condition on which Afghan success depends.¹⁰⁰

About the external support, IMF in its 'World Economic Outlook' has already warned of global economic slowdown, which is worsening as it cuts its growth forecasts for the second time since April 2012. The US and its European allies have to tackle with their major short economic challenges.¹⁰¹ The US Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner, has already said that reforms in Europe 'could take years to bear fruit'. The current and the emerging global economic scenarios indicate that a sustainable economic support to Afghan armed forces and its government might not be possible.¹⁰² On the contrary, self-sufficiency in the economic discipline in Afghanistan seems a distant task because of the varying reasons. As pointed out earlier,

the ANSF lacks discipline and any disruption in salary because of decline in international subsidies, would make the problem more complex.¹⁰³

Two reports published during 2012, one by the World Economic Forum's (WEF) Global Risks 2012 and the 2012 Strategic Survey, a flagship publication of the London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) identify the key trends impacting the world, fuelling uncertainty and endangering the world's security and prosperity". "Both map a world in political and economic flux in a strategic environment of shifting power and financial stress".¹⁰⁴ While these reports have many other angles, we are taking note of the areas, which have direct relevance to Afghan's proposed economic scenarios over the next one decade. The reports indicate that currently, the US remains stuck in a political impasse over how to manage its deficit-ridden economy, while Europe is stuck up in a crisis of assurance and unsettled monetary problems of the 17-member euro-zone. The IISS study sees the continuing rise of 'strategic nationalism' in this changing landscape.¹⁰⁵

Under the current and projected political and economic environment, continued economic flow into Afghanistan seems unrealistic. The promises are often broken, when question of priority comes in. The countries making pledges to Afghanistan in Bonn and Tokyo Conferences have already linked their supports, which are contingent upon bringing number of positive changes that the Afghanistan government is unlikely to make. Pakistan has already seen the plight of similar pledges.¹⁰⁶

As pointed out above, the ANSF will have to be reduced by over 120, 000 troops by 2017. There are no clear guidelines as to where these troops will be employed once they are weeded out from the army. In addition, as pointed out by Brown, the future of ALP, a temporary force is also not secured. In the absence of secured jobs, these trained and hardened soldiers would be available to be employed by hostile warlords and other anti-government lobbies, including Taliban who would be looking for such opportunities.¹⁰⁷

In view of the above debate, it is convenient to forecast the likely scenario: one; in the absence of a consensus regime in Kabul, the best-case scenario may appear where there is a controlled stability in Afghanistan, having limited sovereignty with the Taliban exercising control over bulk of the south and parts of the east of the country. Some warlords commanding the central and northern regions, and Karzai regime might control over an enclave around Kabul and some key urban centres, with low-level conflict along the periphery, two; in the worst-case situation, the country may return to the civil war, similar to that of 1990s, leading to yet another humanitarian crisis.¹⁰⁸

Suggested Way Forward

It is believed that there are four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction plan: governance and participation, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well-being, and finally the security. While all of them merit equal and balanced approach to national building, but the long-term success of Afghan nation lies in the logical

outcome from the current mess, that means, “Afghan led legitimate owners of Afghanistan, moving away from war economy to peace economy”.¹⁰⁹

An early ceasefire, a timetable for troop withdrawals and a negotiating process would strengthen the moderates among the Taliban. A ‘conditions-based’ strategy for the withdrawal of US and NATO combat troops, however, is a recipe for unending conflict.¹¹⁰ The US soft tone towards Taliban may pay the desired dividends.

It is good news that despite differences, both Pakistan and the US seem more than willing for a serious dialogue to find out the ways for meaningful peace talks. They should also draw up a framework that specifies the responsibilities to advance this objective and an understanding on their sequencing and timeframe for implementation. In this context, the Wall Street Journal has already forewarned the US “without involving Pakistan in peace process, the chances of early success are remote.”¹¹¹

The detailed analysis indicates that a security gap does exist that severely limits the progression of post conflict reconstruction pillars in Afghanistan. Therefore, stakeholders must move on to fill the gap by striking a right balance by empowering all segments of Afghan society according to their ethnic composition, including the ANSF, so that they all stand united behind the consensus regime to minimize the impact of ‘spoilers’, while building Afghan governmental institutions.

It is also relevant to highlight that Pakistan in isolation has no capacity to deal with post 2014 Afghan problems.

Pakistan has failed earlier miserably during 1990s, when it took the lead role to bring consensus government in Kabul. Beside ISAF participating countries, the regional powers like Iran, Russia and China also need to be taken on board, as without their participation, a sustainable peace in Afghan cannot be achieved.

The damage has already been done by compromising on quality of recruitment. However, damage control is important if the success is to be ensured after 2014. The stakeholders must avoid short-term force generation and focus on quality induction. The Afghan government may have less numbers but the quality recruitment may prove better than having a mob of 350, 000 illiterate people.

The Western scholars suggest that the coalition forces cannot remain at the back of Afghan national security for ever. Only the Afghans themselves can do that. They suggest that even if the ANA reaches the stage where it can operate independently, the US and its allies should continue to provide back-up security in the country for a substantial period.¹¹²

Maintenance of the ANSF would continue to be serious challenge in the post drawdown period. Although, pledges have been made to support ANA up to 2025, but it all depends on as to what shape the security environment takes in Afghanistan and what kind of political arrangements, the ISAF would place before they leave. Therefore, the world community must ensure that a consensus regime is installed at Kabul, so that the investment made over the past one decade does not go waste.

Reyes suggests, “there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the withdrawal provided that the necessary assets, funding and support are put in place to fill the vacuum of international forces. Should this not be guaranteed, the current fear of growing insecurity could become a reality...”.¹¹³

According to Dennys, the role of Western States in Afghanistan may be constructive only if they reduce, restrain and re-focus interventions to be smaller and more strategically focused on “protecting civilians from ... renewed civil war”.¹¹⁴ Afghan ownership, where possible option must be broadened, from reform design to implementation. Most important is the development of a comprehensive Afghan, rather than US or German, vision of reform.¹¹⁵

Andrew Legon has suggested a comprehensive strategy to reform police. He suggests, “the politics of police reforms should be given away. Since the “centrality of the Ministry reform, in efforts to build an effective, professional ANP has long been identified”, that needs to be implemented in letter and spirit. Secondly, the policemen should not be taken as soldiers, they are not military auxiliaries. They should be deputed for law enforcement and policing duties. Lastly, he suggests that judicial reforms are important to ensure public safety, which is complex and interrelated system of agencies. He said, “reform of one without the other is doomed to fail”.¹¹⁶

Conclusion

Bringing peace and stability in Afghanistan seems to be an uphill challenge for the international community. Though, the 9/11 incident brought miseries for Pakistan, but the problems ahead seem more painful, if the Americans decide to leave Afghanistan without doing the job they intended to do. Nevertheless, one must remember, that prior to 9/11, Taliban were just an Afghan phenomenon, however, if an impression is created that they are the winners, Taliban would become a global phenomenon. Therefore, international community can ill afford to provide them a status, which can lead to global insecurity.

It has already been realized that there is no military solution to the ongoing problem. Even placing of over 350, 000 Afghan troops is unlikely to yield the desired results, even though they are well trained and well organized too, if political reforms are not compatible to the Afghan societal make-up. No single factor, even if it is powerful, can bring peace in Afghanistan. The past reconciliation efforts failed because they were driven by non-Afghans. Only a realistic, well thought out and a balanced approach would help in overcoming the challenges that Afghanistan faces currently.

We cannot afford to repeat the mistakes that we did in the past. We need to look forward positively to evolve a strategy that should create an environment acceptable to all stakeholders. Understanding internal dynamics of Afghan society is crucial for developing such a strategy. Besides Pakistan, other regional countries, especially

those that share border with Afghanistan, are also equally important to play their role.

Lastly, the people of Afghanistan should be mindful that the upcoming elections around 2014/2015 are very important to bring a change. They must guard and protect their democratic norms by selecting the best possible representatives, who should enjoy public confidence. This would allow the foreign investors to help boost their economy. At no stage, the 'spoilers' should be given a chance to be indulged in Afghanistan; with an aim to create chaos and anarchy that the people of Afghanistan had seen during the 1990s.

Key Findings

- Afghanistan's existing security structure draws strength from massive financial as well as military support from ISAF countries, which will be substantially reduced after NATO's drawdown in 2014.
- Afghan National Security Forces do not seem to withstand the challenge of national security after the drawdown of NATO, owing to their inherent weaknesses in relation to their composition, training and experience.
- The solution to Afghan problem lies in building consensus towards political reconciliation, rather than relying on military means only.
- A close cooperation among important global and regional players, particularly Pakistan, Iran,

Afghanistan and China can pave the way for the durable and sustainable peace in South Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular.

Endnotes

- 1 David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), 55.
- 2 Amir Shah and Sebastian Abbot, "Afghan President Karzai tells NATO to pull back," *The Washington Times*, March 15, 2012.
- 3 Robert D. Grymes, "ESTABLISHING SECURITY AND STABILITY IN AFGHANISTAN", *U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA*, April 7, 2003, iii, www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ada415725, accessed July 15, 2013.
- 4 Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan Issued by the Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO, 21 May 2012; Kamran Yousuf, "Istanbul conference ends with a whimper", *Published in The Express Tribune, November 3rd, 2011*; Dr Maleeha Lodhi, "Bonn: more optics than substance", *The News International (Islamabad)*, December 13, 2011; Dr Maleeha Lodhi, "Exit goal without a plan," *The News International (Islamabad)* November 30, 2010; Elaine Kurtenbach, "IMF warns global slowdown is deepening", *Financial Post*, Associated Press, Oct 9, 2012 7:24 AM ET | Last Updated: Oct 9, 2012 10:16 AM ET, business.financialpost.com/.../imf-warns-global-slowdown-is-deepeni..., accessed on October 11, 2012; Dr Maleeha Lodhi, "Global flux", *The News International (Islamabad)*, October 9, 2012; "IMF warns economic slowdown deepens", *The News International (Islamabad)*, October 10, 2012; K Sengupta, "NATO chiefs and politicians battle to delay Afghan troop depletion", *The Independent*, 19 April 2012.
- 5 "Afghan National Police: Facts and Figures", www.aco.nato.int/page265731236.aspx, accessed April 10, 2013.
- 6 Obaid Younossi et al, "The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army", *RAND Corporation*, www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG845.pdf, 12, 29, 40, 43, 48, 49, 50.
- 7 "Reforming Afghan National Police", *RUSI* (www.rusi.org); and Obaid Younossi et al, "The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army", 21; and Abdul waheed Wafa, "Confirmed for Cabinet in Afghanistan", *New York Times*, 28 June 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/29/world/asia/29kابل.html>, accessed April 13, 2014.
- 8 Ben Anderson, "Afghan police accused of corruption and child abuse", *BBC*

- News Asia*, February 25, 2013, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-21547542, accessed April 13, 2013.
- 9 Ibid.
 - 10 “Afghan War Commander Gives Options for After ’14”, *New York Time*, January 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/03/world/middleeast/afghan-war-commander-gives-options-for-after-2014.html?_r=0, accessed April 13, 2014; and Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Bonn: more optics than substance”.
 - 11 Reforming Afghan National Police, *RUSI* (www.rusi.org), 6, 46, 47, 56, 69, 100, 103, 111, 123.
 - 12 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, *RAND National Defence Research Institute*, 2009, <http://www.rand.org>, accessed April 10, 2013.
 - 13 The Official Website of Afghan National Army, <http://www.mod.gov.af/>, accessed April 10, 2013.
 - 14 “Afghan National Police: Facts and Figures”, www.aco.nato.int/page265731236.aspx, accessed April 10, 2013.
 - 15 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, 4; “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)”, www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/.../1667-10_ANSF_LR_en2.pdf; British Battles: First Afghan War (Battle of Ghuznee)Template: Web Cite; British Battles: First Afghan War (Battle of Kabul 1842)Template: Web Cite; and British Battles: First Afghan War (Battle of Kabul and retreat to Gandamak)Template: WebCite.
 - 16 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, 5.
 - 17 Ali. A. Jalali, “Rebuilding Afghanistan’s National Army”, *Parameters*, Autumn, 2002, 76, 77.
 - 18 Ibid., “A Force in Fragments- Reconstituting the Afghan National Army”, Asia Report No 190, May 12, 2010, www.docstoc.com/.../A-FORCE-IN-FRAGMENTS-RECONSTITITI..., accessed April 10, 2013.
 - 19 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army, <http://www.mod.gov.af/>, accessed April 10, 2013.
 - 20 Ibid.
 - 21 In Annex 1, Section 2 of the Bonn Agreement, the participants requested “the assistance of the international community in helping the new Afghan authorities in the establishment and training of new Afghan security and armed forces”; “Rebuilding Afghanistan: Peace and Security,” 2002; Obaid Younossi et al, “The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army”; and United Nations Security Council, UNSCR 1386, December 20, 2001.
 - 22 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, 6.

- 23 “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army”, Asia Report N°190 – 12 May 2010, 7.
- 24 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, 12.
- 25 “Afghanistan National Army (ANA)”, *Institute for Study of War (ISW)*, <https://www.understandingwar.org/.../afghanistan-national-army-ana>, accessed April 10, 2013.
- 26 C.J. Radin, “Afghan National Army: February 2009 Update,” *The Long War Journal*, February 24, 2009.
- 27 Briefing slides presented to Michael O’Hanlon at Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan/NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (CSTC-A/NTM-A), Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 10, 2010, 44.
- 28 “Afghanistan National Army (ANA)”.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)”.
- 32 C.J.Radin, “Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle”; GAO Report, “Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,” June 2005, 6, 8, 21; and Berlin Conference on Afghanistan, “Berlin Declaration,” April 1, 2004.
- 33 “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development”, *NATO factsheet*, April 2012; and More about the training program is available on its website <http://www.ntm-a.com>.
- 34 “Transcript of joint press conference, Chicago”, *Prime Minister of Australia website*, 21 May 2012.
- 35 “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF): Training and Development”.
- 36 “Afghanistan Monthly Progress Report May 2012”, *Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, 28 June 2012.
- 37 Kathy Gannon, “Afghan army still far from ready for duty when Western forces exit”, *Associated Press*, content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Afghan+National+Army (Posted 8/5/2012 04:12:44 AM).
- 38 “Afghan Security Forces Assume Leadership on Security in Four Districts of Ghor”, *ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan*, 2013-02-CA-77, www.isaf.nato.int/.../afghan-security-forces-assume-leadership-on-sec..., accessed April 10, 2013.
- 39 “The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform”, www.usip.org/files/afghanistan_police.pdf, accessed on October 11, 2012.
- 40 “Afghan National Police: Facts and Figures”, www.aco.nato.int/page265731236.aspx, accessed April 10, 2013.
- 41 “Reforming the Afghan National Police”, *RUSI*, (www.fpri.org/.../

- nationalsecurity/afghanpolice/...; “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)”; and Robert M. Perito, “Afghan Civil Order Police”, Special Report-307” United States Institute of Peace, May 2012, www.usip.org, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 42 Olivier Neola, “Building Security Institutions: Lessons Learned in Afghanistan”, *Focus stratégique no 38*, July-August 2012; “Afghan National Police (ANP)-Establishing a Police Force for Afghanistan”, <https://www.understandingwar.org/afghan-national-police-anp>; United Nations, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001; United Nations Security Council, UNSCR 1386, December 20, 2001; James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, et al., “America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq,” *RAND Corporation Monograph*, 2003, 134; United Nations Security Council, Report to the Secretary-General, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security,” March 18, 2002, 11; and Sedra, Mark. “Security first: Afghanistan’s security sector reform process,” *The Ploughshares Monitor*, 24(4), Winter 2003.
- 43 Pellerindate, Cheryl, “Afghan Security Forces Grow in Numbers, Quality”, *American Forces Press Service*, United States Department of Defense, (May 23, 2011, <http://www.defense.gov//news/newsarticle.aspx?id=64044>. Retrieved 2011-07-10.
- 44 “Afghanistan National Army (ANA)”.
- 45 “Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)”.
- 46 Pellerindate, Cheryl, “Afghan Security Forces Grow in Numbers, Quality”; and “Afghan National Police: Facts and Figures”.
- 47 “The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform”.
- 48 “EUPOL assists the Afghan Border Police to build a “Rule of Law” police service”, www.eupol-afg.eu/?q=node/195, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 49 “EUPOL assists the Afghan Border Police to build a “Rule of Law” police service”.
- 50 U.S. troops, Afghan police visit border observation post January 28, 2013, www.army.mil, accessed April 12, 2013; and Afghan border police complete OSCE-supported winter patrol course, *Press release*, www.osce.org › OSCE Office in Tajikistan, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 51 “The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform”; and Colby T Hauser, “CID combats corruption in Afghanistan”, August 15, 2011, www.army.mil, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 52 Robert M. Perito, “Afghan Civil Order Police”, Special Report-307”.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Thomas L. Day, “U.S. spending \$600 million on Afghan police stations”, *McClatchy Washington Bureau* Posted on Mon, Feb. 22, 2010, www.

- mclatchydc.com/2010/.../22/.../us-spending-600-million-on-af., accessed April 12, 2013.
- 55 “Security and Crime Border police equipped with advanced weaponry”, <http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/03/13/border-police-equipped-advanced-weaponry>; and US to help Afghanistan control its borders: Obama.
- 56 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: “It’s Local, So It Must Be Good” - Or Is It?”, Opinion | May 9, 2012 www.brookings.edu/research/.../05/09-afghan-police-felbabbrown, accessed April 10, 2013.
- 57 Ibid.
- 58 Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Peace by piece”, *The News International* (Islamabad), February 12, 2013.
- 59 Afghanistan: After Karzai’s directive, *Pakistan Observer*, March 27, 2013; “Pacifying Karzai”, Editorial, *Khaleej Times*, March 27, 2013.
- 60 “Power Transition Key to Post-2014 Stability”, *Kabul Perspective*, August 15, 2012, kabulperspective.wordpress.com/2012/..., accessed July 15, 2013.
- 61 “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition”; Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Flawed Afghan road map”; and Geoff Burt, Mark Sedra, and Michael Lawrence, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”.
- 62 Michael Kelley, “The Afghan Government Looks Destined to Collapse after NATO Forces Leave”; and “Afghanistan government may collapse: Report”.
- 63 “Afghanistan government may collapse: Report”, *Kuwait Times*, October 9, 2012.
- 64 Gabriel Reyes, “2014: The Other Afghan Withdrawal”, *Barcelona Center for International Affairs*, February 2013.
- 65 “Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force”.
- 66 Obaid Younossi et al, “The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army”, 12, 29, 40, 43, 48, 49, 50.
- 67 “Afghanistan government may collapse”; and “Afghan govt ‘could fall apart’ after NATO withdrawal”.
- 68 Imam Hussain, Special report from Kabul, “Chaos in Washington, where do we go from here,” *The News International* (Islamabad), November 29, 2010.
- 69 Ibid.
- 70 “Afghan civil war feared as Taliban survive US surge”, *Daily Times*, October 5, 2012.
- 71 Kevin Dias, “Security sector reform, counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan are at odds, says report” *News Release*, October 31, 2011, www.cigionline.org/Afghanistan, accessed April 12, 2013.

- 72 Kabul Perspective “Failure of Security Transition?” My op-ed Outlook Afghanistan, August 13, 2012, *kabulperspective.wordpress.com/*, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 73 Bryan McManus, “No rush’ for Afghanistan exit, says NATO chief”, Posted: *Asia Pacific News*, 11 October 2012; and “No rush for Afghanistan exit: NATO chief”, *Daily Times*, October 11, 2012.
- 74 Ibid.
- 75 International Crisis Group, “A Force in Fragments: Reconstituting the Afghan National Army,” May 12, 2010, 19—20, http://www.crisisgroup.org/_/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/190%20A%20Force%20in%20Fragments%20-%20Reconstituting%20the%20Afghan%20National%20Army.ashx; and Although the armed forces include representative numbers of Pashtuns overall, only about 2.5 percent of security personnel come from the south, whereas a more appropriate target would be 10 percent (CSTC-A/NTM-A); Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan, September 10, 2010, briefing slides, 15, 17; and GEOFF BURT, MARK SEDRA, AND MICHAEL LAWRENCE, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”.
- 76 Geoff Burt, Mark Sedra, and Michael Lawrence, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”, *The Globe and Mail*, December, 7, 2011.
- 77 Obaid Younossi, et al, “The Long March- Building an Afghan National Army”, 4.
- 78 Col. Scot D. Mackenzie, “Imperatives For Working With Afghan Security Forces,” *USAWC*, March 1, 2008, 8.
- 79 Obaid Younossi et al, “The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army”.
- 80 The Official Website of the Afghan National Army, <http://www.mod.gov.af/>, accessed April 10, 2013.
- 81 Bret Stephens- Afghanistan: Eyes Wide Shut, *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 June 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703964104575335103325554236.html>, accessed April 12, 2013.
- 82 “Afghan National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective Fighting Force” *House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Testimony* | August 2, 2012 www.brookings.edu/research/.../02-afghanistan-security-felbabbrown.
- 83 Rasul Baksh Rais- Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours, *Ethnic Studies Report*, Vol. XVII, No. 1, January 1999, 2.
- 84 Obaid Younossi et al, “The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army”, 17, 16.
- 85 “Afghan government could collapse, news report says” *Australian News*, October 08, 2012, www.theaustralian.com.au/.../story-fu3dxix6-1226491008874, accessed April 12, 2013..
- 86 Andreas Ulrich, “Ineffective and Unsustainable: Failure Threatens Afghan

- Police Training Mission”, www.spiegel.de, accessed April 13, 2013.
- 87 Andrew Legon, “Ineffective, Unprofessional, and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge”, June 2009, www.fpri.org/enotes/200906.legon.afghannationalpolice.html, accessed April 13, 2013.
- 88 Ben Anderson, “Afghan police accused of corruption and child abuse”.
- 89 “Afghan civil war feared as Taliban survive US surge”, *Daily Times*, October 5, 2012.
- 90 “Afghan Prison Blues”, *Newsweek*, February 11, 2008.
- 91 “Afghan civil war feared as Taliban survive US surge”.
- 92 Muhammad Hassan Khitab, “More than 100 Afghan police killed every month: Bashari”, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, Jan 2, 2011, www.pajhwok.com/.../more-100-afghan-police-killed-every-month-..., accessed April 12, 2013.
- 93 Kathy Gannon, “Afghan army still far from ready for duty when Western forces exit”; and GEOFF BURT, MARK SEDRA, AND MICHAEL LAWRENCE, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”.
- 94 “NATO admits Afghan local police abuses” *Agence France-Presse*, December 16, 2011; “Policemen detained for kidnapping children”, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, January 8, 2012; Kathy Gannon, “Afghan army still far from ready for duty when Western forces exit”; “Nato admits Afghan local police abuses”, *Dawn*, 16th December, 2011; and “NATO Admits Afghan Local Police Abuses”, *Voice of America*, www.voanews.com/.../nato-admits-afghan-local-police-abuses.../168..., accessed April 12, 2013.
- 95 Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Flawed Afghan road map”.
- 96 Keith Crane, “The NATO Drawdown: Implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan”, *RAND Corporation*, December 15, 2011.
- 97 Taro Ichikawa, “Post-2014 Afghanistan draws Focus”, *IndepthNews*, July 15, 2012.
- 98 Najmuddin A. Shaikh, “Unrealistic Expectations”, *Dawn*, July 11, 2012.
- 99 Kathy Gannon, “Afghan army still far from ready for duty when Western forces exit”, *Associated Press*, content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Afghan+National+Army (Posted 8/5/2012, accessed April 12, 2013).
- 100 Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: ‘It’s Local, So It Must Be Good’ - Or Is It?”; Geoff Burt, Mark Sedra, and Michael Lawrence, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”; and “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, Afghanistan”.
- 101 Elaine Kurtenbach, “IMF warns global slowdown is deepening”, *Financial Post*, *Associated Press*, Oct 9, 2012, business.financialpost.com/.../imf-warns-global-slowdown-is-deepeni..., accessed on October 11, 2012; and “US Intelligence sees Asia’s global power rising by 2030”, *The News International* (Islamabad), December 11, 2012.
- 102 “IMF warns economic slowdown deepens”, *The News International*

- (Islamabad), October 10, 2012.
- 103 Geoff Burt, Mark Sedra, and Michael Lawrence, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”; and “Joint Press Conference with NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Kabul, Afghanistan”.
 - 104 Global Risks 2012- Seventh Edition, *World Economic Forum*, (www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-2012-seventh-edition); Strategic Survey 2012, *The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)*, 16 October 2012, www.iiss.org; Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Global flux”; and Sam Ro, “14 Major Risks That Used To Be The Stuff Of Science Fiction” *Business Inside*, Jan. 12, 2012, www.businessinsider.com/wef-global-risks-2012-2012-1?op=1, accessed April 12, 2013.
 - 105 Strategic Survey 2012 – “Press Statement by Dr John Chipman Director-General and Chief Executive”; Sam Ro, “14 Major Risks That Used To Be The Stuff Of Science Fiction”; and Dr Maleeha Lodhi, “Global flux”.
 - 106 Dr Maleeha Lodhi, Bonn: more optics than substance”, *The News International* (Islamabad), Tuesday, December 13, 2011.
 - 107 K Sengupta, “NATO chiefs and politicians battle to delay Afghan troop depletion”; and Vanda Felbe-Brown, “Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: “It’s Local, So It Must Be Good” - Or Is It?”.
 - 108 Geoff Burt, Mark Sedra, and Michael Lawrence, “The Afghan exit strategy is fraught with peril”.
 - 109 Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, “The chimera of a 2014 pullout”, *The News International* (Islamabad), Saturday, December 11, 2010; and Qais Ghanem, “Hope of Afghan turnaround”, March 26, 2013, gulfnews.com., accessed April 13, 2013.
 - 110 Ibid.
 - 111 “US cannot win Afghan war sans Pakistan: US paper”, *Wall Street Journal*, Tuesday, October 26, 2010.
 - 112 Obaid Younossi et al, “The Long March-Building a Afghan National Army”.
 - 113 Gabriel Reyes, “2014: The Other Afghan Withdrawal”.
 - 114 Kevin Dias, “Security sector reform, counterinsurgency and stabilization efforts in Afghanistan are at odds, says report” *News Release*, October 31, 2011, www.cigionline.org/Afghanistan, accessed April 12, 2013.
 - 115 Ibid.
 - 116 Andrew Legon, “Ineffective, Unprofessional, and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge”.

Durand Line Agreement: A Historical Perspective*

Lutfur Rehman¹

Abstract

The cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan is extremely vital for the restoration of peace in the region. The two countries have suffered heavily due to the unrest in Afghanistan and the unabated acts of terrorism. Despite this, Islamabad-Kabul relations have never been cordial, except during the brief period of the Taliban regime. Misunderstandings and misinterpretation of the Durand Agreement has created hurdles in improvement of Pak-Afghan ties. Durand Agreement is seen through different prisms by various actors in Afghan politics. The Durand Agreement was not meant for one century, as claimed by the Afghan government and some writers. It is a permanent treaty, duly recognized by UN, US and all ISAF nations and regional countries. It stands ratified by successive Afghan Governments, barring few, who tried to make it controversial for the consumption of domestic politics, rather than challenging its validity. What the Government of Afghanistan claims, tantamounts to demanding for re-writing the history and re-shaping the geography of this region. It is also incorrect to say that the Durand Line has not been demarcated. The whole border has been demarcated, with the exception of Mohmand Agency and

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

¹ Mr. Lutfur Rehman is a Ph. D scholar at NDU, Islamabad.

a small portion on the Sikkarm hilltop in Kurram Agency. Dozens of a century old pillars still lying on Duran Line are self-speaking proof of its demarcation, which perhaps, our present Afghan leadership did not happen to come across. The Durand Agreement was not signed under the “duress”, as argued by some individuals. The treaty was signed on the repeated requests of Amir Abdur Rahman. The Amir termed signing of the Durand Agreement as one of his big achievements. Afghanistan has not handed over a single inch of its territory to the British India under the Durand Agreement. Kabul immensely benefited from this Accord, as it achieved its cherished goal of gaining control over Asmar, an area of Bajour. The British Government of India also gave Lalpura area of Mohmand Agency and Birmal area of Waziristan to Afghanistan under this Treaty. Afghanistan has violated the Durand Agreement on a number of occasions by occupying a vast area of Bajour, Dir and Chitral located on the southern side of Kunar River. These areas were incorporated into Kunar province. Similarly, the Afghan army occupied and annexed Bashgal Valley of Chitral and re-named it Nooristan, in total violation of the Durand Agreement. It is, therefore, visualized that it is in the best interest of both the nations to remove their mutual irritants amicably and work towards evolution of an effective border management and surveillance mechanism, which can help root out terrorism, drug-trafficking and proliferation of arms and ammunition from and to the region.

Introduction

The friendly and good neighbourly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are the prerequisite for the promotion of peace and stability in the region and the world at large. The two countries have many points of convergence; including a common history, cultural linkages, traditions and religion. But instead of cooperation, they are leveling accusations and counter accusations against each other. Kabul claims several areas of Pakistan, including the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Afghanistan opposes the fencing of Pak-Afghan border, which according to Kabul would weaken its stand. Kabul does not accept the border, which was demarcated in 1895-96 under article No. 4 of the Durand Agreement between Afghanistan and the British India.

Fresh controversies have emerged, especially during the last two decades about the nature of this border and legitimacy of the Durand Agreement itself. Some scholars are of the view that Durand Agreement was to stay just for one century.¹ They say that the Treaty has expired in November 1993. They also maintain that the Pak-Afghan border has not been demarcated anywhere, with the exception of Torkham in Khyber Agency and Chaman, Balochistan. Some Afghan writers claim that FATA and KPK were snatched from Afghanistan and merged with the British India under the Durand Accord.

Addressing a press conference in Kabul on 5th May 2013, the Afghan President Hamid Karzai said,

“Islamabad was exerting pressure on Kabul to accept the Durand Line, the disputed border which Afghans do not accept.”² On another occasion, he said, that “the Afghan people will never never allow their government to recognize the Durand Line...The Durand Line is imposed by the British colonial rule, never recognized by the Afghan people.”³ The Chief of the Afghan Armed Forces, General Sher Ahmad Kairimi, says, “Durand Line Agreement was for hundred years, it’s over now and Afghanistan has the right to claim its territory in Pakistan...our [Afghan] border is not the Durand Line, it’s the Indus River.”⁴

Pakistan says, “the Durand Line is a settled issue and opening discussions on this issue is a distraction from the more pressing issues requiring the priority attention and cooperation of Pakistan and Afghanistan.”⁵ The statement of Hamid Karzai and its rebuttal by Islamabad indicate that how serious the border issue between the two countries is. A spokesman of the Afghan National Front (AFN), Jafar Kohistani, has termed the Durand Agreement as “the mother of all conflicts between Afghanistan and Pakistan.”⁶ The question arises whether the Durand Treaty was really meant for one century? Whether the Pak-Afghan border has not been demarcated? Whether Afghanistan ceded any territory to British India under the Durand Treaty or this is just an assumption? This paper is aimed at answering all these questions.

Historical Perspective

Durand Line refers to the Pak-Afghan border, right from Wakhan to Kohi Sia Malik Range near the tri-

junction border of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. This border is “marked throughout its length by a well-defined natural wall (mountain ranges), running north to south, which varies in height from 20,000 feet in the north to 5,000 feet in the south.”⁷ This long border, stretching over 2590.4 km, was demarcated in the light of the Durand Agreement signed in Kabul on 12th November 1893. Many myths are prevalent about the Durand Agreement, thus, making it, perhaps, the most often misquoted treaty. The Durand Line issue has been one of the major hurdles in improvement of the Pak-Afghan relations since 1947.

According to some Afghans, the biggest historic injustice done to Afghanistan was the imposition of the Durand Line in 1893, which has split the Pashtun population between the British India and Afghanistan.⁸ On the eve of Pakistan’s independence, Kabul did not recognize the Durand Line as an international border.⁹ Chairman of the Upper House of the Afghan Parliament or the House of Elders (*Mesbrano Jirga*) Professor Sibghatullah Mojaddedi says, “he does not recognize the Durand Line as an international border....Durand Line had no meaning for them [Afghans].”¹⁰ W. P. S. Sidhu argues that after the expiry of Durand agreement in 1993, “Pakistan’s de jure western border ceased to exist.”¹¹ Dr. Dipak Basu says, “just like Hong Kong, NWFP (present day KPK) should go back to Afghanistan after expiry of the lease of one hundred years.”¹²

Dr. G. Rauf Roashan writes that Pak-Afghan border has never been demarcated from Khyber Agency

towards the north in Chitral.¹³ Baijan Omrani is of the view that the British threatened Amir Abdur Rahman that if their proposal was not accepted, Afghanistan would be invaded. He, therefore, agreed to the British occupation of Chitral, Dir, Swat, and Peshawar.¹⁴ According to David B. Edwards, “while no British subject was ever allowed to enter tribal territory to survey the actual line and no cairns were set up in place to show where Afghan sovereignty ended and British sovereignty began...”¹⁵

Pakistani writers and policy-makers are not clear about the Durand Agreement. According to the former Governor of KPK, Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman, the Durand Agreement was to stay for one hundred years and he had asked the then President Pervez Musharraf to talk to the Afghan government for extending the agreement.¹⁶ Aslam Effendi argues that under this accord, Afghanistan was deprived of “Chaman, Chaghai, Khyber, Chitral, Waziristan, Peshawar, Chilas, Bajour, Dir, Buner, Swat etc.”¹⁷ Shaukat Piracha writes that Pak-Afghan “boundary has remained un-demarcated except at one or two places.”¹⁸

The views quoted above are essentially ‘opinions’ not facts, based on research from historical evidence. Therefore, this researcher intends challenging the prevailing misperceptions about Durand Line Agreement with the evidence gleaned from a vast array of historical literature, composed by highly respected and credible international writers as well as some primary documents pertaining to the Durand Line Agreement.

During the reign of Mughal Emperor Babur and “his successors down to the middle of the 17th century, the rich provinces of Kandahar, Derajat, Peshawar and Kashmir, besides Khorasan and the western tribes in Persia, were included in the Indian Empire, while the more mountainous regions were well left to govern themselves under their own chieftains.¹⁹ The situation changed afterwards. Nadir Shah conquered Kandahar in 1738 and razed it to the ground. Now Herat, Farah and Kandahar were in the possession of Persia, Balkh was a part of Bokhara, while Kabul was included in the Mughal Empire of Delhi.²⁰ Soon Nadir Shah also conquered Kabul. Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of Afghanistan, was serving as a junior officer in the Persian army at that time. After the assassination of Nadir Shah in June 1747, Ahmad Shah Abdali was able to lay foundation of the modern state of Afghanistan. He became the first king of Afghanistan. The new country was not a nation-state with clear-cut boundaries, but a tribal set-up, with common customs, language and ancestry.²¹

Ahmad Shah Abdali expanded his empire far and wide through conquests. He died of cancer in 1773.²² He was succeeded by Timor Mirza. The new king overcame the unrest stirred by his elder brother, Suleiman, by putting out his eyes.²³ Timor Mirza died in Kabul in 1793. His mourners included 23 sons and a large number of daughters.²⁴ Timor Mirza’s death created turmoil, as each son was trying to gain control over his father’s patrimony. Hence, the Afghan empire so hastily and violently shrunk to its natural geographical limits.²⁵ The Sikh ruler of Punjab, Ranjeet Singh, took benefit

of this situation and seized Multan in 1810, Kashmir in 1819 and Peshawar in 1822.²⁶

The British Indian Government, Ranjeet Singh and the then Afghan king, Shah Shuja, signed a tripartite treaty in 1838. Under this accord, Shah Shuja ceded Peshawar to the Sikhs. Ranjeet Singh died in June 1839 and ten years later, the British Government of India captured Peshawar from the Sikhs. Similarly, the frontier districts of the Punjab i.e. Hazara, Peshawar and Kohat came under the commissioner of Peshawar, while Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and Dera Ghazi Khan came under the commissioner of Derajat.²⁷

Durand's Mission

When Amir Abdur Rahman came into power in July 1880, he started practical work on defining the Afghan borders. He approached first Russia, which responded that Hindu Kush, and not the Oxus, was the Russo-Afghan border.²⁸ The Amir was not sure about the Afghan frontiers. He even did not know "how many provinces he ruled."²⁹ The question of the Afghan frontiers with the Czarist Russia was settled with the British help, therefore, not only the Durand Line but also Russo-Afghan borders owe their legitimacy to the British agreements. A commission headed by Colonel Sir West Ridgeway delimited over 563 km (350 miles) long border from Hari Rud (Herat) to Oxus (Amu River) in 1886. The Amir was so pleased with the British help for settling the thorny issue of Russo-Afghan border that he gave gold medals to Sir West Ridgeway, Qazi Aslam Khan, Colonel Holdich, Colonel Yate and others members of the commission.³⁰

Now, he wanted to identify the Indo-Afghan border. He requested the Indian government in October 1888 to send a mission to Kabul to settle the issue. He suggested, "Sir Mortimer Durand, the Foreign Secretary, might be appointed as the head of this 'Mission'."³¹ But Lord Lansdowne appointed Lord Roberts as chief of the mission to Kabul.³² The Amir did not like Lord Roberts due to his active role in the 2nd Anglo-Afghan war. He, therefore, adopted delaying tactics. The Amir replied, "it is a thing which must take place, but at the proper time."³³ In the meantime, Lord Roberts departed for England and Amir succeeded in his plan. He again proposed that a mission to be headed by Foreign Secretary, Mortimer Durand, be sent to Kabul. Lord Lansdowne approved the proposal and the mission left Peshawar for Kabul on 19th September 1893. Mortimer Durand's entourage included Colonel Elles, Dr. Fenn, Captain Manners-Smith, McMahan, Mr. Donald and Mr. Clarke. Mr. Donald used to "speak Pashto with exceptional fluency."³⁴

No survey officer was permitted to accompany the mission. But, this was a technical mistake and the apprehension of Colonel Sir T. Hungerford Holdich proved correct, who had opposed the Durand Mission right from the start. He was of the view that the inclusion of a surveyor would have prevented some of the errors that were made due to lack of geographical knowledge, and the subsequent political troubles on the border, both during and after demarcation.³⁵ The mission was given a warm welcome in Kabul.

Mortimer Durand was one of the most brilliant civil servants in British India. Besides English, he knew German, French, Russian and Persian. But, Amir Abdur Rahman was also not a weak ruler. He was the Iron Amir, who "...established the boundaries, the offices, and the apparatus of the modern nation state."³⁶ Durand's knowledge of Persian impressed the Afghans and the Amir realized that he (Abdur Rahman) was dealing with an English gentleman, trusted him and became his friend.³⁷ Mortimer Durand spoke of him as "the Amir was the strongest man with whom he had to deal in long and varied career."³⁸

Mortimer Durand persuaded Amir to evacuate the districts of Roshan and Shignan and take control of Darwaz as stipulated in the Russo-Anglo Agreement of 1873. Roshan and Shignan are located in the northern side of River Oxus, while Darwaz on its southern side. The next point of the agenda was the identification of the Indo-Afghan border. The Amir said that he wanted to have a wall around his country, so that he might exactly know the Afghan frontiers. The Amir renounced his claims over the frontier tribes, including Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat. The people of these areas have fought all the invaders and successfully defended their independence throughout history. They have never submitted to Afghan control.³⁹ The difficult point of the negotiation was Asmar, which the Amir wanted to merge into Afghanistan. He was determined never to surrender Asmar but Durand had the power to give concessions. But at this point, he gave extraordinary concession by accepting the Afghan's occupation of Asmar. Since

1861, the Amir was claiming Asmar and Bajour as the Afghan territories, but the Indian government had flatly rejected the claim.

Actually, Bajour comprised four major independent Khanates. These were Nawagai, Khar, Pashat and Asmar; all located on the left bank of the Kunar River. "Asmar forms an independent state..."⁴⁰ The Afghan troops occupied the area in March 1892. The Viceroy sent a letter to Amir Abdur Rahman, asking him "to withdraw his forces from Asmar without delay as it has become evident that further conflict will be inevitable unless Afghan force retires from Asmar."⁴¹ During his talks with Mortimer Durand, the Amir refused to vacate Asmar and requested that he should be given Hissara, Marawara and Shortan areas of Bajour.⁴²

Resultantly, the talks proved successful and they inked two treaties on 12th November 1893. The first agreement was about Roshan, Shignan and Darwaz. The second accord known as the Durand Agreement was pertaining to the Indo-Afghan border. Besides its English version, Persian copies of the agreement were also signed and exchanged. Kabul achieved all its objectives i.e. retaining Asmar, control over Birmal area of Waziristan, Lalpura area of (Mohmand), besides, increase in its annual financial assistance from the British India. It was agreed that the border in Kunar should be at average four miles from Kunar River on the side of Bajour.⁴³ Mortimer Durand appeased the Amir at the cost of Bajour, Chitral, Mohmand and Waziristan despite protests by the people of these areas.

Next day, a special ceremony was arranged in Kabul. The Amir twice addressed the participants, first in the beginning and second time at the conclusion of the function. He thanked Mortimer Durand and members of his team. The Amir was quite contended, because he gained more than his expectations.

The Amir remarked that “the misunderstandings and disputes which were arising about these frontier matters were put to an end, and after the boundary lines had been marked out according to the above-mentioned agreements by the Commissioners of both the Governments, a general peace and harmony reigned between the two Governments, which I pray [to] God may continue forever.”⁴⁴ Mortimer Durand made an extempore speech in Persian. Instead of English, all the talks were held in Persian. The Amir sent medals to members of the Mission. This also includes a golden star for Mortimer Durand.

Durand Agreement is a brief treaty with seven articles. It has no time limit. Article 2 of the agreement says, “His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line (Durand Line) on the side of India.” Similarly, the word “lease” has not been used in any treaty concluded between British India and Afghanistan. There is nothing on the record to prove that the Amir was threatened either by Mortimer Durand or any other member of his delegation. Amir Abdur Rahman considered the Durand Agreement as one of his great achievements.⁴⁵

The successive Afghan governments signed several treaties reaffirming the Durand Agreement. Amir Habibullah signed a treaty with the British India on 21st March 1905. He pledged to honour all the treaties signed by his father with the British India. "...the engagements which His Highness, my late father, that is, Ziaul-millat-wad-din, who had found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting and will act upon the same agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise."⁴⁶ The 3rd Anglo-Afghan war was brought to an end by the treaty of Rawalpindi signed on 8th August 1919.

The Afghan government reaffirmed its commitment to respect the Indo-Afghan border as agreed by Amir Abdur Rahman. When Nadir Shah came into power, the Afghan representative, General Shah Wali Khan exchanged notes with the British in London in May 1930, whereby, Kabul pledged to honour all the engagements reached with the British India. After settlement of the Dokalim dispute, the Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sardar Faiz Khan, in a letter sent to the British Minister in Kabul, Sir Richard Roy Maconachie, on 3rd February 1934, explained that the demarcated line in the vicinity of Dokalim formed the international boundary between Afghanistan and India.

The letter says "the Royal Government of Afghanistan under the rule of His Majesty Muhammad Zahir Shah confirms the boundary line, as demarcated by the said

representatives...⁴⁷ Every Afghan ruler before partition of the Sub-continent accepted the Durand Line as an international border. It was with the emergence of Pakistan that Afghanistan raised objections regarding the Durand Agreement, creating tension in relations between the two countries. However, the Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan, Sardar Shah Wali Khan, while addressing the Aligarh Old Boys Association in Karachi in June 1948, said, “our King has clearly stated that I, as representative of Afghanistan Government with full sense of responsibility, declare that Afghanistan have no claim on the Frontier territory and even if there were any, they have been given up in favour of Pakistan. Anything contrary to this which may have appeared in the press is the past or may appear in future should not be given credence and should be considered just a canard.”⁴⁸

Demarcation of the Border

The whole border was demarcated by three commissions. These included the Asmar Boundary Commission, Waziristan Boundary Commission and the Baloch-Afghan Boundary Commission. These commissions delimited the Indo-Afghan border, thus, making it as one of the “best defined and most clearly recognized frontiers in the world.”⁴⁹ Except Mohmand Agency and Sikaram Peak in Kurram Agency, the rest of the border has been demarcated. Pillars were erected along the border in Kurram, North and South Waziristan and along Balochistan. Dozens of a century old pillars still lying on Duran Line are self-speaking proof of its demarcation, which perhaps, our present Afghan leadership did not happen to come across.

The Afghan Occupation of Nasrat District and Bashgal

Commissioner Peshawar, Sir Richard Udny, was representing the Indian side in Asmar Boundary Commission. He was a good mathematician, but he failed to fulfill his responsibility honestly by allowing Afghanistan to gain control over the areas, to which it was not entitled under the Durand Agreement. He gave free hand to Afghanistan to occupy Nasrat District, Sao and Birkot areas of Chitral in violations of the Durand Agreement. Richard Udny writes "...I must again repeat that this boundary was not capable of being claimed in any way under the Convention (Durand Agreement), and I trust that you will not only admit that my agreeing to it is a remarkably friendly concession..."⁵⁰

This encouraged the Afghan Commissioner, Guhلام Haider Khan, who laid a claim for Bashgal Valley. But Richard Udny allowed Afghanistan to occupy Bashgal valley in violation of the Durand Agreement. The Durand Treaty says that "the British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees on the other hand that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur (Bajour) or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley."⁵¹

Before the Afghan occupation, Bashgal or *Kafiristan* (renamed as Nuristan by the Afghan government) was a province of Chitral. William Watts McNair visited the area in 1883 with the permission of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk. The British Agent at Gilgit, George

Scott Robertson, arrived in Chitral in October 1889, seeking permission of Mehtar Aman-ul-Mulk to pay a visit to Kamdesh, the Headquarters of Bashgal valley. The Mehtar allowed him and provided him an escort. Robertson stayed in Kamdesh for three days. Next year, he again wanted to visit *Kafiristan*. But this time Aman-ul-Mulk was reluctant to allow Robertson to visit *Kafiristan* in the pretext of deteriorating law and order situation. When he insisted, the Aman-ul-Mulk asked him “to sign a paper exonerating him (the Mehtar) from anything which might befall me, and stating clearly that my contemplated journey was to be undertaken in direct opposition to his wishes and advice....So I signed the paper.”⁵² Robertson visited Bashgal valley and stayed there for more than a year.

The Afghan army invaded Bashgal in 1895. Several delegations from Bashgal visited Chitral to get help from their ruler. But the Mehtar left his subjects in lurch. The Afghan army occupied and annexed Bashgal. The Kafir’s houses were looted and “...in the course of pacification of *Kafiristan*, 10,000 were killed and 16,000 forcibly resettled throughout the country, reducing the local population by half.”⁵³ A festival was held in Kabul on 1st January 1896 as a mark of the victory over Kafirs of Bashgal Valley. Guhlam Haider Khan sent “1500 *Kafir* prisoners to Kabul with 100 camel loads of plunder as a gift for the Amir.”⁵⁴

Side by side with these developments, the Russians continued their advancement towards India. Russia was determined that if London tried to create problems for

her (Russia) anywhere on the globe, Petersburg would do so in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. In order to avert this, the British authorities wished to have a neutral strip to separate its border from Russia. They preferred that Wakhan should either be given to China or Afghanistan. However, Peking turned down the proposal. The British, therefore, asked Afghanistan to take control of Wakhan, so that it might serve as a barrier between the Indian and Russian territory. The ruler of Wakhan, Mir Ali Mardan Shah, wanted to merge Wakhan with the Chitral state, but he was discouraged from doing so by the British authorities.

Britain and Russia exchanged a note in March 1895, regarding their sphere of influence on the Pamirs and delimitation of the border on the *Roof of the World*. Article No. 4 of the note says that “Her Britannic Majesty’s and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia engage to abstain from exercising any political influence or control—the former to the north, the latter to the south—of the above line of demarcation.”⁵⁵ But the British Government was determined not to have a common border with Russia anywhere in the world. In order to achieve this objective, it gave Wakhan in the control of Afghanistan, despite Amir Abdur Rahman’s reluctance. Financial assistance was also sanctioned for Kabul to smoothly run the administration of the area. But all these incentives did not satisfy Kabul and it occupied Dokalim, another area of Chitral in September 1912. Dokalim is located across Chitral River near Arandu. Kabul was out to capture all area upto Lowari top but the British did not permit it to do so.

Key Findings

- The Durand Agreement was not meant for one century, as claimed by the Afghan government and some writers. It is a permanent treaty, duly recognized by UN, US and all ISAF nations as well as regional countries. It stands ratified by successive Afghan Governments, barring few, who tried to make it controversial for the consumption of domestic politics, rather than challenging its validity.
- What the Government of Afghanistan claims, tentamounts to demanding for re-writing the history and re-shaping the geography of this region.
- It is also incorrect to say that the Durand Line has not been demarcated. The whole border has been demarcated, with the exception of Mohmand Agency and a small portion on the Sikkarm hilltop in Kurram Agency. Dozens of a century old pillars still lying on Duran Line are self-speaking proof of its demarcation, which perhaps our present Afghan leadership did not happen to come across.
- The Durand Agreement was not signed under the 'duress', as argued by some individuals. The treaty was signed on the repeated requests of Amir Abdur Rahman. The Amir termed signing of the Durand Agreement as one of his big achievements.
- Afghanistan has not handed over a single inch of its territory to the British India under the Durand Agreement. Kabul immensely benefited from this Accord, as it achieved its cherished goal of gaining

control over Asmar, an area of Bajour. The British Government of India also gave Lalpura area of Mohmand Agency and Birmal area of Waziristan to Afghanistan under this Treaty.

- Afghanistan has violated the Durand Agreement on a number of occasions by occupying a vast area of Bajour, Dir and Chitral, located on the southern side of Kunar River. These areas were incorporated into Kunar province. Similarly, the Afghan army occupied and annexed Bashgal Valley of Chitral and re-named it Nooristan, in total violation of the Durand Agreement.
- It is in the best interest of both the nations to remove their mutual irritants amicably and work towards evolution of an effective border management and surveillance mechanism, which can help root out terrorism, drug-trafficking and proliferation of arms and ammunition from and to the region.

Conclusion

Durand Agreement is not meant for one century as claimed by some writers. It is a permanent treaty with no time limit. The whole Pak-Afghan border was demarcated by three commissions in 1895-96. Just about twenty four km border in Mohmand Agency and four km in Kurram Agency has not so far been **demarcated**. It should be remembered that Afghanistan had not ceded a single inch territory to the British India under the Durand Agreement. It is worth mentioning that Kabul achieved maximum benefits from this treaty. Despite

this, Kabul always tried to make Durand Agreement controversial, primarily for the consumption of domestic politics, which revolve around more 'negatives' than 'positives'.

The Afghan authorities are exploiting the ignorance of Pakistani people about the nature of the accord. It should be kept in mind that boundaries of nations can't be changed through claims. Similarly, under section (a) of the Article 11th of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 1978, a boundary established by a treaty cannot be cancelled unilaterally.

The Afghan President Hamid Karzai is making statements against the Durand Line just for domestic political gains. The Afghan opposition to the Durand Line has badly damaged Islamabad-Kabul ties. Instead of cooperation, they are accusing each other of supporting the militants. This has also created problems in the border management. Terrorists and the elements involved in the smuggling of drugs can easily cross the border, as there is no cooperation and coordination between the two countries.

Pakistan has deployed more than one hundred thousand troops along the Pak-Afghan border, to control the illegal crossing of the border, but no such action is visible on the other side of the frontier. The Pakistani efforts will bear fruit only when the Afghan National Army also cooperates in this regard. Joint management of the border is of utmost importance to allow only legal entry of people to and from the border. As the

border is very long, therefore, it is the need of the hour to establish entry and exit points at specific distances. The two countries also need to evolve a mechanism to fence the border, wherever possible.

Kabul and Islamabad should make efforts to ease tension along the border, especially in Bajour, Chitral, Mohmand and Khyber Agency. It is in the supreme interest of the two countries to forget the past and work collectively for the restoration of peace and stability in the region. This will usher a new era in the Pak-Afghan relationship. Kabul should desist from making propaganda against Pakistan's territorial integrity and sovereignty. It should expel the Pakistani Taliban, especially Maulvi Fazullah and Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and their supporters from Kunar and Nuristan provinces, so that terrorist network across Durandline can be rooted out and both the nations live in peace and harmony.

Endnotes

- 1 See for example the arguments made by W.P.S.Sidhu, '*Why the Durand Line is so important*', The Indian Express, 16 November 1999. Dr. Depak Basu, '*Durand Line: the line of Evil*', <http://www.hvk.org/articles/1106/81.html> accessed on 17 September 2010.
- 2 The Express Tribune, 7 May 2013.
- 3 Hamid Karzai's interview with Saleem Safi of Geo Television network. The interview was telecast on 16 June 2013.
- 4 Abbas Daiyar, Afghanistan's Border is Indus River, Daily Outlook, Afghanistan, 28 July 2011.
- 5 The Nation, 7 May 2013.
- 6 Frontier Post, (Peshawar) 6 June 2008.
- 7 Captain H. L. Nevill, *Campaigns on the North-West Frontier* (London: John Murry, 19120), 1.
- 8 Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Culture and Political History* (New Jersey:

- Princeton University Press, 2010), 48.
- 9 Captain Ray Wiss, *A Line in the Sand: Canadians at War in Kandahar* (Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 2011), 42
 - 10 Pakistan Times, 28 May 1992.
 - 11 W.P.S.Sidhu, *Why the Durand Line is so important*, The Indian Express, 16 November 1999.
 - 12 Dr. Depak Basu, *Durand Line: the line of Evil*, <http://www.hvk.org/articles/1106/81.html> accessed on 17 September 2010.
 - 13 [http://www.institute-for-afghanstudies.org/contribution/DRRoasshanArch/2001 unholy durand line](http://www.institute-for-afghanstudies.org/contribution/DRRoasshanArch/2001%20unholy%20durand%20line), accessed on 8 March 2011.
 - 14 Bijan Omrani; *The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border*, Asian Affairs Journal Vol. XI, No. 11 (July 2009), 185.
 - 15 David B. Edwards, *Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier* (California: University of California Press, 1996), 27.
 - 16 The News International, Khaleej Times, 22 September 2005._
 - 17 Aslam Effendi: *Durand Line and the elephant*, the News International, 2 January 2004.
 - 18 Daily Times, 19 May 2003.
 - 19 George B. Scott, *Afghan and Pathan: A sketch* (London: The Mitre Press, 1929), 26.
 - 20 J. Talboys Wheeler: *Memorandum on Afghanistan Affairs from A.D. 1700* (Calcutta: Office of Superintendent Printing, 1869), 5.
 - 21 Arnold Fletcher, *Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), 245.
 - 22 Lt. Vincent Eyre: *The Military Operations at Kabul, which ended in the Retreat and Destruction of the British Army* (London: A. Spottishwoods, 1843), 29.
 - 23 Major H.W. Bellew: *The Races of Afghanistan* (Calcutta: Thacker, spink, and Co. 1880), 32.
 - 24 Philip Francis Walker: *A Short Account of Afghanistan, its History, and Our Dealing with it* (London: Griffith and Farran, 1888), 17.
 - 25 H.W. Bellew: *Afghanistan and the Afghans* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1979), 27.
 - 26 Wheeler: *Memorandum on Afghanistan Affairs from A.D. 1700*, 60.
 - 27 Victoria Schofield: *Afghan Frontier: Feuding and Fighting in Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2003), 85.
 - 28 Lieutenant A. C. Yate, *England and Russia Face to Face: Travel with the Afghan Boundary Commission* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, MDCCCLXXXVII), 256.
 - 29 Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Political Economy of Afghanistan* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2003), 22.
 - 30 Mir Munshi Sultan Mahomed, ed., *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, Volume 11 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1980), 152.
 - 31 Ibid. 155.
 - 32 Sir Percy Sykes, *A Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand* (London: Cassell and

- Company Ltd., 1926), 202.
- 33 Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, *The Indian Borderland 1880-1900* (London: Methuen and Co., 1910), 169.
- 34 *Indo-Afghan Boundary*: Foreign Frontier Department File No.1 (Lahore: Punjab Government Press, 1894), 2.
- 35 Kenneth Mason: H.I. Crosthwait: *Colonel Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich*, the *Geographical Journal*, Vol. 75, No. 3, (March 1930), 212-213.
- 36 David B. Edwards, *Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier* (California: University of California Press, 1996), 84.
- 37 P.M. Sykes, *Sir Mortimer Durand*, the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, No. 3 (July, 1924), 504.
- 38 Sykes, *A Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand*, 222.
- 39 Scott, *Afghan and Pathan: A Sketch*, 42.
- 40 C.R. Markam: *The Upper Basin of Kabul River*, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, New Monthly Series, Vol.1, No.2. (Feb., 1879), 113.
- 41 The Viceroy Letter No. 91 P. O, Simla, 28 June 1892.
- 42 Letter No. 20C sent by Major H. A. Dean, Deputy Commissioner Peshawar to Commissioner Peshawar Division, 7 May 1894. Foreign Frontier Department File No. 52 (Simla: Punjab Government Press: 7 May 1894), 8.
- 43 Letter written by Captain H. Daly, Assistant Foreign Secretary addressed to Fanshawe, the Chief Secretary Punjab, 19 January 1894.
- 44 Mahmomed, *The Life of Abdur Rahman*, 164.
- 45 Sykes, *A Biography of Sir Mortimer Durand*, 223.
- 46 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. X111 (Calcutta: Central Publication Branch, 1933), 282.
- 47 League of Nations-Treaty Series No. 3560 (1934), 355.
- 48 Pakistan Times, 15 June 1948.
- 49 L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Pakistan* (London: Faber, 1966), 62-63.
- 50 Sir Richard Udney's letter No. 1 sent to Guhram Haider Khan (the Afghan Commissioner), 22 Feb. 1895.
- 51 Aitchison, *a Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. X111*, 256-57.
- 52 Sir George Scott Robertson, *The Kafirs of Hindu-Kush* (London: Lawrence and Bullen Ltd, 1900), 45.
- 53 Amin Saikal, Ravan Farhadi, Kirill Nourzhanov, *Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 2006), 38.
- 54 Schuyler Jones, *Men of Influence in Nuristan* (London: Seminar Press, 1974), p. 14.
- 55 Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, Vol. X111, 271.

Swat and FATA Operations*

Sarah Azam, Muhammad Haroon & Beenesh Ansari¹

Abstract

Terrorism has resulted in huge change in socio-economic and geo-political environment of Pakistan. The infighting, wave of insurgency and extremism in Swat and FATA, have added to the terrorist challenge faced by Pakistan. This paper highlights the impact of military operations in Swat and FATA to the overall counter terrorism strategy and security situation in Pakistan. Swat and FATA are seen as case study of insurgency and wide spread terrorism, as the terrorists' challenged the writ of the government in these areas. Attacks were launched against government officials, state functionaries, general public and media. Pakistan military launched various operations to counter this menace. The military strategies also proved to be helpful for the sustainable peace and stability in both the regions.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Sarah Azam is Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of interest include Swat Operation, Intra-State Instability in Pakistan.

Muhammad Haroon is Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His area of interest include Post 2014 Pakistan Afghanistan Scenarios and their implications.

Beenesh Ansari is Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of interest include Pakistan's role in the peace process in the Post 2014.

Introduction

Several regions of Pakistan are facing violence, which is affecting peace and tranquility of the country. US-NATO attacks in Afghanistan led to the expansion of War Theater in Pakistan, as terrorism became a reality for the region. Steps taken by Pakistan to support international coalition against terrorism were at great cost to Pakistan. These losses include military and civilian casualties, high level attacks on strategic installations, public buildings and have adversely affected the economy of the State.

These areas have seen spread of military operations, however, despite extensive military operations, the transform and build-phase' is yet to be completed. The material and psychological impact of the terrorist activities in these areas is yet to be fully determined; as to how effective were the counter-terrorism measures. What should be the counter-insurgency steps and how far has the civil administration taken over the responsibilities from the military counterparts. Military operations did clear the areas from the terrorists' hold, but they created huge socio-economic and psychological challenges. Both the regions faced one of the biggest internal migrations and led to over 3 million internally displaced people.

The military operations in the regions had been punctuated with peace deals, but these peace negotiations have not been entirely fruitful. The development of the affected areas also requires more sustainable efforts by the government. Most importantly it requires serious attention by the federal and the provincial government

towards crisis affected regions to streamline the bases of developmental projects.

Swat Operation with Reference to Peace & Stability in Pakistan

Background

The signs of conflict in Swat started becoming visible in 1992. When writ of the government started losing its virility, a religious teacher Sufi Muhammad formed Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM).¹ This militant group TNSM gave rise to the Swat chapter of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). TNSM was formed by Sufi Muhammad with a view to implementing a strict version of Shariah Law in the Malakand Division, including Swat, Buner, Upper Dir and Lower Dir districts.² At that time, when Taliban were establishing in Afghanistan, TNSM's control spread throughout Swat in the 1990's.³ In 2001, on the attack of US on the Taliban government in Afghanistan, Sufi Muhammad led a team of ten thousands followers to help the Afghan brothers. This cost Sufi Muhammad lives of many of his followers and most of them were made prisoners in Afghanistan. Sufi Muhammad escaped from Afghanistan and came to Pakistan, where he was imprisoned for many years.⁴ As time passed, TNSM established strong ties with Taliban and through these ties TNSM joined TTP in 2007. When Sufi Muhammad was arrested by the government of Pakistan in 2002, his son-in-law took over the leadership of the group.⁵

Swat before Taliban

Swat was a popular tourists' resort before Taliban's presence in the region. The local culture is predominantly Pashtun and follows the traditional honor code known as "Pakhtunwali". Most of the decisions in tribal life are made by a Jirga or Senate of elected elders and wise men.⁶

The Swat district has the distinction of being under the direct rule of an imperial power or an individual; it was founded by a Jirga of Swat Valley in 1915.⁷ Since the beginning, Swat was a peaceful place, where the Wali ruled without any resistance.⁸ Before the outbreak of violence between the government security forces and religious militants, Swat was famous as a vacation destination.⁹ It was in 2006, that the slaughtering of security personnel and civilians, destruction of schools, mass displacement of people, transaction of prisoners and winding up of judicial system, all contributed in worsening the conditions in Swat. Many reasons have been cited for the Taliban insurgency in the area. Lack of economic opportunities and development are considered to be significant factors of violence and religious extremism in Swat.¹⁰

Taliban's Control Over Swat**Implementation of Sharia by Taliban**

The valley became a model Taliban police state. The Taliban implemented their own version of Sharia. A wave of assassinations was unleashed against police officers, tribal leaders and politicians. Family members

of government officials and tribal leaders were killed and their homes were either demolished or torched. Those who dared to resist the Taliban were brutally slaughtered and town centres were converted into execution places. Each family was asked to handover one male member to help them wage jihad and a daughter to be married to Taliban or else the family will be beheaded.¹¹

Conditions for Women Under Taliban's Control

Conditions for the women in TTP controlled areas of Swat became worse. TTP militants strictly confined women in their houses and they could not go out in markets or even for medical treatment. The militants had displayed banners outside the markets stating that the women are not allowed to shop here. The militants deprived the people of every fundamental human right including the rights to life, freedom of expression and movement.¹²

The education system was targeted in a very systematic manner. In January 2009, Taliban ordered that all girls' schools to be closed and an organized campaign was launched to destroy these schools. More than 400 schools were destroyed in the valley. Most of the schools, which were bombed by the militants, were girls' schools, as a result of which women's education suffered.¹³

Swat Operation

In 2007, Swat Operation was launched for countering the growing militant influence in the district of Swat. The first phase, *Operation Rah-e-Haq* started in November 2007, which involved police action against

the militants. The second phase, *Operation Rah-e-Rast* in July 2008 was concentrated in the northern parts of the valley. In the third and final phase *Operation Rah-e-Nijaat* in January 2009, the army imposed shoot-on-sight curfews in Swat's major cities. Important locations like Khawazakhela and Chakdhara were retaken in the first week of this phase. According to Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), almost 600 insurgents were killed in the first week.¹⁴

Swat Peace Accord

Swat Peace Accord was signed on February 16, 2009 between the government of North West Frontier Province and the chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad of Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). Peace Accord was seen as a victory of dialogue over guns, but at the same time the people condemned the Peace Accord as a surrender to militants. But, it was a controversial document. There was a fear that the militants were seeking the overthrow of the Pakistani government. The militants promised more than just prohibition on music and schooling. Islamic justice, effective government and economic redistribution were also promised by them.¹⁵ The NWFP government negotiated the deal in "response to the will of the people rather than a cave-in to the militants to pacify militants and undermine their populist demand for speedy Islamic justice."¹⁶

It was a strategic move to wean away some of the militants from militant Taliban Commander Maulana Fazlullah to Sufi Muhammad, who was apparently co-

operating for peace. But then the peace deal seemed to be collapsing because the militants, Taliban were violating the Accord. They had even spurned Darul Qaza and were challenging the writ of the government in Swat and adjoining areas.¹⁷

Situation took a grim turn when Taliban in utter disregard of the agreement entered the neighboring districts of Buner and Dir. The international community was alarmed, and it appeared that Taliban were executing a well-planned march towards Islamabad. The real face of Taliban was then emerged and was being exposed by the media. Resultantly, the nation, for the first time, realized the gravity of the situation. The public mood changed and a national consensus against militants started building up.¹⁸

In a show of unity, leaders of 43 parties and religious organizations from across the political spectrum assembled in Islamabad in a meeting called by the Prime Minister, Yousuf Raza Gillani, and endorsed the military operation against the militants. On 7th May, the Prime Minister addressed the nation on television and declared launching of a full-scale offensive against Taliban, who had seized control of the Swat and adjoining areas.¹⁹

Terrorists were holding the area with most of the heights occupied as their hideouts and major training centres. Towns and villages were also held by terrorists with civilian administration and local populace factually held hostage. The army faced extreme odds like rugged terrain, a faceless but fiercely motivated resistance, a completely compromised civilian administration along

with traumatized and terror stricken civilian populace. But the positive aspect of the sordid situation was that the haze prevalent in yester years between a terrorist and a religious person had been cleared.²⁰

Armed forces now had a cause to act and with the whole nation rallied behind them, embarked upon one of the toughest counter-insurgency military operations of the history.

As a result of the violation of the Accord by the militants, military action had to be resumed. The Pakistani Military launched *Operation Rah-e-Rast* in May 2009 to eradicate the TTP militants from Swat district and the neighboring areas. Although alone, it could not resolve the issue, but it had to be pursued firmly till they disarmed, as it was promised in the Swat Peace Accord.

Because of the lack of consensus on the way forward on Swat Operation, public opinion fluctuated and was not favorable for a military operation in Swat till early 2009. The International Research Institute (IRI) conducted a survey in July 2009 which resulted in 69 percent support for the military operation. It was suggested by quantified graphical and survey data that the trajectory of public opinion was followed by military success in Swat.²¹

The military operations were successful, however; in the month following the Swat Operation, the people of Swat faced many problems. One of the biggest challenges was the displacement faced by the people as

a result of the operations. Approximately three million people were displaced.

Effects of the Swat Operation

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) of Swat

As a result of military operation against TTP militants in Swat the locals of Swat migrated to safer regions of Pakistan. They took up refuge in IDP camps and with the host families in neighboring districts.²² Swat crisis is termed as largest humanitarian and displacement crisis, because it displaced more than three million people from their places of residence. The government and the citizens of Pakistan did their best to succor the IDPs of Swat. They arranged for their food, shelter and other basic necessities of life. A huge effort was made at all levels to cater for such a huge number of refugees. July 2009 brought the return of the uprooted population to their homes, as the military declared that it had expelled the militants from most of their strongholds.²³

After the military success in eradicating Taliban from Swat and in establishing sustainable peace, almost all the IDPs of Swat moved back to their residences in Swat. In May 2010, the Chief of Army Staff, General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani stated that the roots of terrorism have been eradicated from Swat, Malakand and Tribal Areas.²⁴

Affected Children

The consequences of the Swat Operation were felt the most by the children. They developed severe mental

distress. They coped with the most traumatic experience of losing their family members. Loss of the heads of the families or close relatives left the children with a sense of fear, uncertainty and insecurity. Suffering the long, arduous journey and involuntary displacement with their families in search of safety, many children felt helpless and remained in the fear of being captured and killed by the militants.

Many children witnessed violent acts by the militants including verbal abuse and murder. They also saw dead bodies of the militants and of the security officers who had been beheaded. For extended periods of time, the children remained confined in their homes, where they often heard sounds of mortar shelling and bomb blasts. The children, who were used to a relatively comfortable life at home, had to quickly learn to adapt themselves to live in camps and host communities, where, they along with their families had to wait for long for the food and other provisions. Many of the children had to watch out for themselves and also support their families.

As a result of the lurking fears, a large number of children in Swat were psychologically scared and depressed and they needed counseling. These were the children who had lost their limbs in the conflict. A huge number of children had developed eating and sleeping disorders and they experienced nightmares. The TTP militants justified violence in the name of religion and for this reason many people misinterpret and associate Islam with the violent conflict of Swat.²⁵

Affected Economy

The economy of Swat district is largely dependent on tourism. According to some rough estimates, in 2006, almost 15,000 people were associated with the hotel business. This number reduced to around 2,500 after the conflict. Small scale businesses associated with tourism had employed almost 20,000 people, these businesses were seriously affected. Mingora served as a trade hub for Buner, Shangla and Kohistan districts for a long period of time, but the trade was then shifted to Mardan and Abbottabad districts, causing a massive loss to the economy of Swat. Occupation by heavy military deployment made Swat a conflict area than what existed as a tourist area.

Although, authorities gave special permits to the tourists to facilitate them at the check posts, but they could not do anything about the long queues of vehicles at the check posts. Therefore, a tourist-friendly environment in Swat could not be established at that time. Agricultural industry of Swat has also suffered disproportionately, because the army had to cut down most of the orchard trees as they could provide hiding area to the militants. Army also banned the cultivation of maize, which is one of the main crops of the area.²⁶

FATA Situation and Implications for Pakistan's Stability

The peace in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is essential for keeping Pakistan stable and secure. FATA has an area of 27,224 square kilometers

and population of 3.17 million.²⁷ It comprises seven political agencies: Northern and Southern Waziristan, Bajour, Khyber, Mohmand, Orakzai and Kuram agency. It has four Frontier regions (FRs), which are Kohat, Peshawar, D. I. Khan and Bannu. D. I. Khan and Bannu are further divided into smaller areas, as D. I. Khan is divided into D. I. Khan and Tank, while Bannu is divided into Bannu and Lakki.²⁸ On the behalf of the President of Pakistan, the governor of KPK and federal government of Pakistan installed their administrative system in the FATA region according to Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR).²⁹

The region consists of group structures like clans and tribes.³⁰ In FATA social institutions, which work is the Jirga system also called as assembly. Political agents of tribal areas and Maliks coordinate and use the Jirga system in order to come up with effective conflict resolution measures.

In late 1970s, the policy of Islamization was adopted by Pakistan in support of the first Afghan war. Mujahidins based in FATA region had easy access to Afghanistan; this led to the more active role of Mullahs in the political and socio-economic activities in the region. Later on, they became the Talibans and continue to retain their influence in the region.³¹

Economical Conditions of FATA

The local economy is largely rural based which offers lesser opportunities as compared to the KPK, which categorizes FATA as a deprived region of Pakistan.³² Whereas, economically, they are considered to be very

progressive because of the lucrative illicit market of goods, consumer goods, weapons and drugs.³³

Militancy in FATA

Militancy and insurgency in FATA is rooted in the occupation of Afghanistan, whereis, Pakistan had to play its role as a frontline state in the war on terror.³⁴ From 12-17 December 2001, US-NATO forces launched Tora Bora operation in Afghanistan. In this operation around 2,900 US troops of different divisions participated³⁵. Tora Bora is located opposite to the Kurram agency, close to Pakistani border. At that time, Pakistani authorities were not informed and some militants illegally crossed the border and entered Pakistan's tribal areas. In reaction, Pakistani authorities started small search operations with the coordination of the local tribesmen and captured almost 240 people.

NATO forces launched another operation (Operation Anaconda), without informing Pakistani authorities.³⁶ After this operation in May 2002, US Central Commander, General Tommy R. Frank, came to Pakistan and informed Pakistani army officials that some Al-Qaeda members entered into Pakistan's territory (FATA), as a result of this operation.³⁷

The areas of FATA are considered to be a base for terrorists to attack on the foreign forces in Afghanistan.³⁸ The US led Global War on Terror (GWOT) in Afghanistan exploited the Pashtun factor in the Pakistan's Northern Province. The inhabitants of Pakistan's Northern region have secret and obvious

support in Afghanistan, provided space for Americans to launch a campaign, which influenced Pakistan to take military action in FATA region. The rise of insurgency in FATA has direct linkages with the ideological motives of the militants, who want to keep their own socio-political agendas, so Pakistan Army has faced resistance, while fighting against them.

Peace Deals in FATA

Initially in 2003, when Pakistan Army troops entered FATA region, they gave their stance through different “peace deals” with local tribes.³⁹ Peace agreements with pro-Taliban militants first started with Shakai agreement on April 24, 2004, this agreement was verbal one, which was signed by the government officials and militants (on militants side Sufi Nek Muhammad and other prominent leaders were present). Militants properly communicated their stance to the government officials, which produced no positive results.⁴⁰

Demands also included that the government would release all those militants, who were taken in custody of Army during operations. Like Shakai agreement, other peace agreements include Sararogha Peace Deal⁴¹ (February 22, 2005), Miranshah Peace Accord (16-point peace held on September 5, 2006, deal was held with the militants of North Waziristan), Khyber Agency Pact also took place and all were not successful because these peace agreements had flaws.⁴²

Military Operations in FATA (2001-2012)

Pakistan joined US led war against terrorism and

adopted counter terrorist policies against the insurgents, who were present in tribal areas.⁴³ In order to overcome this crisis situation, Pakistan launched different combating operations in FATA against the insurgents. The ultimate objective of these military operations, with the coordination of frontier and local police force, was to restore peace and legal administrative system.⁴⁴

Pakistan military conducted many military operations in FATA; major and important military operations were Operation Al-Mizan (2002-2006)⁴⁵, Operation Zalzal (2008)⁴⁶ and Operation Rah-e-Nijat South Waziristan (2009-2010).⁴⁷

The government tried its best to stabilize the degrading security situation in the FATA region. On one hand when Pakistan army entered the region for the first time, it helped to cooperate with coalition forces in Afghanistan.⁴⁸ On the other hand the resistance forces in the region were designed by Baitullah Mehsud and other insurgents, who were capable and skilled in dealing with Pakistan Army.⁴⁹

Implications of the Military Operations

The deteriorating security situation in FATA has raised serious concerns for Pakistan's government.⁵⁰ The conflict resulted in enormous casualties and left millions of families as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).⁵¹

The operations resulted in serious political and economic problems for the people of FATA.⁵² The military operations spread in other regions as well including FATA. The consequences of these military

operations affected the whole Pakistan in the form of heavy casualties of the citizens and the security forces, that inflicted the unthinkable damage to Pakistan, which the state has never faced in its entire history.

Initially insurgents suggested their own religious political model which spread the instability in the region. This distorted version of Islam and nationalism provided them space and helped the Taliban to highlight them, not only in FATA against security forces in Pakistan but also against US forces in Afghanistan.

For Pakistan Army, winning the hearts and minds of the FATA locals was first priority because effective operations could not be launched without the support of the local people. Thus, Pakistan's government and military took long term measures for countering Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the area. By allowing Taliban and Al-Qaeda "rope to hang themselves", with the help of this tactic the chances of the Pakistan Army success increased. Al-Qaeda and Taliban became their own worst enemies, as Taliban isolated the major portion of the population, which gave a chance to Pakistani establishment to get the support of the local people, as they also wanted to get rid of Taliban.

The terrorism in FATA is created by the non-state actors existing on both sides of border, supplemented by organized activities, inaccurate religious ideologies and militarized border situation. This is more of an economic and political battle; therefore, the nature of the challenge in FATA was compounded in nature, as it bordered on socio-political, religious narrative and hardcore terrorist activities.

Conclusion

The paper suggests that in order to solve the security problem of the country, dialogue with the warring factions are highly recommended. Military operations are not the ultimate solution; the people of these areas have to be taken into confidence before any such action. The recent initiatives to promote dialogues with the Taliban is one of the best options, in order to bring peace and stability in these areas.

The military actions in these areas must be conducted independently, only if the ground situation requires. Militants usually escape and conduct attacks in these regions; therefore, the need of the hour is to hunt down their widespread networks. Efforts must be made for dialogues and negotiations. If no productive results are seen, then, a permanent and effective counter insurgency strategy must be adopted. Mishandling of the “reconstruct phase” of these operations has led to disappointment in masses and can create a baseline support to the resistance groups in the affected areas, so this must be checked before the problem gains momentum again. For sustainable peace in Swat and FATA, it is necessary that the security strategies should be based on both political and military actions.

Recommendations for Bringing Sustainable Peace in Swat and FATA

- If peace and stability in Swat is to survive, it must reinvent itself. It should start with transformation of the conflict from the current status, to build

and reconstruct. Similarly, it needs to change from justice and reconciliation to peace and stability.

- Mainstream political parties should be encouraged to operate in the tribal areas.
- High ranking government officials should visit the tribal areas regularly.⁵³
- The aim of the political process in FATA should not be to restore the old system of Maliks, rather to strengthen the local council, through holding elections.⁵⁴
- Tremendous human and physical sacrifices given by the people of Swat should not be lost in the aftermath of the military operations. We must move towards the sustainable structures of peace, looking at full spectrum response option, including dialogue and use of force where needed.
- The efforts of NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), which are working in Swat and FATA in the worse security situations, need to be appreciated and given a chance to improve their functions.
- FATA needs true political representation which can be brought up by fair and transparent elections with the help of local Jirgas.
- Another solution for FATA is the “soft power” strategy, division of this region into smaller parts after the traditional names of its tribes can be helpful to control the region effectively by federal

government.

- Different opportunities like better education, health, career opportunities and sustainable development of the roads and provision of other basic facilities can boost a sense of belonging among the people of FATA and Swat.

Key Findings

- Lack of economic opportunities and development are considered to be one of the primary causes of extremism and terrorism in Swat and FATA.
- Swat crisis is termed as the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, where more than three million people were displaced from their homes.
- The US and NATO forces, presence in Afghanistan is fueling insurgency and terrorism in FATA.
- The successful military operation has restored the peace and normalcy in Swat.

Endnotes

- 1 Adnan Rasool. "How bad governance led to conflict: The case of Swat". *Center For Public Policy And Governance, Forman Christian College*.
- 2 Hassan Abbas. "*Pakistan's Troubled Frontier*", Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation, 2009, 198-233.
- 3 Imtiaz Ali. "From Militant to Peace Broker: A Profile of the Swat Valleys Maulana Sufi Muhammad".
- 4 Masud Khan. "Military Operation in Swat". *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*. (2009):2
- 5 ibid
- 6 Fredrik Barth. "*Features of Person and Society in Swat Collected Essays on Pathans*" (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
- 7 Sultan-e- Rome. "Administrative System of the Princely State of Swat". *Research Society of Pakistan*, 2006.
- 8 Sultan-e-Rome. "Merger of Swat State with Pakistan Causes and Effects".

- MARC Occasional Papers*, The University of Geneva, 1999: 14.
- 9 ibid
- 10 Rabia Zafar. "Development and the battle for Swat". *The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Spring 2011*.
- 11 Fredrik Barth. "Features of Person and Society in Swat Collected Essays on Pathans" (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
- 12 Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti. "Military Operation In Swat". 2010
- 13 ibid
- 14 Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti. "Military Operation In Swat". 2010
- 15 Yasir Imtiaz. "Swat Peace Accord", (2009): 1-40.
- 16 Stephen Tankel. "A Risky Deal in Swat", *Guardian*. 17 February, 2009.
- 17 ibid
- 18 Masud Khan. "Military Operation in Swat". *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*. (2009):2
- 19 ibid
- 20 ibid
- 21 Masud Khan. "Military Operation in Swat", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies*. (2009):2.
- 22 Carlotta Gall. "Pakistani Army Poised for New Push into Swat." *New York Times*, 5 May, 2009.
- 23 "Swat Paradise Regained" *Report of an Human Rights Commission Of Pakistan Fact Finding Mission*, (July, 2010)
- 24 Ibid
- 25 Ibid
- 26 Ibid
- 27 "Understanding FATA" http://www.understandingfata.org/en/?page_id=22 (August 18, 2013)
- 28 Rana Muhammad Amir. "Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective," 2009 http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PIPS_TalibanInsurgencyPakistan_CounterinsurgencyPerspective.pdf
- 29 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi "Understanding FATA," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Volume 3, Number 4, (Oct-Dec 2010) (24 August , 2013) <http://www.google.com.pk/#q=Syed+Manzar+Abbas+Zaidi+Understanding+FATA>
- 30 ibid
- 31 Brian R. Kerr, "A Progressive Understanding of Pashtun Social Structures amidst Current Conflict in FATA", *Pak Institute for Peace Studies* (Oct-Dec

- 2010)
- 32 News Desk. "Tackling underdevelopment: FATA uplift top priority, says ACS" *8th October, 2012*
 <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/448416/tackling-underdevelopment-fata-uplift-top-priority-says-ac/>> (30, August 2013)
- 33 Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi "Understanding FATA", *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Volume 3, Number 4, (Oct-Dec 2010) *accessed at August 24, 2013*
 <<http://www.google.com.pk/#q=Syed+Manzar+Abbas+Zaidi+Understanding+FATA>> (10 July, 2013)
- 34 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema "Challenges Facing a Counter-Militant Campaign in Pakistan's FATA" NBR, volume 19, number 3, <<http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/vol19no3.pdf> > (August 2008)
- 35 Josh Levinger, "Taking tora bora," (6 May, 2005) <<http://www.levinger.net/josh/files/writing/tora-bora.pdf>> (19 July, 2013)
- 36 Richard L. Kugler, Michael Baranick, and Hans Binnendijk "Operation Anaconda: Lessons from Joint Operations," (Master diss, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, 2009) <http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html> (10 august, 2013) Operation *Anaconda*, conducted in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan during early March 2002, was a complex battle fought in rugged mountainous terrain under difficult conditions. The battle ended at the cost of eight U.S. military personnel killed and more than 50 wounded.
- 37 Ali Mohammad Jan Orakzi, "Situation in FATA: Causes, Consequences and the Way Forward," Policy Perspectives, Volume 6, Number 1, (January - June 2009) <<http://www.ips.org.pk/global-issues-and-politics/1057-situation-in-fata-causes-consequences-and-the-way-forward.html>> (19 June, 2013)
- 38 Ahmad Ali Naqvi, Shah Zaman Khan, and Zainab Ahmad "The Impact of Militancy on Education in FATA," *Tigah: A Journal of Peace And Development* Volume: Ii, (2012), <http://frc.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2_22.pdf> (24 July 2013)
- 39 Hasan Abbas, "President Obama policy options in pakistan's FATA," institute of social policy, (2009) <<http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/rosenfeld-library/citing-business-sources#annual>> (15 June, 2013)
- 40 Sohail Habib Tajik, "Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future", PIPS (Jan-Mar 2011) The signing of peace agreements with pro-Taliban militants started with the Shakai agreement, which the government signed with Nek Muhammad and other militant commanders at Shakai, South Waziristan on March 27, 2004. Nek, a charismatic Yargulkhel Wazir known as the Che Guevara of Wana, was a battle-hardened commander of Taliban who provided sanctuary to the chief of Uzbek militants Tahir Yaldochev in the military operation in Kaloosha.

- 41 ibid
- 42 ibid
- 43 ibid
- 44 Zahid Ali Khan, "Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan" (2012) <http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf> (25 June, 2013)
- 45 Christine Fair and Seth G. Jon, "Pakistan's War Within", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* Volume: 51 (December 2009 – January 2010) <<http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2009-5f8e/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-december-2009-january-2010-52d5/51-6-13-fair-and-jones-2cc4>> (7 June, 2013) Operation Al Mizan comprised several smaller operations, such as Operation Kalosha II, which took place in South Waziristan.
- 46 Iqbal Khattak, "Deserted town shows human cost of Operation Zalzalā," *Daily Times Pakistan* (May 20, 2008) <http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008/05/20/story_20-5-2008_pg7_26> (8 July, 2013) In mid-January, the army dropped leaflets to urge the local people to vacate the area as the government decided to launch 'Operation Zalzalā (Earthquake)' against Baitullah Mehsud, a powerful militant commander who was challenging the writ of the state.
- 47 Zahid Ali Khan, "Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan" (2012) <http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf> (25 June, 2013)
- 48 Shuja Nawaz, "Learning by Doing The Pakistan Army's Experience with Counterinsurgency," (2011) http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/020111_ACUS_Nawaz_PakistanCounterinsurgency.pdf (2 June, 2013)
- 49 ibid
- 50 Muhammad Amir Rana, "Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan: A Counterinsurgency Perspective," (2009) http://humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PIPS_TalibanInsurgencyPakistan_CounterinsurgencyPerspective.pdf (12 July, 2013)
- 51 Hasan Abbas, "President Obama policy options in Pakistan's FATA," *Institute of Social Policy*, (2009) <<http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/rosenfeld-library/citing-business-sources#annual>> (15 June, 2013)
- 52 Zahid Ali Khan, "Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakistan" (2012) <http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf> (25 June, 2013)
- 53 Abu Bakr Amin Bajwa, *Inside Waziristan: Journey from War to Peace* (Pakistan: Vanguard Press, 2013) (21 Jan, 2013)
- 54 ibid

Pakistan's Role in Building Connectivity for Regional Integration: Turning Dreams into Reality*

Masroor Ahmad & Mahroona Hussain Syed¹

Abstract

The envisaged US/NATO drawdown from Afghanistan in 2014 stimulates mixed feelings among the people of this region. There are as many windows of opportunity knocking at the doors, as are the myriad of challenges, haunting the regional stakeholders, including the Central Asian States, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan and the other SAARC nations. As one of these key regional players, Pakistan looks at the situation with a keen eye. Besides advocating a peaceful resolution of all economic and security-related issues in the region, it calls for exploring avenues for regional economic integration which could bring about prosperity, security and peace for all and contribute ultimately towards the overall socio-economic uplift of the people of this region, right from Central Asia to the SAARC nations, including the people of Pakistan. Hence, the central argument of this study is that for making any viable attempt to convert this entire region into an economic hub, regional connectivity is imperative and Pakistan provides the most vital Golden Link for building this regional connectivity. In support of this argument, this paper highlights the economic

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Brigadier Masroor is a Director at ISSRA, NDU, Islamabad.

2 Ms Mahroona Hussain Syed is a Research Associate at ISSRA, NDU, Islamabad.

opportunities that Pakistan offers, due to its important geo-strategic location, and available facilities and infrastructure i.e. roads, transport, railway links; including the already existing supply routes e.g. the Southern Distribution Network and Silk Route etc. passing through Pakistan. Pakistan has an extremely vital role, as a trade and energy corridor, which can help evolve an effective economic integration of this region.

Introduction

While there is much debate about the ISAF/NATO withdrawal, Pakistan finds itself caught in a quagmire, owing to which apprehensions about possible security and socio-economic fallouts on Pakistan and rest of the region extending from Central Asia to Afghanistan and neighbouring SAARC countries are being expressed at all fora, both at home and abroad. Hence, there is a need to envisage long term plans to analyse the implications, which may help crystallize a bright future not only for the people of Pakistan or Afghanistan but also for the whole region. Although one has no instrument to foresee and accurately predict the outcome of the various scenarios unfolding in post-NATO draw-down but, nevertheless, common sense dictates that regional economic integration can be a viable approach and defining feature, can bring about a win-win solution for a myriad of problems in the region.

It will, however, be impossible to dream of regional economic integration without ensuring physical connectivity through efficient transport sector-related infrastructure, including roads and railways, augmented by energy connectivity and effective trade and commerce activities. Therefore, under the assumption that the security situation in the region stays stable, by having peace in Afghanistan and improved relations among all regional countries, including Pakistan and India; and that, the countries of the region will show active willingness to join hands with Pakistan in the efforts for regional integration, this paper aims at analysing the

crucial links that Pakistan can provide to make this idea of connectivity workable for the whole region, especially for the benefit of the common man at home and also the citizens of all the neighbouring states. The purpose is to highlight the pre-eminence of Pakistan, due to its peculiar geographical position, which provides a golden link for all economic activities, by virtue of available infrastructure and ideal routes for connectivity in terms of energy, commerce and trade. This connectivity, if materialized, would also help in fighting the real challenges faced by regional countries today, including growth and development, poverty alleviation, fighting hunger and starvation and ensuring environment protection.

Importance of Building Regional Interconnectivity through Infrastructure

In terms of granting access to the countries interested in enhancing intra-regional trade, the availability of infrastructure is of paramount importance not only for the purpose of trade and commerce but also for the overall economic growth and socio-economic uplift of the people of the region. Suffice it to say that socio-economic infrastructural development may become boon or bane on an economy through the presence, absence or lack of modes of transport, roads, railways, ports & shipping, aviation and pipelines. Modern research and several surveys regarding business and investment climate claim that lack of infrastructure serves as the biggest stumbling block in the way of developing trade, commerce and business opportunities in a region.¹

The investment in and development of infrastructure even contribute to poverty alleviation in the respective countries in both short and long term², through creation of more job opportunities and an increase in efficiency and productivity.³

The phenomenal rise of South East Asian countries and also of China as a global giant are largely attributable to the huge investments made by them in infrastructure, geared up to increase competitiveness among local and international producers.⁴ Not only this, the development of infrastructure is a major instrument employed in the geo-politics of any region in the world of the 21st century. It is seen as an attempt by states to break free from the geographical constraints that they are facing, in order to watch their interest and also ensure long term security through building ports, roads, railways, and pipelines etc.

Strategic Location of Pakistan: Reaping the Low Hanging Fruits

Fortunately, Pakistan stands at a strategically important location i.e. at the heart of the 'heartland', where it provides shortest possible access through Afghanistan to rich resources of Central Asian States on one hand and to the countries of the Sub-Continent, China and Middle East on the other. Identifying the geographical importance of Pakistan, Anwar recognizes that "Pakistan offers the critical overland routes and connectivity for mutually beneficial trade and energy transactions intra-regionally and inter-regionally."⁵ He further opines, "Pakistan provides the historical route,

which not only entails collaboration and cooperation of trade and commerce but also opens vistas of ideas, culture and more importantly people-to-people contacts between the continents”.

Wasi recognises that Pakistan provides the shortest possible access to CARs, “calculated from Tajik Capital of Dushanbe, Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean is some 9,500 kms away, Rostov-NA-Donu on the Black Sea, 4,200 kms; Abadan and Bandar Abbas on the Gulf, around 3,200 kms and Karachi on the Arabian Sea is 2700 kms. Estimates of other routes put the distance between Central Asian States and Gwadar Port at Arabian Sea (Pakistan) at barely 2,000 kms.”⁶

While describing the main function of the Heartland –Central Eurasia, Ismailov considers provision of sustainable land contacts along the parallels (West-East) and meridians (North-South)⁷ of primary importance. The fact, that the CARs are naturally endowed with geographical proximity with Pakistan, lends Pakistan with a unique opportunity to play its role as a key regional player and stimulates Pakistan’s interests to become a gateway to this region.⁸ In addition, Pakistan can link the SAARC countries with Afghanistan and CARs, just by allowing the use of an already available road and rail routes within its territory, from Wahga to Peshawar/Torkham. Currently, Pakistan is also planning to convert the already existing route between Pakistan and China into a strategically important energy and trade corridor through improvement of rail and road infrastructure between Gwadar and Kashghar.

Improving and Expanding Regional Connectivity

With a focus on mutual cooperation in trade and energy, it is important to realize that issues of transport and infrastructural connectivity point to a basic obstacle. There is a need to evaluate the existing infrastructure in regional countries, so that it could be used immediately and also help in projecting future requirements of transportation and communications infrastructure for making necessary agreements for implementation and attracting investments. At home, Pakistan possesses a reasonably well laid out communications infrastructure, which is under constant development and improvement and can immediately be used for intra-regional trade.

In the transport sector, currently, Pakistan's National Highway offers five main road arteries; which include Grand Trunk (GT) Road, Indus Highway, Motorway, Balochistan Highway (Chaman–Karachi) and Rato-Dero-Gwadar Highway. Pakistan Railways has its basic infrastructure in place, including trained manpower, locomotives, railway lines and other allied facilities.⁹ The three Pakistani Ports i.e. Karachi, Bin Qasim and Deep Sea Port at Gwadar are already in place to handle cargo. Air connectivity with regional countries is also in place, through major airports at Karachi, Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad and Lahore.

Towards the West and North, Pakistan is also developing and improving roads, rail links and other communication channels, which can link Central Asian States and China. The major routes that Pakistan can offer on the platter are indicated as follows:-¹⁰

- Rawalpindi - Gilgit-Khunjrab Pass - Xinkiang (Kashghar) - Almaty (Kazakhstan).
- Peshawar - Jalalabad - Termez(Oxus)-Tajikistan.
- Quetta-Kandhar-Herat-Oxus-CARs.
- Chitral- Wakhan-Tajikistan.
- Quetta-Koh-e-Taftan-Zahidan-Ashkabad (Turkmenistan)

Towards Iran, Pakistan is connected through rail and road link; however, its rail link capacity needs improvement, to make it a corridor, which can connect whole South Asia with Europe through Iran and Turkey.

To the East, Pakistan is connected with India through many road and rail links, out of which a few are operational like Wahga-Attari (rail and road) close to Lahore and Khokhrapar-Munabao (rail) in Rajisthan and Sindh and these can be further improved for enhancement of trade. However, there are a number of rail and road links which existed for long but had been closed since partition and need reopening. These include Sialkot-Jammu (road), Kasur-Khem Kiran (rail), Kasur-Ferozepur (road), Haveli-Fazilka/Ferozepur (road), Amruka-Fazilka (rail) and Mandi Sadiqganj-Abohar (rail) in Punjab and some other routes between Pakistan and Indian-held Kashmir. (Figure 1 shows these linkages on the map taken from the Survey of Pakistan).¹¹

Pakistan has undertaken quite a few new projects to ensure smooth flow of trade and commerce

through its territory, despite the financial constraints, it has been facing in recent years. These projects include development and handing over of Gwadar Port to China and construction of Lowari Tunnel to link Wakhan corridor and CARs,¹² development of Central Trade Corridor from Dera Ismael Khan to Durand Line, which passes through Tank, Angoor Adda and Wana, Makeen, Miranshah (North and South Waziristan agencies) and would link Ghazni and Kabul on the ring road, once developed within Afghanistan (Figure 2). Central Trade Corridor is served by over 548 kms of roads, out of which 324 kms (approximately 58%) of high quality roads (class 70) have been completed on Pakistani side, facilitating movement of 20 wheelers all along the route.




Figure-1

It is equally important that maritime facilities for trade between India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran and Pakistan are improved and expanded through mutually beneficial agreements. At the same time, air traffic between Pakistan and other regional countries needs to be increased in order to facilitate visits of members of the business community of the region.

Pakistan: Providing a Trade and Energy Corridor

'Pakistan provides the natural link to SCO states to connect the Eurasian heartland with Arabian Sea and South Asia'.¹³ Cheema recognises that the world's consumption of oil was 83 million barrels a day (mbd), and this will, substantially, rise up to 118 mbd in 2030, including significant increase in the demand for gas around the world.¹⁴ Pakistan, due to short distances with CARs, available infrastructure and access to warm water, is qualified to serve as an energy and trade corridor not only within the region but also to the adjacent regions.

As the regional economies grow at faster rate, the demand for energy resources in domestic, commercial, industrial and transport sectors increases exponentially. Pakistan, being well aware of its energy constraints, should aspire to develop its indigenous energy potential like tapping of its water resources by building dams (Kalabagh and Diamir-Bhasha) and exploiting its coal (Thar desert), wind and solar resources. It should also explore prospects of mutually beneficial trade of energy within South Asia and imports from neighbouring regions and countries such as Central Asia, Gulf region and Iran.

In this context, Pakistan wants that oil and gas pipelines, electricity transmission lines and connected installations should be mutually planned and constructed through investments by South Asian countries and attracting other foreign investments. For this purpose, Pakistan is ready to provide guarantees for secure and uninterrupted flow of oil, gas and electricity through pipelines and transmission lines passing through its territory.

Pakistan is also considering to import electricity from India through Kasur border. India and Pakistan have already signed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Gas pipeline project. Pakistan still wishes to import gas from Iran through proposed Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, although India has opted out of the project, as a party, due to some unknown reasons. In this regard, Pakistan still desires that India should rejoin the project. Pakistan is also planning to import electricity from Tajikistan through Central Asia-South Asia (CASA), a 1,000 MW electricity trade project.

In the South Asian region, in April 1993 at the Dhaka summit, SAARC took the first concrete step towards enhancing economic cooperation by signing the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA). It meant converting South Asia into a trading block. The objective of SAPTA was to promote and sustain mutual trade and economic cooperation through exchange of trade-related concessions.

After experiencing difficulties in implementation of SAPTA, the SAARC member states opted to sign

South Asian Free Trading Agreement (SAFTA) in 2004 and launched it in 2006. The objectives are the same but since both SAPTA and SAFTA have not been able to achieve anything as yet, the objectives envisaged in them still have to be achieved by gradually reducing and finally eliminating tariffs, negative list of trade-able goods and non-tariff barriers. Nonetheless, as a model to be followed, comprising 25 elaborate articles, SAFTA is a well-structured agreement to facilitate economic integration in South Asia.

In the overall perspective, keeping in view the limited resources and increasing demands, energy security for millions of people in South Asia will remain a major challenge. Therefore, apart from tapping and efficiently using their own resources, countries in South Asia will have to depend on energy imports from within South Asia as well as from neighbouring regions and countries which are quite rich in energy resources. For this purpose, it will be necessary to accord primacy to economic cooperation over security-related issues, to keep cordial political relations to attract intra-regional and inter-regional investments and joint ventures to ensure energy security through trade.

Analysis

The existing Pakistani routes are not only cost-effective, short in distance and save time, but their efficacy is also determined by their continuous development and improvement. The ease of access has been proven over the years through the US-led NATO supplies carried out through these routes. Though much

room for improvement and development is there, but still the infrastructure available in Pakistan for the purpose of connectivity amounts to a share of 12% in its GDP according to a report by Planning Commission of Pakistan.¹⁵ However, to ensure pre-eminence of Pakistan as the regional integrator and a ‘Golden Link’ for all economic activities within the region, it needs to further upgrade its road and rail infrastructure. In addition, it needs to open all the closed routes and develop new routes with neighbouring countries as discussed earlier. Once all these routes are opened and developed, Pakistan’s connections (Golden Link) would look somewhat like this (Figure 3):-




Figure 2

It is pertinent to mention that a multiplicity of hurdles has so far hindered any meaningful progress in terms of increasing trade and commerce in the region, including infrastructural impediments, tariff walls,

*Pakistan's Role in Building Connectivity for Regional Integration:
Turning Dreams into Reality*

comparative advantage and cost of transportation etc. This has resulted in a very dismal performance in terms of regional integration, particularly, among SAARC countries. However, in case of Afghanistan, the geographical contiguity of this country with Pakistan and many other linkages can lend the region tremendous opportunities to boost the intra-regional trade.

There is a plethora of literature related to the importance of the regional economic integration to the benefit of all, right from the SAARC countries and Afghanistan to Central Asian Republics. However, the major irritants to this economic integration is that Pakistan does not have any direct geographical link with CARs and the easy access is through Afghanistan. For example, Fair identifies that the success of early ventures to CARs was limited because of the yawning gap between Pakistan's intent and its capability.¹⁶ One would argue that it is certainly not a matter of intent but of capability on the Pakistani side. As Afghanistan is a conduit to the CARs, therefore, stability in Afghanistan will remain most essential for Pakistan, if any meaningful way ahead for economic integration with these states is to be looked forward to.¹⁷

Poor infrastructure and a lack of security are responsible for Afghanistan's current economic isolation, which puts Pakistan in a difficult position even with the best of intentions. As far as Pakistan's contribution to increasing trade with Afghanistan is concerned, Fair points out that Pakistan and Afghanistan are showing

steady progress in terms of bilateral trade, because Afghan traders and businessmen mostly prefer to deal with Pakistani counterparts, not only because of geographical contiguity and ease of access but also because of the centuries-old cultural and linguistic ties between the two peoples of these countries.¹⁸

“Currently, Pakistan’s bilateral trade with Afghanistan surpasses \$2 billion annually. Pakistani exports to Afghanistan total \$1.2 billion and Afghanistan’s exports to Pakistan total \$700 million. Indeed, trade volume has increased since the fall of the Taliban, when bilateral trade was only \$25 million. In 2003–04, bilateral trade was only \$492 million and for 2004–05, the figure climbed to \$1.63 billion dollars mainly because of exports.”

The world must recognise that Pakistan, without sufficient economic support from the world, will not be able to provide viable infrastructure and safe passages to Afghanistan and the CARs in the long term. Besides, the world would be able to gain maximum benefit out of the resource-rich areas of this region, once it realizes Pakistan’s strategically important location in terms of short access to these areas and availability of ports to ship the resources to the rest of the world.

Among other obstacles to enhancing regional economic and security integration include the mercurial relations between India and Pakistan, terrorism in the region and the sour relations of US with Iran and some other CARs, which have created major impediments in the way to Pakistan’s achieving the status of an energy corridor.¹⁹

From Pakistan's point of view, Singh recognizes that Pakistan's objectives in Central Asia revolve around three basic components, which are defined as political, security imperatives, economic and commercial gains countering India's influence and virtually to work as an energy transit-corridor.²⁰ However, in the wake of this, Pakistan is apprehensive about the intentions of its neighbours, due to a chequered past.

Such apprehensions are not ill-founded, when similar sentiments are reflected in the remarks given by officials from key governments of the world. For example, Mark Grossman, the former Special US representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan stated, "I think India has a huge and important role to play in the success of the New Silk Road. It is trying to connect Central Asian economies with South Asian economies."²¹ Surely, India's interests lie in the hydrocarbons of Central Asia and Anwar considers the Road, pipeline and transmission line initiatives of India to be a part of India's strategy of 'reach around' and across Pakistan and into the resource-rich Central Asia.²²

Dr Salman Shah, former Finance Minister of Pakistan, raises similar concerns by quoting Indian News that allowing access to India and Afghanistan through Pakistan will increase Indian leverage in Afghanistan and its strategic presence in the region. This, in turn, will open opportunities for Indian companies to explore Afghanistan's mineral wealth, believed to be worth \$1-3 trillion for mutual benefit as compared to present Indian economy, which is valued at \$1.2 trillion. This

indicates the economic rationale for Indian investment in Chabahar, once the entire network comprising road, rail and port is in place, it can become a launching pad for greater economic and strategic involvement of India in the oil and mineral-rich Central Asia.

Thus, if the international community wants Pakistan to be the gateway for India to reach Afghanistan and Central Asia, they must realise that this will be seriously dependent on India and Pakistan resolving their historical disputes in an equitable manner.²³ Pakistan believes that it is India, which being an emerging power, should allay the apprehensions of Pakistan. Till then pragmatic policies cannot be implemented, when every now and then a fear of escalation over major or minor issues with India lurks large on the heads, as the proverbial sword of Damocles. Given a surety on stable and secure environment, the necessary policy decisions need to be implemented in time to facilitate the use of already existing infrastructure within the region for example, as a starter, the passenger and cargo services, particularly rail and road links, which existed for decades but had been closed ever since partition between India and Pakistan, can be re-opened for facilitation of trade.

Recommendations

- The existing road and rail infrastructure of individual countries should be connected and plans for its further expansion to meet future demands should be made and agreed upon through robust mutual agreements. In a similar manner, maritime and air communications have

to be coordinated, expanded and managed.

- All the countries of the region, including Pakistan, must reduce the bureaucratic hurdles, for an easy flow of trade through Pakistan. On the other side, proper documenting system needs to be implemented at main entry and exit points on their borders.
- SAFTA should be made more effective by removing tariff and non tariff/technical barriers and eliminating the negative list of trade-able goods. Visa process may be liberalized and border controls, customs and security clearance procedures should be simplified and streamlined. Issues of standardization and rules of origin of trade-able goods should be resolved. The regional countries should also initiate steps for enhanced customs cooperation and harmonization of standards, among other initiatives.
- Regular trade festivals and exhibitions should be arranged.
- Regional countries need to further develop their indigenous energy resources and ensure that energy is used in the most efficient ways by introducing modern technical means.
- To meet existing energy shortages of countries, intra-regional trade of energy should be facilitated, by investing in the energy-rich countries for enhancing production of energy for export to energy demanding countries in the region. In this

context, water disputes within the region should be resolved at priority, and unilateral actions to disrupt water supply to neighboring countries should be avoided.

- Pakistan needs to recognise its role in provision of efficient road infrastructure and safe environment in accessing the heartland. It has to actually act as Energy Conduit through different energy projects like gas pipelines from CARs to the region and the world. Some of the trade opportunities in terms of energy connectivity should include priority projects like CASA 1,000, IPI gas pipeline, and TAPI, which have very long term and wide spread positive implications for the countries involved in particular and for the region on the whole.
- For intra-regional trade of energy and imports from neighbouring regions and countries, it is necessary that energy pipelines are built through joint investments and by attracting extra-regional investments. As a test case, Pakistan should be supported with around \$1.5 billion to build Pakistan –Iran gas Pipeline, which has the potential for further linking up with India and China.
- Natural resources of the region such as hydro-electric potential should be tapped through joint ventures. Pakistan should be helped in the construction of Diamer-Bhasha Dam on Indus River by arranging funds through World Bank or

Asian Development Bank.

- Pakistan is endowed with huge deposits of coal and regional countries could cooperate in coal mining and power generation sectors in Pakistan.

Conclusion

Today, the heartland, Pakistan and the other SAARC countries stand at cross roads, as challenges of growth and ultimately socio-economic development, including poverty alleviation, fighting hunger and starvation, environment protection and stabilised security situation become priority issues for them. The world cannot remain oblivious to the importance of Pakistan due to their interests in mineral resources of the region and the prime location of Pakistan as a trade route and energy conduit. On one hand, the region and Pakistan need support of the world for development and on the other, there is a need that the regional countries should themselves overcome present deteriorating security situation and provide sustainable access to the resources through development of required infrastructure. The interconnectivity of the globalised world needs an integrated and all-encompassing approach to reap the fruits of integration within the region, for which Pakistan presents the key to success.

Key Findings

- This article elucidates that in order to make the entire region; including Central Asian States, Afghanistan, Iran, China and the SAARC

nations, an economic hub, regional connectivity is imperative and Pakistan provides the most vital Golden Link for building this regional connectivity.

- This region needs the support of the world community for progress and development. The regional countries must overcome present deteriorating security situation in the region and provide sustainable access to the available resources through development of required infrastructure, for a meaningful economic integration of this region.
- To meet existing energy shortages of countries of this region, Pakistan offers unique opportunities, in the form of viable trade route and energy conduit. Therefore, energy sector of the whole region can be given a boost through large-scale investments in the energy-rich countries, for enhancing production of energy for export to energy-demanding countries in the region, using this ideal golden link provided by Pakistan.

Endnotes

- 1 For example Studies by Roller and Waverman 2001, Canning and Pedroni, 2004 and Commonwealth Business Council Survey, 2007.
- 2 Stephen Jones, "Infrastructure Challenges in East and South Asia," *IDS Bulletin*, vol. 34, no. 3 (March, 2006), available at www.opml.co.uk/.../Infrastructure_Challenges_in_East_and_South_Asia..., (August 14, 2013).
- 3 Parvakar Sahoo and Ranjan Kumar Dash, "Economic Growth in South Asia: Role of Infrastructure," *The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development*, vol. 21, no. 2, (January, 2012), 217-252, available at ideas.repec.org/f/psa1018.html, (June 13, 2013).
- 4 Shiladitya Chatterjee, "Poverty Reduction Strategies-Lessons from the

*Pakistan's Role in Building Connectivity for Regional Integration:
Turning Dreams into Reality*

- Asian and Pacific Region on Inclusive Development,” *Asian Development Review*, vol. 22, no. 1 (January 1, 2005), available at www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/261.pdf, (May 26, 2013).
- 5 Dr Zahid Anwar, “View: New Silk Road in Pakistani perspective,” *Daily Times*, January 23, 2013.
- 6 Nausheen Wasi, “Pakistan’s Interests in Central Asia,” *Pakistan Horizon* 55, No. 4 (October 2002): 15-26.
- 7 Eldar Ismailov and Vladimir Papaya, *The Heartland Theory and the Present-Day Geopolitical Structure of Central Eurasia*, June 11, 2013, available at www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/1006Rethinking-4.pdf.
- 8 Farhat Asif, “Pakistan’s Ties with Central Asian States: Irritants and Challenges,” *Paper, Pak Institute of Peace Studies*, January-March 2011.
- 9 The complete details of Pakistan Railways current infrastructure and future projects can be seen at <http://pakrail.com/ybook2.pdf>.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 21.
- 11 “Road Map of Pakistan”, *Survey of Pakistan*, 6th Edition, Corrected up to 2013
- 12 The complete details of Pakistan Railways current infrastructure and future projects can be seen at <http://pakrail.com/ybook2.pdf>.
- 13 Shabbir Ahmad Khan, “Pakistan’s Policy towards Central Asia: Evaluation Since 1991,” *Central Asia*, available at http://www.asccentralasia.edu.pk/Issue_65/06_Pakistan_Policy_Towards_Central_Asia.html, (February 13, 2013).
- 14 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “Pakistan as an Energy Corridor for Iran and Central Asia: The EU’s Interests,” *Journal for European Studies*, (May 28, 2013).
- 15 “Rethinking Connectivity As Interactivity: Role of Networks,” *Planning Commission Report, Government of Pakistan*, available at http://www.pc.gov.pk/feg/PDFs/Connectivity_final_report.pdf, (July 13, 2013).
- 16 C. Christine Fair, “Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, No. 2 (April 2008): 201 – 227.
- 17 Farhat Asif, “Pakistan’s Ties with Central Asian States.”
- 18 Fair, “Pakistan’s Relations with Central Asia: Is Past Prologue?”
- 19 *Ibid.*
- 20 Meena Singh Roy, “Pakistan’s Strategies in Central Asia,” *Strategic Affairs*, vol. 30, no.4 (October, 2006).
- 21 Mark Grossman, “India has huge role to play in Silk Road’s success,” *Indian Express*, March 21, 2013.
- 22 Dr Zahid Anwar, “View: New Silk Road in Pakistani perspective”.
- 23 Dr. Salman Shah, “Heart of Asia Strategy,” *Pakistan Today*, January 12, 2012.

Combating Terrorism: The Battle Fought by Pakistan*

Ali Qaswar Khaleeq & Ayesha Zaryab¹

Abstract

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan became a front-line US ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Since then, Pakistan has witnessed increased violence, in the shape of terrorism. The new wave of terrorism experienced by Pakistan comprised suicide attacks, targeting both the government personnel and the civilians, infrastructure damage, synchronized militant attacks and sectarian violence. Terrorism still remains a threat to Pakistan despite the fact that Pakistan has made serious efforts toward eliminating the phenomenon. The challenge remains in connection with crafting a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that could cover the entire spectrum of threat. This article argues that the intense terrorism in Pakistan today is a result of Pakistan's participation in the GWOT as a front line US ally. Pakistan is facing both internal and external challenges in combating terrorism. There is a need to devise a widespread counter-terrorism strategy to maximize the success in eradicating terrorism from Pakistan. This article aims to analyze efforts as well as challenges faced by Pakistan to combat terrorism with efficacy.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Mr. Ali Qaswar Khaleeq is a research fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. He is currently working on 'Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Strategy'.

Ms Aeysha Zaryab is a research fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is currently working on 'Aftermath of GWOT in Pakistan'.

Introduction

Terrorism does not find a universal definition in international politics till to date. The terrorists for one school of thought may be the freedom fighters for another. There is not a single meaning that explains the phenomenon. However, in year 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted the Resolution 1566 that defines this term as:

“Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”¹

Terrorism is regarded as a phenomenon that sets serious challenges for the countries all across the world, let alone Pakistan. These challenges are multi-dimensional; the security constraint, the social disorder, and the context of economy are the fundamental outcomes of terrorism. The problem of terrorism needs to be dealt with on these fronts collectively, if the real success is required.

Security is vital for any state, because if left unaddressed, it can cause challenges to its survival. In Pakistan’s context, the continuous militant attacks carried out against government institutions, military personnel and the civilians define the security challenge for

Pakistan. Pakistan has adopted the strategy of carrying out military operations against the terrorists, in addition to the deliberate efforts to strike peace agreements with the terrorist groups. These efforts to combat terrorism essentially show the will of the government to eradicate the menace of terrorism.

However, the loopholes between formulation of the laws and their implementation have not allowed an effective solution to the problem of terrorism. The choice of the government to align its policies with the global agenda, without analyzing domestic constraints and the blow back, has been contributing towards spread of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan still could not be declared as terrorist free zone, despite an active participation in GWOT and carrying out the efforts to combat terrorism; although commendable success in the areas like Swat and to some extent in FATA has been achieved.

Terrorism, today, is both a transnational as well as a transborder problem and requires both the internal and the external level response. It needs to be addressed at both levels, simultaneously, by the government of Pakistan. Addressing the terrorist challenge in Pakistan, would be a great success, not only for the current government, but for any elected government.

The Dynamics of Terrorism in Pakistan

The 1980's sectarian violence (Shia-Sunni) laid the basis for terrorism in Pakistan internally. This was supplemented by Pakistan's engagement in the first Afghan war. This issue drew its strength from foreign

funding (Saudi and Iranian) as the two fought proxy wars in Pakistan, in the wake of post Islamic Revolution of Iran, to draw lines of influence.² This led to an intense wave of sectarian based violence in Pakistan.

The attacks of 9/11 intensified the already existing terrorism in Pakistan. However, the terrorism today does not confine itself with the terrorism that existed till 90's. The former originated with the US President Bush's strategy to start a 'non-discriminatory' war on terror following the 9/11 attacks. The then US Secretary of State, General Collin Powell, in a telephonic conversation with Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf, said, "You are either with us or against us."³ This led to the cooperation between the two states in combating terrorism.

The war was initiated against terrorism. To target Al-Qaeda suspects, the US attacked Afghanistan's Taliban regime that resulted in the war objective becoming counter-insurgency instead of counter-terrorism. Pakistan was with US unquestionably in counter-terrorism approach, but counter-insurgency created this debate as to the requirement, methods of war and the outcomes; and most importantly how to contain the sub-processes of terrorism in Pakistan.

The connection between Taliban and Pakistan became the focal point for the international community vis-a-vis Pakistan's involvement in GWOT. This was in reference to Pakistan being one of the three states that had officially recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the other two being Saudi Arabia and UAE. Besides, Pakistani support for the Taliban fighting the US proxy

war in Afghanistan during the Cold War was also not unknown to the world. In the wake of post 9/11 context, terrorism in Pakistan intensified to include the bomb blasts, suicide attacks, target killings and other measures and methods adopted by the militants. Pakistan re-oriented its foreign policy and the once freedom fighters became the terrorists for Pakistan as well.

Pakistan joined US and stood united against Taliban. Being a US ally in the GWOT has resulted in increased militancy and training and funding of violent groups. In post 2001 environment, Pakistan cracked down heavily on these groups and cut off most of their foreign funding sources. However, the challenge remained as the militants shifted their orientation towards the second Afghan war. Small networks drew support from Al-Qaeda and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to regain power domestically.

Afghans viewed Pakistan joining hands with the US in the GWOT as a 'betrayal', since Pakistan had become a part of war against a regime that had been officially recognized by Pakistan earlier. Pakistan experienced an intense wave of terrorism domestically that was believed to be a reaction of Pakistan's loyalties with the US. Bomb blasts and suicide attacks on sensitive government and military installations, target killings of prominent government personalities and military personnel and attempts to create a 'state within a state' became frequent headlines. The government and Armed Forces of Pakistan responded strongly and stood firm against the terrorists that have been trying to destabilize the country.

As a result of the efforts of the government of Pakistan, the intensity of the problem has seen a relative decrease in the 2013, although, the issue still continues to exist.

Casualties in Pakistan in Terrorist Activities (2003-2013)

Pakistan has faced more than 51,000 (according to ISPR) and almost 48,000 (according to SASSI classified data) civilian and military casualties in the war on terror. According to recent reports at least 3675 people, including 1985 civilians, 427 security forces personnel and 1263 terrorists, have lost their lives in terrorist violence in the country during the first four months of the year 2013.⁴

Table-1: Casualties in Pakistan in Terrorist Activities (2003-2013)⁵

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	1451	283	962	2696
Total*	16606	5105	26122	47833

Source: SASSI Factsheet No. 37

Pakistan has faced a large number of suicide attacks in the last decade. According to the data compiled by the Conflict Monitoring Center (CMC)⁶, militants carried out 41 suicide attacks during the year 2011 in Pakistan. 606 people were killed and 1002 were injured in these attacks. Army lost 33 of its soldiers, while 110 personnel of Frontier Corps and 54 policemen lost their lives in these suicide attacks.⁷

Year	Attacks	Fatalities
2002	2	27
2003	2	65
2004	8	82
2005	4	83
2006	9	161
2007	57	842
2008	61	940
2009	90	1090
2010	58	1153
2011	44	625
2012	32	243
2013	9	511
Total	376	5,822

Source: Pakistan Body Count

Efforts by Pakistan to Combat Terrorism

The government of Pakistan has been facing the problem of terrorism since the day it joined GWOT. The tribal belt of Pakistan, in particular, has served as the hot bed for terrorists. In this regard, Pakistan Army has been in state of war with the terrorists since 2002. Multiple

military operations were carried out by Pakistan Army to cordon off the areas contributing to terrorism. Apart from the partial success achieved against the terrorists through these military strikes, much damage in terms of human life as well as the economic order, and the infrastructure has also been experienced.

Table-3: Military Operations Carried out in FATA

Year	Operation
2002-2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Al-Mizan (FATA)
2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation Zalzala (South Waziristan) Operation Sher Dil (Bajour Agency) Operation Daraghalam (Khyber Agency)
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation Rah-e-Haq (Swat) Operation Rah-e-Rast (Swat) Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Swat)
2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation in Khyber Agency
March 2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Operation in Tirah Valley

Source: SASSI Factsheet No.53

Brief Details of Military Operations⁹

Operation Al-Mizan

The operation started in 2002 and was declared successful in 2006. Around eighty thousand troops

were deployed in FATA to combat the terrorist groups. The operation resulted in casualties of significant leaders of the opponent side, including Nek Mohammad Wazir, Noor-ul-Islam, Haji Mohammad Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Maulvi Abdul Aziz.

Operation Zalzala

The operation was carried out in 2008, when security forces cordoned off majority of the areas of South Waziristan under threat of terrorism. The objective was to neutralize the support to Mehsud network. The damage included over 4,000 houses within the month of January only and an estimated 200,000 people were displaced.

Operation Sher Dil

This operation was launched on 9th September 2008 in Bajour Agency. The objective was to counter all the militant groups that threatened the national security of Pakistan. Thousands of militants and around sixty security personnel were killed during this operation.

Operation Daraghalam

Operation Daraghalam was carried out in 2008 in Khyber Agency, during which dozens of suspects were arrested. It was claimed as an eighty percent successful operation where significant targets were achieved. The operation was a collaborative action of Pakistan Army and local paramilitary forces.

Operation Rah-e-Haq

The operation started in November 2007. The objective was to counter Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and cordon off Swat valley.

The tactics included shoot at sight and curfews were also imposed. Malakand Agreement came as a cease fire between the Armed Forces and the terrorists.

Operation Rah-e-Rast

The operation Rah-e-Rast was carried out in Swat in May 2009. This was a reaction to the violation of Malakand Agreement by the terrorists groups. The aim of the operation was to capture and kill the leaders of the terrorist groups and maintain peace in Swat.

Operation Rah-e-Nijat

The operation was carried out in summers of 2009 in Swat. Its aim was to secure Line of Communications to gain control over Mehsud network and TTP.

Operation in Tirah Valley

This was initially a result of a clash that broke out within the militant groups of Tehrik-e-Taliban, Lashkar-e-Islam and Ansar-ul-Islam. The operation displaced about 300,000 people.

A close and detailed study of these military operations and their aftermath actually highlight the confusion caused in counter-terrorism efforts by the counter-insurgency tactics. The real challenge was to convince the masses about the operation being counter-terrorism. In Swat and a few areas of FATA, public fully backed the military operations carried out to halt terrorism. But when it comes to counter-insurgency, there is a clear divide seen in the public opinion with regards to its need and method. These operations have also claimed a large number of military/civilian lives and left a number of civilian displaced, besides achieving some success against

the militants. There is a need to adopt such a strategy as could increase the success ratio in comparison to the loss suffered.

Peace Agreements

The military operations are not the only solution to the problem. These were undertaken by Pakistan Army as the last resort. The government of Pakistan made serious efforts to conclude peace agreements, but the failure of these agreements left the government with no other option than conducting the military operations. A brief review of these agreements is as under:-

Table-4: Peace Agreements¹⁰

Year	Agreement	Signed between Govt. of Pakistan and	Reasons for Failure
2004	Shakai Peace Agreement	Taliban: Nek Muhammad Wazir	Disagreement between the signatories on the status of the militants as “foreign fighters” in the area.
2005	Srarogha Peace Agreement	Taliban: Baitullah Mehsud	The second figurehead of Taliban in the region, Abdullah Mehsud pulled out of the deal.

2005	Miran Shah Peace Accord	Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor and Maulana Abdul Khaliq	Violation of the terms of agreement by Taliban.
2008	The Swat Agreement	Maulana Fazalullah and Faqir Muhammad	The continued violations by the Jihadists right after the deal was struck. They continued to challenge the writ of the state by introducing parallel system of judiciary.

Source: SASSI Factsheet No.54

All Parties Conference (APC) was held before 2013 general elections in Pakistan. This APC contributed towards persuading the Taliban for the peace talks once again. But, the death of Wali-ur-Rehman (Second-in-Command of the TTP) in a US drone attack on 29th May 2013, ended the possibility of peace negotiations that were to be held between the government of Pakistan and Taliban even before they could start.

Various peace agreements have been concluded and then violated afterwards. The measurement of “peace” also needs to be clarified; if the decrease in number of attacks is regarded as peace, then, the tribal areas have been more peaceful during the periods, when peace agreements were negotiated. But, as a matter of fact, this was not the case, the target killings continued, with

increased frequency, even after the agreements.¹¹ What is different is the level of confidence, in the local public about the commitment of the security apparatus to respond to this challenge. With these violations or the drone strikes being carried out to eliminate the suspects, there is never a chance of initialization of any peace talks.

Challenges for Pakistan to Combat Terrorism

With ever increasing ratio and intricate concepts in the field of terrorism, combating terrorism has become a serious challenge for Pakistan. There are several factors, both at internal as well as at external level, which contribute to the complexity of the issue. The menace of terrorism can only be dealt with, completely, if the two levels are simultaneously taken care of.

Internal Issues

The primary requirement for any state to run its affairs smoothly is to have internal stability. Unfortunately, Pakistan is still striving for internal stability even after more than a decade of fighting the GWOT. The writ of the state is the pre-condition of a stable political system. This, in a consolidated form, will counteract the independent terrorist organizations and terrorism as a whole. Law enforcement agencies need to bridge the gap between the theoretical formulation of laws and their implementation in practice.

The inherent lack of an effective monitoring mechanism and absence of rule of law in any state create the space for the elements to sabotage the writ of the government. Hence, the projected sense of the writ of

the government needs to be built as credible policy and then communicated well to the citizens.

Below is a brief account of the challenges faced by Pakistan on the internal front, to combat terrorism:-

Banned Organizations Operating with Different Names

The government has imposed ban on the terrorist and militant organizations several times, but the issue still remains to exist. The same organizations, once banned under the law, continue to operate under different names with same old agenda. The most prominent example is Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan that was banned by General Pervez Musharraf in January 2002, but remained intact under the name of Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jama'at.¹² The loophole here, hence, needs to be plugged in. Once a ban has been imposed on a militant organization; the re-emergence of the same group of people with the same agenda under different name must be checked and stopped through proper legislation and close inter-agency coordination.

Balochistan

Geographically, Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan. There are several internal challenges in Balochistan that produce threats to security. Till date, there have been five major challenges in Balochistan since the independence of Pakistan. According to government sources, presently there are five terrorist outfits operating in Balochistan. Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) is the most prominent amongst them that seeks separation of Balochistan from Pakistan. Besides

BLA, four other terrorist organizations including Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), Balochistan Republican Army (BRA), Lashkar-e-Balochistan and Jhalawan Baloch Tigers have emerged to challenge the writ of the government. The former Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, reported, "The BLA is a killing machine which is overhauled in Afghanistan and all its spare parts come from Afghanistan."¹³ Mr. Malik referred to his meeting with Hamid Karzai, he said the Afghan President had indirectly admitted that his country had a role in Balochistan.

On the other hand, the US Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel has talked about Indian involvement in Balochistan.¹⁴ The internal and external elements together pose a great challenge to the government of Pakistan in dealing with the insurgency in the province of Balochistan. Not only that the Baloch liberation movements need to be halted, but the external support provided to them needs to be severed effectively as well.

The government has not been focusing on the sectors of health and education in Balochistan. The infrastructure in the province stands nowhere near the development in Sindh and Punjab, despite the funds allocated for Balochistan. These factors have contributed towards the increased grievances of Baloch terrorists against the government. Foreign elements have exploited this situation to strengthen the Baloch terrorists. Thus, Balochistan serves as a challenge for Pakistan both at internal as well as external levels.

FATA

When we discuss the internal challenges that Pakistan faces in combating terrorism, FATA is also one of those big challenges that need to be addressed appropriately. The presence of Taliban in FATA is no news. The fact remains explicit to all. An overview of the presence of terrorists/militants in FATA is given below:-

Main Militant Groups in FATA

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

The TTP is an alliance of militant groups from Pakistan's tribal areas that was formed in 2007 under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. Following the Pakistan Army's operation in South Waziristan, TTP emerged as the most dangerous group inside Pakistan. Currently, it is responsible for most of the violence against the State of Pakistan. It maintains close linkages with other militant groups, including Al Qaeda and Punjab-based sectarian outfits like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, other than targeting US forces in Afghanistan.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is a violent, anti-Shiite militant group in Pakistan connected with several other groups, including Al-Qaeda. Government of Pakistan formally banned LeJ in 2001. LeJ is now believed to be allied with the TTP.¹⁵ Some analysts claim that LeJ members pose "a more serious threat to Pakistan's stability and global security" than the TTP itself.¹⁶

Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group

Gul Bahadur is the most influential tribal leader in North Waziristan. He maintains influence in the West of Miran Shah and has avoided any direct confrontation with the Pakistani military since Baitullah's death.

Uzbek Militants

The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was originally founded in Uzbekistan in 1996. President Islam Karimov forced IMU out of Uzbekistan and by 1998 IMU had established its militant camps in Afghanistan.¹⁷ 2002 US attack on Afghanistan further forced them out of Afghanistan and the Pakistani tribal belt became the new shelter of these Uzbek militants. These militants have been reportedly present in South Waziristan till 2009 and were involved in beheading of Frontier Corps (FC) personnel and almost 95% of all the attacks carried out against the Pakistan Armed Forces. Their presence was in the South Waziristan before the military operations. The military operation in the region forced them to leave South Waziristan, so they settled in North afterwards.¹⁸

Other Foreign Fighters

Foreign fighters operating from North Waziristan (FATA) include, Arabs, Tajiks and Turks affiliated with Al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. These Foreign fighters have allegedly been involved in attacks in Afghanistan, Europe, and the United States. Several

military operations have been launched against the foreign fighters that have resulted in these fighters being killed or captured.¹⁹

Pakistan Army has carried out several operations in this region against the terrorists. These operations have met with relative success as the real challenge to break the network and the learning curve of various splinter groups still exists. The activities carried out by the militant organizations are not confined to one region or one sector. Until and unless the network of these organizations is intact, the operations are not going to bring about peace. So far this region could not be declared as a terrorist free zone despite several military operations carried out by Pakistan Army. At present, there is no clarity about the ranks and files of the terrorists working with TTP. However, various splinter groups consisting of elements from Al-Qaeda, LeJ, Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Muhammad are considered to be from their ranks. It is also believed that the confluence of these actors has allowed for a rapid learning curve in the militancy tactics of TTP and the violence faced due to the terrorist activities.

External Issues

Drone Strikes-(2004-2013)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) started launching drone attacks inside Pakistani tribal areas in 2004 during Musharraf's regime. Drone strike is a double edged sword that kills few random High Valued Targets (HVTs)²⁰ along with many civilians on one

hand and simultaneously kills the peace efforts on the other. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, as of 28th July 2013, three hundred and seventy one (371) CIA drone strikes have taken place in Pakistan in which about 2,505—3,584 people were killed and 1,111—1,493 were injured.²¹ Out of the total death toll given, 407—928 people were reported to be civilians, whereas, 164-195 children have reportedly lost their lives.²² Despite a few gains against Al-Qaeda, TTP and other militant groups; drone strikes are unpopular in Pakistan and around the globe, for lacking legitimacy.

The US led drone strikes have grounded a sense of hatred among those who have been the victims of these strikes. The fact, government of Pakistan did not raise much concern for a longer period of time, has been considered as one of the major reasons for the continued aggression of the terrorist elements against the government. There is no written documentation of any such 'deal' on drone strikes, as has been mentioned by General Musharraf in his interview to CNN.²³ If at all any thing was discussed between General Musharraf and the Bush Administration, that verbal understanding between two individuals has no legal standing, to let the US bypass Pakistan's sovereignty. The US drone strikes are unquestionably a violation of international humanitarian law and human rights and the challenge to stop such an intrusion is yet to be met.

The government of Pakistan not prioritizing the matter resulted in an immense public pressure on

the government, responding to which the Pakistani leadership; the President, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, recorded their protest at diplomatic level. However, this protest did not prove to be effective. The loss of innocent lives in the US drone strikes and the perceived silence of Pakistan's government has created factions in the society. This division has led to a disruption and disarray within Pakistani society.

Cross Border Violations

Pakistan has an approximately 2,640 km long porous border with Afghanistan that cuts through the Pashtun Tribal belt and Balochistan region. This border, the Durand Line, demarcates the Khyber Pakhtoon Khwa, FATA, Balochistan and Gilgit Baltistan from the Afghan provinces in north-east and north-south.


Figure 1: Durand Line (Pak-Afghan Border)



Combating Terrorism: The Battle Fought by Pakistan


Durand Line poses a great challenge to Pakistan for stopping the cross-border activities. At present, the border is not secured that allows cross border movement of terrorists as well as drug trafficking. The border violations have increased significantly in recent years. SASSI classified data below shows statistical overview of these border violations in last 4 years.

Figure 2: Pak-Afghan Border Violations 2010-2012²⁴



Source: SASSI Factsheet No.39

Figure 3: Pak-Afghan Border Violations during 2013 up-till May²⁵



Source: SASSI Factsheet No.40

It is not possible to monitor such a long porous border, humanly. Pakistan suggested to have fencing along the border, but it was not accepted by Afghanistan since they do not consider Durand Line as the international border, as is accepted by Pakistan. As there is lack of monitoring for entry and exit on this border, it is very easy for the terrorists to cross the border and return back after carrying out any terrorist activity. The unsecured border also serves as one of the major reasons for the military operations conducted in FATA not meeting complete success. This is due to the fact that the terrorists find it very easy to cross the border, thus, getting shelter during the time when the operation is being carried out. Once, the operation is over these terrorists move back to regain their previous positions and, thus, the issue remains unresolved. The threat will remain to exist until the border is not secured properly.

Policy Recommendations

Following are some policy recommendations that could provide an appropriate line of action for the decision-making authorities in this regard;

- First, a grand strategy to combat the internal challenges must be devised.
- Reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy regarding GWOT and formulation of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy is required.
- Strict and proper implementation regarding the ban on militant organizations, in addition to a strong inter-agency coordination, must be ensured.

- Ungoverned areas like FATA must cease to be a shelter for terrorists. The authorities need to develop a full action plan against the terrorists present in FATA.
- Pak-Afghan border needs to be made properly secured, so as to avoid cross border movements of the terrorists.
- The problems in Balochistan must be focused on internal as well as on external front to eliminate the irritants.
- Peace in Pakistan is likely to enhance the global security. For this reason, the international players have to play a responsible role.
- The concerns of Pakistan, regarding the foreign hand in aggravating the problem of terrorism, should be addressed.
- The global as well as regional players ought to take up the issue on priority and facilitate Pakistan in combating terrorism.

Conclusion

The menace of terrorism has expanded drastically in Pakistan through the post 9/11 era. Pakistan has not been successful to capitalize on defeating the terrorism in the country, regardless of its prolonged involvement in GWOT. The statistics suggest that there has been a relative decline in the trend of life-loss experienced by Pakistan. However, the issue still needs to be addressed more keenly, so as to eradicate the element of terrorism from the society. Pakistan needs to fight terrorism on multiple fronts, each being a significant concern for Pakistan. Pakistan has shown its will and responsibility in

combating terrorism, however, the intensity of the issue demands for advanced and proactive strategies. The fact that the phenomenon of terrorism has rather ingrained within Pakistan seeks practical efforts more than good intentions only. The policy and decision-makers need to re-orient their strategies in order to achieve the best results. Pakistan has to take a clear stance regarding the issue. Pakistan should not rely on foreign involvement such as US drone strikes and CIA led operations inside the country to deal with terrorism. Instead, the issue should be dealt with by Pakistan itself. In this way the anti-government perception prevailing in the public against the outside influence will reduce, thus, leading towards national cohesion. Once the internal issues are addressed properly, only then Pakistan will be able to confront the challenge at external front effectively.

Key Findings

- Pakistan still faces the challenge of terrorism despite fighting the war against terrorism for more than a decade.
- Pakistan's counter-terrorism strategy needs to be more comprehensive and flexible to deal with the internal and external challenges.
- The US drone strikes carried out in Pakistan have led to a strong anti-government sentiment among the people of Pakistan that has further flared up the militancy.
- Military operation is not the solution to the problem. Other means must be accounted for to counter the challenges posed by terrorists.

Endnotes

- 1 US Department of State Press Release SC/8214, *Security Council Acts Unanimously to Adopt Resolution Strongly Condemning Terrorism as One of Most Serious Threats to Peace*, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566, 8th Oct. 2004, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8214.doc.htm> accessed on 10th April 2013
- 2 Moonis Ahmer, *Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan*, Pakistan Vision Vol. 9, No.1, pp.8-10
- 3 Pervez Musharraf, 'In The Line of Fire', One Day That Changed The World. FREE PRESS, New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, 2006, p.201
- 4 South-Asian Terrorism Portal, Datasheet, "*Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan*", Weekly Assessments and Briefings <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>, Accessed on 2nd July, 2013.
- 5 Fact Sheet No.37 by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University.
- 6 CMC is an Islamabad based Independent Research Center that focuses on inter-state and intra-state armed conflicts and prepares periodic analytical reports on South Asian conflicts.
- 7 Pakistan Body Count was invented in 2006 as a web page including the database regarding the drone strikes, suicide bombings, the data is recorded through the media reports and published record, Pakistan Body Count, "*Suicide Bombing*", <http://pakistanbodycount.org/analytics> accessed on 14th April 2013.
- 8 Ibid
- 9 Zahid Ali Khan, "*Military operations in FATA and PATA: implications for Pakista*", Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad ISSI, http://www.issi.org.pk/publication-files/1339999992_58398784.pdf, Amnesty International Publications, "*As if the hell fell on me*", The Human Rights Crisis in North-West Pakistan, 2010, pp.20-25, http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/files/public/rap_pakistan_as_if_hell_fell_on_me.pdf
- 10 Sohail Habib Tajik, 'Analysis of Peace Agreements with Militants and Lessons for the Future'. *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Jan-Mar 2011, Vol 4 number 1, p 7-13
- 11 Ibid
- 12 Sipah Sahaba Pakistan Anjuman sipah sahaba pakistan, Ahle sunnat wal jamaat <http://sipahsahaba.webs.com/about-ssp-leader-s>
- 13 Lahore World, '*BLA has become a killing machine*', Aug 2012. <http://lahoreworld.com/2013/02/27/indian-involvement-in-balochistan-confirmed-by-us-senator/pic-syed-munawar-hasan-12/>, accessed on 17th April 2013.
- 14 Pakistan Defence, "*Turmoil In Baluchistan: Chuck Hagel And The Indian Factor*",

- 27 February 2013, <http://www.defence.pk/forums/strategic-geopolitical-issues/237615-turmoil-baluchistan-chuck-hagel-indian-factor-see-more.html>. Accessed on 17 April 2013.
- 15 Jane Pervez, "Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links," *The New York Times*, October 15, 2009.
- 16 Ibid
- 17 Dr. Manzar Abbas Zaidi, "Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan", *SLAS Report no.1-2013*, February 4, 2013, p.6
- 18 Ibid
- 19 Jeffrey Dressler, "A Dangerous Mix: Militant Groups in North Waziristan", *Critical Threats*, June 1, 2011, available at www.criticalthreats.org, retrieved on April 16, 2013.
- 20 HVTs are the hardcore terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda. The term has been coined by the US to specify the prime target of their Drone Strikes.
- 21 "Obama 2013 Pakistan drone strikes". *The Bureau of Investigative Journalism*, 3 January 2013, <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama-2013-pakistan-drone-strikes/>. Accessed on 4 August 2013.
- 22 Ibid
- 23 Nic Robertson Greg Botelho, Ex-Pakistani President Musharraf admits secret deal with U.S. on drone strikes, CNN, April 12, 2013
- 24 Fact Sheet No.39 by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University
- 25 Fact Sheet No.40 by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University

A Decade of Drones' Strikes: Pakistan and Afghanistan*

Mateah Aqeel, Sajjad Haider & Mobeen Tariq¹

Abstract

The use of drones by the United States and its escalation by the Obama Administration has raised serious reservations against United States policy of using drones as a central component of counter terrorism strategy. It is argued that the use of drones is illegal though United States justifies its actions by saying that drones are being used as a tactic in the global war against terror based on US self-defense. This paper explores key issues regarding the US drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan and its impact on the stability of these states. The paper argues that United States drone strikes in Pakistan are a clear violation of the Pakistani sovereignty and are not legal (either internationally or aided through any bilateral agreement). The legitimacy of the use of drones in the armed conflict has been seen through the lens of International Armed Conflict. It is argued that Pakistan's challenge in FATA is Non-International Armed Conflict, according to which the drones are illegal and amount to extrajudicial killing.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Ms. Mateah Aqeel is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of interest is 'Legal Aspects and Psychological and civilian impacts of Drones'.

Mr. Sajjad Haider is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His area of interest is Drone warfare.

Mr. Mobeen Tariq is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His areas of interests include 'Drone Warfare' and its impacts. He has also worked on Afghanistan and Regional Stability.

Introduction

Pakistan has been front line state in the war against terror and has sacrificed a lot both in terms of human and economic losses. Since the 9/11 incident Pakistan has faced 51000 human losses¹ which include over 4000 military casualties. On the economic front, Pakistan has suffered \$90 billion loss².

Drones have been a major tool of kinetic operations of US in Pakistan to pursue the US Counter Terrorism Strategy. The 9/11 Congressional Document, commonly known as the Bush Doctrine, is used by the proponents of the drones as a base line document to justify their use in FATA.

FATA is considered as a terrorist sanctuary, and the argument is made that Pakistan has no control of the area and US faces direct threat from the region, therefore, it has the right to carry out drone strikes in FATA. The use of drones in FATA is not legitimate. FATA is Pakistan's territory and US does not have any right to carry out drone strikes in that region, so these strikes by United States are clear violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. These strikes are illegal even in according to the laws used to justify them.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) leads the drone campaign in Pakistan. Intelligence operatives are not legitimate actors for the use of force in International Armed Conflict or Non International Armed Conflict. In addition, FATA faces the terrorist challenge. Nonetheless, the conduct of military operations in the

area clearly indicate that the writ of government of Pakistan exists in FATA. To specify entire FATA as terrorist sanctuary is both misleading and dangerous. It can be prelude for worsening Pak-US relations and substantive resistance to the shared objectives of counter terrorism of both states.

The paper aims to analyze the legitimacy of the drone strikes in FATA and raises questions on the following accounts. Can the US extend the use of drone strikes in Pakistan? Do these strikes have legitimacy? Is there any international or domestic law which allows its use? How far this strategy has been useful to counter terrorism or whether this has led to induction of more terrorists and widespread alienation of the people of Pakistan from the war against terrorism?

Drones: An Overview

The debate of drones has become the subject of significant importance. The traces of its use can be found in the history as well. Since the early 20th century, aircrafts have been used that are capable of flying under control without a pilot on board. Such aircrafts have been called drones, robot planes and the pilot-less aircraft. According to the definition by US Department of Defense, a drone or unmanned aircraft is an “*aircraft or balloon that does not carry a human operator and is capable of flight under remote control or autonomous programming.*”³ The drone technology has made advancement and the technological advances have direct impact on the war fighting capability of any country.

The drones are operated through highly trained crew at the base who steers the craft and gives command to the Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV) through satellite, the craft then follows the command and attacks the target. However, the take-off and landing of these planes are controlled from the base camp.

Tactical Advantages of Drones

Drone offers a unique advantage in warfare that its ability to fight a war without endangering operator's life. The operating platform of drones have the following tactical advantages, which include effective ground support for soldiers, high value target destruction, increased combat effectiveness and signals intelligence collection.⁴ Another tactical advantage of the drones is terrain maneuverability, that is drones can reach at those places, where ground forces are unable to reach. This ability to enter difficult terrains is one of the major tactical advantages of drones. A US intelligence official stated to summarize the advantage of drones:

“Many of the highest priority terrorists are in some of the remotest, most inaccessible parts of our planet ... When these people are where they are, and are doing what they're doing, it's just not a tough decision.”⁵

The motive behind the use of drones by United States is that they are a safer alternative to manned aircraft, because they lessen the danger of damage, casualties and deaths of American troops.

US Narrative on Drone Strikes

Drones are one of the fundamental counter terrorism strategies of United States. US has used drones to launch lethal strikes against suspected Al-Qaeda members. US claims its actions as legitimate under the justification of national self-defense. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, US has been in a status of armed conflict. After the 9/11 incident, President Bush declared United States to be engaged in a global war against terrorism and obtained Congressional endorsement (Bush Doctrine) to retaliate against those who are suspected to be responsible for this.⁶

Legal Advisor Harold Koh from the US State Department has defended the CIA's drone program on the basis of targeting enemy combatants, saying that the United States is "*in an armed conflict with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban and associated forces.*"⁷

The use of drones by the United States and escalation of these strikes during Obama's Administration has provoked negative sentiments against United States around the world. This has become a controversial issue among many nations. United States must determine some clear guidelines for the use of these weapons.⁸

US Justification of Drones Strikes

These drone strikes have now become a key part of the US government's approach to counter terrorism. Drones provide a safe and secure method to retrieve reliable intelligence as to the location and actions of "high-value targets". Drones are successful at killing allegedly 'high value targets' (HVTs). Some of them are

supported by vague facts that try to calculate the outlay of drone strikes against the effects of enemy. The validity of these facts remains questionable.

United States argues that in the post-2001 era, it has developed and has been using drones to target terrorists. The use of drones is illegal and immoral but US justifies its actions by saying that drones are used as a tactic in the Global War against Terrorism and self-defense. Drones have proven to be an effective measure to fight terrorism in the inaccessible regions mainly without massive killing of civilians, as they have terrain maneuverability.

The government of United States has established an escalating fervor to utilize drones in the Global War on Terror. Drones have been authorized by the Bush administration and continued by the Obama administration. Juan Zarate, a counter terrorism adviser during the Bush era stated that “*drone strikes had knocked Al-Qaeda ‘on its heels’ because of the death of so many leading operatives*”.⁹ Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta has shaped the argument that “*drones are remarkably precise and limited in terms of collateral damage, and were the only game in town in terms of trying to disrupt the Al- Qaeda leadership*”.¹⁰

Escalation of the Drone Program and Obama’s New Strategy

After declaration of War against Terrorism by President Bush, where he legitimized the use of drones based on pre-emptive strikes and self-defense, President Obama escalated the program. Within the first four years of his tenure, there were more than 292 attacks.¹¹

During Obama's first tenure an increase in drone strikes has seriously constrained the relations between Pakistan and United States. There are different views on the Obama's drone policies. Some are in favor of the policy, while others are against it.

The current Obama administration have rested their justifications on the post 9/11 congressional authorization, popularly known as the Bush Doctrine to wage the War on Terror and combat terrorists. But there is a visible change in policy between the two administrations. Bush administration reportedly focused targeted killings on "personality" strikes. Alternate to this, in the 'Obama's administration' use of drones has been a reported extension of "signature" strikes.¹²

Drone Attacks and International Law

The use of drones must come under the jurisdiction of International Humanitarian Law. In order to find answer to the questions raised about the legality of drones, we may consider the legal regime to govern the use of drones, the United Nations Charter, of which primary component is the *jus ad bellum* (law on resort to force).

The UN Charter is the legal regulation through which legality of US drone strikes can be checked. This Charter in general forbids the resort to military force. The Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is the fundamental principle of the law on resort to force, a general rule on the prohibition of the use of force in international relations. The Charter holds two exceptions to this, the

right to self-defense under Article 51 (if any attack occurs) and authorization by the Security Council in consistence with Chapter VII.¹³ (The Security Council has not authorized the ongoing use of force by the United States).¹⁴

In any case the resort to force to be lawful, it must comply with one of the exceptions of UN Charter or have a request from a state (where armed conflict occurs). Apart from having a preliminary right to resort to force, there is another exception that is to comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. For the use of military force to be lawful, it should have a potency of success in executing the military objective, otherwise, resort to military force or use of drones in any state's territory is unlawful. The principles of necessity and the proportionality must be complied with, if the resort to military force is the last option.

United States justifies its actions by saying that drones are used as a tactic in the global war against terror and US self-defense. The Charter provides in Article 51 that states may respond in self-defense "if an armed attack occurs."¹⁵ In addition, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has marked the term "self-defense" as a term of art in international law. "Self-defense" is the right of a victim state to use offensive military force on the territory of a state legally responsible for a significant armed attack on the defending state.¹⁶

Under Article 51, International Law does not support operations in the states that are not responsible for any armed attack on the defender or the presence

of any organized armed group. Terrorist attacks are not taken as armed attacks but they are criminal acts that do not give the right of self-defense. And also the principles of proportionality and necessity bound the extent of military operations in self-defense. However, US justifies its actions that it has the right to use military force in Afghanistan under Article 51, because the government of Afghanistan had officially requested US assistance. The US assistance was justified in terms of fighting the alleged Al-Qaeda and other terrorists groups. But when the Taliban regime was driven out of power, there remains no justification to continue the fight.

United States has been carrying out drone strikes in Pakistan but there is no formal agreement between United States and Pakistan that allows the use of drones in Pakistan. Drones attacks have taken place against alleged terrorist targets in areas where there is no armed conflict and this is not allowed under the principle of proportionality.¹⁷ Use of drones has in fact failed to counter the terrorism. The use of drones has failed the applicable tests of the lawful use.

Drones and International Armed Conflict Law

International Armed Conflicts normally are easy to identify, as they are clear use of armed forces between states¹⁸, whereas determining the Non-International Armed Conflicts is quite complex.

Classification of the Type of Armed Conflict

It is essential to differentiate between International and Non-International Armed Conflicts. The rules of

International Humanitarian Law apply when an armed conflict is ascertained. Traditionally, there have been different sets of rules for International Armed Conflict¹⁹ and Non-International Armed Conflicts²⁰.

“International Armed Conflict according to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, common article 2 is stated as “all cases of declared war or of any armed conflict that may arise between two or more high contracting parties, even if the state of war is not recognized, the convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a high contracting party even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance” (Geneva Convention, 1949, Common Art.2). This means that the occurrence of international armed conflict is clear, that is, it would be a conflict between the legal armed forces of two different states.”

“The Manual of Non-International Armed Conflict seems to agree and defines internal conflicts as: ‘armed confrontations occurring within the territory of a single State and in which the armed forces of no other State are engaged against the central government.’ non-international armed conflicts are those taking place within the territory of a State and in which the armed forces of no other State participate. Under treaty law, slightly different provisions apply when the internal opposition is better organized in terms of

command and control of territory, enabling it to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement the law. These provisions only apply if government troops are involved in the fighting”.

The territorial limitation in Common Article 3 of Geneva Convention 1949 provides that the conflict must take place in the territory of ‘one of the High Contracting Parties’. A strict reading of this Article leads to the conclusion that the conflict must remain within the borders of one single State, but it is asserted that the Article does not cease to apply just because the conflict spills over to the territory of another State.²¹ According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the conflict shall arise on the territory of a State for Common Article 3 to be applicable, clearly opening for the possibility of “spillover” effects into the territory of other States.²²

“When a foreign State extends its military support to the government of a State within which a Non-International Armed Conflict is taking place, the conflict remains non-international in character. Conversely, should a foreign State extend military support to an armed group acting against the government, the conflict will become international in character.”²³

As per definition, the situation in Pakistan is of

non-international character. The situation in Pakistan is largely infected with acts of violence on several fronts. The Islamist militant groups are present in various parts of the tribal areas of North-Western Pakistan. The drone attacks targeting militants raise serious concerns on state sovereignty as well as unlawful killings. The conflict in Pakistan remains of a non-international character, even if the United States is intervening in an armed conflict between Pakistan and the TTP.²⁴ The drone attacks conducted by the United States in Pakistan are a 'spillover' effect of the conflict in Afghanistan; therefore, it is here assessed within the Non International Armed Conflict.²⁵

There are various kinds of Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) such as conflict between government forces and armed groups, that is 'spillover' NIAC which currently prevails in Pakistan, where the border of a neighboring state is crossed by the hostilities.²⁶ Further, there are 'multinational Non-International Armed Conflicts', such as the current conflict in Afghanistan, where multinational forces are supporting the host state in its conflict with one or more organized armed groups on its territory.

The situation in Afghanistan can be described as a multinational Non-International Armed Conflict. The conflict was one of international character until the fall of the Taliban, when the international forces supported the Northern Alliance in the fight against the Taliban regime. After this the allies have fought on the same side as the government against Taliban (which are now

an armed group) and the conflict no longer remains of the international character.

US Drone Strikes in Afghanistan

To counter Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, United States adopted a strategy of using drone strikes. The primary aim of drone strikes in Afghanistan is to counter Al-Qaeda and to reduce its ability to assault United States. These strikes are directed towards an extensive use of drones as a strategic tool by United States, against the threat of terrorism.

It is also perceived that through such attacks the probability of terrorist assaults by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda against NATO and US forces in Afghanistan will decrease. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by United States along with its allies, France, Canada and Australia, in 2001. This operation was in response to the terrorist attacks that took place on September 11.

The drones have dual purpose, first, surveillance and second to carry out bomb and missile strikes. There has been an increase in drone strikes against terrorist organizations during Obama's administration. From 2002 to 2008, 24,000 air strikes against Taliban were conducted (during 7 years of Bush government). This entails that there has been an air strike after about every three hours, while during Obama's regime 20,130 strikes in four years add up to one attack after every 1-3/4 hours.²⁷

Table.1: Obama Administration & Air Strikes in Afghanistan²⁸

Air strikes in Afghanistan (since 2009)	18,274 air strikes
Drones Strikes	1,160 drones strikes

Source: Los Angeles Times

The table shows the statistics of drone strikes conducted during Obama's administration in Afghanistan. The new strategy by Obama's administration revolves around the idea to utilize more drone attacks and less use of ground forces against these terrorist.

United States Drone Strikes in Pakistan

The drone strikes in Pakistan are the expansion of the strikes in Afghanistan. Out of 200 check posts on the Af-Pak border, only 2 posts are being monitored. In the neighboring regions of the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Afghan refugees and militants can move freely as these areas are easily accessible. So United States has extended its drones strike policy to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan as well, in order to fight these combatants, as some of the militant groups are believed to be hidden in Pakistani tribal areas.

United States drone strikes are clear violation of Pakistani sovereignty. US justified these drone strikes by claiming it as an act of self-defense, however international law states that no country is permitted to use weapons in the territory of another state.

Table.2: Drones Strikes in Pakistan 2004-2013²⁹

Total US strikes:	370
Strikes during Obama's tenures:	318
Total reported killed:	2,548-3,549
Total reported injured:	1,177-1,480

Source: Los Angeles Times

According to above mentioned table about the United States drone strikes inside Pakistan, there were total 318 (2009-2013) drone strikes till now in the Obama's term of government.

Table.3: Summary of Drones Attacks in Pakistan: 2004 – 2013³⁰


Years	No. of Strikes	Total Killed	Children Deaths	Civilian Deaths	HVT's killed
2004	1	7	2	0	1
2005	3	15	5	3	2
2006	3	108	75	24	0
2007	5	47	1	28	0
2008	38	332	31	86	12
2009	55	643	39	116	8
2010	128	985	16	146	7
2011	75	573	4	108	10
2012	48	336	1	23	6
2013	14	81	1	1	5
Total	370	3127	175	535	51

Source: SASSI Factsheet 61

The above mentioned table shows the detailed summary of the drone attacks statistics from 2004 to 2013.

Drones attacks and killing of civilians in FATA region have major impacts on economic, social, and cultural activities of the people living there. According to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism (2004-2013), available data indicate that drone strikes killed 411-890 civilians, which include 168-197 children in the FATA region. The data is about the casualties, but the victims which are left behind are also sufferers of these strikes. It adversely affects the health, economic and social life of the civilians, who became the victims of these drone strikes.

Figure.1³¹



Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism

The graph above shows the drone strikes by United States inside Pakistan from 2004 to 2013. The drone attacks carried out in Afghanistan and Pakistan have destabilized the regional stability and do not possess any justification.

Another concern is related to the respect and protection of the human rights of citizens of Pakistan.

According to international law the extrajudicial killing is prohibited, therefore, no country can support killing of individuals by other states' organizations. The customary international humanitarian law strictly follows the policy that areas densely populated by civilians should not be attacked.³²

Role of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The use of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives to conduct drone strikes adds another legal complexity, as it is not subject to military command structure, rules and regulations, as an intelligence agency. This is further affected by the status of intelligence operatives and their sub contractors under International Armed Conflict Law. CIA is primarily an intelligence agency which has no legal right of participation in internal conflict or amnesty for violent acts. Therefore, they are civilians who are openly participating in hostilities. C.I.A. operatives could be charged with a crime, under international law for using drones, if they knowingly target alleged terrorists, who are surrounded by civilians or lead to civilian casualties.³³

CIA cannot operate directly or indirectly in Pakistani territory, as there is no legal agreement between Pakistan and United States. According to the Pakistani constitution, the only legitimate actor to use force in Pakistan's territory is Pakistan's military or paramilitary forces (Article 243-245, Chapter 2). This provides CIA with no right to attack Pakistani territory.

Table 4: Comparison of Pakistan and Afghanistan

Components	Pakistan	FATA	Afghanistan
Government	Legitimate	Legitimate	Legitimate/ Illegitimate
Constitution	Legitimate	Legitimate	Legitimate/ Illegitimate
Writ of the state	100%	80-90%	Restricted to specific zones only
Forces	Pakistan military and paramilitary forces (legal actors as per constitution)	CIA operatives and contractors	ANA, ISAF, foreign troops (UNSC, Afghan-NATO partnership)
Sovereignty	100%	Challenged by United States	Challenged by United States
Threat	Legal writ being challenged by terrorists	Terrorism/ CIA	Convolute (US waring factions, drones, Talibans)

The components in the table illustrate the fact that Pakistan and Afghanistan are governed by entirely different state affairs. The government in Pakistan is unquestionably legitimate, however there are many questions raised upon legitimacy of Afghan government.

Pakistan have its own military and paramilitary forces to conduct operations, while Afghanistan is dependent on foreign military forces. This questions the writ of the state (Afghanistan) which is restricted only to a few regions of the country.

These facts clarify that situation in Pakistan is dissimilar from Afghanistan. United States may possess the right to intervene in Afghanistan due to its critical state of affairs; however, US does not possess privilege to attack within the defined territorial boundaries of Pakistan, as it contains its own legitimate government, constitution and military forces to defend its borders.

Drone Strikes: Success or Failure?

Pakistan is a front line ally of United States in GWOT and is recognized internationally to fight against terrorism. Pakistan has faced the serious challenge of terrorism. According to an estimate, Pakistan has suffered a loss of more than 90 billion dollars in the recent 10 years. Pakistan has faced 51000 casualties during this ongoing war against terrorism. 1500 IED and terrorist attacks have badly hampered the peace and stability in the state. The loss faced by Pakistan because of these attacks has been unbearable, both at the societal and psychological level. This has raised serious questions that whether or not drone strikes are an effective tool in countering terrorism?

The drone strikes have given rise to serious security concerns for Pakistan. The statistics show that US drones strikes strategy in Pakistan has been a clear failure to counter terrorism. The US policy not only fails to curb

terrorists activities in the region but it has increased the terrorists, who in return, have organized themselves to attack more civilians, causing severe casualties and economic loss as well.

Second question raised in the study was whether strategy of using drones has countered terrorism or has it led to widespread alienation of the people of Pakistan from the GWOT? The effect of drone strikes in Pakistan is not only confined to the alleged terrorist groups, but the drone strikes have caused a social and psychological destruction in the society. The psychological impact is not limited to the civilians or the immediate family of the alleged targets but it has led to a large scale psychological impact on the surrounding population of the region as well. This has affected the society on various levels which involve psychological, societal, political and military levels.

Regarding drone strikes the New America Foundation pointed out, “when the US drones attack Pakistan’s tribal areas, it is not just the 10 or 50 innocent civilians they kill, but it creates anti-US sentiments among masses...”³⁴ Illegality of drones in FATA has helped to replace United States as a key threat to Pakistan in comparison to the real challenge of terrorists or other regional adversaries.

Conclusion

Pakistan has important geo-political significance in the region and a key player in American efforts in Afghanistan. But the United States drone strikes are a

clear violation of Pakistani sovereignty that has a critical effect on the relations between Pakistan and United States. The use of drones by the United States and escalation of the use of drones by the Obama Administration has provoked negative sentiments against United States around the world. The use of drones is illegal and immoral according to the International Humanitarian Law.

Hillary Clinton had repeatedly stated that “the US needs Pakistan’s help for stability in Afghanistan in the post-2014 scenario”. If the drone strikes continue the Pakistani government will be compelled to leave the US war against terrorism. It is worth noting that there is a link between the stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Drone strikes on the tribal areas of Pakistan will cause drastic consequences on the US counter terrorism strategy, not only in Pakistan, but also in Afghanistan where US led NATO forces are still present. This will undermine efforts of stability both in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Recommendations

US cannot continue to ignore evidence of the civilian casualties and counter-productivity of drone strikes. US policy-makers are recommended to rethink current targeted killing practices and the drone policy.

The US Department of Justice should release or make a memorandum outlining the legal basis for US targeted killing by drones on any of the country, so that the right of the innocent civilians can be protected. United States should fulfill its international obligations with respect

to accountability and transparency, and ensure proper democratic debate about its future policies related to drones.

In the light of significant evidence of harmful impacts to civilians of Afghan and FATA region, US current policy to address terrorism through targeted killings and drone strikes must be carefully re-evaluated. A wide-ranging discourse is requisite, to determine and rectify the shortcomings in the international regime to stop such illegal actions by the state parties.

United Nations must take an action regarding the drone strikes being carried out in Pakistan. Rules on International Armed Conflict need to be spelled out clearly to stop use of illicit measures by the state parties, as they are illegal and inhumane.

Key Findings

- The use of drones by the United States and escalation in the use of drones by the Obama Administration has raised serious reservations against United States policy of using drones, as a central component of counter terrorism strategy in the region.
- International law states that the extrajudicial killings are prohibited and no country can support or even acquiesce in the extrajudicial killing of individuals inside or outside its territory. United States does not have any right to carry out operations or drone strikes inside Pakistani territory.
- US right to operate militarily in Afghanistan is

based on United Nations Resolution; however this resolution is only applicable to Afghanistan. No expanded mandate can be drawn from UN resolutions and made applicable to Pakistan.

- An Armed Conflict that exists in Pakistan is a ‘spillover’ effect of the Non-International Armed Conflict in Afghanistan.
- United States should fulfill its international commitment as per human rights commitments with respect to the use of force.

Endnotes

- 1 Mudassir Raja, “Pakistani victims: War on terror”, *The Express Tribune*, 23 March 2013, <http://tribune.com.pk/story/527016/pakistani-victims-war-on-terror-toll-put-at-49000/>. Accessed on 11 July 2013.
- 2 Ibid
- 3 Dictionary Of Military And Associated Terms, “Dep’t Of Defense, 331 Joint Publication”, (2010).
- 4 Justin D. Wallestad, Dr. Theodore Karasik, “Drones, a New Chapter In Modern Warfare– Analysis,” *Eurasia Review* (17 October 2011): accessed 08 July 2013.
- 5 Adam Entous, “Special Report: How the White House learned to Love the Drone,” *Reuters Special Report* (18 May 2010): accessed on July 08, 2013.
- 6 Jervis Robert, “Understanding the Bush Doctrine,” *Political Science Quarterly* (Fall, 2003): accessed on July 15, 2013.
- 7 *UN News Centre*, “UN rights expert voices concern over use of unmanned drones by United States,” accessed on 25 June 2013.
- 8 Oliver O’Donovan, *The Just War Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
- 9 Tatiana Waisberg, *War On Terror and the New International Order: Shaping International Law use of Force, Discourse at the 21 Century*, (U.S.A: Create Space, 2012).
- 10 *CNN*, “US airstrikes called very effective”, 18 May 2009, accessed 12 April 2013.
- 11 *Covert War on Terror—The Data*, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/covert-war-on-terror-the-data/5309831> :accessed on 20 June 2013.

- 12 Ali Yasmeen, "The drone call! Personality and Signature Strike Logistic,"(2013), <http://www.opednews.com/articles/The-drone-call-Personalit-by-Yasmeen-Ali-130718-744.html>, accessed on 15 July 2013.
- 13 Prof Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Drones under International law," World Law Institute (2010).
- 14 Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism," The University of Pittsburgh Law Review (2002).
- 15 United Nations Charter, Article, 51. *The Security Council referred to Article 51 and to a U.S. right of self-defense following the 9/11 attacks in Resolution 1368 (2001), but the Council did not authorize the use of force in that resolution. The resolution was useful in making a finding that the 9/11 attacks could give rise to a right of self-defense, but the actual exercise of force was under Article 51.*
- 16 Mary Ellen O'Connell, *Preserving the Peace: The Continuing Ban on War Between States*, Oxford Journals (2007).
- 17 Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Drones under International law," World Law Institute (2010). *"The principle of proportionality requires that the cost in civilian lives lost and civilian property destroyed may not be disproportionate to the value of the military objective."*
- 18 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?," March 2008, accessed on 29 June 2013.
- 19 J-M Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, "Customary International Humanitarian Law," (ICRC and Cambridge University Press, 2009).
- 20 Anthony Cullen, *The Concept of Non-international Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 21 J. Pejic, "The protective scope of Common Article 3: more than meets the eye," *International Review of the Red Cross* (2011): accessed on 3 July 2013.
- 22 Yoram Dinstein, *War, Agression and Self-defense*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 23 Ibid
- 24 L. R. Blank and B. R. Farley, "Characterizing US operations in Pakistan: Is the United States engaged in an armed conflict?," *Fordham Int'l*, (2010-2011).
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Ibid.
- 27 Nicolas J.S. Davies, "Bomber in Chief", AlterNet, January 2013, <http://www.alternet.org/world/bomber-chief-20000-airstrikes-presidents-first-term-cause-death-and-destruction-iraq-somalia>
- 28 Shashank Bengali and David S. Cloud, "U.S. drone strikes up sharply in Afghanistan," Los Angeles times, February, 2013, <http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/21/world/la-fg-afghanistan-drones-20130222> accessed on

- 16 April 2013.
- 29 Ibid
- 30 Fact Sheet by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University.
- 31 The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, "CIA DRONE STRIKES IN PAKISTAN", 2013, <http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/obama-2013-pakistan-drone-strikes/> Accessed on 29 June 2013.
- 32 Stanford International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (IHRCRC), "Living Under Drones, Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan" Sep 2012.
- 33 Mary Ellen O'Connell, "Flying Blind: U.S. Combat Drones Operate Outside International Law", *America Magazine: The National Catholic Weekly Online* (2010).p.3.
- 34 Shaukat Sajjad, "Pakistan: Reopening the NATO Supply Route and Drone Attacks", July 2012, accessed on 4 July 2013.

Improvised Explosive Devices: The Impending Threats*

Ameer Abdullah Khan & Ghulam Muhammad Qaisrani¹

Abstract

Easy to manufacture, transport and explode, improvised explosive devices have become a weapon of choice for the terrorists. The long, unmanned Pak-Afghan border, increasing instability and sharp learning curve of the terrorists combined with wide availability of raw material required for making IEDs have made them a clear and present danger. IEDs attacks have been lunched on both military and civil installations. IEDs are the most effective tool in the hands of the terrorists. The psychological offensive launched by terrorists through this tool has been the most extreme. Makeshift nature of IEDs makes their detection and jamming more difficult. This has made Pakistan the second largest victim of IEDs in the world, following Afghanistan. This paper aims to analyze the use of IEDs against Pakistan in the ongoing war against terrorism. It will also identify socio-economic impact of this weapon in the context of terrorists' strategy as well as counter terrorism initiative. A brief review of Pakistan's counter IED efforts is also carried out during the course of this paper to help draw policy recommendations.

* The views expressed by authors are of their own and do not represent the official views of the respective Institutions.

1 Ameer Abdullah Khan is Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His area of interest include Asia Pacific, South Asia, Economics of War and non-traditional security threats to Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad Qaisrani is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His area of interest include Chemical Weapons Convention and its impact on various regions.

Introduction

The use of non-proscribed measures to create weapons of choice has existed since the invention of explosives. Throughout the history, terrorism campaigns have relied on destructive powers of IEDs to achieve their objectives. Interestingly, the ongoing war against terrorism began with two IEDs flown into the World Trade Center.¹ Improvised Explosive Devices or IEDs have become a weapon of choice for terrorists in the post 9/11 world. IEDs are home-made explosive devices usually used in guerilla warfare against regular militaries.² IEDs vary in types and shapes, ranging from small pipe bombs to numerous weaponry bombs related together to create a mechanism with large explosive power. They can be set alongside a road, magnetically driven, can be placed in a vehicle and easily transported into markets or buildings. Terrorists use commercially accessible materials, such as composites, derived from hydrogen peroxides, agricultural fertilizers, or acetones etc to make IEDs.³

Pakistan shares a long porous border with Afghanistan, the burning war theater in ongoing war against terrorism, where material convertible to explosives, expertise and tactics are available in abundance. Pakistan has so far lost more than 51,000 lives in the decade long war, where IEDs have been the major component of these attacks. Owing to easy availability of raw material, simple manufacturing techniques and weaknesses in counter IEDs strategy, IEDs explosions have posed a major challenge to Pakistan's security.⁴ Furthermore, absence of effective state control challenges Afghanistan's stability and its ability to implement a regulatory policy.

Strong networks of terrorists and militants exploit this weakness and cause proliferation of IEDs. This had led to inflow of tactics and expertise to Pakistan where large populated cities provide easy hideouts to terrorists to transport, hide and explode IEDs at the time and places of their choice.

Another challenge for Pakistan is to ensure easy availability of urea and Nitrogen based fertilizers in far flung areas of the country to back its agriculture based economy. However, these fertilizers can illicitly be used in manufacturing IEDs. All above mentioned aspects will be taken into consideration during the course of this paper to understand the dynamics of IEDs problem in Pakistan. The paper will argue that paralyzing adversary's capability to use IEDs will be a major prerequisite to winning the war against terrorism and securing the nation from deadly terrorist attacks. The paper will also try to find out the answers to the questions, including as to why terrorists choose IEDs as their primary weapon. How proliferation of IEDs takes place and what are the weaknesses in Pakistan's policy for countering IEDs? What steps are required at state and institutional level to counter IEDs threat? What role should counter IEDs policy have in Pakistan?

“We and our allies face an agile, adaptive and resilient enemy whose ease of access to IED materials and unfettered ability to collaborate makes this weapon an enduring challenge for our military forces and our security partners.”

*Lt Gen Michael Barbero
Op-ed in Washington Post, 17 May 13*

Understanding IEDs

According to the definition laid down by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), “an IED is a piece of equipment fabricated in a non-military manner, incorporating destructive, incendiary chemicals or pyrotechnic lethal compounds and planned to destroy, distract, harass or injure. Its power incorporates armed stores, but normally devised from non-military mechanism.”⁵ Small Arms Survey defines IED as an explosive mechanism, using non-commercial process; generally through makeshift device or chemicals that have been customized to allow it, to start in a non-standard way and for a reason not envisioned by the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM).⁶

A typical IED consists of an initiator, safety and arming switch, container, main charge and a firing switch.⁷ Design and shape of an IED varies with respect to the varying target and aims. At one time, it is designed to spread and cause destruction of huge infrastructures and on the other side for attacks on both the vehicles and the personnel. The impact and usefulness of the IEDs is determined in the way they are designed as well as their destructive capabilities and the ease with which such explosive devices can be transported to their target.

Global Use of IEDs

The world has seen a rise in use of IEDs over the past a few years. Tamil Tigers in war against Sri Lanka used IEDs effectively to spread terror in the country. However, internationally, the re-introduction of IEDs for use in

terrorist and insurgent activities started from Iraq. The world has been hit by more than 17,000 IED explosions in 123 countries from 2011 to 2013.⁸ The countries going through major wars, like Iraq and Afghanistan, have witnessed the use of IEDs at a large scale. In Iraq, the resistant groups used these bombs smartly to make it almost impossible for the US forces to protect them. Vehicle Borne IEDs (VBIEDs) were an improved form of IEDs, used for causing wide spread destruction. These methods, tactics, and the strategy flowed from there to other adjacent conflict zones. Owing to their nature, terrorists, insurgents and criminals are now using IEDs everywhere. This is the reason that in March 2013 alone, more than 700 IED events occurred worldwide.⁹

The first decade of the war against terrorism has taken the lives of 6,300 American troops with a major part thereof killed in Iraq. From Iraq, copy-cat phenomenon transferred IED manufacturing methods and exploding techniques to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Here, terrorists modified these techniques according to the needs of the domestic environment. However, such weapons have comparatively been less effective in Afghanistan, to say the least, as they have caused only 39 percent of the killings.

In Afghanistan, the situation is a little different because of its terrain. This is because; generally, IEDs are used to target troops on patrol there. In Afghanistan, the enemy is usually seen to use land mines against the troops and the larger ones against vehicles travelling the numerous dirt roads. Statistics show that IEDs are

a challenge for not only the countries involved directly in war against terrorism, but also for the whole world. Globally, terrorists are relying on IEDs in many other parts of the world to meet their objectives. Other than three adjacent countries of South Asia mentioned above, IEDs victim states include countries like Somalia, Nigeria, Yemen and Syria.

Proliferation of IEDs

IEDs proliferation is usually attributed to these reasons:-

- Easy access to available material in open markets
- On the shelf technologies
- Requirement of little or no training for their use
- Invisible nature
- Easy transportation of the material
- Porous Pak-Afghan border
- Ineffective border management
- Strong networks of terrorist groups

Invisibility of threats and nature of attacks, using IEDs explosions, have tested the nerves of the nation, by deteriorating security environment of the country and consequently bringing down the economy. In around past four years, 79% of global IED incidents occurred in the region. Approximately, 21% of these attacks took place in Pakistan.¹⁰ Terrorist have used this weapon to target markets, schools, hospitals, mosques and military. In 2011, the leading three countries affected most by terrorists related incidents, mostly using improvised explosives, include Afghanistan at the top

(with 6,778 incidents and 3313 fatalities) followed by Pakistan (with 1,680 incidents and 1876 fatalities) and India (230 Incidents and 623 fatalities) respectively.¹¹ The following paragraphs will explain that what are IEDs and how do they become a weapon of choice for terrorists.

As explained earlier, IEDs are made by using commercial or non-commercial material in a way that the original manufacture has not intended to. Thus, their use becomes obvious in conflict zones, where a regular military has to face irregular militias or insurgent groups. In such areas, insurgents usually do not have a central command and act in small groups, utilizing all available resources to harm the adversary. Easy access to knowledge due to spread of technology, reveals different methods to these groups to manufacture makeshift bombs. In addition, in conflict zones, weapons are available in abundance without a strict check and regulation, Afghanistan representing the best example of it. This proliferation is aided by the capability of the insurgents and terrorists to hide in the society, particularly in the areas with mass urbanization.

It has been observed that terrorists are quick to adapt to new methods and techniques in making IEDs and exploding them. Adjacent conflict zones make possible transfer of lessons learnt by one group to another more quickly and easily. Mass dependence of modern every day life on chemical based compounds further streamlines the conditions for terrorists to acquire raw material used for manufacturing IEDs. Apart

from these direct reasons, illicit drugs trade and arms trafficking fuel proliferations of IEDs. Above all, weak counter IED policies and infrastructure, governance issues, lack of coordination among different agencies and institutions and technological lag contribute to proliferation of IEDs. When all these factors act jointly in a conflict hit area, the proliferation of IEDs becomes easier.

In the states with agriculture based economy and small chemical industries, terrorists have more chances of acquiring raw material easily. Nitrogen based fertilizers, like Calcium Ammonium Nitrate, Potassium Chlorate, Urea and RDX compounds, are not only available easily but also are cheap in price. In addition, the smuggling of these chemicals from one place to another is less difficult than regular arms trafficking. Other than this, terrorists use nails, ball bearing and Sulfur based poisonous and inflammable compounds to make these bombs more destructive. Unfortunately, these materials are not too hard to be obtained by the terrorists in any part of the world. Lastly, weak policy and infrastructure, governance issues and technological lags also contribute to ease the proliferation of IEDs.

Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN) and IEDs

CAN fertilizers produced in Pakistan are alleged by the West to be a big contributory factor towards increased use of IEDs in the region. Pakistan is an agriculture-based economy with 45% of Pakistan's population dependent upon this sector¹². Pakistani soil in Southern Punjab and Sindh is deficient of Nitrogen and requires Nitrogen based fertilizers for optimum crops

production. Moreover, composition of CAN fertilizer is such that it compensates for scarcity of water, which is a big issue in the said provinces. Pakistan is considered water scarce country with little over 1,000 cubic meters of water available per capita.

As a result, the farmers have to rely on CAN as their total earning comes from what they grow. 5% of the fertilizers used in agricultural sector of Pakistan are based on CAN. Production and consumption of CAN in Pakistan have come under spotlight at national and international levels. The issue was raised up to the extent that a perception was created that controlling CAN was the only way to neutralize the threat of IEDs. Unfortunately, the Western attitude was so stiff that any argument by Pakistan against this assumption was considered as Pakistan's reluctance to act against IEDs. Pakistan claims that CAN is only one of the originators of IEDs. The accusations of CAN being used by terrorists for manufacturing of IEDs may stand true in some cases, but the fact exists that Pakistan is not the only country in the region, manufacturing and using CANs. Pakistan accounts for only around 0.1% of the world's total production of CAN.¹³ Several other chemicals are easily available for manufacturing IEDs. Many other countries in the region also produce CAN, which has a higher degree of nitrogen content than that of CAN produced in Pakistan. For example, Ammonium Nitrate, produced in certain regional countries has 34-35% of nitrogen content, as compared to 26% contained in the Pakistani product.¹⁴

Table 1: Production of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate (CAN)

Country	Production in 2010 (000 Metric Tons)		Average Nitrogen Content	
	CAN ¹⁵	AN ¹⁶	CAN	AN
Turkmenistan	-	1900	-	34.5%
Uzbekistan	-	612	-	34.5%
Russia	-	30385	-	27%
Turkey	1585	2346	33%	26%
Iran	-	704	-	35%
Pakistan	1384	-	26%	-
China	850	1646	27%	33.5%
India	245	1250	25%	35%

Source: International Fertilizer Industry Association Report on AN / CAN Production and Deliveries in Major Producing Countries- 2010

The interrelation of CAN with IEDs creates a matter of food security for Pakistan. Pakistan stands fifth in the list of eight top CAN manufacturers neighboring Afghanistan. The Government of Pakistan, fulfilling its responsibility, has taken solid measures to regulate the flow of CAN fertilizer inside the country and to stop its smuggling across the border. Another point to ponder is that CAN is not the only substance that is used in making IED. A number of other fertilizers and commercially available chemicals can be used to form highly explosive materials. There are sufficient evidences that since Pakistan took effective control measures against smuggling of CAN, use of Potassium Chlorate has increased; which is not manufactured in Pakistan. Hence, the only solution to control and regulate the materials, which can easily be converted to explosives, lies in more cooperated regional efforts.

Strategic Context of IEDs in Pakistan

Successful use of IEDs in Iraq gave birth to copy-cat phenomenon. Terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan learnt from experiences of similar groups in Iraq. As at both of these places, the target was foreign troops, their tactics kept on improving. The spillover effect of war from the Western side of Durand Line into Pakistani territory brought IEDs here as well. Long and porous Pak-Afghan border, ineffective border management, large-scale urbanization in Pakistan and better transportation infrastructure supported by lack of preparedness made Pakistan the second largest sufferer at the hands of IEDs. War in Afghanistan provided insurgent groups an access to the full variety of bombs as well as land mines, hand grenades, artillery shells all of which have possible function for IED assembling. These devices are supplied through a composite, worldwide system of legal and illegal means as well.

Table 2: IEDs attacks in Pakistan from 2006 - 2012

Year	IED Attacks	Deaths
2006	646	222
2007	1,046	376
2008	1,308	814
2009	373	1,104
2010	510	76
2011	29	100
2012 uptill mid March	4824	15
Total		2707

Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal

In Pakistan, there are two types of groups using IEDs to cause destruction. In FATA and KPK, TTP has launched a war against the state of Pakistan while the others are insurgent groups of Balochistan. TTP has a higher level of mastery over the use of IEDs, so it has managed to carry out some horrible attacks in main cities. The Improvised Explosive Devices caused 13,918 casualties and 47% of the sum of wounded persons, who suffered during 2006 - 2009 in Pakistan.¹⁷ In tribal areas and KPK, about 1,244 were wounded, 221 killed and 1,023 seriously injured.¹⁸ Only in the province of Balochistan, more than 700 IED attacks took place in past a few years.¹⁹ In neighboring Afghanistan, IEDs are responsible for 60% of the total casualties of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In 2012, 1,900 American soldiers became victims of IEDs.²⁰

Socio-economic Impact of IEDs

IEDs have a dual effect on Pakistan. On the one hand, these attacks disrupt every day life by causing casualties and loss of public and private property. Deteriorated law and order situation shakes the confidence of investors to weaken the already suffering economy. A series of IED explosions for years has badly affected the economy by harming Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), infrastructure and peace of the country. National exchequer, on the average, suffered a loss of Rs 60 billion per annum.²¹ This way, IEDs not only disrupt everyday life but also affect the resolve of the nation to fight against terrorism by bringing down economy of the country.

Table 3: Social Impact of IEDs Attacks

Affected Group	Military Casualties	Civilians Casualties
Only sons	135	275
Widows	1,570	3,124
Orphans	3,123	6,897

*Source: South Asian Strategic Stability Institute Fact Sheet No 21**

IEDs are not only affecting economy but also having social and psychological impact on every Pakistani. IEDs being the main weapon of the terrorists, have hampered economic growth of the country, caused destruction of infrastructure and slowed down the development. In addition, their impact on the lives of families of the victims and on those who were injured in these attacks is drastic. From schools to mosques and hospitals to markets, every place has become a target of IEDs. Overall result is demoralization and spread of frustration among the nation. As the worst case, incapability of the law enforcing agencies to stop these attacks has led towards severe criticism on these agencies from inside the country.

Another devastating impact of continuous IEDs attacks is social divide on the question of how to eradicate terrorism. Terrorists have been successful in obtaining the objective of their deadly attacks to create an environment of fear. They have also managed to convey their political message by exploiting the spread of electronic media and their live coverage of any event.

The decade long, war on terror has created two visible factions in the society. One faction, tired of this long war, wants negotiations with Taliban and an immediate end to all military operations. They view the ongoing war as the leading cause of IEDs attacks inside Pakistan. This faction of society demands complete isolation from America's war in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the other group demands stricter and harsher measures against terrorists with the occurrence of every IED attack. This social divided has led to failure in forming a consensus based counter terrorism policy, which has resulted in increased casualties.

The US Experience of Countering IEDs

Long engagement of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq made IEDs a considerable challenge for the US. The US has worked extensively to control the proliferation of IEDs and reduce casualties. However, the US focuses the most on prevention and tactical control of this weapon. Obama's strategy to counter IEDs argues for a more comprehensive engagement among military, law enforcement agencies and diplomats. To challenge IEDs comprehensively at the international level, the United States stressed on the need of "sharing information." In the Policy, stress was laid on 'enhanced public awareness campaign' about the threat of IEDs. It stated that to counter the risk of IEDs, the networks of individuals as well as those of groups of propagators, perpetrators, suppliers and financers should be identified, isolated and targeted under the devised US strategy.

The US policy also carries a renewed focus on capacity building mechanism to counter IEDs. Different techniques, methods and forensic and biometric information were focused to be shared for better policy implementation. This policy of sharing information, in case of Pakistan and Afghanistan has greater significance, as it provides a large source of information to streamline the efforts, to eliminate IEDs threat. Information sharing not only leads towards identifying the commonalities between IEDs attacks on both sides of the Durand Line, but also provides better working knowledge of counter IED mechanisms.

The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is an entity under the US department of defense. This department was established to eradicate the threat of the IEDs. The mission of JIEDDO is very simple and based on a three-fold plan. Firstly, its mission is to attack the enemy, secondly, to defeat the device and thirdly, to train the force. Since 2003, JIEDDO has spent reportedly \$ 37.8 million in their efforts to counter IEDs. A major part of this money was spent on the purchase of equipment of vital importance to counter the IEDs like electronic jammers.²² Subsequently in 2005, \$ 129.7 million were allocated from Iraqi Freedom Fund by the US Congress for capacity building to counter IEDs. For this purpose, modern equipment like mobile multiband warlock jammers, concealed on the vehicles to detect the threats were purchased. This program also included investment on training of the work force and research and development for countering IEDs.²³ Tasks assigned by JIEDDO can be accomplished, if technology is focused.

Pakistan's Effort to Counter IEDs

Countering IEDs is one of the top priorities of Pakistan. Pakistan has taken concrete measures to counter IED threat nonetheless, the challenge remains. As IEDs threat inside Pakistan is due to the smuggling across the Pak-Afghan porous border, Pakistan has been taking action against these networks and all the supply chains that are involved in smuggling of these devices and explosive material. Pakistan is working with JIEDDO to launch public awareness campaign inside Pakistan, increasing public knowledge of the threat posed by IEDs and the knowledge about the terrorists who deploy these IEDs. Successful implementation of public awareness campaigns will minimize the working space for terrorists in the society. Pakistan has followed a multi-pronged strategy to counter IEDs. It includes effective response mechanism, policy framework for regulation and institution building, backed by legislation and public awareness campaigns. Pakistan's government and military have launched synchronized efforts in this regard, as the challenge requires a 'Whole of the Nation Approach'. These efforts aim to target the networks that design, transport and explode the devices, and the socio-political aspects that facilitate IED employment. Pakistan's C-IED policy carries multiple lines of operation, which aims at targeting the ideology, support base, leadership of terrorists, their communication networks, intelligence and financial base of the terrorists. The proposal for establishment of C-IED Forum²⁴ and drafting of C-IED Act 2012²⁵ are important steps taken by Government of Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan military is acting

in an equally vibrant way to address this issue. Measures taken by Pakistan military include devising C-IED strategy for military and intelligence organizations. In addition, military has worked on institutional and capacity building mechanisms to counter IEDs challenge. In this regard, set-ups at the services level have been formed including establishment of C-IEDO and JC-IEDO and establishment of C-IED Centre of Excellence (CoE) at Risalpur. Focused training program running under Pakistan military to respond to IEDs threat include training cooperation within Services, Second Line Forces and LEAs at Centre of Excellence and training of Canine through Army Dog Centre.²⁶ In addition, to train officers to understand the nature of IEDs and all the dynamics of the challenge, special arrangements have been made to arrange in house discussions on the threat. All these measures are likely to have a significant effect in countering IED danger.

Apart from these efforts, Pakistan has deployed 28,087 troops of Frontier Corps for border control along Durand Line. Additionally 645 border posts, 1352 check posts have been established along the border.²⁷ Similarly, stringent measures have been taken to make inter-provincial flow of goods checked through civil-military cooperation along with spot-checking through border task force and improved inter-agency coordination.

Pakistan is also working with its partners since 2009 to counter IEDs. US Department of Defence provided approximately \$113 millions in Pakistan Counter-insurgency Capability Fund and (PCCF) Pakistan

Counter-insurgency Funds (PCF) to support Pakistan's C-IED efforts,²⁸ including forensic and detection kits, jammers and mine resistant vehicles.²⁹ Pakistan emphasizes on the US-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group (DCG), that the priority should be given to assist it for acquiring C-IED protection equipment.

Project Global Shield (PGS) is an international effort to provide awareness about the harmful effects of trade of chemicals. Pakistan and Central Asian states identify and seize the precursor chemicals that are smuggled across the borders and used in the manufacturing of IEDs. The collaborative efforts of the member states of PGS have resulted in 49 seizures of IED precursors, including more than 140 metric tons of seized Calcium Ammonium Nitrate. Pakistan's effort to counter IEDs is going in a constructive way and the Government has taken the important steps over the last a few years through UN Security Council, in the designation of IED facilitators. The strategies have not been implemented fully due to lack of ability, training and equipment, but still there is a considerable development on this issue.

Recommendations

The following recommendations would be helpful for decision makers and prove beneficial for the government in countering IEDs:-

- There is a need to enhance awareness about IEDs' challenge, through information sharing with public and private sectors and preparatory measures. Pakistan possesses several social

institutions, including Mosques and *Panchayats*³⁰ etc, which can be used effectively to spread public awareness in this regard and train common citizens.

- Destruction of support bases of terrorists in the society should be an important part in counter terrorism strategy. It includes efforts at social level along-with political decision making to deprive terrorists of the legitimacy, which they enjoy in a small faction of the society. To defeat the terrorism, it is necessary, to root out the causes behind terrorism.
- Pakistan needs to increase global participation and negotiation with other states to counter IED threat. It involves not only information sharing but also integrated efforts to regulate the flow of materials. In addition, Pakistan needs renewed help from major powers in capacity building with respect to countering IEDs' challenge.
- States need to adopt law enforcement, investigative and forensic expertise to fulfill the need of law enforcers. This will be helpful to regulate the flow of the material, detect and check illegal transport of the materials, which can potentially be used in IEDs manufacturing.
- The government should develop and implement Federal counter-IED operational plan for domestic safeguard as well as transnational threat. These include effective response mechanism,

policy framework for regulation and institution building, backed by legislation and public awareness campaigns.

- Chemical and fertilizer industries should need to detect, report and prevent the illegal acquisition and theft of explosives and material related to it. Pakistan has one of the world's largest database of its citizens through National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). If government computerizes all the land record, it will help in implementing an effective regulatory policy for fertilizers, as quota can be allotted to farmers according to their cultivatable land area.
- States should make domestic and international efforts to interrupt, investigate, dismantle and arrest members of terrorist networks, involved in the financing and proliferating IEDs. It involves targeting networks of drugs traffickers and illicit arm traders. It will paralyze terrorists' ability to acquire material and money used for making IEDs.

Conclusion

Since the dawn of independence, Pakistan has come across many challenges. However, the challenge to eradicate terrorism is the severest in nature. IEDs, being the strategic weapon of terrorists, obviously become the primary target, if the war against terrorism is to be won. Pakistan has done a lot and given more sacrifices than any other nation in the world. Pakistan has a rich

experience of dealing with and getting successes against the enemy, who employs highly innovative means of destruction. In the pursuit of global peace, Pakistan has to respond to this enemy equally innovatively, while always staying a step ahead.³¹ However, the dynamic nature of the threat demands more vibrant and innovative efforts to get decisive victory. The gravest threat being faced by a Pakistani soldier in a battlefield and a common citizen in the streets is from the deadly attacks of the IEDs. The use of IEDs will not automatically disappear with the end of the war in Afghanistan. Countering the threat of the IEDs is a multi-layered problem. A complete and long-term remedy of this problem lies in dismantling terrorists' networks. Demolishing terrorists' support base in society and destroying their nurseries demand not only good tactics but also a long process of social overhaul. Allegations on Pakistan regarding the issue of CAN, being used in making explosives, has less significance in the view of facts mentioned above.

Key Findings

- 'Improvised Explosive Devices' have become terrorists' strategic weapon, owing to their simple manufacturing techniques, wide availability of raw material and expertise.
- The menace of IEDs was transferred from militants of Iraq to Afghanistan and then to Pakistan, through 'copy-cat phenomenon', backed by sharp learning curve of terrorists.
- Allegations on Pakistan for not taking solid

actions against IEDs are baseless and the solution to the phenomenon of IEDs demands a more rational approach from the West and the rest.

- Pakistan has taken concrete measures to regulate the flow of Calcium Ammonium Nitrate across the country, which has forced terrorists to rely on Potassium Chlorate for making IEDs. The latter, not being a Pakistani product, shifts responsibility on other regional countries.
- The issue of IEDs needs to be taken as a global issue and to be dealt with accordingly.

Endnotes

- 1 Robert K. Ackerman, "Improvised Explosive Devices A Multifaceted Threat", <<http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1638>> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 2 Improvised Explosive Devices, Free Dictionary Online ,<<http://www.thefreedictionary.com/improvised+explosive+device>> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 3 International Ammunition Technical Guidelines: Securing ammunition stockpiles to prevent IED manufacture, United Nations Office at Geneva <<http://goo.gl/c4SqEY> > Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 4 DGMO Pakistan Army, Pakistan Today, May 20, 2013, <<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2013/05/20/news/national/more-than-51000-killed-in-ied-blasts-dgmo/>>
- 5 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions: Listing Terms of Military Significance and Their Definitions for Use in NATO, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 2007. AAP-6(2007)
- 6 "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): An Introduction", Small Arms Survey <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/index.php?id=68&q%3D=IED's%20definition>> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 7 Adrian Wilkinson, James Bevan, and Ian Biddle, "Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs):" An Introduction, Small Arms Survey, <<http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-05-Conventional-Ammo/SAS-Conventional-Ammunition-in-Surplus->

- Book-16-Chapter-14.pdf> p 5, Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 8 Michael D. Barbero, “Improvised Explosive Devices are Here to Stay” in Washington Post on May 17, 2013 <http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-17/opinions/39335897_1_ieds-afghanistan-improvised-explosive-devices> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 9 JIEDDO Report “IEDs Attacks” <<https://www.jieddo.mil/index.aspx>> Last retrieved August 26, 2013
 - 10 Factsheet No. 22 by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
 - 11 International Symposium on Counter IED, by ISPR Pakistan May 20,2013
 - 12 Economic Survey of Pakistan 2012-13
 - 13 Saad Hasan, “Fertilizer or bomb?” The Tribune, Published: December 16, 2011 <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/307331/fertiliser-or-bomb-fatima-group-says-its-product-within-accepted-standards/>> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 14 Factsheet by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute, Source International Symposium on Counter IED, by ISPR Pakistan May 20,2013
 - 15 Calcium Ammonium Nitrate
 - 16 Ammonium Nitrate
 - 17 International Symposium on Counter IED, by ISPR Pakistan May 20,2013
 - 18 “Under US pressure, Pakistan prepares plan to counter IEDs”, <<http://tribune.com.pk/story/361403/national-strategy-under-us-pressure-pakistan-prepares-plan-to-counter-ieds/>> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 19 “Improvised Explosive Devices: In Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan” 2002-2009, April 2010.
 - 20 A.J. Bosker, “Cooperative engagement with Pakistan needed to counter IED networks in Afghanistan” JIEDDO News Service <https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20121213_news_Barbero_testimony.pdf>
 - 21 PIDE Pakistan <www.pide.org.pk/pdr/index.php/pdr/article/view/1558/1531> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 22 Jen di mascio, “Pentagon Transfers \$ 160 million to Buy Protection Equipment”, on Inside The Army, January 17, 2005.< www.globalsecurity.org>Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 23 Michael Moss, “Many Missteps Tied to Delay of Armor to Protect Soldiers”, the New York times, March 7th, 2005.<www.globalsecurity.org> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
 - 24 Sikander Shaheen, “Kayani proposes regional counter-IED forum” in The News on May 21, 2013 (August 26, 2013)

- 25 Bassam Javed, "IEDs: A threat to global security" in the Frontier Post <<http://www.thefrontierpost.com/article/170164/>> (August 26, 2013)
- 26 Facts sheet by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
- 27 ISPR International Symposium on Counter-IEDs, May 20, 2013 Rawalpindi
- 28 Factsheet No. 52 by South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
- 29 I Michael Moss, "Many Missteps Tied to Delay of Armor to Protect Soldiers", The New York Times, March 7th, 2005. <www.globalsecurity.org> Last retrieved: August 26, 1013
- 30 Small village councils in Pakistan, usually informal but very influential in decision-making and implementation
- 31 Sikander Shaheen, "Kayani proposes regional counter-IED forum" in The News on May 21, 2013

Afterword

In battle, one engages with the orthodox and gains victory through the unorthodox. Thus, one who excels at sending forth the unorthodox is as inexhaustible as heaven, as unlimited as the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers. What reach an end and again are the sun and the moon. What die and are reborn are the four seasons. ... in warfare the strategic configurations of power do not exceed the unorthodox and orthodox, but the changes of the unorthodox and orthodox can never be exhausted. The unorthodox and the orthodox mutually produce each other, just like the endless cycle. Who can exhaust them?

Sun Tzu, 'The Art of War'

The war in Afghanistan has been one of the most orthodox fought with the most unorthodox methods. The war was launched in Afghanistan with a US pledge that the Afghan territory would never become a 'safe heaven' for terrorists. It must not be used as a 'launch pad' for terrorism against the United States and its allies. The aim was to stop the spread of 'global jihad' from Afghanistan to other parts of the world. However, the lack of clarity in the strategic objectives, outlined at the start of the war and at the end of the war, has made the war almost unwinnable; no matter how the peace process in Afghanistan proceeds. There is not enough collective progress on either of the fronts, that is security or the economic front. The terms of transition are still undefined and unachievable. The conditions of success are still as elusive even on May 1, 2012, on the eve of President Obama's announcement of the

strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan and US/NATO's withdrawal plan.

Five goals were seen as bench marks for success, negotiated peace, building an enduring partnership with Afghanistan, timeline from draw down, training of Afghan National Security Force for counter terrorism and building regional support for peace. None of these goals have been achieved in totality a year before the planned withdrawal rather what has become a reality is an increase in green on blue attacks, IED attacks and increasingly sophisticated military attacks carried out by the terrorists both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Nearly 28 provinces of Afghanistan are under the Taliban influence, approximately 50,000 dissertations from the Afghan army annually, for the goals set for the force strength have but only partially been achieved. The objective to have an Afghan Force, led by Afghan commanders, seems militarily untenable.

This is amidst allegations of large scale corruption within Afghan government, increasing war fatigue amongst ISAF members, vague donor priorities and commitments. The regenerative capacity of the Taliban led insurgency, and the unsupportive role of Karzai led Afghan government cast serious doubts about the success for an early conclusion. The absence of 'Forces on Ground Agreement' means that US military forces have no legal cover for their presence and the pursuance of strategic objectives beyond 2014. Karzai government is playing a dangerous game, as the wild card itself is the legitimacy failure of the Karzai government. Similarly,

the absence of a broad based negotiating strategy with all Taliban factions including the Haqqani network, Hekmatyar, the Uzbek and other indigenous fighters, achieving force withdrawal by 2014, as per the plan, but only complicate the exit for all parties concerned, if the conditions of minimum success are not negotiated.

The level of mistrust between Pakistan and United States is still to reach manageable level, from the dark periods, following the Raymond Davis incident, OBL killing and the Salallah incident. The permanence of the drug based Afghan economy and the shared regional goal of controlling the golden crescent of drug trafficking from Afghanistan are at odds with the NATO, ISAF, US and Afghan inclination to keep it off the table as condition of success.

What is clear is that convergence of interests between United States, the Afghan government, Pakistan, the Taliban, the warring factions and other regional actors is as short-lived as the success of the mission's objectives of counter terrorism and counter insurgency in Afghanistan. This is compounded by the possibilities of yet another US led war in Syria, which will but reflect directly on the level of violence.

The multitude of choices and possibilities of the Afghan outcome after post 2014 bring all the stakeholders to the decision point of redefining their goals and interests in a manner, where assuming success and actually achieving success against an insurgency does not remain specific to narrow goals, defined by time and the battle space, but in fact become part of a successful

counters urgency campaign and counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan.

The year 2014, in fact, will be the decision point for Afghanistan, the region and international community to determine what will be the future of Afghanistan, as to be a peaceful state, with dreams of an energy corridor and transit trade coming to life or the yet another grave of the unsung heroes of the terrorism.

The rebirth of the region will depend on the rebirth of Afghanistan after almost a century of war and conflict, local yet strategic in nature. All said and done, let peace and tranquility be the final destiny of the people of this region. No more violence and bloodshed. This is the decision point!

Summary

The book in hand 'Afghanistan 2014: The Decision Point' comes up in a crucial time, when NATO/ISAF are planning to wind up from Afghanistan, leaving behind so many questions unanswered, which the writers of this book have so painstakingly tried to highlight. Right at the beginning, Dr Maria Sultan questions Pakistan's priorities with regard to Afghan issue and uncovers not only the facts of Afghan imbroglio, but also the 'fixations' of the key players in addressing the Afghan problem. She argues for constructive dialogue with all stakeholders, to bring about reconciliation and, in result thereof, peace and stability in Afghanistan.

In their article, Amb Arif Kamal and Ms Beenish Sultan, dilate upon the dynamics of Afghan end-game, with their focus on emerging scenarios in post-2014 Afghanistan. The central argument of this paper is that Afghan situation in post-2014 scenario seems fraught with un-predictibilities and uncertainties, as we can witness a game of competing interests among regional and global players. They suggest that Pakistan should look towards employing a strategy so as to minimize the negatives and instill damage control.

In the next paper, '*Political Stability of Afghanistan; A Pre-requisite for Political Stability of Pakistan*', Colonel Abbasi, touches the most vital theme, which has to be the focus of all efforts, if any progress towards peace is really aimed at. Political stability in Afghanistan has eluded both Afghans as well as their neighbours in the most part

of recent history. The state structures of Afghanistan are two fragile and do not seem to be able to withstand the challenges of post-2014 emerging scenario. He asserts that political stability of Afghanistan is in the interest of not only Pakistan but also of entire region. However, the political stability of Afghanistan can not be dreamt of without meaningful involvement and co-operation of its neighbors. For fostering fraternal ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan, mutual irritants need to be removed.

The rapidly evolving security milieu in Afghanistan and overall in the region has created a set of challenges and opportunities for regional and extra-regional countries to re-adjust their strategic priorities, according to the changing security architecture. Tahir Nazir and Shumaila Ishaque in their work, titled, *Pakistan and Afghanistan End-game*, have analyzed the prospects of end-game in Afghanistan. In this paper, security challenges and opportunities for Pakistan in the post 2014, vis-à-vis Afghan conflict have been discussed. They argue that Pakistan is a key player and it has legitimate strategic interests in Afghanistan, which can neither be relegated nor wished away. Pakistan and Afghanistan are bound in an inalienable relationship, which needs to be strengthened rather than to be injured. Pakistan has to re-position its security, political and economic priorities in the regional and in the international context, to optimize its benefits and reduce challenges of the Afghan end game.

Brigadier Muhammad Khursheed Khan and Ms Afifa Kiran in their paper, '*Afghan National Security Force: A Catch-22*', distill the existing the security structures of the state of the Afghanistan and their viability in post-2014 Afghanistan. They are of the view that Afghan National Security Forces, despite heavy investment on their training and equipment, do not seem to be capable of withstanding the challenges of security after NATO's draw down in 2014. They advocate for extensive dialogue with all stakeholders to evolve a broad consensus, which should aim at political reconciliation in Afghanistan and more effective cooperation of neighboring counties as well as global and regional players.

Mr. Lutfur Rehman in his paper, '*Duran Line Agreement: A Hystorical Perspective*', comes up with an ardent and passionate case for persuading the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote good neighborly relations, by removing the most unwanted irritant i.e. the Durand Line controversy . He says that the centuries old treaties among nations can neither be altered nor the geographies re-drawn. What is required instead is to develop good relations, so that the borders become irrelevant and mutual interests, based on equity and common good, should overtake vested interests, driven by short term political mileages. Effective border management is in the interest of both the nations, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In their paper '*Swat and FATA Operations*', Beenesh Ansari, Muhammad Haroon and Sara Azam have stated that terrorism has resulted into a huge change

in the socio-economic and geo-political environment of Pakistan. The infighting, the wave of insurgency and extremism in Swat and FATA have added to the terrorist challenge faced by Pakistan. This paper has highlighted the impact of military operations in Swat and FATA; and the overall counter terrorism strategy and the security situation in Pakistan. The paper elucidates Pakistan's sacrifices in these operations, which unfortunately did not receive due recognition and appreciation of the world community.

Brigadier Masroor Ahmad and Ms Mahroona Hussain seem to be building up a solid argument for '*Pakistan's Role in Building Connectivity for Regional Integration: Turning Dreams into Reality*'. They substantiate their case with pointed references about Pakistan's geo-strategic location, its communication infrastructure and enormous economic potential, which can help 'turning dreams into reality', as far as economic development and prosperity of Central, West and South Asia are concerned. They argue that the region should rise above conflicts and strifes and work for the betterment of its people. Economic integration, they plead, and not the conflicts can improve upon the plight of this region, which is a habitat to people touching the figure of around two billions, perhaps, the largest one, as compared to any other region in the world.

The paper 'Combating Terrorism: The Battle Fought by Pakistan', authored by Ali Qaswar Khaleeq and Ayesha Zaryab, provides an understanding about the challenge of terrorism being faced by Pakistan. Since Pakistan

became a front-line US ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), it has witnessed increased violence, unprecedented upsurge in terrorist attacks, targeting the government personnel and the civilians, infrastructure damage, synchronized militant attacks and sectarian violence. The authors argue that terrorism remains a threat to Pakistan despite the fact that Pakistan has made serious efforts to eliminate this phenomenon. The challenge remains regarding crafting of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy that could cover the entire spectrum of threat. There is a need to devise a widespread counter-terrorism policy to maximize the success in eradicating terrorism from Pakistan.

'Decade of Drones', Strikes, authored by Sajjad Haider, Mobeen Tariq and Mateah Aqeel dwells on the drones' devastating effect on the psychology of the common people, which are being used with impunity in the ongoing war against terrorism. The authors have analyzed the use of drones by the United States and they argue that drones are counter-productive and there are serious reservations against it across the board in Pakistani society, as a central component of counter terrorism strategy. The authors are of the view that the use of drones is illegal. These have no moral grounding whatsoever, despite the fact that United States believes that they possess immense tactical advantage.

Easy to manufacture, transport and explode, improvised explosive devices have become a weapon of choice for the terrorists. Ameer Abdullah Khan and Ghulam Muhammad Qaisrani, in this paper, *'Improvised*

Explosive Devices: The Impending Threats have analyzed the dynamics of the terrorist's strategic weapon. An overview of factors involved in proliferation of IEDs, global use of IEDs and efforts by Pakistan and the US to combat this challenge are part of this paper. Authors have argued that IEDs were re-introduced by Iraqi militias fighting against the US forces. This phenomenon was transferred to adjacent conflict regions and, which, ultimately reached Pakistan. The long, unmanned Pak-Afghan border, increasing instability and sharp rising curve of the terrorists, combined with wide availability of raw material required for making IEDs, have made the IEDs the lethal weapons, which pose a grave danger to Pakistan. This paper also identifies socio-economic impact of this weapon in the context of terrorists' strategy as well as counter terrorism initiative. A brief review of Pakistan's counter IED efforts has also been carried during the course of this paper, to help draw pertinent conclusions.

Contributors

Colonel Aamir Hashmi is presently working as Director, Research and Publications, deputy director, Libraries, ISSRA, NDU. He is also the editor of the annual research journal of the NDU. He has also served in ISPR as an Editor of the magazines, *The Press Review* and *Military Bulliten* from 2005 to 2007 and he is aslo an author of two books in poetry i.e. 'Zara Si Roshni Chahea' in Urdu and 'Eclipse of the Heart' in English. He is a masters in english, and has earned a diploma in english language from Defence Language Institute at Texas, USA, as well as a basic course in Public Affairs from Defence Information School, Forte Meade, Washington. At present Mr. Hashmi is registered for a m.phil in international relations at the NDU. .

Ambassador Arif Kamal is currently a Director Global Studies at ISSRA-NDU, Islamabad. He His role there draws upon years of experience as a diplomat and allows him to return to academia and research in the nation's premier higher education institute and think tank for policy and strategic formulation. Earlier, Kamal had moved from an academic environment focused in teaching political science in the early 1970's to the diplomatic arena across the globe and a full-bloom professional career over 34 years.

Ayesha Zaryab is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is currently working on the 'Aftermath of GWOT in Pakistan'. Her major work consists of border tensions

between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Afghan Refugee's issue.

Afifa Kiran is working as a Research Associate at ISSRA, National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad. She is currently working on Defence and Strategic issues.

Ali Qaswar Khaleeq is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. He has expertise in the Contemporary International Politics. He is currently working on 'Terrorism and Counter Terrorism Strategy'. Previously, he has been working on Pakistan's foreign policy issues vis-a-vis United States.

Ameer Abdullah Khan is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His areas of interest include Asia Pacific, South Asia, Economics of War and non-traditional security threats to Pakistan.

Asra Hassan is a Research Fellow at the South Asia Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is currently working on combating terrorism and core mission objectives in Afghanistan directly effecting Pakistan's security situation. Her work also investigates the parallel trends linking not only the security matrix in the region but also the intensified existing security trends, and the challenges emanating from the South Asian security situation.

Beenesh Ansari is working as a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is an analyst on security issues and is presently working on Pakistan's role in the peace process post US-NATO forces' withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Beenish Sultan is a Research Associate at ISSRA-NDU, Islamabad. She has a rich background in the domain of International Relations with a focus on foreign policy of major powers, conflict transformation processes and international law.

Elishma Noel Khokhar is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of interest is 'Terrorism and Counter Terrorism'. She has worked, previously, on border issues between Pakistan and Afghanistan with focus on human smuggling and drug trafficking her other area of interest include International Political Economy.

Ghulam Muhammad Qaisrani is a research fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His work investigates dimensions of Chemical Weapons Convention and its impact on various regions. Currently he is working on the lethality of Improvised Explosive Devices and their usage in disrupting the peace of the South Asian region with special reference to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Lutfur Rehman hails from the historic town of Chakdara, Lower Dir (KPK). He joined the News Bureau of Radio Pakistan, after doing his M.A in International Relations from University of Peshawar in 1986. He has been declared as the best News Editor of Radio Pakistan at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa level and the best News Reporter at the national level. He did his M. Phil in Peace and Conflict Study from the National Defence University Islamabad in 2011 and is now pursuing his PhD in International Relations. He has keen interest in the Afghan issue, especially the question of Pak-Afghan border or

the Durand Line. His book, 'The Durand Agreement: Its Impacts on Bajour, Chitral, Dir and Swat' has been published by the NDU. He has also written papers and articles on situation in Afghanistan, FATA, Swat and the Durand Line from time to time.

Mahroona Hussain Syed is a sociologist, Government and Public Policy analyst and author of the book, 'The Nature of Dependency in the Socio-Economic Development of Pakistan'. At present, she is working as a Research Associate at ISSRA, NDU. The key areas of her interest include military sociology and non-kinetic warfare. She is currently involved in a research project on Counter-Insurgency, being carried out in collaboration with Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark and NDU.

Lieutenant Colonel Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi is, at present, serving as Deputy Director, National and Military History Cell. He is also the Editor of NDU bi-annual research publication, 'ISSRA Papers'. He has M Phil in Government and Public Policy to his credit and is pursuing, at present, his PhD studies at NDU. His areas of interest include the comparative study of religions, radicalization and de-radicalization in societies and history, in particular, military history.

Dr Maria Sultan is the Chairperson and Director General of the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. She is also the founding co-director of South Asian Strategic Stability Unit at the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre (University of Bradford). Dr Sultan is a specialist in South Asian nuclear arms control and disarmament issues, weapon systems development and strategic stability. She has been publishing widely in

academic journals, national and international dailies and books. Dr Sultan earlier worked as an assistant editor in the influential English daily, 'The Muslim'. She is on the visiting faculty of National Defence University, Pakistan, Foreign Service Academy, Pakistan Naval War College, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and Command and Staff College Quetta. She is also an advisor to Ministry of Defence on Strategic and Military Affairs.

Brigadier Masroor Ahmad is a graduate of Command and Staff College, Quetta, who has qualified various courses, including Infantry Company Commanders' Course (Germany), Armed Forces War Course (AFWC), National Defence Course (NDC), besides earning a Master's degree in History. He has served as United Nations Military Observer (UNMO) in Georgia and commanded an infantry brigade in Pakistan Army. He is presently serving as Director Defence Studies in Institute of Research and Analysis (ISSRA), NDU, Islamabad.

Mateah Aqeel is a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her areas of research include the 'Legal Aspects, Psychological Effects and Civilian Impacts of Drones'. Previously, she has worked on terrorism, its dynamics & various related issues. She is also looking at contemporary issues in the South Asian region with primary focus on Pak-Afghan relations post-2014.

Mobeen Tariq is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His areas of interests include 'Drone Warfare' and its impacts. He

has also worked on Afghanistan and Regional Stability.

Brigadier Muhammad Khurshid Khan recently retired from the post of Director Internal Security at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), NDU, Islamabad. He is a Fellow from Stimson Centre Washington D.C. and a student of Ph.D in International Relations at National Defence University, Islamabad. The officer has five years of experience of serving in Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs (ACDA) Directorate, Strategic Plans Division (SPD) of Pakistan as a Deputy Director and later as a Director (ACD). He is, at present, at the faculty of National University of Science and Technology (NUST), Islamabad.

Muhammad Haroon is working as a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. His areas of interests are US-NATO withdrawal and post- 2014 Afghanistan, Indo-Afghan strategic relations and their implications for Pakistan, terrorism in FATA and its effects on the peace and stability of Pakistan.

Sajjad Haider is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute University (SASSI). He is presently working on 'Drone Warfare'. He has also worked on the export of Extremism and the Jihadist element from Afghanistan to the tribal areas of Pakistan, with reference to its impact on the socio-economic fabric of Pakistani society.

Sarah Azam is working as a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her major areas of interest are "Terrorism and Counter

Terrorism'. Currently she is working on 'Swat Operation and Intra-state Instability in Pakistan due to Terrorism'. She is also examining the role of regional and international players in the wake of US-NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Shumaila Ishaque is working as a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Her area of research is 'Afghanistan and Peace Process Post-2014'. Her research interests also include nuclear security issues in South Asia, regional security, strategic stability, arms race and FMCT.

Tahir Nazir is a Research Fellow at South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) University. Currently he is focusing on Global War on Terror and its implications for regional stability. His primary areas of research are nuclear non-proliferation and issues related to international security. He has participated and presented his papers at various national and international conferences, which include, 'Indian Cold Start Doctrine: Implications for the Strategic Stability of South Asia', 'FMT Debate: Possibility and Prospects' and 'Pakistan-Russia Collaboration and the Afghan Crises'.

List of Abbreviations

ABP	Afghan Border Police
ALP	Afghan Local Police
AN	Ammonium Nitrate
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANCOP	Afghan National Civil Order Police
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan Nation Security Forces
APC	All Parties Conference
BLA	Baloch LiberationArmy
BLF	Baloch Liberation Front
BRA	Baloch Republican Army
CAN	Calcium Ammonium Nitrate
CARs	Central Asian Republics
CASA	Central Asia-South Asia
CFC-A	Combined Forces Command- Afgahnistan
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
CIED	Counter Improvised Explosive Device
CMC	Conflict Monitoring Center
CNN	Cable News Ntework
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan

CWIED	Command Wire Improvised Explosive Device
DCG	Defense Consultative Group
D.I Khan	Dera Ismail khan
ETT	Embedded Training Teams
EUPOL	EU Police Mission
FATA	Federally Administrative Tribal Areas
FC	Frontier Corps
FR	Frontier Region
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HPC	High Peace Council
HVT	High Value Targets
IAC	International Armed Conflict
IAPD	Indian Agency for Partnership in Development
ICG	International Crisis Group
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDP's	Internally Displaced Persons
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IPI	Iran-Pakistan-India


ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations
JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
KMTC	Kabul Military Training Center
KPK	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	National Civil Order
NDU	National Defense University
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIAC	Non International Armed Conflict
NMAA	National Military Training Center
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OBL	Osama Bin Laden
OEM	Original Equipment Manufacturer
OMLT	Operational Mentor And Liaison Teams
OSC-A	Office of Security Cooperation-Afghanistan
PCCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund
PCF	Pakistan Counterinsurgency Funds

PDPA	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SAPTA	SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement
SASSI	South Asian Strategic Stability Institute
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India
TNSM	Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAV	Unmanned Air Vehicle
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UK	United Kingdom
VBIED	Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device
WEF	World Economic Forum

Annexure-I: Statistics about Fatalities

Bomb Blasts in Pakistan, 2013

Data updated till August 4, 2013
Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013



	Date	Place	Killed	Injured
1	January 1	Ayesha Manzil / Gulberg PS / Karachi / Sindh	4	50
2	January 1	Dallokhel / Lakki Marwat / KP	0	0
3	January 1	Matches Camp / Miranshah / NWA / FATA	1	4
4	January 1	Vermando Mela / Jamrud / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0
5	January 2	University Peshawar / Peshawar / KP	0	5
6	January 2	Pir Koh / Dera Bugti / Balochistan	0	0

7	January 3	Mashokhel / NWA / FATA	0	0
8	January 4	Badhaber / Peshawar / KP	2	1
9	January 4	Hassan Garhi / Peshawar / KP	0	0
10	January 4	Kaingar / Bannu / KP	0	0
11	January 4	Miryan / Bannu / KP	0	3
12	January 4	District Jail / Rehmanabad / Hangu / KP	0	0
13	January 6	Arakh / Razar / Swabi / KP	0	0
14	January 7	Albo / Margano Jalaa / Khwezai / Ghalanai / Mohmand Agency / FATA	2	1
15	January 7	Kassai / Haleemzai / Mohmand Agency / FATA	0	0
16	January 7	Sariab Road / Quetta / Balochistan	1	3
17	January 7	Sariab Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
18	January 7	Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
19	January 8	Raisani Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	1

20	January 8	Bokhar / Tirah Valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	1
21	January 8	Swabi bazaar / Swabi / KP	0	3
22	January 9	Dera Road / Bannu town / KP	0	0
23	January 10	Alamdar Road / Quetta / Balochistan	106	169
24	January 10	Bacha Khan Chowk / Quetta / Balochistan	12	47
25	January 10	Takhta Band Road / Mingora / Swat / KP	31	70
26	January 12	Hanji Ayub Kallay / Spin Qabar / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0
27	January 12	Brewery road / Quetta / Balochistan	1	1
28	January 13	Dosali / SWA / FATA	14	21
29	January 13	Khwar Killay / Sadda / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	8
30	January 13	Qala Shah Baig / Shabqadar / Charsadda / KP	0	3
31	January 14	Kahayan-e-Ittehad / DHA Phase-VI / Gizri PS / Karachi / Sindh	0	8
32	January 15	Bonistan / Panjgur / Balochistan	5	0

33	January 15	Bakra Mandi / Quetta / Balochistan	0	1
34	January 15	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah / Balochistan	0	3
35	January 16	Bannu / Bannu / KP	0	0
36	January 16	Shahdand / Loundkhor / Mardan / KP	0	0
37	January 17	Chowki Mamraiz / Nowshera / KP	0	0
38	January 19	Khameesa Khan Bugti / Quetta / Balochistan	2	0
39	January 19	Badhaber / Peshawar / KP	0	0
40	January 20	Shalobar / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	5
41	January 20	Khyber Chowk / Ittehad Town / Mochko PS / Karachi / Sindh	0	4
42	January 21	Kanra / Pandyali / Mohmand Agency / FATA	2	11
43	January 21	Merikhel / Akkakhel / Bara / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0
44	January 22	Bacha Khan Chowk / Charssada Road / Peshawar / KP	0	0
45	January 22	Chota Lahore / Swabi / KP	0	0

46	January 22	Thall-Mir Ali Road / NWA / FATA	0	4
47	January 23	Jandary Killay / Orakzai Agency / FATA	7	4
48	January 23	Motorway Interchange / Charsadda / KP	0	0
49	January 23	Zakat office / Mardan road / Charsadda / KP	0	0
50	January 23	Kablay Marzay / Battagram / Shabqadar / Charsadda / KP	0	0
51	January 24	Sherpao Colony / Landhi / Karachi / Sindh	4	12
52	January 25	New Muzaffarabad Colony / Bakhtawar Goth / Karachi / Sindh	4	0
53	January 25	Mushki Para / Manghopir / Karachi / Sindh	1	2
54	January 27	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah / Balochistan	0	0
55	January 27	Marhati Banda / Nowshera / KP	0	0
56	January 28	Sarband / Peshawar / KP	0	0
57	January 29	Hangorabad / Lyari / Karachi / Sindh	0	4
58	January 29	Acheeni Mera / Al-Hamra Township / Peshawar / KP	1	3

59	January 29	Baamkhel / Swabi / KP	0	0
60	January 30	Indus Plaza / Al-Asif Square / Karachi / Sindh	3	0
61	January 30	Bannu-Miranshah road / Miranshah / NWA / FATA	0	3
62	January 31	Mali Khel village / Kurram Agency / FATA	2	0
63	January 31	Firdus / Hashtnagri / Peshawar / KP	0	10
64	February 1	Pat Bazaar / Hangu District / KP	29	46
65	February 1	Shinwari Town / Paharipura / Peshawar / KP	0	0
66	February 1	Badaber PS / Peshawar / KP	0	0
67	February 2	Sarai Naurang / Lakki Marwat / KP	36	11
68	February 3	Warasta Road / Hangu Town / KP	0	0
69	February 3	Vegetable market / Hangu Town / KP	0	0
70	February 4	PS-128 / Future Colony / Landhi town / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
71	February 4	KANUPP petrol / Hawkes Bay road / Karachi / Sindh	0	0

72	February 5	PAF Base Faisal / Shakra-e-Faisal / Karachi / Sindh	0	1
73	February 7	Orangi town / Karachi / Sindh	1	5
74	February 7	Archar Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	1
75	February 8	Kalaya / Orakzai Agency / FATA	16	27
76	February 9	Kuchlak Town / Quetta / Balochistan	1	0
77	February 10	Kuchlak / Quetta / Balochistan	0	4
78	February 10	GT Road / Nishterabad / Peshawar / KP	0	4
79	February 10	Akhwan Salaq Baba Shrine / Badaber / Peshawar / KP	0	0
80	February 12	PG Degree College / Mardan / KP	0	0
81	February 13	Behzadi Chakarkot / Kohat / KP	1	0
82	February 13	Taja Koroona Shero / Katlang / Mardan / Balochistan	0	0
83	February 13	Landhi / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
84	February 14	Hassanzo / Orakzai Agency / FATA	7	13

85	February 14	Hassanzo / Orakzai Agency / FATA	2	10
86	February 14	Spin Thall / Hangu / KP	11	23
87	February 14	Miryan / Bannu / KP	6	0
88	February 15	Mardan / KP	1	0
89	February 16	Quetta / Balochistan	84	169
90	February 17	Razmak Town / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	0	4
91	February 18	FTC flyover / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
92	February 18	Banaras Colony / Peerabad PS / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
93	February 18	Cantonment / Peshawar / KP	8	5
94	February 20	Goth Ahmad Din Brohi / Jacobabad / Sindh	1	10
95	February 20	Sector 5-A-3 / Khawaja Ajmer Nagri PS / Karachi / Sindh	0	2
96	February 21	Khushal Market / old Hashtnagri / Peshawar / KP	2	17
97	February 21	Sanni Shroon / Bolan / Balochistan	0	3

98	February 22	Barokehl-Sultankhel Road / Haleemzai / Mohmand Agency / FATA	0	0
99	February 25	Shah Lakhi Ghulam / Shikarpur / Karachi / Sindh	2	10
100	February 25	Badhber / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
101	February 26	Lucky Star / Saddar area / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
102	February 27	Shah Faisal / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
103	February 27	Baloch Colony/ Karachi / Sindh	0	0
104	February 28	Kandharoo / Safi tehsil / Mohmand Agency	0	0
105	February 28	Shafee Iron Works / Laurence Road / Naipier/ Karachi / Sindh	0	3
106	February 28	Gulbai / Shershah Division/ Karachi / Sindh	0	1
107	March 1	Wanda Zerhan / Lakki Marwat/ Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
108	March 3	Abbas town/ Karachi / Sindh	48	70
109	March 3	Mamond tehsil / Bajaur Agency/ FATA	0	0
110	March 5	Metroville / SITE-A/ Karachi / Sindh	0	2

111	March 5	Mominabad / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
112	March 5	Jamrud / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	1
113	March 6	FR Bannu / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	5
114	March 6	Jamrud / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	1
115	March 7	Katlang area / Mardan / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
116	March 7	Nowshera / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
117	March 7	Bab-e-Dosti / Chaman / Balochistan	0	0
118	March 10	Dattakhel tehsil / North Waziristan Agency / FATA.	2	0
119	March 10	Landikotal town / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	1
120	March 10	Parao Chinar / lower Kurram Agency / FATA	0	2
121	March 11	Dogar area / Kurram Agency / FATA	3	2
122	March 11	Khurramabad / Landhi / Karachi / Sindh.	2	12
123	March 12	University road / Karachi	0	0

124	March 12	Bannu bazaar /KP	3	19
125	March 12	Peshawar / KP	1	0
126	March 12	Pabbi / KP	0	6
127	March 14	Landhi / New Muzaffarabad / Quaidabad	3	6
128	March 15	Togh Sarai / Hangu / KP	0	0
129	March 16	Miranshah area / North Waziristan / FATA	0	5
130	March 17	Matani area / Peshawar/ KP	0	0
131	March 17	Goth Peeru Bugti /Jaffarabad/ Balochistan	0	0
132	March 18	Safi / Mohmand Agency / FATA	10	6
133	March 18	Batgram / Peshawar / KP	5	49
134	March 18	Karbogha Sharif / Doaba / Hangu / KP	0	0
135	March 18	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah	0	0
136	March 19	Bagh / Tirah Valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	48	0

137	March 19	North Nazimabad / Karachi / Sindh	1	3
138	March 19	Shabqadar area / Charsadda / KP	0	0
139	March 19	Batgram / KP	0	0
140	March 22	Dera Allahyar / Jaffarabad / Balochistan	10	37
141	March 22	Go-pat / Dera Bugti / Balochistan	0	0
142	March 22	Meeri Khel / Akkakhel / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0
143	March 23	Miranshah / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	18	25
144	March 24	Shabqadar / Charsadda / KP	0	0
145	March 25	Damadola / Mamond / Bajaur Agency / FATA	2	0
146	March 25	Dorra / Banamari / Peshawar / / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
147	March 25	Pat Feeder / Dera Bugti District	0	0
148	March 27	Sadda Bazaar / Kurram Agency / FATA	0	0
149	March 27	Yunus Park / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	2

150	March 27	Shami Road / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
151	March 28	Damadola / Bajaur Agency / FATA	2	0
152	March 29	Abdul Majeed Marwat / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	12	35
153	March 29	Sheedano Dhand / lower Kurram Agency / FATA	0	4
154	March 30	Ittehad Town / Karachi / Sindh	1	8
155	March 31	Bannu / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	0	0
156	March 31	Amandarra area / Malakand Agency / FATA	0	1
157	March 31	Sariab / Quetta / Balochistan	0	2
158	April 1	Sheikh Muhammadi / Badhabar / Peshawar / KP	8	0
159	April 2	Darsamand / Hangu / KP	0	0
160	April 3	Paramilitary complex / Korangi / Karachi / Sindh	4	3
161	April 4	Kotkhel / Orakzai Agency / FATA	8	0
162	April 4	Tirah valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	3	0

163	April 5	Hayatabad / Peshawar / KP	1	4
164	April 5	Ghaziabad / Kohat / Peshawar / KP	0	0
165	April 5	Ghauriwala / Bannu / KP	0	1
166	April 5	Khazana / Peshawar / KP	0	0
167	April 5	Matani / Peshawar / KP	0	0
168	April 6	Nushki / Balochistan	0	0
169	April 7	Hangu / KP	0	0
170	April 7	Mir Ali / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	2	0
171	April 7	Naseerabad / Balochistan	0	0
172	April 8	NADRA / Kharan / Balochistan	0	4
173	April 9	Pasni / Gwadar / Balochistan	2	0
174	April 9	Sui / Dera Bugti / Balochistan	0	0
175	April 9	Alamgudar / Bara tehsil / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	1

176	April 9	Shalobar / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0
177	April 11	Manatu / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	0
178	April 8	Hayatabad Phase-II / Peshawar / KP	0	0
179	April 9	Mian Iqbal Chowk / cantonment / Peshawar / KP	0	0
180	April 11	Peshawar / KP	0	3
181	April 11	Peshawar / KP	0	0
182	April 12	Shewa / Sheikh / Swabi / KP	0	1
183	April 13	Matani / Peshawar / KP	9	0
184	April 14	Manglawar / Swat / KP	1	0
185	April 14	Katozai / Shabqadar / Charsadda / KP	0	4
186	April 15	Dari area / Tirah valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	0
187	April 16	Saidgai / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	9	8
188	April 16	Bilour / Mundabheri / Yakatut / Peshawar / KP	16	35

189	April 16	Maripur / Kiamari / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
190	April 17	Shadheri / Charsadda / KP	0	2
191	April 17	Kharan / Balochistan	2	0
192	April 18	Sariab area / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
193	April 19	Korya / Buner / KP	3	0
194	April 19	Faiz Muhammad Goth / Rajanpur / Punjab	0	0
195	April 20	Khar / Bajaur / FATA	4	4
196	April 21	Mir Ali / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	4	4
197	April 21	Kharadar / Karachi / Sindh	0	14
198	April 22	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah / Balochistan	0	5
199	April 22	Panjgur / Balochistan	0	0
200	April 22	Maneri / Swabi / KP	0	1
201	April 23	Alamdard Road / Quetta / Balochistan	6	30

202	April 23	Jinnah town / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
203	April 23	Gawalmandi chowk / Quetta / Balochistan	0	6
204	April 23	Gurdatt Singh Road intersection / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
205	April 23	Chowranghi / Taimuria PS / Karachi / Sindh	3	30
206	April 23	University Road / Tehkal / Peshawar / KP	0	0
207	April 23	Matani / Peshawar / KP	0	0
208	April 24	Judbah / Torghar / KP	1	2
209	April 24	Sarki Gate / Peshawar / KP	0	2
210	April 24	Swat town / Swat / KP	0	6
211	April 24	Parori / Dera Ismail Khan / KP	0	0
212	April 24	Satellite town / Quetta / Balochistan	0	13
213	April 24	Kechi Baig PS / Sariab Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	2
214	April 24	Jadoon Chowk / New Jan Muhammad Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	1

215	April 24	Rashidugun / Larkana city / Punjab	0	0
216	April 25	Nusrat Bhutto Colony / North Nazimabad / Karachi / Sindh	6	13
217	April 25	Sports Complex / Parachinar / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	3
218	April 26	Orangi town / Karachi / Sindh	11	45
219	April 26	Mach / Kachi / Balochistan	0	6
220	April 26	Khwaja Muhammad / Hangu / KP	0	0
221	April 26	Dhoda / Kohat / KP	0	0
222	April 26	Amirabad / Charsadda / KP	0	0
223	April 27	Qasba Colony / Pirabad PS / Karachi / Sindh	1	25
224	April 27	Kumharnwala / Lyari / Karachi / Sindh	2	15
225	April 28	Kacha Pakka / Kohat town / Kohat / KP	5	22
226	April 28	Charsadda Road / Peshawar / KP	3	26
227	April 28	Swabi town / Swabi / KP	2	16

228	April 29	University Road / Peshawar / KP	11	60
229	April 29	Nowshera town / Nowshera / KP	1	2
230	April 29	Sar Dheri / Charsadda town / Charsadda / KP	1	20
231	April 29	Hajyanoo Koroona / Ghundo / Katlang PS / Mardan / KP	0	0
232	April 29	Bannu town / Bannu / KP	0	0
233	April 29	Dera Ismail Khan Road / Bannu town / Bannu / KP	0	0
234	April 29	Safora Chowrangi / Gulistan-e-Jauhar / Karachi / Sindh	0	2
235	April 29	Seitharija railway station / Khairpur / Sindh	0	0
236	April 30	Jhal Magsi / Jhal Magsi District / Balochistan	0	0
237	May 1	Bombay Bazar / Mithadar PS / Karachi / Sindh	0	8
238	May 1	Tahir Kot / Nasirabad / Balochistan	0	0
239	May 2	Fresco Chowk / Burns Road / Karachi / Sindh	0	8
240	May 2	Chatter / Nasirabad / Balochistan	0	0

241	May 4	Baizrot / Orakzai Agency / FATA	0	0
242	May 4	MQM head office / Nine Zero / Karachi / Sindh	3	35
243	May 4	Pat Feeder / Jaffarabad / Balochistan	0	0
244	May 5	Kam Sarobi / Razmak / NWA / FATA	2	3
245	May 5	Haiderkhel / Mir Ali / NWA / FATA	0	0
246	May 5	Tali / Sibi / Balochistan	2	0
247	May 5	Killi Deba / Quetta / Balochistan	0	2
248	May 5	Killi Sahibzada / Nushki / Balochistan	0	0
249	May 5	Kharan town / Kharan / Balochistan	0	6
250	May 5	Mach / Bolan / Balochistan	0	3
251	May 5	Gharibabad / Takhbai / Mardan / KP	0	4
252	May 6	Sewak / Kurram Agency / FATA	23	70
253	May 6	Sariab / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0

254	May 6	Mirzai / Shabqadar / Charssada / KP	0	1
255	May 7	Doaba / Hangu / KP	12	35
256	May 7	Babagam / Maidan / Lower Dir / KP	5	0
257	May 7	Akhagram / Upper Dir / KP	0	4
258	May 8	Mehmoodabad / Karachi / Sindh	0	32
259	May 8	Sitara Bakery / Mehmoodabad / Karachi / Sindh	0	18
260	May 8	Rasheed Garhi / Peshawar / KP	4	0
261	May 8	Domail PS / Bannu town / Bannu / KP	3	27
262	May 8	Jani Chowk / Hangu Bazaar / Hangu / KP	2	18
263	May 8	Dera Ismail Khan Town / Dera Ismail Khan / KP	0	5
264	May 8	Shahidano Dhand / Parachinar / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	1
265	May 8	Eastern bypass / Quetta / Balochistan	0	14
266	May 8	Johaana / Kalat / Balochistan	0	0

267	May 9	Sarmal Nusratkhalil / Torghar town / Torghar / KP	6	10
268	May 9	Katlang / Mardan / KP	0	0
269	May 9	Bhalola / Charsadda / KP	0	0
270	May 9	Yar Hussain / Swabi / KP	0	0
271	May 9	Mir Ali / NWA / FATA	1	6
272	May 9	Rashkai / Bajaur Agency / FATA	1	4
273	May 9	Ghot Raisani / Dhadar / Bolan / Balochistan	0	0
274	May 9	Jaffarabad / Balochistan	0	0
275	May 9	Chah Sar / Turbat / Balochistan	0	0
276	May 10	Khwaja Jan Chowk / Miranshah bazaar / NWA / FATA	4	21
277	May 10	Uthmankhel bazaar / Orakzai Agency / FATA	0	5
278	May 10	MCB Chowk / Yar Hussain bazaar / Swabi / KP	2	3
279	May 11	Dawood Chali / Quaidabad / Karachi / Sindh	11	45

280	May 11	Mianwali Colony / Pirabad / Karachi / Sindh	1	5
281	May 11	Islami Colony / Manghopir / Karachi / Sindh	2	11
282	May 11	Orangi Town, Baldia Town, Garden areas / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
283-285	May 11	Dawood Chali / Quaidabad / Karachi / Sindh	11	45
286	May 12	Zarghoon Road / Quetta / Balochistan	7	45
287	May 12	Goth Manzoor Jan / Naseerabad / Balochistan	2	0
288	May 12	Badaber / Peshawar / KP	2	8
289	May 16	Kohat Road / Sra Khawra / Matani / Peshawar / KP	5	6
290	May 17	Baz Darra / Palai Union Council / Malakand / KP	21	120
291	May 18	Dera Allahyar / Jaffarabad / Balochistan	0	2
292	May 19	Raz Mohammad Khan / Kachkot Asad Khan / Surani / Bannu / KP	0	6
293	May 19	Azad Mandi / Bannu / KP	0	0
294	May 20	Landhi / Karachi / Sindh	0	0

295	May 20	Manzai area / South Waziristan Agency / FATA	0	1
296	May 21	Dargai area / South Waziristan Agency / FATA	2	4
297	May 23	Bhossa Mandi / Eastern Bypass / Quetta / Balochistan	13	17
298	May 23	Sariab Road / Quetta/ Balochistan	1	0
299	May 24	Quetta / Balochistan	1	0
300	May 24	Tump / Turbat/ Balochistan	0	2
301	May 24	Orangi town / Karachi / Sindh	0	3
302	May 24	Saeedabad area / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	4	0
303	May 27	Poran / Shangla / KP	5	0
304	May 28	Imamia Colony / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	3	14
305	May 28	Beshbanar / Swat / KP	1	6
306	May 28	Shabqadar / Charsadda / KP	0	0
307	May 29	Parachamkani / Kurram Agency / FATA	15	0

308	May 30	Loti area / Dera Bugti / Balochistan	1	3
309	May 30	Tabay / central Kurram Agency / FATA	18	0
310	May 31	Peshawar/ KP	1	0
311	June 2	Esha checkpoint / Miranshah / North Waziristan Agency/ FATA	0	2
312	June 2	Dasht / Mastung/ Balochistan	0	0
313	June 3	Mastung/ Balochistan	2	2
314	June 6	Daudzai / Peshawar / KP	2	3
315	June 9	North Waziristan Agency / FATA	3	4
316	June 9	Razmak-Miranshah road / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	3	1
317	June 12	Maidan area / Tirah valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	0
318	June 12	Khyber Chowk / Baldia / Karachi / Sindh	1	0
319	June 14	Mach town / Bolan / Balochistan	0	0
320	June 15	Quetta / Balochistan	24	27

321	June 15	Kati Pahari / Qasba Colony / Karachi / Sindh	1	11
322	June 18	Qala village / Shergarh / Mardan / KP	36	57
323	June 19	Gulbahar / GT Road / Peshawar / KP	0	3
324	June 20	Karbogha / Doaba / Hangu / KP	0	0
325	June 20	Pasni / Gwadar / Balochistan	0	1
326	June 21	Gulshan Colony / Peshawar / Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	16	25
327	June 21	Bandat Musazai / Killa Saifullah	1	0
328	June 21	Pandialai / Mohmand Agency / FATA	0	0
329	June 22	Chamarkand / Bajaur Agency / FATA	2	0
330	June 23	Sadda town / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	5
331	June 23	Khawa / Bannu / KP	1	2
332	June 24	Tirayee Payan / Peshawar / KP	0	0
333	June 25	Wazirdhand / Jamrud / Khyber Agency / FATA	0	0

334	June 26	Burns Road / Karachi / Sindh	10	15
335	June 26	Mashkay / Awaran / Balochistan	1	3
336	June 27	Kuchlak / Quetta / Balochistan	2	1
337	June 28	Lapakai / Maidan / Tirah Valley / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	6
338	June 29	Paharkhel Pakka / Ghaznikhel PS / Lakki Marwat / KP	0	0
339	June 30	Aliabad / Hazara Town / Quetta / Balochistan	29	60
340	June 30	Badbher / Peshawar / KP	18	46
341	June 30	Miranshah / North Waziristan Agency / FATA	7	27
342	July 2	Zakhakhel Bazaar / Khyber Agency / FATA	1	0
343	July 2	Kitkoot / Bajaur Agency / FATA	1	0
344	July 3	Jacobabad / Sindh	0	4
345	July 4	Bowia check post / NWA / FATA	6	3
346	July 4	Sirki Kot / Wana / SWA / FATA	0	0

347	July 4	Station Koroona / City PS in Charsadda Town / Charsadda / KP	0	0
348	July 6	Old Anarkali / Lahore / Punjab	5	46
349	July 6	Miryan / Bannu / KP	0	0
350	July 7	Kansi Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	2
351	July 8	Torha Warhai / Doaba Bazaar / Hangu / KP	9	11
352	July 8	Jamalabad / Swabi / KP	2	0
353	July 8	Muhammadzai / Kohat / KP	0	3
354	July 9	Zikri Mohalla / Lyari / Karachi / Sindh	0	21
355	July 9	Bamkhel / Swabi / KP	0	0
356	July 10	Guru Mandir / Jamshed Town / Karachi / Sindh	4	12
357	July 10	Khyber Medical Centre / Dabgari Garden / Peshawar / KP	0	0
358	July 11	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah / Balochistan	8	10
359	July 11	Kacha Pakka / Kohat Town / KP	2	5

360-62	July 12	Hyderabad / Hyderabad District / Sindh	0	0
363	July 16	Jetani / Mach / Bolan / Balochistan	0	0
364	July 17	Paharipura / Peshawar / KP	0	0
365	July 17	Scheme chowk / Kohat road / Peshawar / KP	0	0
366	July 18	Badan / Mamond / Bajaur Agency / FATA	3	2
367	July 19	Akkakhel / Bara / Khyber Agency / FATA	2	0
368	July 20	Essa Nagri / Karachi / Sindh	1	4
369	July 20	Patel Para / Karachi / Sindh	3	3
370	July 21	Gulshan-e-Buner / Landhi Town / Karachi / Sindh	2	7
371	July 21	Sikandarpurah / Peshawar / KP	0	2
372	July 21	Yakatoot / Peshawar / KP	0	0
373	July 22	Chaman / Qilla Abdullah / Balochistan	2	4
374	July 22	Taugh / Kohat / KP	0	3

375	July 22	Afghan Colony / Faqirabad / Peshawar / KP	0	0
376	July 23	Machh / Bolan / Balochistan	1	0
377	July 24	ISI office / Sukkur Barrage Colony / Sukkur / Sindh	8	50
378	July 26	Parachinar / Kurram Agency / FATA	62	180
379	July 26	Kharpati / Kurram Agency / FATA	2	7
380	July 28	Pawar Tungi / Parachinar / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	2
381	July 28	Musa Colony / Sariab Road / Quetta / Balochistan	0	0
382	July 28	Hashtnagri / Yakatut / Peshawar / KP	0	4
383	July 30	Azizabad / Gulberg Town / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
384	July 31	Manghopir / Karachi / Sindh	0	2
385	August 4	Rashkai / Khar / Bajaur Agency / FATA	0	0
386	August 5	Aab-e-gum / Mach / Bolan / Balochistan	0	0
387	August 5	Toba Tek Singh town / Punjab	3	NS

388	August 6	Goth Pervaiz Domki / Jahan Bukhshpur / Kashmore / Sindh	3	1
389	August 6	Khayaban-e-Muslim / Defence area / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
390	August 6	Khayaban-e-Rahat / Defence area / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
391	August 6	Gulshan-e-Iqbal / Karachi / Sindh	0	0
392	August 6	Khudaabad Railways gate / Tando Adam town / Shaheed Benazir Abad / Sindh	0	0
393	August 6	Hayatabad / Peshawar / KP	0	0
394	August 6	Darra Pezu bazaar / Lakki Marwat / KP	0	0
395	August 7	Lyari / Karachi / Sindh	11	26
396	August 7	Mastung town / Mastung / Balochistan	3	21
397	August 8	Police Lines / Quetta / Balochistan	39	40
398	August 11	Dera Murad Jamali / Nasirabad / Balochistan	1	3
399	August 11	Dera Bugti / Dera Bugti / Balochistan	1	2
400	August 11	Shakh / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	2

401	August 11	Pewaar / Kurram Agency / FATA	1	0
402	August 11	Baghdi / Kurram Agency / FATA	0	1
Total*			1267	3049


Annexure-II: Statistics about Drones

Drones Attacks inside Pakistan: 2004 – 2013

* Data update till June 2013

Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013


Years	No of strikes	Total Killed	Children deaths	Civilian deaths	Mtts Killed	HVTs Killed
2004	1	7	2	0	5	1
2005	3	15	5	3	7	2
2006	3	108	75	24	9	0
2007	5	47	1	28	18	0
2008	38	332	31	86	215	12
2009	55	643	39	116	488	8
2010	128	985	16	146	823	7
2011	75	573	4	108	461	10
2012	48	336	1	23	312	6
2013	14	81	1	1	79	5
Total	370	3127	175	535	2417	51



High Value Targets Killed in Drone Attacks: 2004 – 2013

* Data update till June 2013

Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013



High Value Targets Killed in Drone Attacks: 2004 – 2013

* Data update till June 2013

Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013

S. No.	Name	Organization
1	Haithem al-Yemeni, al-Qaeda Explosive Expert	Al-Qaeda
3	Abu Hamza Rabia, Top al-Qaeda official	Al-Qaeda
4	Abu Laith al-Libi, al-Qaeda no-3	Al-Qaeda
5	Abu Sulayman al Jazairi, al-Qaeda Planner	Al-Qaeda
6	Abu Khabab al Masri, al-Qaeda WMD Expert	Al-Qaeda
7	Abu Wafa al Saudi, al-Qaeda Commander and logistician	Al-Qaeda

8	Abu Haris, al-Qaeda Chief in Pakistan	Al-Qaeda
9	Khalid Habib, Senior member of al-Qaeda	Al-Qaeda
10	Muhammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim aka Abu Jihad al-Masri, al-Qaeda Propaganda Chief	Al-Qaeda
11	Abdullah Azam al Saudi, Senior al-Qaeda member	Al-Qaeda
12	Abu Zubair al Masri, Senior al-Qaeda member	Al-Qaeda
13	Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan, al-Qaeda leader involved in 1998 US embassy bombing	Al-Qaeda
14	Osama al Kini, al-Qaeda leader involved in 1998 US embassy bombing	Al-Qaeda
15	Abu Sulayman al Jazairi, al-Qaeda Planner	Al-Qaeda
16	Nazimuddin Zalalov alias Yahyo, Leader of Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan and lieutenant of Usama bin Laden	Al-Qaeda
17	Saleh al-Somali, al-Qaeda External Operations Chief and link between al-Qaeda in Af-Pak and abroad	Al-Qaeda
18	Zuhaib al-Zahibi, al-Qaeda Commander in North Waziristan	Al-Qaeda
19	Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, Leader of Turkastani Islamic Party linked with al-Qaeda	Al-Qaeda
20	Sheikh Mansoor, al-Qaeda Leader	Al-Qaeda
21	Sadam Hussain al-Hussami, al-Qaeda Planner and Explosive Expert	Al-Qaeda

22	Mustafa Abu al Yazid, al-Qaeda no-3	Al-Qaeda
23	Sheikh al Fateh, al-Qaeda Chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan	Al-Qaeda
24	Ilyas Kashmiri, senior al-Qaeda Commander in Pakistan	Al-Qaeda
25	Atiyah Abd ur Rehman, al-Qaeda number 2	Al-Qaeda
26	Abu Hafs al Shahri, al-Qaeda's Chief of Operations in Pakistan	Al-Qaeda
27	Aleemullah, Senior Taliban Commander	Al-Qaeda
28	Aslam Awan, Senior Operation Organizer for al-Qaeda from Abbottabad	Al-Qaeda
29	Badar Mansoor, al-Qaeda senior leader in Taliban	Al-Qaeda
30	Abu Yahya al-libi, al-Qaeda Second in Command	Al-Qaeda
31	Nek Muhammad, Amir TTP South Waziristan	TTP
32	Abdul Rehman, Taliban Commander in South Waziristan	TTP
33	Islam Wazir, Taliban Commander in South Waziristan	TTP
34	Muhammad Omar, Taliban Commander / Close associate of Nek Muhammad	TTP
35	Mullah Sangeen, Afghan Commander of TTP	TTP
36	Baitullah Mehsud, Amir TTP	TTP
37	Amir Moawia, Taliban Commander	TTP
38	Taj Gul Mehsud, Taliban Commander	TTP

39	Muhammad Khan, Molvi Nazir's Younger brothers / Taliban Commander	TTP
40	Hazrat Umer, Molvi Nazir's Younger brothers / Taliban Commander	TTP
41	Miraj Wazir, Taliban Commander	TTP
42	Ashfaq Wazir, Taliban Commander	TTP
43	Amir Hamza Toji Khel, Senior Taliban Commander associated with Molvi Nazir	TTP
44	Mullah Shamsullah, Senior Taliban Commander associated with Molvi Nazir	TTP
45	Maulvi Nazir Wazir, Amir TTP South Waziristan Chapter	TTP
46	Shah Faisal, Militant Commander TTP	TTP
47	Wali Mohammad Toofan, Head TTP Suicide Wing	TTP
48	Waliur Rehman, Second in Command TTP	TTP
49	Mutaqi alias Bahadar Khan, Pakistani Taliban commander	TTP
50	Janbaz Zadran, Third in Command Haqqani Network	Haqqani Network
51	Badruddin Haqqani, Third in Command Haqqani Network / Commander Military Operations	Haqqani Network
52	Al Marjan, Local Lashker-e-Islam Commander	Lashker-e-Islam

DETAILED STATISTICS OF DRONES ATTACKS: 2004 – 2013

** Data update till June 2013*

Sources: SASSI Factsheet September 2013

S.N	Date	Place	Total Killed	Children deaths	Civilian deaths	HVT killed
1.	17-Jun-04	Wana, SWA	7	2	0	Nek Muhammad, South Waziristan
2.	8-May-05	Toorikhel, NWA	2	0	0	Haithem al-Yemeni, al-Qaeda Explosive Expert
3.	5-Nov-05	Mosaki,	8	3	3	
4.	1-Dec-05	Haisori,	5	2	0	Abu Hamza Rabia, Top al-Qaeda official
5.	6-Jan-06	Saidgai	8	1	3	
6.	13-Jan-06	Damadola	18	5	9	
7.	30-Oct-06	Chenegai	82	69	12	
8.	16-Jan-07	Zamazola	8	1	7	
9.	27-Apr-07	Saidgai	4	0	4	
10.	19-Jun-07	Mami Rogha	27	0	17	
11.	2-Nov-07	Dana Darpakhel	8	0	0	
12.	Dec-07	Unknown	0	0	0	
13.	29-Jan-08	Mir Ali	14	3	2	Abu Laith al-Libi, al-Qaeda no-3
14.	28-Feb-08	Azam Warsak	11	0	3	
15.	16-Mar-08	Dhook Pir Bagh	16	0	2	
16.	14-May-08	Damadola	16	3	2	Abu Sulayman al Jazairi, al-Qaeda Planner

17.	14-Jun-08	Makeen	1	0	0	
18.	28-Jul-08	Zeralita	9	3	0	Abu Khabab al Masri, al-Qaeda WMD Expert
19.	12-Aug-08	Bhaggar, SWA	19	0	3	Abdul Rehman & Islam Wazir, Both Taliban Commanders in South Waziristan
20.	20-Aug-08	Zari Noor	10	0	0	
21.	30-Aug-08	Korzai	5	0	0	
22.	30-Aug-08	Miram Shah	7	0	4	
23.	Aug-08	1 x Drone strike details not available				
24.	2-Sep-08	Unknown	7	0	0	
25.	4-Sep-08	Muhammad Khel	6	0	0	Abu Wafa al Saudi, al-Qaeda Commander and logistician
26.	5-Sep-08	Gurwak	9	4	3	
27.	8-Sep-08	Miram Shah	20	8	5	Abu Haris, al-Qaeda Chief in Pakistan
28.	12-Sep-08	Tol Khel	13	0	0	
29.	17-Sep-08	Baghar Cheena	6	0	0	
30.	30-Sep-08	Khushali	6	0	4	
31.	3-Oct-08	Datta Khel	3	1	2	
32.	3-Oct-08	Datta Khel	21	3	8	
33.	9-Oct-08	Tati	7	4	3	
34.	11-Oct-08	Miram Shah	5	0	3	
35.	16-Oct-08	Taparghai	7	0	4	Khalid Habib, Senior member of al-Qaeda
36.	23-Oct-08	Danda Darpakhel	9	0	4	

37.	26-Oct-08	Mandata	18	2	4	Muhammad Omar, Taliban Commander / Close associate of Nek Muhammad
38.	31-Oct-08	Asori	15	0	10	Muhammad Hasan Khalil al-Hakim aka Abu Jihad al-Masri, al-Qaeda Propaganda Chief
39.	31-Oct-08	Kari Kot	8	0	0	
40.	7-Nov-08	Kumsham	14	0	6	
41.	14-Nov-08	Garyom	12	0	7	
42.	19-Nov-08	Jani Khel	5	0	0	Abdullah Azam al Saudi, Senior al-Qaeda member
43.	22-Nov-08	Ali Khel	5	0	0	Abu Zubair al Masri, Senior al-Qaeda member
44.	27-Nov-08	Wana	5	0	0	
45.	29-Nov-08	Chashma	3	0	2	
46.	5-Dec-08	Kateera	4	0	0	
47.	11-Dec-08	Azam Warsak	7	0	4	
48.	15-Dec-08	Tapi Tool	3	0	1	
49.	22-Dec-08	Kari Kot	3	0	0	
50.	22-Dec-08	Shin Warsak	3	0	0	
51.	1-Jan-09	Kari Kot	4	0	0	Sheikh Ahmed Salim Swedan and Osama al Kini, both al-Qaeda leaders involved in 1998 US embassy bombing

52.	2-Jan-09	Madin Village	4	0	0	
53.	23-Jan-09	Ganki Khel	8	3	4	
54.	23-Jan-09	Zharki	11	1	8	
55.	14-Feb-09	Narsi Khel	31	1	8	
56.	16-Feb-09	Sur Pul	31	0	0	
57.	1-Mar-09	Sararogha	10	0	0	
58.	12-Mar-09	Barjo	20	0	0	
59.	15-Mar-09	Jani Khel	4	0	0	
60.	25-Mar-09	Makeen	8	0	0	
61.	26-Mar-09	Sokhel	5	0	3	
62.	1-Apr-09	Khadezai	13	3	4	
63.	4-Apr-09	Datta Khel	13	4	6	
64.	8-Apr-09	Ganki Khel	4	0	0	
65.	19-Apr-09	Ganki Khel	4	2	6	
66.	29-Apr-09	Kaniguram	8	0	2	Abu Sulayman al Jazairi, al-Qaeda Planner
67.	9-May-09	Tabbi Langhar Khel	17	0	0	
68.	12-May-09	Sara Khwara	9	0	0	
69.	16-May-09	Khesoor	33	0	9	
70.	14-Jun-09	Marda Algad	4	0	0	
71.	18-Jun-09	Wana	13	0	4	
72.	23-Jun-09	Makeen	6	0	0	Mullah Sangeen, Afghan Commander of TTP
73.	23-Jun-09	Miram Shah	75	10	22	
74.	Jun-09	1 x Drone strike details not available				
75.	3-Jul-09	Mantoi	3	0	3	

76.	3-Jul-09	Zamarai Nairai	15	0	0	
77.	7-Jul-09	Makeen	17	0	0	
78.	8-Jul-09	Ladha	9	0	0	
79.	8-Jul-09	Ladha	38	0	0	
80.	10-Jul-09	Painda Khel	4	0	0	
81.	17-Jul-09	Gariwam	6	0	0	
82.	5-Aug-09	Ladha	7	0	2	Baitullah Mehsud, Amir TTP
83.	11-Aug-09	Ladha	20	4	0	
84.	21-Aug-09	Danda Darpakhel	19	6	9	
85.	27-Aug-09	Taparghal	9	0	0	
86.	7-Sep-09	Machi Khel	7	0	3	
87.	8-Sep-09	Darga Mandi	13	3	2	
88.	14-Sep-09	TooriKhel	5	0	0	Nazimuddin Zhalalov alias Yahyo, Leader of Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan and lieutenant of Usama bin Laden
89.	24-Sep-09	Mir Ali	11	0	0	
90.	29-Sep-09	Sararogha	6	0	0	
91.	29-Sep-09	Danda Darpakhel	7	0	0	
92.	30-Sep-09	Norak	9	0	0	
93.	15-Oct-09	Danda Darpakhel	4	0	0	
94.	21-Oct-09	Spalaga	3	0	0	
95.	24-Oct-09	Damadola	24	0	0	
96.	5-Nov-09	Norak	5	0	0	
97.	18-Nov-09	Shanakorah	5	0	0	
98.	20-Nov-09	Machi Khel	7	1	2	

99.	8-Dec-09	Spalaga	4	0	0	Saleh al-Somali, al-Qaeda External Operations Chief and link between al-Qaeda in Af-Pak and abroad
100.	10-Dec-09	Ladha	6	0	0	
101.	17-Dec-09	Datta Khel	2	0	0	Zuhaib al-Zahibi, al-Qaeda Commander in North Waziristan
102.	17-Dec-09	Ambar Shaga	14	0	6	
103.	18-Dec-09	Babarak Ziarat	7	0	5	
104.	26-Dec-09	Saidgai	17	0	6	
105.	31-Dec-09	Machi Khel	5	1	2	
106.	1-Jan-10	Ghundikala	3	0	0	
107.	3-Jan-10	Mosakai	5	1	1	
108.	6-Jan-10	Sanzali	6	0	3	
109.	6-Jan-10	Sanzali	7	0	5	
110.	8-Jan-10	Tappi	5	1	4	
111.	9-Jan-10	Ismail Khel	5	0	0	
112.	9-Jan-10	Shaktoi	17	0	0	
113.	15-Jan-10	Shaktoi	8	0	0	
114.	15-Jan-10	Zanani	5	0	0	
115.	17-Jan-10	Shaktoi	20	0	0	
116.	19-Jan-10	Deegan	6	0	0	
117.	29-Jan-10	Mohammad Khel	12	0	0	
118.	2-Feb-10	Deegan	23	0	0	
119.	2-Feb-10	Pai Khel	9	0	5	
120.	14-Feb-10	Mir Ali	7	0	0	

121.	15-Feb-10	Tappi	5	0	0	Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, Leader of Turkastani Islamic Party linked with al-Qaeda
122.	17-Feb-10	Tabbi	4	0	0	Sheikh Mansoor, al-Qaeda Leader
123.	18-Feb-10	Danda Darpakhel	5	0	0	
124.	24-Feb-10	Darga Mandi	9	1	5	
125.	Feb-10	2 x Drone strike details not available				
126.	8-Mar-10	Miram Shah	9	0	0	Sadam Hussain al-Hussami, al-Qaeda Planner and Explosive Expert
127.	10-Mar-10	Mizar Madakhel	7	0	4	
128.	10-Mar-10	Mizar Madakhel	8	0	0	
129.	16-Mar-10	Datta Khel	11	0	2	
130.	17-Mar-10	Hamzoni	5	0	0	
131.	17-Mar-10	Mizar Madakhel	5	0	0	
132.	21-Mar-10	Inzar	7	0	0	
133.	23-Mar-10	Machis	6	0	0	
134.	27-Mar-10	Hurmuz	4	0	2	
135.	31-Mar-10	Tappi	6	1	5	
136.	12-Apr-10	Boya	13	0	11	
137.	14-Apr-10	Ambar Shaga	4	0	0	
138.	16-Apr-10	Toori Khel	4	0	0	
139.	24-Apr-10	Machi Khel	8	0	0	
140.	26-Apr-10	Khushali	7	0	0	
141.	3-May-10	Machi Khel	5	0	1	

142.	9-May-10	Datta Khel	10	0	4	
143.	11-May-10	Datta Khel	14	0	0	
144.	11-May-10	Gurwak	11	0	3	
145.	15-May-10	Khyber	10	0	2	
146.	21-May-10	Boya	11	4	2	Mustafa Abu al Yazid, al-Qaeda no-3
147.	28-May-10	Mizari Nari	10	0	0	
148.	10-Jun-10	Norak	7	0	4	
149.	11-Jun-10	Maizer	14	0	0	
150.	17-Jun-10	Haider Khel	17	0	0	
151.	26-Jun-10	Khushali	3	0	0	
152.	27-Jun-10	Tabbi	6	0	0	
153.	29-Jun-10	Kari Kot	9	0	0	
154.	15-Jul-10	Sheerani	12	0	6	
155.	24-Jul-10	Dwasarak	17	0	0	
156.	25-Jul-10	Sararogha	4	0	0	
157.	25-Jul-10	Shaktoi	14	0	0	
158.	25-Jul-10	Tabbi	6	0	0	
159.	14-Aug-10	Issori	14	0	7	Amir Moawia, Taliban Commander
160.	21-Aug-10	Qutab Khel	5	0	2	
161.	23-Aug-10	Danda Darpakhel	20	3	7	
162.	23-Aug-10	Darga Mandi	6	0	3	
163.	27-Aug-10	Shahidono	9	0	0	
164.	27-Aug-10	Taalloo Ganj	3	0	0	
165.	Aug-10	1 x Drone strike details not available				
166.	3-Sep-10	Datta Khel	3	0	0	

167.	3-Sep-10	Miram Shah	8	0	0	
168.	4-Sep-10	Datta Khel	8	0	0	
169.	6-Sep-10	Khar Qamar	6	0	0	
170.	8-Sep-10	Ambar Shaga	4	0	2	
171.	8-Sep-10	Danda Darpakhel	10	0	0	
172.	8-Sep-10	Danda Darpakhel	10	4	0	
173.	9-Sep-10	Miram Shah	6	0	0	
174.	12-Sep-10	Newey Adda	6	0	0	
175.	14-Sep-10	Bushanarai	12	0	0	
176.	14-Sep-10	Qutab Khel	4	0	0	
177.	15-Sep-10	Darga Mandi	14	0	5	
178.	15-Sep-10	Pai Khel	6	0	0	
179.	19-Sep-10	Deegan	7	0	5	
180.	20-Sep-10	Darazinda	6	0	2	
181.	21-Sep-10	Khand Morsak	8	0	0	
182.	21-Sep-10	Azam Warsak	16	0	0	
183.	25-Sep-10	Datta Khel	4	0	0	
184.	26-Sep-10	Miram Shah	4	0	3	
185.	26-Sep-10	sheerani	3	0	2	
186.	26-Sep-10	Lawra Mandi	4	0	0	Sheikh al Fateh, al- Qaeda Chief in Afghanistan and Pakistan
187.	27-Sep-10	Khushali	4	0	0	
188.	28-Sep-10	Zeba	4	0	0	
189.	2-Oct-10	Asar Village	10	0	0	
190.	2-Oct-10	Inzarkes	11	0	0	
191.	4-Oct-10	Mir Ali	7	0	2	
192.	6-Oct-10	Hurmuz	4	0	0	

193.	6-Oct-10	Miram Shah	6	0	0	
194.	7-Oct-10	khaisoori	4	0	0	
195.	8-Oct-10	Char Khel	7	0	2	
196.	8-Oct-10	Mohammad Khel	5	0	0	
197.	10-Oct-10	Shira	8	0	5	
198.	13-Oct-10	Datta Khel	13	0	3	
199.	15-Oct-10	Aziz Khel	5	0	0	
200.	15-Oct-10	Machi Khel	4	0	3	
201.	18-Oct-10	Datta Khel	7	1	0	
202.	27-Oct-10	Deegam	4	0	0	
203.	27-Oct-10	Mir Ali	5	0	0	
204.	28-Oct-10	Ismail Khel	7	0	0	
205.	1-Nov-10	Haider Khel	6	0	0	
206.	3-Nov-10	Khaso Khel	5	0	0	
207.	3-Nov-10	Qutab Khel	5	0	0	
208.	3-Nov-10	Pai Khel	5	0	0	
209.	7-Nov-10	Datta Khel	5	0	3	
210.	7-Nov-10	Ghulam Khan	9	0	0	
211.	11-Nov-10	Ghulam Khan	7	0	0	
212.	13-Nov-10	Miram Shah	4	0	2	
213.	16-Nov-10	Ghulam Khan	20	0	5	
214.	19-Nov-10	Norak	4	0	0	
215.	21-Nov-10	Khaddi	8	0	2	
216.	22-Nov-10	Khesoor	6	0	0	
217.	26-Nov-10	Pir Khel	4	0	2	
218.	28-Nov-10	Hassan Khel	2	0	0	
219.	6-Dec-10	khushali	5	0	2	
220.	6-Dec-10	Unknown	2	0	0	
221.	10-Dec-10	Khadar Khel	4	0	0	

222.	14-Dec-10	Saplaga	4	0	2	
223.	16-Dec-10	Tirah Valley	7	0	0	
224.	17-Dec-10	Nakal	13	0	0	Al Marjan, Local Lashker- e-Islam Commander
225.	17-Dec-10	Sandana	7	0	0	
226.	17-Dec-10	Speen Drang	32	0	2	
227.	27-Dec-10	Machi Khel	4	0	2	
228.	27-Dec-10	Shera Tala	20	0	0	
229.	28-Dec-10	Guhlam Khel	6	0	0	
230.	28-Dec-10	Guhlam Khel	9	0	2	
231.	28-Dec-10	Guhlam Khel	10	0	0	
232.	31-Dec-10	Guhlam Khel	6	0	0	
233.	1-Jan-11	Boya	4	0	0	
234.	1-Jan-11	Datta Khel	5	0	0	
235.	1-Jan-11	Mandal Khel	6	0	0	
236.	1-Jan-11	Mandal Khel	9	0	0	
237.	7-Jan-11	Ghar Laley	5	0	3	
238.	12-Jan-11	Haider Khel	4	0	0	
239.	18-Jan-11	Dashgah	5	0	0	
240.	23-Jan-11	Doga Mada Khel	5	0	0	
241.	23-Jan-11	Doga Mada Khel	3	0	0	
242.	23-Jan-11	Razmak	5	0	0	
243.	20-Feb-11	Azam Warsak	7	0	0	
244.	21-Feb-11	Malik Jashdar	9	0	6	
245.	24-Feb-11	Mohammad Khel	6	0	0	
256.	8-Mar-11	Landidog	5	0	3	
247.	9-Mar-11	Datta Khel	5	0	0	

248.	11-Mar-11	Ghoraski	4	0	0	
249.	11-Mar-11	Khesoor	9	0	5	
250.	13-Mar-11	Azam Warsak	2	0	0	
251.	13-Mar-11	Spalaga	7	0	0	
252.	14-Mar-11	Malik jashdar	5	0	0	
253.	16-Mar-11	Datta Khel	5	0	0	
254.	17-Mar-11	Datta Khel	34	0	34	
255.	13-Apr-11	Angor Adda	7	0	0	
256.	22-Apr-11	Spinwan	26	3	4	
257.	6-May-11	Dwa Tooe	17	0	6	
258.	10-May-11	Angor Adda	4	0	0	
259.	12-May-11	Datta Khel	8	0	0	
260.	13-May-11	Doga Manda Khel	4	0	0	
261.	16-May-11	Almarld	5	0	0	
262.	16-May-11	Sandasa Village	7	0	0	
263.	20-May-11	Tappi	5	0	0	
264.	23-May-11	Mir Ali	6	0	0	
265.	3-Jun-11	Gawa Khwa	10	0	0	Ilyas Kashmiri, senior al-Qaeda Commander in Pakistan
266.	6-Jun-11	Darnashtra	4	0	0	
267.	6-Jun-11	Shalam Razhzai	8	0	0	
268.	6-Jun-11	Wacja Dama	9	0	4	
269.	8-Jun-11	Shawal	4	0	0	
270.	8-Jun-11	Zoynari	21	0	0	
271.	15-Jun-11	Klana	7	0	0	

272.	15-Jun-11	Mir Ali	6	0	6	
273.	20-Jun-11	Khardand	7	0	5	
274.	20-Jun-11	Zarakai	4	0	0	
275.	27-Jun-11	Shahkai	18	0	10	
276.	27-Jun-11	Shawal	9	0	0	
277.	Jun-11	1 x Drone strike details not available				
278.	5-Jul-11	Mir Ali	5	0	0	
279.	11-Jul-11	Gurwak	9	0	3	
280.	12-Jul-11	Barmal	9	0	0	
281.	12-Jul-11	Datta Khel	14	0	4	
282.	12-Jul-11	Datta Khel	9	0	1	
283.	12-Jul-11	Gurwak	19	0	0	
284.	20-Jul-11	Mir Ali	4	0	0	
285.	1-Aug-11	Azam Warsak	5	0	3	
286.	2-Aug-11	Qutab Khel	4	0	0	
287.	10-Aug-11	Miram Shah	23	0	0	
288.	16-Aug-11	Miram Shah	6	1	3	
289.	19-Aug-11	Shln Warsak	4	0	0	
290.	22-Aug-11	Norak	6	0	2	Atiyah Abd ur Rehman, al-Qaeda number 2
291.	11-Sep-11	Hisokhel	5	0	0	Abu Hafs al Shahri, al-Qaeda's Chief of Operations in Pakistan
292.	23-Sep-11	Khushall	6	0	0	
293.	27-Sep-11	Azam Warsak	2	0	0	
294.	30-Sep-11	Baghar	4	0	0	Aleemullah, Senior Taliban Commander

295.	13-Oct-11	Danda Darpakhel	5	0	0	
296.	13-Oct-11	Zeba Pahar	5	0	0	Janbaz Zadran, Third in Command Haqqani Network
297.	14-Oct-11	Danda Darpakhel	6	0	0	
298.	15-Oct-11	Angor Adda	5	0	0	
299.	26-Oct-11	Bobar	18	0	0	Taj Gul Mehsud, Taliban Commander
300.	27-Oct-11	Azam Warsak	5	0	0	Muhammad Khan, Hazrat Umer (Both Molvi Nazir's Younger brothers), Miraj Wazir, Ashfaq Wazir, All four were Taliban Commanders
301.	27-Oct-11	Hisokhel	5	0	0	
302.	30-Oct-11	Datta Khel	5	0	4	
303.	31-Oct-11	Norak	3	0	2	
304.	3-Nov-11	Danda Darpakhel	3	0	0	
305.	15-Nov-11	Miran Shah	7	0	0	
306.	16-Nov-11	Babar Ghar	19	0	0	
307.	17-Nov-11	Shawal	8	0	0	
308.	10-Jan-12	Miranshah	3	0	0	Aslam Awan, Senior Operation Organizer for al-Qaeda from Abbottabad
309.	12-Jan-12	Datta Khel	7	0	0	
310.	23-Jan	Deegan	5	0	0	


311.	9-Feb-12	Miranshah	7	0	2	Badar Mansoor, al-Qaeda senior leader in Taliban
312.	8-Feb-12	Miran Shah	10	0	0	
313.	16-Feb-12	Mir Ali	13	0	0	
314.	16-Feb-12	Miranshah	6	0	0	
315.	13-Mar-12	Dray Nishter	7	0	0	Amir Hamza Toji Khel & Mullah Shamsullah, Both Senior Taliban Commanders associated with Molvi Nazir
316.	9-Mar-12	Shaktoi Mandao	12	0	0	
317.	13-Mar-12	Shaawa	7	0	0	
318.	30-Mar-12	Miranshah	4	0	0	
319.	1-Apr-12	Miranshah	5	0	0	
320.	5-May-12	Shawal	9	0	5	
321.	24-May-12	Khassokhel	11	0	6	
322.	23-May-12	Datta Khel Kalai	5	0	0	
323.	26-May-12	Miranshah	4	0	0	
324.	28-May-12	Khassokhel	8	0	0	
325.	28-May-12	Mir Ali	4	0	0	
326.	4-Jun-12	Hesokhel	10	0	0	Abu Yahya al- libi, al-Qaeda Second in Command
327.	2-Jun-12	Khawashi Khel	3	0	1	
328.	3-Jun-12	Mana Ragzai	9	0	0	
329.	13-Jun-12	Isha	4	0	0	

330.	14-Jun-12	Miranshah	4	0	0	
331.	26-Jun-12	Shawal	5	0	0	
332.	6-Jul-12	Datta Khel	21	0	2	
333.	1-Jul-12	Dre Nishter/ Shawal	7	0	0	
334.	23-Jul-12	Dre Nishter/ Shawal	13	0	0	
335.	29-Jul-12	Kushhali Turkhel	6	0	0	
336.	21-Aug-12	Shankhura, Datta Khel	15	1	0	
337.	18-Aug-12	Mammon Narai, Shuweda	9	0	3	
338.	24-Aug-12	Makai / Maki Ghar Shawal	16	0	0	Badruddin Haqqani, Third in Command Haqqani Network / Commander Military Operations
339.	19-Aug-12	Mana, Shawal	6	0	0	
340.	19-Aug-12	Mana, Shawal	3	0	0	
341.	Aug-12	2 drone strikes details not available				
342.	1-Sep-12	Degan	5	0	0	
343.	21-Sep-12	Mohammad Khel/ Datta Khel	4	0	0	
344.	24-Sep-12	Khader Kail/ Mir Ali	7	0	0	
345.	24-Oct-12	Miranshah	3	0	1	
346.	1-Oct-12	Khadar Khel	3	0	0	

347.	10-Oct-12	Hurmuz/ Mir Ali	6	0	0	
348.	11-Oct-12	Buland Khel	21	0	0	
349.	29-Nov-12	Shin Warsak	3	0	0	
350.	9-Dec-12	Tabbi	4	0	2	
351.	1-Dec-12	Shin Warsak	4	0	0	
352.	6-Dec-12	Mubarak Shahi	8	0	1	
353.	21-Dec-12	Hasso Khel	5	0	0	
354.	29-Dec-12	Gurbaz	5	0	0	
355.	8-Jan-13	Haider Khel	7	1	0	
356.	2-Jan-13	Angor Adda	9	0	0	Maulvi Nazir Wazir, Amir TTP South Waziristan Chapter
357.	3-Jan-13	Mir Ali	5	0	0	Shah Faisal, Militant Commander TTP
358.	6-Jan-13	Babar Ghar	13	0	0	Wali Mohammad Toofan, Head TTP Suicide Wing
359.	8-Jan-13	Hassokhel	3	0	0	
360.	10-Jan-13	Hassokhel	5	0	0	
361.	6-Feb-13	Spin Warm	4	0	1	
362.	8-Feb-13	Babar Ghar	8	0	0	
363.	10-Mar-13	Datta Khel	2	0	0	
364.	22-Mar-13	Datta Khel	3	0	0	
365.	14-Apr-13	Datta Khel	5	0	0	
366.	17-Apr-13	Sararogha	5	0	0	
367.	29-May- 13	Chashma Vill or Miranshah	6	0	0	Waliur Rehman, Second in Command TTP


368.	7-Jun-13	Shawal, North Waziristan	6	0	0	Mutaqi alias Bahadar Khan, Pakistani Taliban commander
Total			370	175	535	


ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS (RCs)






PAK-AFGHAN BORDER






CROSS BORDER ATTACKS INTO PAKISTAN



WHERE WE ARE - JANUARY 12



RISK ASSESSMENT – 2011

